KIRAN PAL SINGHversusTHE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
- Citation
- 2018 INSC 530
- Decided
- 17 May 2018
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- DIPAK MISRA
Holding
Section 15(12) does not apply because no meeting was convened under the first notice; therefore the second notice of no‑confidence is statutorily permissible.
Summary
Kiran Pal Singh, the Pramukh of a Kshettra Panchayat in Uttar Pradesh, challenged a second notice of a no‑confidence motion issued by the Collector, arguing that Section 15(12) of the Uttar Pradesh Kshettra Panchayats and Zila Panchayats Act, 1961 barred any subsequent notice within a year of the first notice. The High Court dismissed the petition, and the Supreme Court on appeal examined the statutory scheme. The Court held that Section 15(12) only becomes operative after a meeting has been convened and the motion either fails or cannot be held due to lack of quorum; mere receipt of a notice does not trigger the one‑year bar. Since no meeting was held on the first notice, the second notice was valid and the appeal was dismissed.
Issues considered
- Does Section 15(12) of the Uttar Pradesh Kshettra Panchayats and Zila Panchayats Act, 1961 prohibit issuance of a second no‑confidence notice within one year when the first notice has not resulted in a meeting?
- What is the scope of the Collector's duty under Section 15(3) in verifying the notice before convening a meeting?
- How should the terms ‘motion not carried out’ and ‘quorum’ be interpreted under the Act?
Legislation cited
- Uttar Pradesh Kshettra Panchayats and Zila Panchayats Adhiniyam, 1961s. 11, s. 13, s. 15, s. 8, s. 9
Subjects
Judgment
[2018] 4 S.C.R. 535 535
KIRAN PAL SINGH A
v.
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 2622 of 2018)
MAY 17, 2018 B
[DIPAK MISRA, CJI, A. M. KHANWILKAR
AND DR. D.Y. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.]
Uttar Pradesh Kshettra Panchayats and Zila Panchayats
Adhiniyam, 1961:
C
s. 15 (2) and (12) – Notice under s. 15(2) – For carrying out
no confidence motion – Against Pramukh of the Kshettra Panchyat
(Appellant) – No action taken on the notice – Another notice u/s.
15(2) – Meeting of Panchayat convened by Competent Authority
for consideration of no confidence motion – Resulting in passing
D
of no confidence motion – Appellant filed writ petition u/Art. 226 of
Constitution challenging the second notice on the ground that
during pendency of first notice second notice could not have been
issued in view of prohibition under sub-section (12) of s. 15 – High
Court dismissed the petition – On appeal, held: s. 15(12) comes
into play when there is meeting and motion is not carried out as per E
provisions of s.15 or meeting could not be held for want of quorum
– In the present case, s. 15(12) would not be applicable as no
meeting was convened to consider the previous notice – Mere
receipt of notice would not allow prohibition under s. 15(12) to
come into play.
F
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. In the present case, there is no allegation that
the meeting was convened to consider the previous notice dated
9th October, 2017, as provided in Section 15 of Uttar Pradesh
Kshettra Panchyats and Zila Panchayats Adhiniyam, 1961 and the G
motion was not challenged on any other ground or the lack of
quorum. What is singularly contended is that once a notice is
given under Section 15(2), another notice of no confidence shall
not be received until after expiration of one year. The said
submission is without any substance inasmuch as the prohibition
H
535
536 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 4 S.C.R.
A under Section 15(12) would only come into play when there is
meeting and the motion is “not carried out” as per the provisions
of Section 15 or meeting could not be held for want of quorum.
As the facts of the instant case would reveal that no meeting was
convened to consider the previous notice dated 9th October, 2017,
as per the provisions of the Act. Mere receipt of a notice by the
B
Collector will not allow the prohibition under Section 15(12) to
come into play. That is not the purpose of the provision.
Therefore, sub-section 15(12) would not come into play. Neither
of the conditions precedent is satisfied to attract the prohibition
engrafted under Section 15(12) of the Act. [Para 20][545-D-G]
C 2. The legislature being empowered by the Constitution
has legislated to provide for the establishment of Kshettra
Panchayats and Zila Panchayats in the Districts of Uttar Pradesh
to undertake certain Governmental functions at Kshettra and
District levels respectively in furtherance of the principles of
D democratic decentralisation of Governmental functions. It intends
to empower the Panchayats and that is why, Section 9 clearly
provides that the term of the office of Pramukh is for five years
from the date appointed for its first meeting. That brings stability
to the administration of the Gram Panchayat. Simultaneously, it
also provides that the democracy at the rural level must cherish
E the values of democracy and, therefore, a Pramukh can be
removed when a vote of no confidence is passed against him.
Once the no confidence motion fails, it cannot be brought again
for one year. Sub-section (13) of Section 15 provides that no
notice of a motion under Section 15 shall be received within two
F years of the assumption of office by a Pramukh. This is in
consonance with the principle of stability of rural governance.
[Para 21] [545-H; 546-A-C]
Bhanumati etc. etc. v. State of U.P. and Others
(2010) 12 SCC 1 : [2010] 7 SCR 585 ; The Punjab
G University, Chandigarh v. Vijay Singh Lamba and
Others (1976) 3 SCC 344 : [1976] Suppl. SCR 67 –
referred to.
Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 74 ; Black’s Law
Dictionary (Second Edition) – referred to.
H
KIRAN PAL SINGH v. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 537
& ORS.
Case Law Reference A
[2010] 7 SCR 585 referred to Para 3
[1976] Suppl. SCR 67 referred to Para 16
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.2622
of 2018. B
From the Judgment and Final Order dated 22.11.2017 of the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Writ-C No.55499 of 2017.
Aditya Ranjan, Adv. for the Appellant.
Md. Shahid Anwar, Aamir Naseem, Gyanendra Singh, Deepak
C
Goel, Advs. for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DIPAK MISRA, CJI. 1. India, a vast country, lives in villages.
The Gram Sabhas in the ancient era were conferred certain powers so
that there could be a feeling of participation in the societal and local D
issues and also to establish a socio-cultural amity among the members
of the collective. History records with satisfaction that panchayats were
able to settle disputes amongst the villagers and they had many a tool to
focus on unity. Mahatma Gandhi, the father of the nation, emphasized
on many an occasion that people should go to the villages to realize the
true character of real India. He had said with emphasis that ““India E
lives in her seven hundred thousand villages” and “the soul of India lives
in its villages”. The Constituent Assembly debates reflected on the
importance of the villages but it thought appropriate to incorporate the
concept of village panchayats in Article 40 of the Constitution which
occurs in Chapter IV dealing with Directive Principles of State Policy. F
The said article provides that the State shall take steps to organize village
panchayats and endow them with such powers and authorities as may
be necessary to enable them to function as units of self-government.
The said article, as is evincible, only requires the State to take steps to
confer such powers.
G
2. With the passage of time, it was realized that there had been no
real decentralization of powers. In the absence of basic decentralization
of powers travelling to the mores in one of the largest democracies like
India, it was felt that the real purpose of social transformation could not
H
538 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 4 S.C.R.
A be achieved. It was acknowledged and accepted that the people at the
grass root level deserved to be politically, economically and socially
empowered and the Seventy Third Amendment was brought into the
framework of our organic Constitution with the clear intent of having
local self-government. The vision, it can be said with certitude, is sacred
and the same is explicit from the Statement of Objects and Reasons of
B
the Seventy Third Amendment to the Constitution. It reads as follows:-
“Though the Panchayati Raj Institutions have been in existence
for a long time, it has been observed that these institutions have
not been able to acquire the status and dignity of viable and
responsive people’s bodies due to a number of reasons including
C absence of regular elections, prolonged supersessions, insufficient
representation of weaker sections like Scheduled Castes,
Scheduled Tribes and women, inadequate devolution of powers
and lack of financial resources.
2. Article 40 of the Constitution which enshrines one of the
D Directive Principles of State Policy lays down that the State shall
take steps to organise village panchayats and endow them with
such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them
to function as units of self-government. In the light of the
experience in the last forty years and in view of the short-comings
E which have been observed, it is considered that there is an
imperative need to enshrine in the Constitution certain basic and
essential features of Panchayati Raj Institutions to impart certainty,
continuity and strength to them.
3. Accordingly, it is proposed to add a new Part relating to
F Panchayats in the Constitution to provide for among other things,
Gram Sabha in a village or group of villages; constitution of
Panchayats at village and other level or levels; direct elections to
all seats in Panchayats at the village and intermediate level, if any,
and to the offices of Chairpersons of Panchayats at such levels;
reservation of seats for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
G in proportion to their population for membership of Panchayats
and office of Chairpersons in Panchayats at each level; reservation
of not less than one-third of the seats for women; fixing tenure of
5 years for Panchayats and holding elections within a period of 6
months in the event of supersession of any Panchayat;
H
KIRAN PAL SINGH v. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 539
& ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, CJI]
disqualifications for membership of Panchayats; devolution by the A
State Legislature of powers and responsibilities upon the
Panchayats with respect to the preparation of plans for economic
developments and social justice and for the implementation of
development schemes; sound finance of the Panchayats by
securing authorisation from State Legislatures for grants-in-aid to
B
the Panchayats from the Consolidated Fund of the State, as also
assignment to, or appropriation by, the Panchayats of the revenues
of designated taxes, duties, tolls and fees; setting up of a Finance
Commission within one year of the proposed amendment and
thereafter every 5 years to review the financial position of
Panchayats; auditing of accounts of the Panchayats; powers of C
State Legislatures to make provisions with respect to elections to
Panchayats under the superintendence, direction and control of
the chief electoral officer of the State; application of the provisions
of the said Part to Union territories; excluding certain States and
areas from the application of the provisions of the said Part;
D
continuance of existing laws and Panchayats until one year from
the commencement of the proposed amendment and barring
interference by courts in electoral matters relating to Panchayats.”
3. The amendment saw the introduction of Articles 243 to 243-O
which are meant for the panchayats at different levels that include Article
243(d) which defines ‘Panchayat’ to mean an institution (by whatever E
name called) of self-government (constituted under Article 243B) for
the rural areas. The said articles ignited the spirit of self-governance in
the pyramidical structure of local self government. The democratically
organized units have been conferred powers of governance and the
purpose as envisioned is to instill a sense of satisfaction in the people at F
the grass root level. It has been so recognized in Bhanumati etc. etc. v.
State of U.P. and others1. The two-Judge Bench in the said case has
expressed thus with lucidity:-
“32. What was in a nebulous state as one of Directive Principles
under Article 40, through 73rd Constitutional Amendment G
metamorphosed to a distinct part of Constitutional dispensation
with detailed provision for functioning of Panchayat. The main
purpose behind this is to ensure democratic decentralization on
the Gandhian principle of participatory democracy so that the
1
AIR 2010 SC 3796 : (2010) 12 SCC 1
H
540 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 4 S.C.R.
A Panchayat may become viable and responsive people’s bodies as
an institution of governance and thus it may acquire the necessary
status and function with dignity by inspiring respect of common
man.”
4. The singular purpose of so stating is that the source of power
B has been incorporated in the Constitution which requires the States to
make law to carry out the constitutional command. The structure of the
panchayats, the concept of Gram Sabha, the composition of panchayats,
reservation of seats, duration of panchayats, disqualification for
membership, powers, authority and responsibility of panchayats and
conferment of power on the panchayats to impose taxes, duties, tolls
C and fees, election to the panchayats, and creation of bar for courts to
interfere in electoral matters clearly show the distinct identity carved
out for the panchayats. The legislations made by the State legislatures,
inter alia, have fixed the tenure of the panchayats and also grant
protection for continuance of the elected members subject to the
D disqualifications and further the method for vote of no confidence. We
shall dwell upon the said aspect after delineation of the facts of the
case.
5. In the instant case, the appellant was elected as Pramukh,
Kshettra Panchayat Vikash Khand Gulawati, District, Bulandshahr in
E the election held in the year 2015. Some of the members of the said
panchayat moved an application under Section 15(2) of the Uttar Pradesh
Kshettra Panchayats and Zila Panchayats Adhiniyam, 1961 (for brevity,
“the Act”) before the District Magistrate/Collector, District Bulandshahr
for carrying out a no confidence motion against the Pramukh. As no
action was taken by the District Magistrate/Collector, one of the movers
F of the motion preferred Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 49013 of 2017 in
the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad seeking direction to the
competent authority to accept the notice dated 09.10.2017 under Section
15(2) of the Act and to take appropriate steps for bringing logical end to
the no confidence motion.
G 6. The Division Bench of the High Court on 24.10.2017 asked the
learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel to obtain instructions and posted
the matter on 01.11.2017. On the date fixed, the Writ Petition was
dismissed as not pressed. It is not necessary to advert under what
circumstances the said writ petition was dismissed as not pressed.
H
KIRAN PAL SINGH v. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 541
& ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, CJI]
7. As the facts would further uncurtain, on 31.10.2017 another A
written notice of intention to make the motion of no confidence was
delivered to the District Magistrate/Collector, Bulandshahr with signature
of 35 members. The District Magistrate/Collector issued notice on
07.11.2017 to convene a meeting of Kshettra Panchayat for consideration
of the motion of no confidence at 10.30 a.m. on 27.11.2017 in the office
B
of Kshettra Panchayat. On the said date, in the presence of the authorized
officer, the vote of no confidence motion was considered and, eventually,
after casting of votes, the no confidence motion was passed by 32 votes
against the appellant.
8. In pursuance of the said proceedings, the post of Pramukh fell
vacant and a public notice was issued on 21.02.2018 for holding the C
election on 09.03.2018 and the respondent No.11 was elected. We may
hasten to add that we are really not concerned with the passing of vote
of no confidence motion or the election of the respondent No.11 in the
subsequent election.
9. Suffice it to state that the appellant knocked at the doors of the D
High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution assailing the second
notice for want of confidence on the foundation of statutory
impermissibility. It was contended before the High Court that under
Section 15(2) of the Act, the District Magistrate/Collector had completely
erred in accepting the notice of intention to convene a meeting and, E
therefore, the ultimate result of the said meeting is sans effect. The
High Court, by the impugned order dated 22.11.2017, negatived the said
contention and dismissed the writ petition. Hence, the present appeal by
way of special leave.
10. Presently, we shall scrutinize the relevant statutory scheme. F
Section 8 of the Act provides for the term of Kshettra Panchayat and its
members. Section 9 deals with the term of Pramukh. It lays the postulate
that save as otherwise provided in the Act the term of office of a Pramukh
of a Kshettra Panchayat shall commence upon his election and shall
extend up to the term of the Kshettra Panchayat. Section 11 deals with
resignation of Pramukh or a member. Section 13 deals with G
disqualification for membership of Kshettra Panchayat. Section 15 deals
with motion of non-confidence in Pramukh. Sub-section (1) of Section
15 stipulates that a motion expressing want of confidence in the Pramukh
of a Kshettra Panchayat may be made and proceeded with in accordance
H
542 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 4 S.C.R.
A with the procedure laid down in the subsequent sub-sections. Sub-section
(2) of Section 15 requires the written notice of intention to make the
motion in such form as may be prescribed, signed by at least half of the
total number of elected members of Kshettra Panchayat for the time
being together with a copy of the proposed motion, to be delivered in
person, by any one of the members signing the notice, to the Collector
B
having jurisdiction over the Kshettra Panchayat. Sub-section (3) of
Section 15, by employing the word ‘shall’, makes it obligatory for the
Collector, upon receiving a written notice as aforesaid, to convene a
meeting at the office of Kshettra Panchayat for consideration of the
motion within 30 days from the date on which the notice under Section
C 15(2) is delivered to the Collector. Further, the Collector is also obligated
to give to the elected members of the Kshettra Panchayat a notice, in
such a manner as may be prescribed, at least 15 days prior to the meeting
which he is required to convene. That apart, the explanation appended
to sub-section (3) to Section 15 stipulates that for the purposes of
calculating 30 days specified in this sub-section, the period during which
D
any stay order issued by a competent court on a petition filed against the
motion is in force plus such further time as may be required for issuing
of fresh notices of the meeting to the members, shall be excluded.
11. Sub-section (4) of Section 15 postulates that the sub-divisional
officer of the sub-division in which the Kshettra Panchayat exercises
E jurisdiction shall preside over the meeting convened for consideration of
the motion at the office of the Kshettra Panchayat. The subsequent
sub-sections of Section 15 stipulate that no debate on the motion under
Section 15 shall be adjourned and the Presiding Officer shall not speak
on the merits of the motion. Also, he is not entitled to vote in the motion.
F 12. Sub-section (11)(a) of Section 15 provides that if the motion is
carried with the support of more than half of the total number of elected
members of the Kshettra Panchayat, the Presiding Officer shall cause
this fact to be published by affixing a notice on the notice board of the
office of the Kshettra Panchayat and also by notifying the same in the
G Gazette. Sub-section (11)(b) of Section 15 stipulates the consequences
of a successful motion being carried out to the effect that the Pramukh
of the Kshettra Panchayat ceases to hold office and is required to vacate
the same on and from the date next following that on which the said
notice is fixed on the notice board of the office of the Kshettra
Panchayat.
H
KIRAN PAL SINGH v. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 543
& ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, CJI]
13. Sub-section (12) of Section 15 deals with the situation when a A
motion is not carried as contemplated by the aforesaid sub-sections of
Section 15. For our purposes, sub-section (12) of Section 15, being
pertinent, is reproduced below:-
“(12) If the motion is not carried as aforesaid or if the meeting
could not be held for want of quorum, no notice of any subsequent B
motion expressing want of confidence in the same Pramukh shall
be received until after the expiration of one year from the date of
such meeting.”
14. The aforesaid provision is absolutely clear and unambiguous.
The conditions precedent for stipulation of the period of one year after
C
the expiration from the date of such meeting are dependent on three
situations, namely, (i) if the motion is not carried out as contemplated
under sub-section (11), (ii) if the meeting would not be held for want of
the quorum and, (iii) the notice of no confidence motion should be in
respect of the same Pramukh.
15. To appreciate the controversy, we have to understand the D
scheme engrafted under Section 15 of the Act. Sub-section (2) of Section
15 provides that a written notice of intention to make the motion in such
form as may be prescribed, signed by at least half of the total number of
elected members of the Kshettra Panchayat for the time being together
with a copy of the proposed motion, shall be delivered in person, by any E
one of the members signing the notice, to the Collector having jurisdiction
over the Kshettra Panchayat. Sub-section (3) requires the Collector to
convene a meeting. At this stage, the only jurisdiction that the Collector
has to scan the notice to find out whether it fulfills the essential
requirements of a valid notice. The exercise of the said discretion, as we
perceive, has to be summary in nature. There cannot be a detailed F
inquiry with regard to the validity of the notice. We are obliged to think
so as sub-section (3) mandates that a meeting has to be convened not
later than 30 days from the date of delivery of the notice and further
there should be at least 15 days’ notice to be given to all the elected
members of the Kshettra Panchayat. The Collector, therefore, should G
not assume power to enter into an arena or record a finding on seriously
disputed questions of facts relating to fraud, undue influence or coercion.
His only duty is to determine whether there has been a valid notice as
contemplated under Sub-section (2) of Section 15. His delving deep to
conduct a regular inquiry would frustrate the provision. He must function
within his own limits and leave the rest to be determined in the meeting. H
544 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 4 S.C.R.
A 16. We may now note the stand that was put forth before the
High Court. It was contended that during the pendency of the 1st notice,
the 2nd notice could not have been issued. There was no assertion that
the meeting was convened pursuant to the 1st notice in the manner in
which the statute provides for the same. The words “not carried out”
as aforesaid are of immense significance. The meeting has to be
B
convened as per the provisions of the said Section. The second part
relates to want of the quorum. Though the quorum has not been defined
under the Act, yet in the context, it would mean the quorum that requires
the number of members to be present for the purpose of voting. For
example, if the notice of intention is given to the Collector by more than
C half of the total members in Kshettra of 40 members but on the date of
the meeting, there are only 10 members, indubitably there is a lack of
quorum. Similarly, when the quorum is there and voting takes place, but
eventually the vote of no confidence fails then the motion is not carried
out as per the provisions contained in Section 15. To understand the
concept of quorum, we may refer with profit to the authority in The
D
Punjab University, Chandigarh v. Vijay Singh Lamba and othres2,
wherein while discussing about quorum, the Court had held:-
“7. …‘Quorum’ denotes the minimum number of members of any
body of persons whose presence is necessary in order to enable
that body to transact its business validly so that its acts may be
E lawful. …”
17. In Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 74, the word ‘quorum’
has been defined as follows:-
“The word ‘quorum’, now in common use, is from the Latin and
F has come to signify such a number of officers or members of any
body, as is competent by law or constitution to transact business;…
Quorum of a body is an absolute majority of it unless the authority
by which the body was created fixes it at a different number.”
18. In Black’s Law Dictionary (Second Edition), the word
G ‘quorum’ is defined as under:-
“When a committee, board of directors. meeting of shareholders,
legislative or other body of persons cannot act unless a certain
number at least of them are present, that number is called a
2
(1976) 3 SCC 344
H
KIRAN PAL SINGH v. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 545
& ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, CJI]
“quorum.” Sweet. In the absence of any law or rule fixing the A
quorum, it consists of a majority of those entitled to act. See Ex
parte Willcocks, 7 Cow. (N.Y.) 409, 17 Am. Dec. 525; State v.
Wilkesville Tp.. 20 Ohio St. 293; Heiskell v. Baltimore, 65 Md.
125, 4 Atl. 136, 57 Am. Rep. 308; Snider v. Rinehart, 18 Colo. 18,
31 Pac. 716.”
B
19. In this context, reference to sub-section (6) of Section 15 is
fruitful. It reads thus:-
“(6) As soon as the meeting convened under this section
commences, the Presiding Officer shall read to the Kshettra
Panchayat the motion for the consideration of which the meeting C
has been convened and declare it to be open for debate.”
It is quite clear that only when the number of persons are present
and the meeting takes place, the debate under sub-section (6) comes
into play. Thus, in the absence of quorum, the said provision will not
come into play. D
20. In the case at hand, there is no allegation that the meeting was
convened to consider the previous notice dated 9th October, 2017, as
provided in Section 15 and the motion was not challenged on any other
ground or the lack of quorum. What is singularly contended is that once
a notice is given under Section 15(2), another notice of no confidence E
shall not be received until after expiration of one year. The said submission
is without any substance inasmuch as the prohibition under Section 15(12)
would only come into play when there is meeting and the motion is “not
carried out” as per the provisions of Section 15 or meeting could not be
held for want of quorum. As the facts of the instant case would reveal
that no meeting was convened to consider the previous notice dated 9th F
October, 2017, as per the provisions of the Act. Mere receipt of a notice
by the Collector will not allow the prohibition under Section 15(12) to
come into play. That is not the purpose of the provision. That being the
position, the ground urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that
sub-section 15(12) would come into play is sans substratum. Neither of G
the conditions precedent is satisfied to attract the prohibition engrafted
under Section 15(12) of the Act.
21. As we have stated earlier, the legislature being empowered
by the Constitution has legislated to provide for the establishment of
H
546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 4 S.C.R.
A Kshettra Panchayats and Zila Panchayats in the Districts of Uttar Pradesh
to undertake certain Governmental functions at Kshettra and District
levels respectively in furtherance of the principles of democratic
decentralisation of Governmental functions. It intends to empower the
Panchayats and that is why, Section 9 clearly provides that the term of
the office of Pramukh is for five years from the date appointed for its
B
first meeting. That brings stability to the administration of the Gram
Panchayat. Simultaneously, it also provides that the democracy at the
rural level must cherish the values of democracy and, therefore, a Pramukh
can be removed when a vote of no confidence is passed against him.
Once the no confidence motion fails, it cannot be brought again for one
C year. It is worthy to note here that sub-section (13) of Section 15 provides
that no notice of a motion under Section 15 shall be received within two
years of the assumption of office by a Pramukh. This is in consonance
with the principle of stability of rural governance. There are provisions
for removal in case of misconduct and certain other situations with which
we are not concerned. We have referred to this aspect to highlight how
D
the legislature has visualized the democracy at the grass root level.
22. In view of the premised reasons, the appeal, being devoid of
merit, stands dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
E Kalpana K. Tripathy Appeal dismissed.
F
G
H
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