KANUBHAI BRAHMBHATTversusSTATE OF GUJARAT
- Citation
- 1987 INSC 48
- Decided
- 18 February 1987
- Bench
- M P THAKKAR
Holding
The Supreme Court directed the petitioner to approach the appropriate High Court first, dismissing the writ petition filed under Article 32.
Summary
In Writ Petition No. 1669 of 1986 filed under Article 32 of the Constitution, the petitioner sought relief directly from the Supreme Court against the State of Gujarat. The Court examined whether there were good and substantial reasons to require the petitioner to first approach the concerned High Court. It held that allowing the Supreme Court to entertain every writ petition that could be dealt with by a High Court would overload the apex court, undermine the hierarchy of courts, and delay justice in matters of exclusive Supreme Court jurisdiction under Article 136. The Court emphasized the need to inspire confidence in the High Courts and to achieve faster, decentralized disposal of cases. Consequently, the petitioner was directed to file the writ petition in the appropriate High Court, and the Supreme Court dismissed the petition.
Issues considered
- Whether the Supreme Court should entertain a writ petition under Article 32 when the High Court is competent to decide the matter.
- Whether there exist good and substantial reasons to direct the petitioner to the High Court first.
Legislation cited
- Constitution of Indias. Article 136, s. Article 32
Subjects
Judgment
KANUBHAIBRAHMBHA1T
A
v.
STATE OF GUJARAT
FEBRUARY 18, 1987
B [M.P. THAKKAR AND B.C. RAY, JJ.]
Constitution of India, 1950, Article 32-Writ Petition-Filing
of-Sometimes reasons good and substantial exist to direct writ peti-
tioner to approach High Court in First instance-Faith to be inspired in
the hierarchy of courts. I
c
~
Practice & Procedure, Supreme Court-W"it petition-Filing
of-Litigant to be directed to approach High Court if good and substan-
tial reasons exist-Faith to be inspired in the hierarchy of courts.
In a writ petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of
D India, the Court found that good and substantial reasons existed for
directing the petitioner to approach the concerned High Court in the
first instance instead of knocking at the doors of this Court straight-
away. While directing so, this Court,
HELD: 1. If Supreme Court takes upon itself to do everything
E which even the High Court can do, this Court will not be able to do what
this Court alone can do under Art. 136 of the Constitution of India, and
other provisions conferring exclusive jurisdiction on this Court. There
is no reason to assume !hall the concerned High Court will not do
justice. Or that this Court alone can do justice. If this Court entertains
Writ Petitions at the instance of parties who approach this Court directly
F instead of appraoching the ·concerned High Court in the first instance,
tens of thousands of Writ Petitions would in course of time be instituted
in this Court directly. The inevitable result will be that the arrears
pertaining to matters in respect of which this Court exercises exclusive
jurisdiction under the Constitution will assume more alarming pro-
portions. [3168-D]
G •
2. It is as important to clo justice at this level, as to inspire confi-
dence in the litigants that justice will be meted out to them at the High
Court level, and other levels. Faith must be inspired in the hierarchy of
Courts and the institution as a whole. Not only in this Court alone. And
this objective can be achieved only by this Court showing trust in the
H High Courts by directing the litigants to approach the High Courts in
314
K. BRAHMBNATT v. STATE OF GUJARAT [THAKKAR. J.] 315
the first instance. Besides, as a matter of fact, if matters like the present
one are instituted in the High Courts, there is a likelihood of the same A
being disposed of much more quickly, and equally effectively, on account
of the decentralisation of the process of administering justice. [316E-G I
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 1669 of 1986.
B
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India).
By post.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
THAKKAR, J. Reasons, good and substantial, exist for direct- C
~ ing the petitioner to approach the concerned High Court in the first
instance instead of knocking at the doors of this Court straightaway.
And these need to be spelled out.
An illustration may tell more effectively, what otherwise may not D
be told as effectively, and perhaps, only with some embarrassment.
Suppose there is only one National Hospital established especially for
performing open-heart surgery which cannot be performed elsewhere
in any of the eighteen Regional Hospitals. What will happen to the
patients needing such surgery, if the National Hospital which alone is
specially equipped for this type of surgery, throws its doors wide open E
also for patients suffering from other ailments who can be treated by
any and every one of the eighteen Regional Hospitals? More parti-
cularly when the patients already admitted for such surgery by the
National Hospital are already lying unattended to on its floors, and in
1 its corridors, for an unconscionably long time? Showing sympathy for
-t a patient with other than a heart problem who can also be treated F
equally effectively, and perhaps much more quickly, may well consti-
tute cruelty to the heart patients who can be treated only by the
National Hospital established especially and exclusively for the treat-
ment of such patients. Will it not be more merciful to all concerned (by
being firm enough) to tell those suffering from other than heart prob-
lems to go to Regional Hospitals, instead of insisting on being treated G
at the National Hospital, which also can of course treat them, but only
at the cost of neglecting the heart patients who have nowhere else to
go? More so as the patients going to the Regional Hospital may well
benefit much more by securing more personalized and urgent attention
thereat. On the other hand. not to do so many well amount to being
engaged in trying to relieve the distress of those whose distress can be H
316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 2 S.C.R.
removed by any one else at the cost of refusing to treat those who
A
cannot be treated by any one else.
If this Court takes upon itself to do everything which even the
High Courts can do, this Court will not be able to do what this Court
alone can do under Art. 136 of the Constitution of India, and other
B provisions conferring exclusive jurisdiction on this Court. There is no
reason to assume that th1~ concerned High Court will not do justice. Or
that this Court alone can do justice. If this Court entertains Writ
Petitions at the instance of parties who approach this Court directly
instead of approaching the concerned High Court in the first instance,
tens of thousands of Writ Petitions would in course of time be
instituted in this Court directly.* The inevitable result will be that the
c arrears pertaining to matters in respect of which this Court exercises
exclusive jurisdiction under the Constitution will assume more alarm-
ing proportions. As it is, more than ten years old Civil Appeals and
Criminal Appeals are sobbing for attention. It will occasion great
misery and immense hardship to tens of thousands of litigants if the
D seriousness of this aspect is not sufficiently realized. And this is no
imaginary phobia. A dismissed government servant has to wait for .
nearly ten years for redress in this Court. 1 A litigant whose appeal has
been dismissed by wrongly refusing to condone delay has to wait for 14
years before his wrong is righted by this Court.2 The time for imposing
self-discipline has already come, even if it involves shedding of some
E amount of institutional-ego, or raising of some eye-brows. Again, it is
as important to do justice at this level, as to inspire confidence in the •
litigants that justice will be meted out to them at the High Court level,
and other levels. Faith must be inspired in the hierarchy of Courts and
the institution as a whole. Not only in this Court alone. And this
objective can be achieved only by this Court showing trust in the High
F Court by directing the litigants to approach the High Court in the first +
instance. Besides, as a matter of fact, if matters like the present one
are instituted in the High Court, there is a likelihood of the same being
disposed of much more quickly, and equally effectively, on account of
the decentralisation of the process of administering justice. We are of
the opinion that the petitioner should be directed to adopt this course
G and approach the High Court.
* More than 9000 are already pending now.
1. K8shinath Dikshita v. Union of India and others (SCC 1986 Vol. 3 p. 229)
2. Shankarrao v. Chandrasenkunwar (Civil Appeal No. 1355{N) of 1973 decided on
H January29, 1987.
K. BRAHMBNATI v. STATE OF GUJARAT [THAKKAR,· J.] 317
It needs to be clarified that it will be open to the High Court to A
call upon the petitioner to present a properly framed Writ Petition
without obliging him to incur the legal and other incidental expendi-
ture if the petitioner cannot afford the same. The matter may in such
an event be assigned to a learned Advocate practising in the High
Court through the State Legal Aid and Assistance Board, or through
the High Court Legal Aid Committee which can provide him with the
B
requisite funds to enable him to do the needful. It will also be open to
the High Court to request the learned District Judge of Vadodara to
look into the matter from the point of view of the complaints made in
the letter in question, and make an appropriate report to enable the
High Court to pass such suitable orders as may be called for in the facts
and circumstances of the case in order to secure ends of justice. c
~ These are the reasons which we 'now' articulate in support of the
order we passed 'then'.
M.L.A.
'
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