KANTILAL MARTAJI PANDORversusSTATE OF GUJARAT & ANR.

                     [2013] 8 S.C.R. 137


               KANTILAL MARTAJI PANDOR                             A
                               v.
               STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR.
            (Criminal Appeal No. 1567 of 2007)
                       JULY 25, 2013
                                                                   B
         [A.K. PATNAIK AND SUDHANSU JYOTI
                 MUKHOPADHAYA, JJ.]

     Penal Code, 1860 - s.498A - Suicide by second wife of
appellant - One day earlier, the deceased-wife had written         C
letter to the police station against the appellant - Conviction
of appellant u/s.498A - Justification - Held: Not justified -
Explanation uls. 498A defines "cruelty" for purpose of s. 498A
to mean any of the acts mentioned in clause (a) or clause (b)
of the Explanation - Alleged acts or conduct of the appellant      D
did not amount to cruelty within meaning of clauses (a) or (b}
of the Explanation - As the cause of the death of deceased
was not in question, the statements made by her in her letter
to the Police Station cannot be taken to be proof of cruel acts
committed by the appellant for holding him guilty u/s.498A -       E
Except the letter written by the deceased to the Police Station,
no other witness spoke about the appellant having starved her
of food and having committed acts of mental cruelty to her -
In view of the evidence of deceased's mother (PW-3), the
High Court could not have come to the conclusion that the          F
deceased was subjected to financial exploitation and starving
and mental cruelty by the appellant - Finding of the High Court
that the appellant committed a cruel act by permitting his first
wife to enter the house of the deceased with new born child,
is erroneous - No evidence of any physical harm or mental          G
cruelty by the appellant against the deceased - Appellant
therefore acquitted.

   The appellant had two wives. The second wife of the
appellant wrote a letter dated 26.03.1992 to the police
                          137                                      H
    138       SUPREME COURT REPORTS           (2013] 8 S.C.R.


A station complaining that the appellant's family was living
  on her salary and the appellant had started torturing her
  to a limit no longer tolerable by her and she was also not
  given meals and that the appellant was threatening to kill
  her and for all this the appellant and his first wife and his
B o~her family members were involved. The next day, the
  appellant's second wife jumped into a well and died.
       In view of the allegations made by the deceased in
  her letter dated 26.03.1992 to the police station, FIR was
  registered under Sections 498A and 306 IPC. The trial
C court acquitted the first wife of the appellant, but
  convicted the appellant under Sections 498A and 306,
  IPC. In appeal, the High Court acquitted the appellant
  from the charge under Section 306, IPC, but maintained
  the conviction under Section 498A, IPC, and therefore the
D instant appeal.
          Allowing the appeal, the Court
         HELD: 1.1. It is clear from the language of Section
   498A, IPC, that if a husband subjects his wife to cruelty,
E he shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which
    may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.
   The Explanation under Section 498A defines ''<:ruelty" for
   the purpose of Section 498A to mean any of the acts
   mentioned in clause (a) or clause (b). In this case, clause
F . (b) is not attracted as there was no harassment by the
    husband with a view to coercing her to meet any unlawful
    demand for any property or valuable security or on
    account of failure by her to meet such demand. [Para 10)
    [146-C-E]
G      1.2. The first limb of clause (a) of the Explanation of
  Section 498A, IPC, states that "cruelty" means any wilful
  conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the
  woman to commit suicide. In the present case, although
  the trial court found the appellant guilty of conduct which
H had driven the deceased to commit suicide and hence
  KANTILAL MARTAJI PANDOR v. STATE OF GUJARAT 139


  liable for the offence of abetment of suicide under           A
  Section 306, IPC, the High Court has given a clear finding
  in the impugned judgment that the conviction of the
  appellant under Section 306, IPC, cannot be sustained in
  the eye of law and the appellant deserves to be acquitted
  of the charge of abetment of suicide under Section 306,       B
  IPC. This part of the finding has not been challenged by
  the State in appeal before the Supreme Court and has,
- therefore, become final. Thus, the appellant cannot be
  held guilty of any wilful conduct which was of such a
  nature as is likely to drive the deceased to commit           c
  suicide. [Para 11] [146-E-H]

       1.3. The second limb of clause (a) of the Explanation
  of Section 498A, IPC, states that cruelty means any illful
  conduct which is of such a nature as to cause grave
  injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or   D
  physical) of the woman. In the present case, the High
  Court has recorded findings against the appellant to hold
  him guilty of the offence under Section 498A, IPC,
  presumably for "cruelty" which falls within the second
  limb of clause (a) of the Explanation under Section 498A,     E
  IPC. [Para 12] [147-A-C]

       1.4. The finding of the High Court that permitting the
  first wife to enter the house of deceased with new born
  child amounts to a cruel act is erroneous as such act         F
  cannot amount to cruelty within the meaning of second
  limb of clause (a) of the Explanation under Section 498-
  A, IPC. However, the High Court, relying on the letter
  written by the deceased to the Police Station on
  26.03.1992 (Ext.10), has also come to a finding that the      G
  appellant had starved the deceased of food when she
  was pregnant by spending the salary earned by the
  deceased on his own family and had also subjected the
  deceased to other acts of mental cruelty. [Para 13] [148-
  F-H]
                                                                H
    140       SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2013] 8 S.C.R.


A      1.5. The letter written by the deceased on 26.03.1992
  could be relevant only under Section 32(1) of the Indian
  Evidence Act, 1872, which provides that a statement,
  written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who
  is dead, is relevant when the statement is made by a
s person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the
  circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his
  death, in cases in which the cause of that person's death
  comes into question. The High Court in the present case
  has already held that the appellant was not guilty of
c abetting the suicide of the deceased and was, therefore,
  not guilty of the offence under Section 306, IPC. As the
  cause of the death of the deceased is no more in question
  in the present case, the statements made by the
  deceased in the letter dated 26.03.1992 to the Police
  Station cannot be taken to be proof of cruel acts
0
  committed by the appellant for the purpose of holding
  him guilty under Section 498A, IPC. [Para 14] [149-8-E]
       1.6. In the present case, except Ext.10, the letter
  written by the deceased to the Police Station on
E 26.03.1992, no other witness has spoken about the
  appellant having starved the deceased of food and
  having committed acts of mental cruelty to the deceased.
  On the other hand, in view of the evidence of the
  deceased's mother (PW-3) in her cross-examination, the
F High Court could not have come to the conclusion that
  the deceased was subjected to financial exploitation and
  starving and mental cruelty by the appellant. There is no
  evidence of any physical harm having been caused by
  the appellant to the deceased nor any acts of mental
G cruelty committed by him. Hence, the appellant cannot be
  held guilty of any cruelty within the meaning of clause (a)
  of the Explanation under Section 498A, IPC. The appellant
  is therefore acquitted of the charge under Section 498A,
  IPC. [Paras 16, 17, 18] [150-G; 151-8-D]
H         lnderpal v. State of MP. (2001) 10 sec 736 - relied on.
KANTILAL MARTAJI PANDOR v. STATE OF GUJARAT 141


    State of West Bengal v. Ori/al Jaiswal & Anr. (1994) 1           A
SCC 73; Manju Ram Kalita v. State of Assam (2009) 13 SCC
330: 2009 (9) SCR 902 - referred to.
                      Case Law Reference:
    (1994) 1 sec 73            referred to            Para 7, 8,     B
                                                      17
    2009 (9) SCR 902            referred to            Para 7
    (2001) 1o sec 736           relied on              Para 15
                                                                     c
    CRIMINAL AP PELLA TE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 1567 of 2007.

    From the Judgment and Order dated 13.09.2007 of the
High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Criminal Appeal No.
294 of 1994.                                                         D

    Aishwarya Bhati, Gp. Cap. Karan Singh Bhati, Dr.
Prikhshayat Singh, Sanjoli Mittal, Pawan Kr. Saini for the
Appellant.
                                                                     E
    Pinky Behera, Hemantika Wahi for the Respondents.

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    A.K. PATNAIK, J. 1. This is an appeal by way of special
leave under Article 136 of the Constitution against the judgment     F
and order dated 13.09.2007 of the Gujarat High Court in
Criminal Appeal No.294 of 1994.

FACTS

      2. The facts very briefly are that the appellant was married   G
to Laxmiben in 1980. The appellant, who was a teacher, used
to travel in a bus along with Amriben, who was also a teacher,
for their work in their respective schools located at a distance
of 2 kms. from each other. The appellant and Amriben fell in
love and got married in 1990. A daughter was born to Amriben         H
    142       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 8 S.C.R.


A   in 1991. The appellant, Laxmiben and Amriben were living
    together in different portions of one house of the appellant in
    village Dhuleta Palla. On 26.03.1992, a letter written by
    Amriben was received in Shamlaji Police Station. In this letter,
    Amriben alleged inter alia that the appellant was more
B   interested in money and not in !ove and he had threatened and
    kidnapped her, although he had a wife and three children and
    the appellant had cheated her and persuaded her to have civil
    marriage on 21.08.1990. She further alleged in the letter that
    after marriage the appellant's family was living on her salary and
c   the appellant had started torturing her to a limit which was no
    longer tolerable by her and she was also not given meals and
    the appellant was threatening to kill her and for all this the
    appellant and his first wife Laxmiben and his other family
    members were involved. On 26.03.1992 in the afternoon, the
    appellant came to the school of Amriben and enquired from the
0
     Principal of the school and the teacher of Amriben as to
    whether Amriben had made a complaint to the Police Station.
    That evening, the appellant who usually took Amriben back
    from her school instead requested the Principal of her school,
E    Ms. Timothibhai, to take seat on the scooter with him and as a
     result Amriben had to walk along with Lilavatiben, who was
     holding her little daughter, to the bus stand. During the night of
    26.03.1992, the appellant slept with Laxmiben while Amriben
     slept with her new born daughter in another room of the house.
     On 27.03.1992, early in the morning, the appellant and
F    Laxmiben heard the little daughter of Amriben crying and they
     found that Amriben had jumped into the well and had died.

       3. A post mortem on the dead body of Amriben (for short
  'the deceased') was conducted on 28.03.1992 at 2.30 p.m. and
G the cause of the death was found to be drowning. Initially, on
  the report of the appellant, the Shamlaji Police Station
  registered an aecidental death case under Section 174 of the
  Criminal Procedure Code, (for short 'the Cr.P.C.').
  Subsequently, however, on 03.04.1992 an FIR was registered
H by Shamlaji Police Station under Sections 498A and 306 of
  KANTILAL MARTAJI PANDOR v. STATE OF GUJARAT 143                         ; .
                [A.K. PATNAIK, J.]

  the Indian Penal Code (for short 'the IPC') in view of the          A
  allegations made by the deceased in her letter dated
  26.03.1992 to the police station. Investigation was carried out
  and a charge-sheet was filed against the appellant and
  Laxmiben under Sections 498A and 306, IPC.
                                                                      B
         4. At the trial, amongst other witnesses examined on
    behalf of the prosecution, Ms. Timothibhai, Principal of the
· - school, was examined as PW-1, the doctor who carried out the
    post mortem was examined as PW-2, the mother of the
    deceased was examined as PW-3, Lilavatiben, co-teacher of         C
    deceased was examined as PW-4 and the Investigating Officer
    was examined as PW-10. The appellant also examined various
    witnesses in his defence. The trial court by its judgment dated
    10.02.1994 in Sessions Case No.59/92 acquitted Laxmiben,
    but convicted the appellant under Sections 498A and 306, IPC,
    and sentenced him to simple imprisonment for one year and         D
    two years for the two offences respectively and also imposed
    a fine of Rs.100/- for each of the offences. Aggrieved, the
    appellant filed criminal appeal before the High Court, and by
    the impugned judgment, the High Court acquitted the appellant
    from the charge under Section 306, IPC, but maintained the        E
    conviction and sentence on the appellant under Section 498A,
    IPC. Aggrieved, the appellant has filed this appeal.

  Contentions of the learned Counsel for the parties:
                                                                      F
        5. Learned counsel for the appellant, Ms. Aishwarya Bhati,
  submitted that in the impugned judgment, the High Court found
  the appellant to be guilty of the offence under Section 498A,
  IPC, because of some conduct or acts of the appellant of which
  the deceased has complained of in her letter to the Police
  Station on 26.03.1992. She submitted that the High Court held       G
  that the acts or conduct of the appellant amounted to cruelty for
  which the appellant was liable for the offence under Section
  498A, IPC, but did not amount to abetment of suicide within
  the meaning of Section 306, IPC. She submitted that the
  statements of the deceased in the letter of the deceased to the     H
    144      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013] 8 S.C.R.


A   Police Station (Ext.10) were not proof of the acts or conduct of
    the appellant in the letter and in any case these acts or conduct
    of the appellant did not amount to cruelty within the meaning of
    clauses (a) or (b) of the Explanation under Section 498A, IPC.

       6. Ms. Bhati submitted that the evidence of PW-3, the
8
  mother of the deceased, would show that when the deceased
  was carrying the child. PW-3 had been to see the deceased
  and she did not find that the deceased had any food problem.
  She also referred to the evidence of PW-4 to show that the
  appellant's conduct was not such as to amount to cruelty or
C harassment within the meaning of clauses (a) or (b) of the
  Explanation of Section 498A, IPC. She submitted that the post
  mortem report (Ext.15), on the other hand, would show that the
  deceased was well-nourished and was well-built and did not
  suggest that she was starved of any food.
D
       7. Ms. Bhati cited the decision of this Court in State of
  West Bengal v. Ori/al Jaiswal & Anr. [(1994) 1 SCC 73] in
  which it has been held that the charges made against an
  accused under Section 498A, IPC, must be proved beyond all
E reasonable doubt and that the requirement of proof is not
  satisfied by surmises and conjectures. She also cited the
  decision of this Court in Manju Ram Kalita v. State of Assam
  [(2009) 13 sec 330] wherein it has been held that for holding
  an accused guilty under Section 498A, IPC, it has to be
F established that the woman has been subjected to cruelty
  continuously/persistently or at least in close proximity of time
  to the lodging of the complaint and petty quarrels cannot be
  termed as "cruelty" to attract the provisions of Section 498A,
  IPC, though mental torture to the extent that it becomes
G unbearable may be termed as cruelty. She vehemently
  submitted that in this case the prosecution has not proved
  beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was in any way
  guilty of any act or conduct which is of the nature described in
  clauses (a) and (b) of Section 498A, IPC, so as to amount to
  cruelty within the meaning of this Section and, therefore, the
H
      KANTILAL M.ARTAJI PANDOR v. STATE OF                     145
            GUJARAT [AK. PATNAIK, J.]

appellant is entitled to be acquitted by this Court of the charge      A
under Section 498A, IPC.

     8. Ms. Pinky Behera, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent-State, on the other hand, relied on Ext.10, which is
the letter written by Amriben to Shamlaji Police Station on            8
26.03.1992 to the Police Station and submitted that there was
sufficient evidence in Ext.10 to show that the appellant had
treated the deceased with cruelty within the meaning of Section
498A, IPC. She also relied on the findings of the High Court in
paragraph 15 of the impugned judgment in which the High                C
Court has found the appellant guilty of the offence punishable
under Section 498A, IPC. She vehemently argued that even
though the High Court has found that the appellant was not guilty
of abetment of suicide within the meaning of Section 306, IPC,
the appellant can still be held liable for the offence under Section
498A, IPC, if he had committed acts bf cruelty towards the             D
deceased. In support of this contention, she relied on the
decision of this Court in West Bengal v. Ori/al Jaiswal & Anr.
(supra).

Findings of the Court:                                                 E
    9. Section 498A, IPC, under which the appellant's
conviction has been maintained by the High Court is extracted
herein below:

     "498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman                  F
     subjecting her to cruelty.-- Whoever, being the husband
     or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such
     woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for
     a term which may extend to three years and shall also be
     liable to fine.                                                   G

     Explanation.- For the purposes of this section, "cruelty"
     means-

     (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely
                                                                       H
    146        SUPREME COURT REPORTS               (2013] 8 S.C.R.


A         to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave
          injury or danger to life. limb or health (whether mental or
          physical) of the woman; or

          (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is
          with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to
B
          meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable
          security or is on account of failure by her or any person
          related to her to meet such demand."

        10. It will be clear from the language of Section 498A, IPC,
C that if a husband subjects his wife to cruelty, he shall be
  punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to
  three years and shall also be liable to fine. The Explanation
  under Section 498A defines "cruelty" for the purpose of Section
  498A to mean any of the acts·mentioned in clause (a) or clause
D (b). In this case. clause (b) ill not attracted as there was no
  harassment by the husband with a view to coercing her to meet
  any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or on
  account of failure by her to meet such demand.

E       11. The first limb of clause (a) of the Explanation of Section
  498A, IPC, states that "cruelty" means any wilful conduct which
  is of such a nature as is likely te drive the woman to commit
  suicide. In the present case, although the trial court found the
  appellant guilty of conduct which had driven the deceased to
  commit suicide and hence liable for the offence of abetment
F of suicide under Section 306, IPC, the High Court has given a
  clear finding in paragraph 13 of the impugned judgment that
  the conviction of the 2ppellant under Section 306, IPC, cannot
  be sustained in the eye of law and the appellant deserves to
  be acquitted of the charge of atretment of suicide under Section
G 306, IPC. This part of the finding has not been challenged by
  the State in appeal before this Court and has, therefore,
  become final. Thus, the appellant cannot be held guilty of any
  wilful conduct which was of such a nature as is likely to drive
  the deceased to commit suicide.
H
KANTILAL MARTAJI PANDOR v. STATE OF GUJARAT 147
              [A.K. PATNAIK, ~I.)
         12. The second limb of clause (a) of the Explanation of        A
  Section 498A, IPC, states that cruelty means any wilful conduct
  which is of such a nature as to cause grave injury or danger to
  life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman.
  In the present case, the High Court has recorded findings
  against the appellant to hold, him guilty of the offence under        B
  Section 498A, IPC, presumably for "cruelty" which falls within
  the second limb of clause (a) of the Explanation under Section
  498A, IPC. The relevant findings of the High Court in paragraph
· 15 of the impugned judgment are extracted hereunder:

     "As discussed earlier, permitting to enter his first wife in       C
     the house of deceased Amariben with new born child, is
     an act of the appellant - accused, which can be said to be
     a cruel act. The document Exhibit 10 indicates that she
     was financially exploited and the demand of money were
     made by the appellant - accused frequently. She has                D
     stated that on account of this, she was falling in starving. It
     is not in evidence that this Court can notice on one fact
     based on biological reasons assigned that the pregnant
     lady or lady, who has given birth to child, need more food,
     as such women are feeling more hungry then other normal            E
     women. She was facing very much financial problem and
     there should be possibility to go into depression and the
     present appellant - accused was the responsible person
     for creating this situation. The deceased was dropped
     woman, but self-respect is privilege of each individuals.          F
     The accused depended on the income of deceased
     Amariben after performing second marriage with her and
     was under lega! as well as moral obligation to see that she
     may be treated well and may not be felt to insult or ignore.
     It is settled position that the cruelty includes mental cruelty,   G
     physical marks falls over the body are not required to be
     proved by the prosecution. The date of the application
     received by the police is 26.3.1992 and the evidence of
     PW-1 also show that on 26.3.1992 the appelic.11t-accused
     had come to the school to inquire whether the deceased             H
    148       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 8 S.C.R.


A         Amariben had made an application to the Principal of
          school or not. He must have been frightened that the
          deceased may complain genuinely to the school authority
          and Government and he may lose the job or at least, may
          invite some departmental action, so anxiety of the
B         appellant-accused is found, which is exposed in the
          deposition of PW-1. When the deceased Amariben felt in
          creating apprehension in the mind that she may be killed
          by her husband is sufficient to conclude that the wife must
          have been treated with cruelty either mentally or physically
c         or both types of cruelty and that too frequently made
          otherwise the defence ought to have prove that she was a
          patient of depression. No such suggestive evidence made
          to the school teacher or other witness including mother.
          Meaning thereby, there is sufficient evidence to show that
          the deceased was treated with cruelty and that had led her
D
          to frustration and thereafter, depression, this is not an act
          of commission of a lady with child. She had decided to
          jump into the well leaving the child and accused behind,
          therefore, the act of the suicide appears to be intentional
          act to get rid of the frequent insult, ignorance and
E         exploitation. The learned Trial Judge has rightly linked the
          accused with the offence punishable under Section 498A.
          There is no error in evaluating the evidence so far as
          cruelty is concerned.

F         13. Obviously, the finding of the High Court that permitting
    the first wife to enter the house of deceased Amriben with new
    born child amounts to a cruel act is erroneous as such act
    cannot amount to cruelty within the meaning of second limb of
    clause (a) of the Explanation under Section 498-A, IPC.
G   However, the High Court, relying on the letter written by the
    deceased to the Police Station on 26.03.1992 (Ext.10), has
    also come to a finding that the appellant had starved the
    deceased of food when she was pregnant by spending the
    salary earned by the deceased on his own family and had also
H   subjected the deceased to other acts of mental cruelty.
KANTILAL MARTAJI PANDOR v. STATE OF GUJARAT 149
              [A.K. PATNAIK, J.]
      14. The question that we have, therefore, to decide is         A
whether the Court could have arrived at this finding that the
appellant has starved the deceased and committed various acts
of mental cruelty towards the deceased only on the basis of the
contents of the letter dated 26.03.1992 written by the deceased
to the Police Station. The letter written by the deceased on         B
26.03.1992 could be relevant only under Section 32(1) of the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which provides that a statement,
written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is
dead, is relevant when the statement is made by a person as
to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of      c
the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which
the cause of that person's death comes into question. The High
Court in the present case has already held that the appellant
was not guilty of abetting the suicide of the deceased and was,
therefore, not guilty of the offence under Section 306, IPC. As      0
the cause of the death of the deceased is no more in question
in the present case, the statements made by the deceased in
the letter dated 26.03.1992 to the Police Station cannot be
taken to be proof of cruel acts committed by the appellant for
the purpose of holding him guilty under Section 498A, IPC.
                                                                     E
      15. For taking this view, we are supported by the decision
of this Court in lnderpal v. State of MP. [(2001) 10 SCC 736].
In this case, lnderpal was charged and tried for the offence
under Section 306, IPC, and convicted by the trial court for the
said offence of abetment of suicide. In appeal filed by lnderpal,    F
the High Court found that the offence under Section 306, IPC,
was not made out as it could not be held that death of the
deceased was due to commission of suicide, but the High
Court held the appellant guilty of the offence under Section
498A, IPC. This finding of the High Court was based on the           G
evidence of the father, mother, sister and another relative of the
deceased who deposed on the basis of inter alia the two letters
(Exhibits P-7 and P-8) written by the deceased Damyanti that
lnderpal, her husband, had subjected her to beating. This Court
found that apart from the statement attributed to the deceased,      H
    150       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 8 S.C.'R.


A none of the witnesses had spoken of anything which they had
  seen directly and the question that this Court had to decide was
  whether the statement attributed to the deceased could be
  used as evidence including the contents of Exts.P-7 and P-8
  and this Court held that the contents of Exts. P-7 and P-8 written
B by the deceased could not be treated as proof of the acts of
  cruelty by lnderpal for the purpose of offence under Section
  498A, IPC. The reasons given by this Court in paragraph 7 of
  the judgment as reported in the sec are as follows:

          "7. Unless the statement of a dead person would fall within
c         the purview of Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act
          there is no other provision under which the same can be
          admitted in evidence. In order to make the statement of a
          dead person admissible in law (written or verbal) the
          statement must be as to the cause of her death or as to
D         any of the circumstance of the transactions which resulted
          in her death, in cases in which the cause of death comes
          into question. By no stretch of imagination can the
          statements of Damyanti contained in Exhibit P-7 or Exhibit
          P-8 and those quoted l?Y the witnesses be connected with
E         any circumstance of the transaction which resulted in her
          death. Even that apart, when we are dealingwith an offence
          under Section 498-A IPC disjuncted from the offence under
          Section 306 IPC the question of her death is not an issue
          for consideration and on that premise also Section 32(1)
F         of the Evidence Act will stand at bay so far as these
          materials are concerned.

        16. In the present case also, except Ext.10, the letter written
  by the deceased to the Police Station on 26.03.1992, no other
G witness has spoken aoout the appellant having starved the
  deceased of food and having committed acts of mental cruelty
  to the deceased. On the other hand, the mother of the deceased
  (PW-3) has stated in ber cross-examination:

          "I have not recorded in my statement before police that
H         Amri was giving -her salary to her husband. It is not true
KANTILAL MARTAJI PANDOR v. STATE OF GUJARAT 151
              [A.K. PATNAJK, J.]
    that when I went tO' see Amri, at that time, my daughter was    A
    crying she had food problem, I say it is false."

      17. This being the evidence of the mother of the deceased,
the High Court could not have come to the conclusion that the
deceased was subjected to financial exploitation and starving · 8
and mental cruelty by the appellant. Unlike the case of State of
West Bengal v. Ori/al Jaiswal & Anr. (supra) cited by Ms.
Behera in which there was evidence of the husband coming
home drunk and abusing and assaulting the deceased wife, in
this case there is no evidence of any. physical harm having been C
caused by the appellant to the deceased nor any acts of mental
cruelty committed by him. Hence, the appellant cannot be held
guilty of any cruelty within the meaning of clause (a) of the
Explanation under Section 498A, IPC.

     18. In the result, we set aside the impugned judgment of       D
the High Court and acquit the appellant of the charge under
Section 498A, IPC. Since the appellant is on bail, his bail bonds
be discharged.

B.B.B.                                         Appeal allowed.      E