Holding

A university established under a State Universities Act is an “other authority” within the meaning of Section 3(31) of the General Clauses Act, its fund is a local fund, and acquisition of land for its campus is a public purpose, so Chapter VII procedures are not required.

Summary

The case concerned Kashi Vidyapith, a deemed university under the U.P. State Universities Act, which sought acquisition of land for its campus, staff quarters, hostels and playground. The High Court had set aside the declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, holding that the university was not an “other authority” under Section 3(31) of the General Clauses Act and that the acquisition was not a public purpose, thus requiring compliance with Chapter VII procedures. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the university, whose funds are subject to statutory control and inspection by the State Government, qualifies as a “local authority” and whether the expenditure of those funds constitutes a local fund within the meaning of Section 3(31). The Court held that the university is indeed an “other authority” under the General Clauses Act, its fund is a local fund, and the acquisition for university buildings serves a public purpose, so the Chapter VII procedure need not be followed. Consequently, the High Court’s quashing of the declaration was reversed and the land acquisition was allowed to proceed, with the Land Acquisition Officer directed to complete the award within six months. The appeal was allowed without costs.

Issues considered

Whether Kashi Vidyapith, as a deemed university under the U.P. State Universities Act, qualifies as an “other authority” within the meaning of Section 3(31) of the General Clauses Act, 1897.
Whether the funds of the university constitute a “local fund” under the same provision, thereby making the acquisition a public purpose.
Whether the procedure prescribed in Chapter VII of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 must be complied with for the acquisition of land for university purposes.
Whether the High Court’s interpretation of the ejusdem generis rule in limiting “other authority” to municipalities and similar bodies is applicable.

Legislation cited

Amendment Act 68 of 1984
General Clauses Act, 1897s. 3(31)
Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 3(j), s. 4(1), s. 5-A, s. 6, s. Chapter VII
U.P. State Universities Act, 1973s. 33, s. 4(2), s. 4(3)(i), s. 55(3), s. 55(8), s. 55-A, s. 8

Subjects

land acquisitionpublic purposelocal fundGeneral Clauses Actuniversitystatutory authorityejusdem generisChapter VIIdeclaration under Section 6U.P. State Universities ActSupreme Court interpretation

Judgment

- KASHI VIDYAPITH
v.
MOTILAL AND ORS.
A

JULY 24, 1996
B
[K. RAMASWAMY AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.]

Land Acquisition Act, 1894: Section 3(j) (As it stood prior to Amend-
ment Act 68 of 1984), 4(1), 5-A and 6 and Chapter VII.

U.P. State Universities Act, 1973 : Sections 4(2)(3)(i), 8, 33, 55(3)(8) C
and 55-A.

General Clauses Act, 1897: Section 3(31).

Kashi Vidyapith-Acquisition of lands for construction of the University D
campus building and staff quarters-W>it challenging Notification and decla-
rati01i-High Cowt setting aside the declarati01t-Appeal-Held object of
establishment of University is for impa1ting higher educatio1r-Acquisition for
construction of University building including staff quarters, hostels and play-
ground was for a public purpose-Amount spent from the University fund is
a local fund within the meaning of section 3(31) of General Clauses E
Act-Therefore it is not necessary that State Gove1nnzent should again con-
bibute front its exchequer toward acquisition-Procedure presclibed under
Chapter VII of the land acquisition need not be followed-Held a University
must be constn1ed to be any other authority within the meaning of Section
3(31) of General Clauses Act-Quashing of declaration by High Court cannot F
be upheld.

Interpretation of Statutes.

Rule of ejusdem generis-Applicability of
G
Words and Phrases :"Other authority''-''Local ftmd"-Meaning of

Valjibhai Muljibhai Soneji & Anr. v. The State of Bombay (now
Gujarat) & Ors., [1964) 3 SCR 686 and State of West Bengal & 01~. v. P.N.
Talukdar & Ors., (1966) 1 SCJ 28, held inapplicable. H
5
6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 929-30 of
1981.

From the Judgment and Order dated 10.5.79 of the Allahabad High
Court in C.W.P. No. 2171-2172 of 1977. \.

B
Shiva Pujan Singh for the Appellant.

P.A. Choudhary, T.C. Sharma, Ms. Rajni K. Prasad and (Ms. Shiel
Sethi) Adv. (NP) for the Respondents.

c The following Order of the Court was delivered :

These appeals by special leave arise from the order of the Division
Bench of the Allahabad High Court made on May 10, 1979 in W.P. Nos.
2171 and 2172 of 1977. The admitted facts are that the appellant Vidyapith
D thm,gh initially was a society constituted under the Societies Registration
Act, by operation of sub-section (2) of Section 4 of the U.P. State Univer-
sities Act, 1973 (for short, the 'Universities Act'), it became a deemed
university w.e.f. 16.1.1974 after the publication of the notification under
Section (4)2 on 10.1.1974. Though proceedings were initiated in the year
1971-72 for acquisition of the lands for construction for the university
E campus buildings including the staff quarters etc., the notification under
Section 4(1) of the land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894) (for short, the
'Act') came to be pl'blished in the State Gazette on 19.4.1974. After
enquiry was conducted under Section 5-A declaration, under Section 6(1)
was published on March 27, 1977. The respondents came to question the
F validity of the notification under Section 4(1) and the declaration under
Section 6 of the Act. The Division Bench allowed the writ petitions and set
aside the declaration under Section 6 on the ground that the procedure
contemplated in Chapter-VII of the Act was not followed. The University
is not "other authority" under Section 3(31) of the General Clauses Act,
1897 as applicable to the State of U.P. The "other authority" should be
G understood ejus dem generis as municipality, gram panchayat etc. The fund
held by the Appellant cannot be held to be a local fund under the control
of the State. Under those circumstances, unless the State makes a part of
its contribution for the acquisition, it is not a public purpose and, therefore,
the declaration under Section 6 was invalid. Calling that order in question,
H these appeals came to be filed.
KASHIVIDYAPITH v. MOTILAL 7

The crucial question that arises for consideration is : whether the A
view taken by the High Court is correct in law ? It is contended by Shri
Shiv Pujan Singh, learned counsel for the appellant, that the view of the
High Court is not correct in view of the provisions contained in the
Universities Act, After the appellant became a deemed university, by
operation of sub-section (3)(1) of Section 4 of the Universities Act the fund
B
held by the appellant became a statutory fund over which the members had

.. no control. The fund should be expended only for the purpose of manage-
ment and improvement of the university and for no other purpose. The
"local fund" as defined in Section 3(31) of the General Clauses Act has
wide meaning over which the State Government has control under the Act.
Therefore, the view of the Court is untenable. Shri P.A. Chowdhary, c
learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents, raised three-fold
contentions. It is contended that the view of the High Court is sustainable
on the ground that unless the university is a local authority, the purpose of
acquisition cannot be declared to be a public purpose. The authority ejus
dem gene1is would be like municipality having statutory control over its D
local funds over which the State Government also has control. In this case,
y
the university is an autonomons university over which the State has no
financial control. The local fund as understood in etymological sense would
be construed to be the fund analogous to the fund held and expended by
the municipality etc. In support thereof, he places strong reliance on the
judgment of this Court in Valjibhai Mu/jibhai Soneji & A111: v. The State of E
Bombay (now Gujarat) & Ors., [1964] 3 SCR 686 and State of West Bengal
& 01>. v. P.N. Talukdar & Ors., (1966) 1 SCJ 28. With a view to appreciate
the respective contentions, it is necessary to look to the provisions of the
• Act.
F
The "Public purpose" as was available prior to the Amendment Act
68 of 1984 is an inclusive definition as contained in Section 3(f) of the Act
which includes the provision of villages in districts in which the local
Government shall have declared by notification in the official gazette which
is necessary for the Government to make such provision and .... Under
second proviso to Section 6(1) of the Act, no such declaration shall be G
made unless the compensation to be awarded for such property ~' to be
paid by a company or wholly or partly out of the public revenue or fund
controlled or managed by a local authority.

It is not in dispute that the establishment of university and construe- H
8 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A tion of the buildings including staff quarters, hostels, play-ground etc. is a
public purpose provided if it is done by an authority within the meaning of
Section 3(31) of General Clauses Act. The main emphasis of Shri
Chowdhary is that unless the authority is one that is analogous to the one
like municipality, it would not be a local authority. The State has the
control over the local fund held by the municipalities etc., but the funds
B
held or controlled by the university are not under the control of the State
Government and that, therefore, unless the procedure prescribed in Chap-
ter VII of the Act is followed, it is not public purpose. We do not find the
contention to be acceptable.

c Section 4(3)(i) of the Universities Act postulates thus :

"(3) As from the date appointed under sub-section (2) ..

(i) the society known as the Kashi Vidyapith, Varanasi shall be
dissolved, and all property movable and immovable, and rights,
D powers and privileges of the society shall be transferred to and
vest in the University and shall be applied to the objects and
purpose for which the University is established;" '
Section 8 of the Act envisages the inspection and control over the
universities and it postulates, among other things, that the State Govern-
E ment shall have the right to cause an inspection made by such person or
persons as it may direct, of the University or any constituent college or any
institute maintained by the University, including its buildings etc. etc. to
cause an inquiry made in the like manner in respect of any matters
connected with the administration and finances of the university. 1

F
Section 33 gives power of control over the provident fund etc. of the
teaching staff. Section 55(3) obligates the university to prepare annual
accounts and the balance sheet duly audited which shall together with the
•
copies of the report be submitted by the Executive Council to the Court
and to the State Government. Section 55(8) gives control to the State
G Government over the finances as welL Section 55-A gives power to impose
surcharge and Section 55(8) and to take action against the erring Vice-
Chancellor. It also gives power to have the control over the grants made
by the State povernment, Government of India, or the University Grants
Commission or any international organisation or any other fund by the
H funding authorities. It would thus be clear that the State Government has
KASH! VIDYAPITH v. MOTILAL 9

financial control over the university. A

It is true that the University is supposed to be autonomous in its
management. But the limited question that arises for consideration is :
whether the State has control over the funds of the University ? As seen
from the above provisions, the State has sufficient control over the funds B
to be expended by the university. Though the expenditure is to be made by
the university, the funds come from the contributions made by various
authorities. Under those circumstances, it is a local fund.

The further question is whether the procedure prescribed under
> Chapter VII should be followed ? It is true that this Court in Valfibhai's C
case (supra) had held that the State Transport Corporation constituted
under the Bombay Transport Corporation Act was a company and the
procedure prescribed in Chapter VII was not followed and that, therefore,
though the Road Transport Corporation came lo be constituted for public
transport, it is not a public purpose. It is seen that decision has no D
application to the facts in this case. In that case the State Transport
Authority came to be constituted under a State enactment which was
repealed by the Central Act. The Corporation was not constituted under
the Central Act. Under the State statute that continued to be a company
and the Government had not contributed any money for the expenditure
to be incurred for acquisition. Under those circumstances, this Court came E
to hold that the acquisition was bad in law.

In Talukdar's case (supra) a Bench of three Judges of this Court was
called upon to consider whether the acquisition of Ramakrishna Mission
was for a public purpose without following the procedure prescribed under F
Section 40 in Chapter VII of the Act. Though the object of the institution
was very wide and it intended to propagate religious, social educational
and teaching activities for the benefi~ of the public, it was held that
construction of the staff quarters, play-ground and hostel was not a public
purpose. Since the acquisition was for an lntegral scheme which cannot be
separated, the entire notification came to be quashed. The ratio therein G
. .,... also has no application to the facts in this ca;-e. Once it is held that the
University was duly constituted under the Act, the very object of the
establishment of the university is for imparting higher education to the
students. Without the buildings to the staff and the students, hostel,
playground etc., the object of the establishment of the university cannot be H
10 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A achieved. Under these circumstances, it must be that the acquisition is for
a public purpose.

The learned Judges, with due respect, have applied the doctrine of
ejus dem geneiis to the other authority under Section 3(31) of the General
Clauses Act to be like a municipality etc. When the "local authority" was
B widely defined under the General Clauses Act to include "any authority",
a university must be construed to be any other authority within the meaning
of Section 3(31) of the General Clauses Act as applicable to the State of
U.P. Therefore, the establishment of a university being by an authority
established under the Universities Act, the amount spent from the univer-
c sity fund is a local fund within the meaning of Section 3(31) of the General
Clauses Act and that, therefore, there is no need for the State Government
again to contribute from its exchequedowards the costs of acquisition of
the property. Consequently, the procedure prescribed under Chapter VII
of the Act need not be followed.

D It is then contended by Shri Chowdhary that since there was inor-
dinate delay of over 22 years from 1974, it is not a case for interference.
We find no force in the contention. As seen, when the declaration was
published, the appellants had gone to the Court and had the declaration
quashed. In view of the fact that the view taken by the High Court was not
correct in law; we cannot uphold the quashing of declaration under Section
E 6. However, the Land Acquisition Officer is directed to conduct and
complete the award enquiry within a period of six months from the date
of the receipt of this order and then pass appropriate award accordingly.

The appeals are accordingly allowed, but in the circumstances,
p without costs.

T.N.A. Appeals allowed.

~-