Holding

A conviction based on a guilty plea entered as a result of plea‑bargaining cannot be sustained and must be set aside.

Summary

The accused were charged under Section 16(1)(a)(i) read with Section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 for adulterating turmeric powder. After the prosecution presented some evidence, a plea‑bargaining arrangement was reached among the prosecution, the defence and the magistrate, leading the accused to plead guilty. The magistrate recorded a conviction based solely on the guilty plea and imposed a nominal sentence of imprisonment till the rising of the court and a small fine. The Gujarat High Court, in a suo motu revision, enhanced the sentence to three months’ imprisonment and a higher fine without setting aside the conviction. The Supreme Court held that a conviction based only on a guilty plea obtained through plea‑bargaining, without a trial of the evidence, is unconstitutional and contrary to public policy, and that the High Court erred in not remanding the case for trial. The appeal was allowed, the conviction and sentence were set aside, and the matter was remanded to the magistrate to conduct a proper trial ignoring the guilty plea.

Issues considered

Whether a conviction recorded solely on the basis of a guilty plea entered as a result of plea‑bargaining, without a trial of the evidence, is valid under criminal law.
Whether the High Court could enhance the sentence without setting aside the conviction obtained through such a plea.
Whether recording a conviction in this manner violates Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 21
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954s. 16(1)(a)(i), s. 7

Subjects

plea bargainingconvictionfood adulterationPrevention of Food Adulteration ActArticle 21criminal proceduremagistratesentencingpublic policy

Judgment

l0'.l7

' KASAMBHAI ARDUL REHMANBHAI SHAIKH A
v.
STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR.
February 13, 1980
(P. N. BHAGWATI AND A. P. SEN, JJ.]
n
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954, Sertioru. 7 and 16-Plea-bar-
gaining-Magistrate if co1npetent to record conviction if ar.cused pleads
·guilty.

Cri1ninal Trial-Judgn1ent-Cyclostyled fonn in which nzerely blanks filled
by Magistrate-Such Disposal-Reprehensible Policy.
Sentencing-Offences of food adulteration-Deterrent and punitive sen- c
tences-Necessity for.
The appellants were prosecuted for con1mitting offences under section
16(l)(a)(i) read with section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act,
1954. After some evidence \vas led on behalf of the prosecution, ple:l.-
bargaining took place between the prosecution, the accused and the :r..1agistrate.
The accused pleaded guilty which plea Vi as accepted by the Magistrate. The
1
D
accused were accordingly convicted a,nd sentenced to undergo imprisonment
till the rising of the Court and to pay a sn1all fine.

• The High Court initiated suo n1otu proceeding in revision. The accused
appeared and challenged the convictions recorded against them, but the High
Court did not go into the circumstances in which the plea of guilty was
entered, enhanced the sentences in1poscd on them to three months' simple E
imprisonment a.nd fine.
Allowing the appeals,
HELD : 1. A conviction based on the plea of guilty entered by the
accused as a result of plea-bargaining cannot be sustained. [1041EJ
2. The I-Iigh Court was clearly in error in not setting aside the conviction
and sending the case back to the Magistrate for trial in ,accordance. with Jaw, F
ignoring the plea of guilty entered by the appellants. [1041F]
3. The Magistrate trying an accused for a serious offence like adulteration
must apply his mind to the evidence recorded before him and, on the facts
.as they emerge from the evidence, decide \\-'hether the accused is guilty or
not. [1040B]
G
In the instant case the 1fagistrate had got a cyclostyled form of judg-
ment in which merely blanks were filled in by him. This clearly indicates
.... that the Magistrate \Vas in the habit of encouraging plea~bargaining and
letting off the accused lightly if there was a plea. of guilty, enabling quick
disposal without any effort. This Was a highly reprehensible practice. The
High Court had expressed strong disapproval of it. [1039H-1040A]
4. (i) It is highly regrettable that the prosecution as well as the 1fagistrate 0
should have been a. party to any plea-bargaining in a prosecution for adultera-
tion· ·iiivolVing the health and well-being of the comn1unity. Adulteration has

' -\
1038 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [l980J 2 !>.C.il.

A assumed alarming proportions and it is essential to \vipe it out ruthlessly and '
completely by bringing to book offenders responsible for adulteration resulting
in ruination of the health of the people. The investigating agencies must .intensify
their effo1ts and catch hold of those who for private economic gain are
prepared to jeopardize the health of the community. When such persons are
arraigned before the Court and found guilty a deterrent and punitive sentence
must be imposed upon thctn. [1039E-CJ]
B (ii) If it is possible to get a\vay with a light sentence in respect of an
offence of adnltera.tion the anti-adultcratio11 hl\v will cease to have any
meaning and validity. [1039H]
5. Administration of justice is a sacred t~L'~k and partakes of the divine
function. Jt is with the greatest sense of responsibility and anxiety that the
judicial officer must discharge his judicial function, pa.rticularly when it con-
c ·cc:Tis the liberty of a person. [1040C]

6. It would be contrary to public policy to allo\v a conviction to be
recorded against an accused by inducing hlln to confess to a plea of guilty
on an allurement being held out to him that if he enters a plea of guilty,
he will be let off very lightly. Such .a. procedure would be clearly un-
reasonable, unfair and unjust and would be violative of Art. 21 of the
D Constitution. It \VOtil<l have the effect of polluting the pure fount of justice,
because it might induce an innocent accused to plead guilty to suffer a light
and inconsequential punishn1cnt rather than go through a long and ardous
criminal trial. The judge also might be likely to be deflected from the path •
of duty to do justice and he n1ight either convict an innocent accused by
hccepting the plea of guilty or let off a guilty accused with a light sentence,
thus, subverting the process of h~w and fru-;trating the social objective
E and purpose of the anti-adulteration statute. This practice would also tend
. ,....
__

to encourage corruption and collusion and as a direct consequence, contribute
to the lowering of the standard of justice. [1041B-EJ

CRIMINAT- APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal Nos ..
93-94 of 1980.
F Appeals by special leave from the Judgment and order dated·
30" 1-1979 of the Gujarat High Court in Criminal Revision Application
No. 306/78 and 305/78.
T. U. Mehta and Vimal Dave for the Appellant.
H. R. Khanna and M. N. Shro[j for the Respondent.
G The following Judgments were delivered :
BHAGWATJ. J. This appeal by special leave is directed against a .Al
judgment of the Gujarat High Court in suo motu revision against an
order passed by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Balasinor convict-
ing the appdlant of the offence under s. 16(1) (a) (i) read withs. 7 of
H the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 and sc!iltencing him
to suffer simple imprisonment till the rising of the Court and to pay·
a fine of Rs. l 25 /- or in default to undergo simple imprisonment for-
K. ADDUL REHMAN BHAI v. GU.JARAT (Bhagwati, J.) 1039

a further period of 30 dnys. The appellant was prosecuted in the Court A
of the learned Magistrate for an offence of adulteration of turmeric
powder punishable under s. 16(1)(a)(l) read withs. 7 of the Preven-.
!ion of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.
It appears fro'm the record that after some evidence was led on
· behalf of the prosecution, plea bargaining took place between the a'
prosecution, the defence and the learned Magistrate and on the basis

r
-I
of an understanding arrived at between these three parties, the appellant
pleaded guilty and the learned Magistrate accepting this pica of guilty,·
recoroed a finding oJ conviction against the appellant and let off the·
appellant with a nominal sentence of imprisonment till the rising of the
Couit and a small fine. It is, of course true that there is no specific c
evidence to show that the plea for guilty was entered by the appellant
as a result of plea bargaining, but two circumstances, viz., (1) that the
appellant pleaded guilty, even though the sample was treated as can-.
celled by the public Analyst on account of its being broken and leaking
and there was no evidence of the report of the public Analyst showing
• the sample as adulterated and (2) that the judgment of the learned D
Magistrate was given in a cyclostyled form, clearly lead to the inference
that-the pka of guilty was entered by the appellant in consequenc<'· of
an assurance held out by the prosecution and acquiesced in by the
' I
learned Magistrate that he would be let off with a very light sentence.
It is- highly regrettable that the prosecution as well as the learned Magis-
E
trate should have been a party to any such plea bargaining in a prose-
cution for adulteration involving the health and well-being of the com-
munity. Unfortunately, in our country aJu!teration has assumed alarm-
ing proportions and it is absolutely essential to wipe it out ruthlessly .
and completely by bringing to book offenders responsible for adultera-
tion resulting in ruination of the health of the people. The investigat- F
ing agencies must intensify th.eir efforts and catch hold of those who
for· some private economic gain are prepared to jeopardize the health
of the community and indulge in mass murder and when such persons
are arraigned before the Court and found guilty a really deterrent and
punitive sentence must be imposed upon them. If it comes to be known
that even in respect of an offence of adulteration, it is possible to get G
away v.ith a light sentence, the anti-adulteration law will cease to have
any meaning and validity. It will be mocked at by the people as a futile
legislative exercise. Moreover, we find that here the learned Magistrate·
had got a cyclostyled form of judgment in which merely blanks were
filled in by him and this is the clearest possible evidence that he was in
the habit of encouraging plea bargaining and letting off the accused · S,
. lightly if there was a plea of guilty, so that he may get quick disposal·
1~138 SCI/80
1040 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 2 S.C.R. '

A without any effort. This was a high! y reprehensible practice and we are
glad to note that the High Court has expressed strong disapproval of it.
The Magistrate trying an accused for a serious offence like adulteration
must apply h's mind to the evidence recorded before him and, on the
facts as they emerge from the evidence, decide whether the
accused is guilty or not. It must always be remembered by every judi-
cial officer that administration of justice is a sacred task and according
to our hoary Indian traditipn, it partakes of the divine function and it
is with the greatest sence of responsibility and anxiety that the judicial,
officer must discharge his judicial function, particularly when it con-
cerns the liberty of a person. The course followed by !he learned Magis-
trate in the present case clearly showed that there was no application
c of mind by him to the case laid on behalf of the prosecution and he
was a consenting party to the appellant being persuaded to enter the
plea of guilty and, acting mechanically on the plea of guilty as extract-
ed from the appellant, be appeased bis insensitive conscience by recOl'd-
ing a finding conviction against the appellant and let him off with a ..
mere sentence of imprisonment till the rising of the Court and a
D nominal fine. •
The High Court on its attention being drawn to the Order passed
by the learned Magistrate initiated suo motu proceeding in revision by
issuing notice to the appellant to show cause why the sentence impOsed
E on him should not be enhanced. The appellant appeared in answer to
the notice and challenged the conviction recorded against him, but Ute
High Court did not go into the circumstances in which the plea of
guHty was entered by the appellant and relying on the plea-of guilty
prcx:eeded on the basis that the appellant was rightly convicted and
since the offence said to be established against the appellant, was with
F respect to an article of 'primary food' punishable under s. 16(1)(a,)
(i) of the Prevention of Food Adnlteration Act, 1954, the High Court
held that the appellant was liable to be sentenced to imprisonment for
a minimum term of 3 mpntbs and a fine of not less than Rs. 500. The
High Court accordingly enhanced the sentenced. imposed on the appel-
lant to 3 months' simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 500 or in
G
default, further simple imprisonment for 30 days. This order made by
the High Court is challenged in the present. appeal preferred by the
appellant after obtaining special leave of this Court.

Now, it does npt appear from the record whether the entire prose-
cution evidence was completed before the learned Magistrate before the
H plea of gnilty was entered on bel]alf of the appellant, but one thing'
is clear that the finding conviction recorded by the learned MagiStrate ' '
K. ABDUL REHMAN BHAI V. GUJARAT (Bhagwati, J.) I 041

against the appellant was not based on the evidence led on behalf of A.
the prosecution. The conviction of the appellant based solely on the
plea of guilty entered by him and thi&. confession of guilt was the result
of plea of bargaining between the prosecution, the defence and the
learned Magistrate. It is obvious that such conviction based on the
plea of guilty entered by the appellant as a result of plea bargaining

·f,. - cannot be sustained. It is to our. mind contrary to public policy to B
allow a conviction to be recorded against an accused by inducing him
t o confess to a plea of guilty on an allurement being held out to him
1hat if he enters a plea of guilty, he will be let off very lightly. Such a
procedure would be clearly unreasonable, unfair and unjust and would
be violative of the new activist dimension of Art. 21 of the Constitu- c
tion unfolded in Maneka Gandhi s case. It would have the effect of
polluting the pure fount of justice, because it might induce an innocent
accused to plead guilty to suffer a light and inconsequential punish-
ment rather than go through a long and ardous criminal trial which,
having regard to our combrous and unsatisfactory system of adminis-
tration of justice, is not only long drawn out and ruinous in terms of D
time and money, but also uncertain and unpredictable in its result
and the judge also might be likely to be deflected from the path of
duty to do justice and he might eitl1er convict an innocent accused by
accepting the plea of guilty or let off a guilty accused with a light
sentence, thus, subverting the process of law and frustrating the social
objective and purpose of the anti-adulteration statute. This practice E
would also tend to encourage corruption and collusion and as a direct
consequence, contribute to the lowering of the standard of justice.
There is no doubt in our mind that the conviction of an accused
based on a plea of guilty en!ered by him as a result of plea-bargaining
with the prosecution and the Magistrate must be held to be unconsti-
F
tutional and illegal. The High Coun should have therefore, set aside
the conviction of the appellants and sent the case back to the learned
Magistrate for trial in accordal)ce with law, ignoring the plea of guilty
entered by the appellant. The High Coun was clearly in error in
not doing so.
G
We accordingly allow the appeal,· set aside the judgments of the
High Court as also the Order of conviction and sentence recorded
against the appellant by the learned Magistrate and remand the case
to the \earned Magistrate so that he may proceed with the case from
the stage at which the appellant confessed to a plea of guilty. The
learned trial Magistrate will ignore the plea of guilty entered by ilie H
appellant and proceed further with the case after giving an opportunity
to the prosecution to lead such additional evidence as it thinks fit and
1042 SUPREME COURT REPORTS U980J 3 s.c.w

t A then allowing the appellant to enter upon his defence and lead sncb
e'1dence in defence as he thinks proper and then dispose of the case
in accordance with law. The appellant will continue on the same
bail on which he has been released by this Court by its Order dated
30th March, 1979.
BHAGWATI, J. The facts giving arise to this appeal by special
B leave are almost identical with those of Criminal Appeal No. 93 of
1980 save and except that the appellant is different and for the same 1
reasons as are given by us in our Judgment disposing of Criminal-._,_
Appeal No. 93 of 1980, we allow the present appeal, set aside the. ~
judgment of the High Coort as also the Order of Conviction and ,
sentence recorded against the appellant by the learned Magistrate and ·
c remand the case to the learned Magistrate so that he may proceed with I
the case from the stage at which the appellant confessed to a plea of '
guilty. The learned trial Magistrate will iguore the plea of guilty
entered by the appellant and proceed further with the case after giving
an opportunity to the prosecution to lead such additional evidence as
D it thinks fit and then allowing the appellant to enter upon his defence
and lead such evidence in defence as he thinks proper and then dispose
of the case in accordance with law. The appellant will continue on
the same b~il on which he has been released by this Court by its Order
dated 30th March, 1979.
N.V.K. Appeals allowed.
E

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