KAMLESHWAR PRASADversusPRADUMANJU AGARWAL (DEAD) BY LRS.

A                     KAMLESHWAR PRASAD
                              v.
                PRADUMANJU AGARWAL (DEAD) BY LRS.

                                  APRIL 2, 1997

B              [K. RAMASWAMY AND G.B. PATTANAIK, J.T.]

            Tenancy Law: U.P. Act XIII of 1972-Sec. 21 ( 1) (a~Bona fide use
    requirement-Landlord requiling the premises for his own bona fide use-Ap-
    pellate auth01ity satisfied with the bona fide requirement-Landlord dying
C   dwing the pendency of the w1it petition in the High Court-High Cowt holding
    that the decree of the appellate autholity has become final and cannot be
    disturbed-On appeal held bona fide use would not lapse with the death of
    the landlord as such a need must exist on the date of application for eviction
    which is the cmcial date.

D         Constitution of India, 1950 : Articles 226, 227-Decree passed by the
    competent auth01ity having become final-!11te1ference by the High Court
    taking into account subsequent event-Not pennissible.

          Respondent-landlord filed a petition for eviction of the appellant
E   under sec 21 (1) (a) of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972 inter alia on the ground
    that he bona fide required the premises for carrying on his own business
    and he had no other means of livelihood. Appellant filed objections before
    the prescribed authority which, on consideration of the materials on
    record, came to the conclusion that the landlord did not require the
    premises for his own bona fide use. On appeal the appellate authority
F   reversed the conclusion of the prescribed authority and directed the evic-
    tion of the appellant.

           Appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court. During the penden-
    cy of the petition, the landlord died and was substituted by his legal heirs.
    Appellant contended that the landlord having died the bona fide require-
                                                                                     [
G   ment no longer survived and therefore taking into consideration the
    subsequent event the court must quash the order of the appellate
    authority. On behalf of the landlord it was contended that the order of the
    appellate authority was a decree which had become final and it would not
    be appropriate to interfere with the decree under Article 226 of the Con-
H   stitution. It was also contended that the requirement in question must exist
                                         508
        KAMLESHWAR PRASAD v. P. AGARWAL [PATTANAIK, .I.]                  509

on the day the application for eviction was filed and it was no longer open      A
to the High Court to interfere with the said finding in exercise of its
supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226. The High Court held that the
decree for eviction had become final and that finality could not be dis-
turbed under Article 226. Hence this appeal.

        Dismissing the appeal, this Court                                        B

       HELD :l. Under the U.P. Act XIII of 1972 the order of the appellate
authority is final and the said order is a decree of a competent court which
having become final cannot be interfered with the High Court in exercise
of its power of superintendence under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitu-      C
tion by taking into account any subsequent event which might have hap·
pened. [511-F]

      2.1. The landlord needed the premises for starting the business
which had been found by the appellate authority. The day of application
for eviction is the crucial date on which the tenant incurred the liability of   D
being evicted from the premises. [511-G]

      2.2. The bona fide need cannot be said to have lapsed with the death
of the landlord as the business in question can be carried on by his legal
heirs. [511-H]
                                                                                 E
        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2576 of
1997.

     From the Judgment and order dated 17.2.97 of the Allahabad High
Court in C.M.W.P. No. 13903 of 1991.
                                                                                 F
        Manoj Swamp and Ms. Lalitha Kohli for the Appellant.

        Ms. Halida Khatoon for the Respondents.

        The Judgment of the court was delivered by

        PATTANAIK, J. Leave granted.
                                                                                 G

       This appeal by special leave to appeal is directed against the judg-
ment dated 17.2.1997 of the Allahabad High Court dismissing the writ
petition filed by the appellant. The respondent-landlord filed a petition for
eviction of the appellant under Section 21(1) (a) of the U.P. Act XIII of        H
    510                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  (1997) 3 S.C.R.

A 1972 inter alia on the ground that he bona fide requires the premises for
   carrying on his own business and he has no other means of livelihood. The
   tenant- appellant filed objections before the prescrihed authority stating
   therein that the application for eviction has been filed on false and baseless
   allegations and in fact the respondent does not need the premises bona
B fide for starting his own business. The prescribed authority on considera-
   tion of he materials on record came to the conclusion that the landlord
   docs not require the premises for his own use bona fide. The said
   prescribed authority also came to the conclusion that the tenant would be
   comparatively harassed if an order of eviction is passed. With these con-
C clusions, the application for eviction having been rejected, the landlord
   preferred an appeal. The appellate authority re-appreciated the entire
   evidence on record and reversed the conclusion of the prescribed
   authority. The said appellate authority came to the conclusion that in the
   facts and circumstances of the case the requirement of the landlord to start
D a cloth business must be a bona fide requirement entitling him to get an
   order of eviction under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act. The appellate
   authority, therefore, set aside the order of the prescribed authority and
   directed eviction of the appellant. Being aggrieved by the order of the
   appellate authority, the tenant carried the matter to the High Court by
   filing a writ petition. During the pendency of the writ petition in the High
E Court the landlord died and was substituted by his legal heirs namely his
   widow, two sons and the married daughter. On behalf of the tenant, it was
   urged before the High Court that the landlord having died, the bona fide
   requirement which was found to have existed by the appellate authority no
   more survives, and therefore, taking into consideration the subsequent
F event the High Court must quash the order of eviction passed by the
   appellate authority. On behalf of the landlord it was contended that the
   order of the appellate authority in the eviction proceedings, is a decree and
  •that decree having become final, in a proceeding under Article 226 of the
   Constitution, the High Court will not be entitled to take into consideration
G any subsequent event that had occurred and on that score it would not be
   appropriate for the High Court to interfere with the decree passed by the
   appellate authority. It was also contended that the requirement in question
   must exist on the day the application for eviction was filed and the same
   requirement having been found to be established by the competent forum
H who was required to go into the said question, it is no longer open to the
            KAMLESH\VARPRASADv. P.AGARWAL[PATIANAfK,J.J                       511

      High Court to interfere with the said finding in exercise of its supervisory   A
    . jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The High Court by the
      impugned judgment came to the conclusion that the decree fur eviction has
      become final and the said tinality cannot be disturbed on the applicatiun
       under Article 226 of the Constitution by taking into account the facts that
      the original landlord died during the pendency of the writ petition.           B

            Mr. :V1anoj Swarup, learned counsd appearing for the appellant in
     this Court urg.:d that the person for whos.: bona fide n;quircment the order
     of eviction has been passed by the appdlate authority having died during
     the pendency of the writ petition, the said bona fide requirement no longer
     subsists and consequently the High Court should have taken that fact into C


-    consideration and should have interfered with the order passed by the
     appellate authority for the eviction of the tenant. The learned counsel
     further urged that no doubt the proceedings under Article 226 of the
     Constitution is not a continuation of the eviction proceedings under the
     Act, but all the same the High Court while exercising its power of super- D
     vision under Article 226 of the Constitution is not denuded of its power to
     take into consideration the subsequent event that had happened which is
     necessary to be taken into consideration in the interest of justice. Accord-
     ingly, the High Court committed serious error in not taking into account
     the facts of the death of the landlord for whose bona fide requirement the
     order of eviction had been passed by the appellate authority, and therefore, E
     this Court should interfere with the said order of the High Court. Having
     given an anxious considcT<ttion to the contention raised by the learned
     counsel for the appellant and under the facts and circumstances of this
     case we arc of the considered opinion that this case docs not warrant
     interference by this Court unJer Article 136 of the Constitution. Under the
     Act the order of the appellate a·rthority is final and the said order is a F
     decree of the civil court and decree of a competent Court having become
     fiUdl cannot he intertcred with by the High Court in exerci:,e of its power
     of superintendence under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution by
     taking into account any subsequ,;nt event which might have happ"ned. That
     apart, the fact that tht: landlord needcJ the premises in q ucstion for G
     starting a business which fact has been found by the appellate authority, in
     eye of law, it must be that on the day of application for eviction which is
     the crucial date, the tenant incurred the liability of being evicted from the
     premises. Even if the landlord died during the pcndcncy of the writ petition
     in the High Court the bona fide need cannot be said to have lapsed as thl'
     business in question can be carried on by his widow or any elder son. In H
    512                 SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [1997) 3 S.C.R.

A this view of the matter, we find no force in the contention of Mr. Manoj
    Swamp, learned counsel appearing for the appellant and we do not find
    any error in the impugned judgment of the High Court warranting inter-
                                                                               r
    ference by this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. The appeal,
    accordingly, fails and is dismissed but in the circumstances without any
    order as to costs.
B
    J.N.S.                                                Appeal dismissed.




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