Holding

The Supreme Court held that no prima facie case existed because the prosecution’s expenditure calculations were materially flawed, and therefore the appellant must be discharged under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C.

Summary

Kanchan Kumar, a former Assistant General Manager of the Bihar State Financial Corporation, was charged under Sections 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 for allegedly possessing assets disproportionate to his known income during the period 1974‑1988. The charge‑sheet claimed an income of Rs. 3,01,561 and an expenditure of Rs. 5,24,386, suggesting a disproportionate accumulation of Rs. 2,22,825, but the appellant contended that the calculations were erroneous. He filed a discharge application under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which was summarily dismissed by the Special Judge and upheld by the High Court on the ground that a roving enquiry was not permissible at the discharge stage. The Supreme Court held that the appropriate test for discharge is whether a prima facie case exists, requiring the court to sift the material and consider broad probabilities, and found three specific errors in the prosecution's expenditure figures, reducing the alleged expenditure to Rs. 2,69,355, which was less than the income. Consequently, no prima facie case was made out and the continuation of prosecution was deemed unjust given the delay and the appellant’s age. The Court allowed the appeal and discharged the appellant.

Issues considered

Whether the appellant is entitled to discharge under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. on the ground that the prosecution failed to establish a prima facie case of disproportionate assets.
Whether the court may examine and correct the expenditure calculations in the charge‑sheet at the discharge stage.
Whether the inclusion of certain expenditure items (bank balance, loan repayment, and value of articles seized after the check period) is permissible for determining disproportionate assets.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 227, s. 228
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988s. 13(1)(d), s. 13(2)

Subjects

discharge under Cr.P.C. s.227prima facie caseprevention of corruptiondisproportionate assetscalculation errorsroving enquirydelay in prosecutionunjust prosecution

Judgment

188 [2022]REPORTS
SUPREME COURT 16 S.C.R. 188 [2022] 16 S.C.R.

A KANCHAN KUMAR
v.
THE STATE OF BIHAR
(Criminal Appeal No. 1562 of 2022)
B SEPTEMBER 14, 2022
[B. R. GAVAI AND PAMIDIGHANTAM
SRI NARASIMHA, JJ.]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss.227, 228 –
Discharge application – Requirement of prime facie case for
C
framing of charges – FIR filed against appellant under ss.13(1)(d)
and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, alleging
that he possessed assets disproportionate to his known source
of income – Charge-sheet filed against him indicated that he
earned a total income of Rs. 3,01,561 and incurred an expenditure
D of Rs. 5,24,386 during the check period – Thus, charge was of
having amassed Rs. 2,22,825, disproportionate to his known sources
of income – Appellant filed discharge application before the Special
Judge alleging that there were glaring errors in the calculation –
Application was summarily dismissed – High Court dismissed the
revision application while observing that the contention raised by
E
the appellant needed proper verification attracting roving enquiry
which could be permissible only during course of trial – On appeal,
held: The threshold of scrutiny required to adjudicate a discharge
application under s.227 is to consider the broad probabilities of
the case and the total effect of the material on record, including
F examination of any infirmities appearing in the case – Expenditure
amount of Rs. 5,24,386 as alleged in the charge-sheet is based on
certain mistakes – Total expenditure was only Rs. 2,69,355 and not
Rs. 5,24,386 – It was this expenditure of Rs. 2,69,355 which was
contrasted with the income of Rs. 3,01,561 during the check period
– This simple and necessary inquiry for a proper adjudication of
G
an application for discharge clearly demonstrated that there was
no prima facie case made out by the prosecution in the case –
Moreover, considering the delay involved in the case, the
continuation of prosecution would also be unjust.

H
188
KANCHAN KUMAR v. THE STATE OF BIHAR 189

Allowing the appeal, the Court A
HELD : 1. The threshold of scrutiny required to adjudicate
an application under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C., is to consider
the broad probabilities of the case and the total effect of the
material on record, including examination of any infirmities
appearing in the case. [Para 13][195-B-C] B
2.1 It is appropriate and in fact sufficient to confine inquiry
to three heads of expenditure indicated in the chargesheet itself.
This limited inquiry will also satisfy the requirements of Section
227 of the Cr.P.C. [ Para 16.1][197-D-E]
2.2 The first objection pertains to the inclusion an amount C
of Rs. 55,000, recorded as the balance amount in the Appellant’s
bank account during the check period, and accordingly counted
as expenditure in the charge sheet. However, the Bank Passbook
filed by the Appellant, which was available to the Investigation
Officer and the Special Judge (Vigilance), evidently records a D
balance amount of only Rs. 11,998 during the checkperiod. The
difference in the figures was not explained by the Prosecution.
Accordingly, the Special Judge (Vigilance) and the High Court
failed to reconcile such a simple and straightforward inconsistency
in the Prosecution’s evidence. [Para 16.2][197-E-G]
E
2.3 The second objection relates to the inclusion of an
amount of Rs. 53,467 as expenditure towards repayment of the
loan from the BSFC. However, the amount repaid towards loan
instalments was already deducted from Appellant’s gross salary,
and the deducted figure was recorded as the total disposable
income with the Appellant during the check period. Hence, the F
loan repayment cannot be separately counted as an expenditure
yet again. This is a glaring mistake. [Para 16.3][197-H; 198-A-B]
2.4 The third objection relates to the inclusion of
Rs. 1,58,562 as the value of the articles found during a search
conducted in Appellant’s house on 21.02.2000, twelve years after G
the check period of 1974 to 1988. There is nothing to indicate,
even prima facie, that these articles found during the search in

H
190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 16 S.C.R.

A the year 2000 were acquired during the check period. In the
absence of any material to link these articles as having been
acquired during the check period, it is impermissible to include
their value in the expenditure. Appellant’s objection about
inclusion of this amount in the list of expenditure is fully justified
[Para 16.4][198-B-D]
B
3. The three heads of expenditure must be excluded from
Appellant’s total alleged expenditure during the check period.
Accordingly, the total expenditure comes only to Rs. 2,69,355,
and not Rs. 5,24,386, which is based on certain mistakes. It is
this expenditure of Rs. 2,69,355 which is to be contrasted with
C the income of Rs. 3,01,561 during the checkperiod. These facts
clearly demonstrate that there is no prima facie case made out
by the prosecution and therefore the Appellant was entitled to
be discharged. [Para 17][1968-E-F]
4. The allegation relating to Appellant’s disproportionate
D income in the period between 1974 and 1988 was levelled in an
FIR filed twelve years after the said period concluded. The
chargesheet came to be filed seven years after the registration
of the FIR. The application for discharge came to be dismissed
on 28.03.2016, almost after a decade of filing of the charge sheet.
E The dismissal was affirmed by the High Court seven months
thereafter, i.e., on 05.10.2016. Finally, and most unfortunately,
the present SLP has been pending before this Court for the last
six years. In the meanwhile, the Appellant superannuated from
service in 2010, but had no option except to contest the case. He
is now 72 years. Continuation of the prosecution, apart from the
F illegality would also be unjust. [Para 19][198-G-H; 199-A-B]
Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal and Anr. (1979)
3 SCC 4 : [1979] 2 SCR 229; Sajjan Kumar v. Central
Bureau of Investigation (2010) 9 SCC 368 : [2010] 11
SCR 669; Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel v. State of
G Gujarat (2019) 16 SCC 547 : [2019] 6 SCR 701 –
relied on.
Ghulam Hassan Beigh v. Mohammad Maqbool Magrey
2022 SCC OnLine SC 913 – referred to.

H
KANCHAN KUMAR v. THE STATE OF BIHAR 191

Case Law Reference A
[1979] 2 SCR 229 relied on Para 13
[2010] 11 SCR 669 relied on Para 14
[2019] 6 SCR 701 relied on Para 15
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. B
1562 of 2022.
From the Judgment and Order dated 05.10.2016 of the High Court
of Judicature at Patna in Crl. Misc. No. 23031 of 2016.
Sunil Kumar, Sr. Adv., Himanshu Shekhar, Parth Shekhar, Awanish
C
Sinha, Advs. for the Appellant.
Abhinav Mukerji, Adv. for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA J.
D
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal is against the concurrent dismissals by the Trial1
and the High Court2 of the application for discharge filed by the Appellant
under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19733.
3. Facts leading to the filing of this Appeal: The Appellant E
joined the Bihar State Financial Corporation4 in the capacity of an
Assistant General Manager on 19.07.1974. After a period of thirteen
years, in 1987, a complaint came to be filed against the Appellant for
having allegedly purchased three houses and two pieces of land in Bihar,
which according to the complainant, was disproportionate to Appellant’s F
known sources of income. This complaint was inquired into, and after a
detailed investigation, the allegations were found to be false. Except for
a residential house in Patna, which the Appellant had purchased on
29.08.1988 for Rs. 2,26,500 with the help of a loan from the BSFC, no
other assets could be traced to the ownership of the Appellant. However,
despite finding no merit in the allegation, the investigation was kept G
pending.
1
Special Judge (Vigilance), Patna, in Special Case No. 9 of 2000 dated 28.03.2016.
2
High Court of Judicature at Patna, in Criminal Miscellaneous No. 23031 of 2016 dated
05.10.2016.
3
hereinafter referred to as the ‘Cr.P.C.’
4
hereinafter referred to as ‘the BSFC’. H
192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 16 S.C.R.

A 4. In the meanwhile, life moved on and in 1996, the Appellant
joined the Oil and Natural Gas Commission5 as Deputy General Manager
on deputation, keeping his lien with the BSFC. Four years after joining
ONGC, an FIR came to be registered against him on 21.02.2000, under
Sections 13(l)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 6,
on the same allegation that he possessed assets disproportionate to his
B
known sources of income. These alleged assets were purportedly
acquired during his tenure with the BSFC, and consequently, the check
period in the FIR was considered from the date he joined BSFC, i.e.,
19.07.1974 to the date of registration of the residential house purchased
by him, i.e., 29.08.1988. The Appellant wrote a letter to the Director
C General of Police (Vigilance), Patna, on 18.04.2002, raising a grievance
that the calculations in the FIR undervalued his income and overvalued
his assets, thus depicting a false and inflated account of his expenditure.
5. Eventually a charge sheet came to be filed on 11.09.2007, i.e.,
about seven years after the registration of the FIR, and in fact, twenty
D years after the complaint on this very allegation was found to be false by
the authorities. Be that as it may, the charge-sheet filed against the
Appellant indicated that he earned a total income of Rs. 3,01,561 and
incurred an expenditure of Rs. 5,24,386 during the check period. In view
of this, the charge against the Appellant was of having amassed
Rs. 2,22,825, disproportionate to his known sources of income. The
E charge-sheet indicated two components of his income, being - i) savings
of Rs. 1,13,081 (1/3rd of his salary), and ii) home and car loan from
BSFC worth Rs. 1,88,480. On the other hand, the charge sheet included
six components of his expenditure, being – i) payment of Rs. 2,26,500
towards the construction of his house, ii) general expenditure during the
F check period of Rs. 24,800, iii) amount in bank deposit worth Rs. 55,000,
iv) loan repayment of Rs. 53,467, v) LIC deposit worth Rs. 6,057, and
vi) estimated value of articles found during a search conducted on
21.02.2000, as being Rs. 1,58,562.
6. At the relevant stage, the Appellant applied for discharge under
G “Section 239” of the Cr.P.C (which should have been under Section
2277) before the Court of Special Judge (Vigilance), Patna, alleging that
5
hereinafter referred to as ‘the ONGC’.
6
hereinafter referred to as the ‘PC Act’.
7
Though the Appellant stated that the application is under Section 239 of the Cr.P.C.,
as Special Judges appointed under the PC Act are deemed to be Court of Session, the
H
KANCHAN KUMAR v. THE STATE OF BIHAR 193
[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA J.]

there were glaring errors in the calculation. However, the Court summarily A
dismissed the application by its order dated 28.03.2016, without analysing
or examining the documents produced and the arguments advanced.
The Court held that:
“Perused the record and I find that there is sufficient
materials against accused in this case at least prima facie at B
this stage to frame charge against the accused against whom
there is allegation that he during the check period amassed.
Although certain explanations have been advanced by the
learned counsel for the petitioner but the same appears to be
looked into and appreciated during the course of trial when
the accused petitioner wife have a chance to prevents C
innocence producing his oral or documentary evidences. For
the present I am not satisfied with the explanation so produced
by the accused in his favour in support of his discharge
application.
Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances the D
charge petition of the accused petitioner namely Kanchan
Kumar is hereby rejected. Put up on 22.04.2016 for framing
of charge. The accused is directed to remaining physically
present on the date so fixed by this court for framing of
charge.” E
7. Aggrieved by the dismissal of his application for discharge, the
Appellant moved the High Court. After recounting the chronology of
events, the High Court proceeded to quote judgment after judgment, and
finally dismissed the revision application by merely holding that:
“15. In the aforesaid circumstances, even if considering the F
submissions made on behalf of petitioner, for argument’s sake
needs proper verification attracting roving enquiry which
could be permissible only during course of trial.
16. Much emphasis has been laid at the end of the petitioner
relating to valuation. With the cost of repetition, the contention G
of the petitioner is that as the raid was conducted on
21.02.2000, on account thereof, the valuation having been

discharge application should have been filed under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C., and not
under Section 239 therein. The Ld counsel for the Appellant Shri Sunil Kumar, Senior
Advocate clarified this position of law while making his submissions. H
194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 16 S.C.R.

A shown against the article so seized at the end of the Vigilance
must be considered to be in consonance with the date of
recovery. That argument happens to be fallacious in the
background of the fact that from the case diary, it is evident
that valuation has been estimated only. There happens to be
complete absence of prima facie material whereupon one
B
could infer that the value so affixed at that very moment was
prevailing rate on the alleged date of seizure. Furthermore,
to ascertain genuineness on this score will again attract roving
enquiry which for the present stage is found forbidden.
17. Consequent thereupon, the instant petition is found devoid
C of merit and is, accordingly, rejected.”
8. It is against the aforesaid order that the Appellant has
approached this Court.
9. Submissions of parties: The Ld. Senior Counsel Shri Sunil
D Kumar has submitted that the basic objection relating to the calculation
and wrongful inclusion of certain items was sufficient for the Trial Court
to discharge the Appellant. In a simple and straight forward submission,
he took us through certain glaring errors that were evident from the
record of the case before the Special Judge (Vigilance). In support of
his submissions, he also referred to the decisions of this Court in Union
E of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal and Anr. 8 and Ghulam Hassan
Beigh v. Mohammad Maqbool Magrey9.
10. The counsel for the Respondent Shri Abhinav Mukerji AOR,
has contended that the Trial Court was right in dismissing the discharge
application. He submitted that the Courts could not have conducted a
F roving inquiry while adjudicating an application under Section 239 of the
Cr.P.C.
11. Issue: The short question arising for consideration is whether
the Appellant is entitled to be discharged of the proceedings initiated
against him under the PC Act.
G
12. Legal provision and precedents: Section 227 of the Cr.P.C
relating to discharge is as under:

8
(1979) 3 SCC 4.
9
H 2022 SCC OnLine SC 913.
KANCHAN KUMAR v. THE STATE OF BIHAR 195
[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA J.]

“227. Discharge — If, upon consideration of the record of A
the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after
hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution
in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient
ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge
the accused and record his reasons for so doing.”
B
13. The threshold of scrutiny required to adjudicate an application
under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C., is to consider the broad probabilities of
the case and the total effect of the material on record, including
examination of any infirmities appearing in the case. In Prafulla Kumar
Samal (supra), it was noted that:
C
“10. Thus, on a consideration of the authorities mentioned
above, the following principles emerge:
(1) That the Judge while considering the question of
framing the charges under Section 227 of the Code has
the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for D
the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima
facie case against the accused has been made out.
(2) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose
grave suspicion against the accused which has not been
properly explained the Court will be fully justified in E
framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.
(3) The test to determine a prima facie case would naturally
depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay
down a rule of universal application. By and large however
if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied F
that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to
some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused,
he will be fully within his right to discharge the accused.
(4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under Section 227
of the Code the Judge which under the present Code is a
G
senior and experienced court cannot act merely as a Post
Office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to
consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect
of the evidence and the documents produced before the
Court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so
on. This however does not mean that the Judge should H
196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 16 S.C.R.

A make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter
and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.”
(emphasis supplied)
14. In Sajjan Kumar v. Central Bureau of Investigation10, the
Court cautioned against accepting every document produced by the
B prosecution on face value, and noted that it was important to sift the
evidence produced before the Court. It observed that:
“21. On consideration of the authorities about the scope of
Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles
emerge:
C
...
(v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value
of the material on record cannot be gone into but before
framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on
D the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the
commission of offence by the accused was possible.
(vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is required
to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view
to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face
value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting
E
the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence
as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all
that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed
to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case...”
(emphasis supplied)
F
15. Summarising the principles on discharge under Section 227 of
the Cr.P.C, in Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel v. State of Gujarat,11
this Court recapitulated:
“23. At the stage of framing the charge in accordance with
the principles which have been laid down by this Court, what
G the court is expected to do is, it does not act as a mere post
office. The court must indeed sift the material before it. The
material to be sifted would be the material which is produced

10
(2010) 9 SCC 368.
11
H (2019) 16 SCC 547.
KANCHAN KUMAR v. THE STATE OF BIHAR 197
[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA J.]

and relied upon by the prosecution. The sifting is not to be A
meticulous in the sense that the court dons the mantle of the
trial Judge hearing arguments after the entire evidence has
been adduced after a full-fledged trial and the question is
not whether the prosecution has made out the case for the
conviction of the accused. All that is required is, the court
B
must be satisfied that with the materials available, a case is
made out for the accused to stand trial. A strong suspicion
suffices. However, a strong suspicion must be founded on some
material. The material must be such as can be translated into
evidence at the stage of trial. The strong suspicion cannot be
the pure subjective satisfaction based on the moral notions C
of the Judge that here is a case where it is possible that the
accused has committed the offence. Strong suspicion must be
the suspicion which is premised on some material which
commends itself to the court as sufficient to entertain the prima
facie view that the accused has committed the offence.”
D
(emphasis supplied)
16.1 Analysis: Without getting into too many details, we consider
it to be appropriate and in fact sufficient to confine our inquiry to three
heads of expenditure indicated in the charge-sheet itself. This limited
inquiry will also satisfy the requirements of Section 227 of the Cr.P.C.
E
16.2 The first objection pertains to the inclusion an amount of Rs.
55,000, recorded as the balance amount in the Appellant’s bank account
during the check period, and accordingly counted as an expenditure in
the charge sheet. However, the Bank Passbook filed by the Appellant,
which was available to the Investigation Officer and the Special Judge
(Vigilance), evidently records a balance amount of only Rs. 11,998 during F
the check-period. The difference in the figures was not explained by the
Prosecution. Accordingly, the Special Judge (Vigilance) and the High
Court failed to reconcile such a simple and straightforward inconsistency
in the Prosecution’s evidence. We are of the opinion that only an amount
of Rs. 11,998, recorded in the Appellant’s Bank Passbook during the G
check-period as the balance amount, is validly admissible as expenditure
under this head.
16.3 The second objection relates to the inclusion of an amount
of Rs. 53,467 as expenditure towards repayment of the loan from the
BSFC. However, the amount repaid towards loan instalments was already H
198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 16 S.C.R.

A deducted from Appellant’s gross salary, and the deducted figure was
recorded as the total disposable income with the Appellant during the
check period. Hence, the loan repayment cannot be separately counted
as an expenditure yet again. This is a glaring mistake. The Special Judge
(Vigilance) as well as the High Court did not consider this objection on
the ground that a roving inquiry is not permissible the stage of discharge.
B
16.4 The third objection relates to the inclusion of Rs. 1,58,562 as
the value of the articles found during a search conducted in Appellant’s
house on 21.02.2000, twelve years after the check period of 1974 to
1988. There is nothing to indicate, even prima facie, that these articles
found during the search in the year 2000 were acquired during the check
C period. In the absence of any material to link these articles as having
been acquired during the check period, it is impermissible to include their
value in the expenditure. We are therefore of the opinion that the
Appellant’s objection about inclusion of this amount in the list of
expenditure is fully justified. Unfortunately, even this objection, which
D did not require much scrutiny of the material on record, was not considered
by the Special Judge (Vigilance) or the High Court.
17. The three heads of expenditure discussed hereinabove must
be excluded from Appellant’s total alleged expenditure during the check
period. First, the Appellant’s actual balance amount reflected in the Bank
E Passbook, i.e., Rs. 11,998, as against the purported account balance of
Rs. 55,000, must be taken into account. Further, the second and third
amounts, as indicated above, must be excluded from Appellant’s total
expenditure mentioned in the charge-sheet. Accordingly, the total
expenditure comes only to Rs. 2,69,355, and not Rs. 5,24,386, which is
based on certain mistakes that we have indicated hereinabove. It is this
F expenditure of Rs. 2,69,355 which is to be contrasted with the income of
Rs. 3,01,561 during the check-period. These facts clearly demonstrate
that there is no prima facie case made out by the prosecution and
therefore the Appellant was entitled to be discharged.
18. The conclusions that we have drawn are based on materials
G placed before us, which are part of the case record. This is the same
record that was available with the Special Judge (Vigilance) when the
application under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. was taken up. Despite that,
the Special Judge (Vigilance) dismissed the discharge application on the
simple ground that a roving inquiry is not permitted at the stage of
H discharge. What we have undertaken is not a roving inquiry, but a simple
KANCHAN KUMAR v. THE STATE OF BIHAR 199
[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA J.]

and necessary inquiry for a proper adjudication of an application for A
discharge. The Special Judge (Vigilance) was bound to conduct a similar
inquiry for coming to a conclusion that a prima facie case is made out
for the Appellant to stand trial. Unfortunately, the High Court committed
the same mistake as that of the Special Judge (Vigilance).
19. Apart from the above analysis, we would note with great B
distress that the allegation relating to Appellant’s disproportionate income
in the period between 1974 and 1988 was levelled in an FIR filed twelve
years after the said period concluded. The charge-sheet came to be
filed seven years after the registration of the FIR. The application for
discharge came to be dismissed on 28.03.2016, almost after a decade of
filing of the charge sheet. The dismissal was affirmed by the High Court C
seven months thereafter, i.e., on 05.10.2016. Finally, and most
unfortunately, the present SLP has been pending before this Court for
the last six years. In the meanwhile, the Appellant superannuated from
service in 2010, but had no option except to contest the case. He is now
72 years. Continuation of the prosecution, apart from the illegality as D
indicated hereinabove, would also be unjust.
20. For the reasons stated above, we allow the Criminal Appeal
arising out of SLP (Crl) No. 9601 of 2016, and set aside the judgment
and order of the High Court of Patna in CRLM No. 23031 of 2016 dated
05.10.2016, and that of the Court of Special Judge (Vigilance), Patna in E
Special Case No. 09 of 2000, dated 28.03.2016, and discharge the
Appellant.
21. No order as to costs.

Devika Gujral Appeal allowed. F
(Assisted by : Preetam Bharti, LCRA)

G

H