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Supreme Court of India

KIRANversusRAJKUMAR JIVRAJ JAIN & ANR.

Citation
2025 INSC 1067
Decided
1 September 2025
Disposal
Disposed off

Holding

Section 18 of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 creates an absolute bar to the grant of anticipatory bail under Section 438 CrPC where a prima facie case under Section 3 of the Act is made out, rendering the High Court’s order granting bail illegal.

Summary

The case arose from an FIR filed by Kiran, a member of the Scheduled Caste ‘Mang’, alleging that Rajkumar Jain and others assaulted him, his mother and aunt with an iron rod, used caste‑based slurs and threatened to burn their house after he voted against a candidate. The accused sought anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the CrPC, which the trial court denied but the High Court granted. The Supreme Court examined whether Section 18 of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 bars the grant of anticipatory bail when a prima facie case under Section 3 of the Act is made out. Relying on earlier decisions, the Court held that the bar is absolute unless the FIR does not disclose a prima facie offence, which was not the case here as the caste‑based insult and public‑view assault satisfied the elements of the offence. Consequently, the High Court’s order granting anticipatory bail was set aside and the appeal was allowed, cancelling the bail.

Issues considered

  • Whether Section 18 of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 bars the grant of anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the present case.
  • Whether the FIR discloses a prima facie case under Section 3 of the SC/ST Act, making the bar under Section 18 applicable.

Legislation cited

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Whether the High Court was correct in allowing the pre-arrest bail to respondent-accused u/s.438 Cr.PC in respect of alleged commission of offenses punishable u/ss.118(1), 115(1), 189(2), 189(4), 190, 191(2), 191(3), 333, 324(4), 76, 351(3) and 352 of the Bharatiya u/ss.3(1)(o), 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(1)(w)(i) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. Headnotes† Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.438 – Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 – ss.118 (1), 115(1), 189(2), 189(4), 190, 191(2), 191(3),

Subjects

Anticipatory BailSection 18 of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes Act, 1989Applicability of Section 438 CrPCPrima facie merits"Mang" or "Matang"Abusive casteist utteranceOutside the housePlace within public view

Judgment

                [2025] 9 S.C.R. 283 : 2025 INSC 1067

                                Kiran
                                  v.
                      Rajkumar Jivraj Jain & Anr.
                    (Criminal Appeal No. 3867 of 2025)
                             01 September 2025
 [B.R. Gavai, CJI, K. Vinod Chandran and N.V. Anjaria,* JJ.]


                           Issue for Consideration
       Whether the High Court was correct in allowing the pre-arrest
       bail to respondent-accused u/s.438 Cr.PC in respect of alleged
       commission of offenses punishable u/ss.118(1), 115(1), 189(2),
       189(4), 190, 191(2), 191(3), 333, 324(4), 76, 351(3) and 352
       of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and u/ss.3(1)(o), 3(1)(r),
       3(1)(s), 3(1)(w)(i) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
       (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.

                                  Headnotes†
       Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.438 – Bharatiya Nyaya
       Sanhita, 2023 – ss.118 (1), 115(1), 189(2), 189(4), 190, 191(2),
       191(3), 333, 324(4), 76, 351(3), 352 – Scheduled Castes and
       Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 –
       ss.3(1)(o), 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(1)(w)(i), 18 – Allegation that the
       accused persons beat the complainant with iron rod and
       threatened to burn the house – The word “Mangatyano”
       was used with a clear intention to humiliate the complainant
       because he belonged to the said Scheduled Caste community –
       The mother and aunt of the appellant-complainant were also
       meted out similar treatment – FIR registered – Respondent-
       accused sought anticipatory bail, which was rejected by the
       trial Court – However, the High Court granted anticipatory
       bail – Correctness:
       Held: 1. The High Court in proceeding to evaluate the testimony
       of witnesses and to opine on that basis that there were certain
       discrepancies, no offence was made out, committed a manifest
       error – The anticipatory bail granted by overlooking of and
       disregarding the bar of s.18 of the 1989 Act was a clear illegality


* Author
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       and jurisdictional error committed by the High Court – The order of
       the High Court could not be sustained in the eye of law. [Para 9]
       2. The provision of s.18 of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled
       Tribes, Act, 1989 with express language excludes the applicability
       of s.438, Cr.PC, it creates a bar against grant of anticipatory
       bail in absolute terms in relations to the arrest of a person who
       faces specific accusations of having committed the offence under
       the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe Act – The benefit of
       anticipatory bail for such an accused is taken off – The absolute
       nature of bar, however, could be read and has to be applied with a
       rider – Where on the face of it the offence u/s.3 of the Act is found
       to have not been made out and that the accusations relating to the
       commission of such offence are devoid of prima facie merits, the
       Court has a room to exercise the discretion to grant anticipatory
       bail to the accused u/s.438 of the Code – In the instant case, the
       said abusive utterances and conduct by the accused, the caste
       nexus was established – The complainant was humiliated with
       casteist and abusive approach for the reason that he did not vote
       in favour of particular candidate one accused no.8 in the Assembly
       Election as desired by the respondent-accused – In the present
       case, the incident took place outside the house of the appellant
       which could be viewed by anybody – It was indeed a place within
       public view – There is no gainsaying that in the facts of the case
       all ingredients necessary to prima facie constitute offences u/s.3
       of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe Act, 1989 as alleged
       in the FIR stood satisfied. [Paras 6, 6.1, 7.1, 8]

                                Case Law Cited
       State of M.P. & Anr. v. Ram Krishna Balothia & Anr. [1995] 1 SCR 897
       : (1995) 3 SCC 221; Vilas Pandurang Pawar v. State of Maharashtra
       [2012] 8 SCR 270 : (2012) 8 SCC 795; Prathvi Raj Chauhan v.
       Union of India [2020] 2 SCR 727 : (2020) 4 SCC 727 – relied on.
       Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab [1994] 2 SCR 375 : (1994) 3 SCC
       569; Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand [2020] 9 SCR 593 :
       (2020) 10 SCC 710; Ramesh Chandra Vaish v. State of U.P. [2023]
       6 SCR 643 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 668; Shajan Skaria v. The
       State of Kerala & Anr. [2024] 8 SCR 1086 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC
       2249; Karuppudayar v. State Rep. by the Deputy Superintendent
       of Police, Lalguid Trichy & Ors. [2025] 1 SCR 1381: 2025 SCC
       OnLine SC 2015; Swaran Singh & Ors. v. State through Standing
       Counsel & Anr. [2008] 12 SCR 132 – referred to.
[2025] 9 S.C.R.                                                          285

                    Kiran v. Rajkumar Jivraj Jain & Anr.


                                List of Acts
     Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023;
     Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities)
     Act, 1989.

                             List of Keywords
     Anticipatory Bail; Section 18 of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled
     Tribes, Act, 1989; Applicability of Section 438 CrPC; Prima facie
     merits; “Mang” or “Matang”; Abusive casteist utterance; Outside
     the house; Place within public view.

                            Case Arising From
     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
     3867 of 2025
     From the Judgment and Order dated 29.04.2025 of the High Court
     of Judicature at Bombay at Aurangabad in CRLA No. 201 of 2025

                         Appearances for Parties
     Advs. for the Appellant:
     Amol Nirmalkumar Suryawanshi, Ms. Srishty Pandey, B Dhananjay,
     M/S. Juristrust Law Offices.
     Advs. for the Respondents:
     Dilip Annasaheb Taur, Amol V Deshmukh, Ms. Ira Mahajan,
     Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, Shrirang
     B. Varma.

                Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                Judgment

     N.V. Anjaria, J.

     Leave granted.
     1.1 With the consent of learned counsels for the parties and upon
         their joint request, the appeal was taken up for final hearing
         today.
2.   By way of present appeal, what is called in question is judgment and
     order dated 29.04.2025 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay,
286                                                             [2025] 9 S.C.R.

                           Supreme Court Reports


       Bench at Aurangabad, in Criminal Appeal No.201 of 2025, whereby
       the High Court allowed the pre-arrest bail to respondent No.1 under
       Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which was
       refused by the Additional Sessions Judge, Paranda.
3.     FIR No.255/2024 came to be registered by the appellant-complainant
       with the Paranda Police Station, District Dharashiv on 26.11.2024
       against accused-respondent No.1 herein and others in respect of
       alleged commission of offenses punishable under Sections 118 (1),
       115(1), 189(2), 189(4), 190, 191(2), 191(3), 333, 324(4), 76, 351(3)
       and 352 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and under Sections
       3(1)(o), 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(1)(w)(i) of the Scheduled Castes and
       Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.
       3.1 The relevant and material part of the contents of the said FIR
           is extracted below.
                 “Today on 25.11.2024 at around 11:00 AM, while I and
                 my mother Mohini were at home, Bahubali Masalkar,
                 a peon from the Gram Panchayat Office, Kapilapuri,
                 came in front of my house and started abusing us,
                 asking why we did not vote in yesterday’s assembly
                 elections as we had asked. At that time, I tried to tell
                 him that voting was my only concern, but he abused
                 me and then rushed at me. At that time, we got into
                 a fight. After that we got into a fight. After that he
                 left from there.
                 Then at 11:20 in the morning, my village’s known,
                 namely Rajkumar Jain, Jaykumar Jain, Bharatesh
                 Awani, Jayghosh Jain, Kishore Awani, Vaibhav
                 Awani, Nabiraj Awani, Bahubali Masalkar, Jitendra
                 Wasgadekar, Anil Wasgadekar, Ranjit Rajkumar Jain,
                 Jagdish Jain, all residents of Kapilapuri (all Jains),
                 came in front of our house. At that time, Rajkumar
                 Jain said to me, “Mangtyano, you have become much
                 arrogant”, you are staying in the village and voting
                 against me, so he hit me on the head and back with
                 an iron rod.” At that time, I fell down. After that, Kishore
                 Jain and Vaibhav Awani entered my house, pushed
                 my mother Mohini and aunt Rekha, grabbed the
                 saree of mother Mohini and pulled it, threatened that
[2025] 9 S.C.R.                                                             287

                    Kiran v. Rajkumar Jivraj Jain & Anr.


                “Mangtyano, you have become arrogant, we will not let
                you stay in the village, we will burn your houses,” beat
                them with an iron rod and even punched them giving
                internal injuries. In it, a one-tola gold mangalsutra from
                mother Mohini’s fortune necklace fell somewhere in the
                scuffle. The household utensils were damaged by the
                rioters, causing total damage to our household items.
                Seeing us being beaten up, my friend Yashwant
                Bodre from the village came to the house to resolve
                the dispute. Rajkurhar Jain also said to him that you
                Ramoshi have also become arrogant, that you voted
                for someone else in yesterday’s assembly elections
                without listening to us; so he beat Yashwant on the
                left hand and back with an iron rod in his hand. At that
                time, some of them had petrol bottle in their hands
                and were shouting and threatening repeatedly that
                they would burn our houses and not let us stay in
                the village. Due to the noise of this commotion, three
                of our villagers, Avinash Masgude, Appa Masgude,
                Omkar Mane, came to the house and rescued us
                from the clutches of these men. After that, when
                approached to the Paranda police station to file a
                complaint, the police immediately gave us a letter
                for medical treatment and sent us to the Paranda
                Sub-District Hospital for medical treatment.
                On 25.11,2024 between 11:00 AM to 11.20 AM, the
                names of Rajkumar Jain, Jaykumar Jain, Bharatesh
                Awani, Jayghosh Jain, Kishore Awani, Vaibhav
                Awani, Nabiraj Awani, Bahubali Masalkar, Jitendra
                Wasgadekar, Anil Wasgadekar, Ranjeet Rajkumar
                Jain, Jagdish Jain, all residents of Kapilapuri, angry
                that I voted against them in yesterday’s assembly
                elections, even though they knew that I and my family
                belongs to the Matang community, they abused us in
                caste terms, beat us with an iron rod and injured us,
                and they also entered my house and beat my mother
                and aunt abusing in filthy language, and they pulled
                my mother’s saree and molested her, so I have a
                complaint against them.
288                                                          [2025] 9 S.C.R.

                          Supreme Court Reports


                 I am giving my above statement with full of my
                 consciousness and after reading it, I found it
                 completely correct as per my narration.”
       3.2 What is narrated in the FIR disclosed certain manifest aspects.
           On 25.11.2024 in the morning, the respondent-accused along
           with others went to the house of the appellant and standing
           outside and in front of appellant’s house stated to the appellant
           “Mangtyano, you have become much arrogant, you are staying
           in the village and voting against me”. The appellant was attacked
           with an iron rod. The mother and aunt of the appellant were
           addressed with the same set of words as above and that they
           all were beaten with the iron rod and were punched inflicting
           internal injuries, the Mangalsutra of the mother fell somewhere
           in the scuffle. The accused had in their hands petrol bottles
           and were repeatedly shouting and threatening that they would
           burn the house of the appellant. The injured appellant lodged
           the FIR from the hospital.
       3.3 The evident reason for this incident was animosity generated in
           the mind of the accused in respect of appellant’s act of not voting
           in favour of particular candidate in the assembly elections which
           had concluded on the previous day. The exhibition of enmity
           by the accused, their utterances as above and the conduct of
           beating the appellant and hurling castiest abuses and threats
           were in public view, outside the house of the appellant. The
           appellant belonged to the Scheduled Caste community whose
           caste was “Mang” or “Matang”; whereas the respondent accused
           was not the member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe
           community. He hailed from ‘Jain’ community.
       3.4 While rejecting the prayer of respondent-accused for anticipatory
           bail, the Additional Sessions Judge, Paranda recorded findings
           in paragraph 8 of his order inter alia that there was a specific
           allegation against the accused and that the accused had
           abused the complainant by referring to his caste, that the
           caste certificate confirmed that the complainant-informant
           belonged to the Scheduled Caste community and further that
           the incident was witnessed by independent witnesses. On the
           basis of statements in the FIR and the material available, the
           court concluded that the ingredients of the offences punishable
[2025] 9 S.C.R.                                                         289

                        Kiran v. Rajkumar Jivraj Jain & Anr.


             under Section 3 of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
             (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as
             “the SC/ST Act”) as alleged were made out.
      3.5 When the order rejecting the anticipatory bail was challenged
          before the High Court by the accused, the High Court took the
          view to record that there were inconsistencies in the prosecution
          story as could be gathered from the account of eye-witnesses.
          According to the High Court, the entire prosecution case
          appeared to be exaggerated and false. What weighed with the
          High Court was also the aspect that the incident took place
          immediately after the declaration of results of the assembly
          elections, therefore, it had political overtures. Resting on such
          considerations, the High Court concluded that the appellant was
          falsely implicated. Further referring to the nature of the injuries
          and allegations, the High Court granted anticipatory bail.
4.    Mr. Amol Nirmalkumar Suryawanshi, learned counsel appearing for
      the appellant-herein assailed the judgment and order of the High
      Court to submit that the High Court not only misdirected itself in
      exercise of the discretion to grant bail to respondent No.1, but it
      plainly overlooked the provisions of Section 18 of the SC/ST Act.
      Highlighting the contents of and the allegations in the FIR, it was
      submitted that the accused used abusive language referring to
      caste and the appellant who was the member of the Scheduled
      Caste community was thereby subjected to derogation and insult.
      The appellant was intimidated and his mother and aunt were also
      abused with castiest slur and were threatened. Learned counsel for
      the appellant further submitted that the castiest slur and the castiest
      abuse employed against the appellant clearly made out the offence
      under Section 3 of the SC/ST Act as alleged and since the offence
      was prima facie committed, the pre-arrest bail could not have been
      granted by the High Court in view of the provision of Section 18 of
      the Act.
      4.1 Learned counsel for the appellant relied on the decision of Vilas
          Pandurang Pawar vs. State of Maharashtra1 to submit that
          at the stage of the consideration of grant of bail or otherwise,
          the High Court was not expected to conduct a mini trial. It


1    (2012) 8 SCC 795
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                               Supreme Court Reports


             was submitted that the reasoning of the High Court was not
             acceptable. Regarding bar created by virtue of Section 18 of the
             SC/ST Act, learned counsel pressed into service the decision
             of this Court in Prathvi Raj Chauhan vs. Union of India2.
       4.2 On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No.1 seeking
           to defend the order of the High Court, submitted that Section
           18 of the SC/ST Act did not create an absolute bar to grant
           anticipatory bail. He proceeded to submit that in subsequent
           decision of this Court in Shajan Skaria vs. The State of Kerala
           & Anr.3, it was observed that the court needed to undertake an
           exercise to find out whether there was a prima facie substance
           in the allegations. According to learned counsel for respondent
           No.1, the allegations in the FIR were made for the sake of
           making and were out of anger regarding casting of vote in the
           assembly elections. He tried to submit that it was wrong to give
           a castiest colour to the allegations to conclude that any offence
           under the SC/ST Act was committed by the accused.
       4.3 The respondent-State of Maharashtra filed the counter affidavit
           and opposed the grant of pre-arrest bail to respondent No.1
           accused by emphasising the operational ambit of Section 18
           of the SC/ST Act. It was highlighted that when prima facie
           material existed in the form of allegations in the FIR and other
           attendant factual aspects, the respondent No.1 could not have
           been granted the anticipatory bail by the High Court.
5.     Amongst the offences alleged in the FIR, included those under
       Sections 3(1)(o), 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) and 3(1)(w)(i) of the SC/ST Act. The
       relevant extract of Section 3 of the SC/ST Act is as under.
             “3. Punishments for offences atrocities.— (1) Whoever,
             not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled
             Tribe,
             (b) to (n) … … …
             (o) commits any offence under this Act against a member
             of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe for having



2    (2020) 4 SCC 727
3    2024 SCC OnLine SC 2249
[2025] 9 S.C.R.                                                               291

                     Kiran v. Rajkumar Jivraj Jain & Anr.


           voted or not having voted for a particular candidate or for
           having voted in a manner provided by law;
           (p) … … …
           (q) … … …
           (r) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate
           a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in
           any place within public view;
           (s) abuses any member of a Scheduled Caste or a
           Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any place within public
           view;
           (t) … … …
           (u) … … …
           (v) … … …
           (w) (i) intentionally touches a woman belonging to a
           Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, knowing that
           she belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,
           when such act of touching is of a sexual nature and is
           without the recipient’s consent; (ii) uses words, acts or
           gestures of a sexual nature towards a woman belonging
           to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, knowing that
           she belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe.
     5.1 Section 18 of the SC/ST Act is reproduced:
                    “18. Section 438 of the Code not to apply to
                    persons committing an offence under the Act.—
                    Nothing in section 438 of the Code shall apply in
                    relation to any case involving the arrest of any
                    person on an accusation of having committed an
                    offence under this Act.”
           5.1.1 Section 18A in its sub section (1) of the Act provides
                 that for the registration of an FIR against any person,
                 preliminary enquiry shall not be required. It is further
                 stated that the investigating officer shall not be required
                 to take approval for the arrest, if necessary, of any person
                 against whom an accusation about the commission of
                 an offence under this SC/ST Act has been made. Sub
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                       section (2) of Section 18A of the SC/ST Act mentions
                       that the provisions of Section 438 of the Cr.PC shall
                       not apply to a case under this Act notwithstanding any
                       judgment or order or direction of any Court.
       5.2 It is evident from the above provision of Section 18 that it
           expressly excludes the applicability of Section 438 of the Code
           of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“hereinafter referred to as “the
           Cr.PC”). In another words, in relation to any case involving
           arrest of a person who is facing the accusation about committing
           offence under this Act, protection of Section 438, Cr.P.C. would
           not be available. The Legislature has taken away the benefit of
           anticipatory bail in respect of the arrest for the offences alleged
           under the SC/ST Act. The bar in Section 18 of the SC/ST Act
           would operate.
       5.3 While upholding the Constitutional validity of Section 18 of
           the Act, this Court in State of M.P. & Anr. vs. Ram Krishna
           Balothia & Anr.4 observed as under,
                       “… The offences enumerated under the said Act
                       fall into a separate and special class. Article 17 of
                       the Constitution expressly deals with abolition of
                       ‘untouchability’ and forbids its practice in any form.
                       It also provides that enforcement of any disability
                       arising out of ‘untouchability’ shall be an offence
                       punishable in accordance with law. The offences,
                       therefore, which are enumerated under Section 3(1)
                       arise out of the practice of ‘untouchability’.”
                                                                    (Para 6)

            5.3.1 The court proceeded to observe,
                       “The exclusion of Section 438 CrPC in connection
                       with offences under the Act has to be viewed in the
                       contest of the prevailing social conditions which give
                       rise to such offences, and the apprehension that
                       perpetrators of such atrocities are likely to threaten
                       and intimidate their victims and prevent or obstruct


4   (1995) 3 SCC 221
[2025] 9 S.C.R.                                                                293

                        Kiran v. Rajkumar Jivraj Jain & Anr.


                       them in the prosecution of these offenders, if the
                       offenders are allowed to avail of anticipatory bail as
                       pointed out in the Statement of Objects and Reasons
                       of the Act. In these circumstances, if anticipatory
                       bail is not made available to persons who commit
                       such offences, such a denial cannot be considered
                       as unreasonable or violative of Article 14, as these
                       offences form a distinct class by themselves and
                       cannot be compared with other offences”
                                                                    (para 6)

     5.4 The aforesaid bar is held to be not violative of Article 21 of
         the Constitution. In Kartar Singh vs. State of Punjab5 it was
         stated that taking away the right of pre-arrest bail under Section
         438 of the Cr.PC, under Section 18 of the SC/ST Act would not
         infringe the right to personal liberty.
     5.5 In Vilas Pandurang Pawar vs. State of Maharashtra6, this
         Court explained the bar under Section 18 of the SC/ST Act
         against grant of anticipatory bail in the following words,
                       “Section 18 of the SC/ST Act creates a bar for
                       invoking Section 438 of the Code. However, a
                       duty is cast on the court to verify the averments in
                       the complaint and to find out whether an offence
                       under Section 3(1) of the SC/ST Act has been
                       prima facie made out. In other words, if there is a
                       specific averment in the complaint, namely, insult or
                       intimidation with intent to humiliate by calling with
                       caste name, the accused persons are not entitled
                       to anticipatory bail.”
                                                                    (Para 9)

            5.5.1 It was further stated in Vilas Pandurang Pawar (supra),
                       “Moreover, while considering the application for bail,
                       scope for appreciation of evidence and other material


5   (1994) 3 SCC 569
6   (2012) 8 SCC 795
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                         Supreme Court Reports


                 on record is limited. The court is not expected
                 to indulge in critical analysis of the evidence on
                 record. When a provision has been enacted in the
                 Special Act to protect the persons who belong to
                 the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes
                 and a bar has been imposed in granting bail under
                 Section 438 of the Code, the provision in the Special
                 Act cannot be easily brushed aside by elaborate
                 discussion on the evidence.”
                                                            Para 10)

       5.6 A three judge bench of this Court in Prathvi Raj Chauhan
           (supra) expressed itself thus,
                 “… exclusion of Section 438 CrPC in connection
                 with offences under the Act has to be viewed in
                 the context of the prevailing social conditions which
                 give rise to such offences, and the apprehension
                 that perpetrators of such atrocities are likely to
                 threaten and intimidate their victims and prevent or
                 obstruct them in the prosecution of these offenders,
                 if the offenders are allowed to avail of anticipatory
                 bail as pointed out in the Statement of Objects and
                 Reasons of the Act.”
                                                             (Para 6)

           5.6.1 This Court emphasised in Prithvi Raj Chauhan (supra)
                 that anticipatory bail cannot be granted as a matter of
                 right. It was stated that bail is essentially a statutory
                 right and cannot be said to be an essential ingredient
                 of Article 21of the Constitution. It was further observed
                 that if anticipatory bail is not made available to persons
                 who commit such offences, such a denial cannot be
                 considered as unreasonable or violative of Article 14, as
                 these offences form a distinct class by themselves and
                 cannot be compared with other offences.
       5.7 The aforesaid provision of Section 18 and the bar created
           thereunder has to be seen in the context of the object and
           purpose with which the Parliament enacted the SC/SC Act,
[2025] 9 S.C.R.                                                       295

                    Kiran v. Rajkumar Jivraj Jain & Anr.


           1989. This legislation was brought into force with an avowed
           object of implementing the measures to improve the socio-
           economic conditions of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
           Tribes, who have remained a vulnerable class in the society.
           The underlying idea is to ensure that the persons belonging
           to these classes are not denied their civil rights, are not
           subjected to indignities and are insulated from humiliation
           and harassment.
           5.7.1 The provisions of Section 18 in its ultimate analysis,
                 furthers the very object of the enactment. Seemingly a
                 stricter provision, it underscores the Constitutional idea
                 of availing social justice and to ensure the same pedestal
                 for the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe community
                 people with other classes in the society.
     5.8 The decision of this Court in Shajan Skaria (supra) sought to
         be pressed into service on behalf of respondent No.1 take no
         different view. In that case, the Bench of two Judges of this
         Court elaborated the law in respect of grant of anticipatory bail,
         then highlighted and recognised the bar created under Section
         18 of the SC/ST Act to observe that only in the cases where
         the offence could not be said to have been made out on a very
         prima facie consideration, the court may exercise the discretion
         to grant pre-arrest bail to the accused.
           5.8.1 In Shajan Skaria (supra) case the appellant-accused
                 who was an Editor of an Online news channel who
                 had published a video on YouTube levelling certain
                 allegations against the complainant who belonged
                 to “Pulaya” community and who was a Member of
                 Kerala State Legislative Assembly representing the
                 constituency which seat was reserved for the member
                 of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe community.
                 An attentive reading of the broadcast made on YouTube
                 which was a subject matter in that case, would go to
                 indicate that there was no reference therein to the
                 caste name, which aspect becomes clear from the very
                 translation itself, narrated in the judgment by the Court.
                 The caste word “Pulaya” was not even referred to in the
                 complaint also, what was only stated by complainant
296                                                            [2025] 9 S.C.R.

                              Supreme Court Reports


                     the subject matter was on Scheduled Caste community.
                     In the totality of the circumstances thereby this Court in
                     Shajan Skaria (supra) took the view that the contents
                     of the YouTube video displayed by the accused were
                     not intended to denigrate the complainant as a member
                     of the Scheduled Caste and that it could not be said
                     to be with castiest slur.
       5.9 In Hitesh Verma vs. State of Uttarakhand & Anr.7 as well
           as in Ramesh Chandra Vaish vs. State of U.P.8 this Court
           stated that intimidation or insult amounts to an offence
           under Section 3(1) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
           Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 should have been
           targeted intentionally to the member of the Scheduled Caste or
           Scheduled Tribe community and also because he is member
           of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe community. In
           Swarn Singh (supra), it was stated that for making out
           the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the SC/ST Act, 1989, it
           requires that the insult or intimidation should be at a place
           within public view.
6.     In light of the parameters in relation to the applicability of Section 18
       of the Act emanating from afore-discussed various decisions of this
       Court, the proposition could be summarised that as the provision
       of Section 18 of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes, Act,
       1989 with express language excludes the applicability of Section
       438, Cr.PC, it creates a bar against grant of anticipatory bail in
       absolute terms in relations to the arrest of a person who faces specific
       accusations of having committed the offence under the Scheduled
       Caste and Scheduled Tribe Act. The benefit of anticipatory bail for
       such an accused is taken off.
       6.1 The absolute nature of bar, however, could be read and has to
           be applied with a rider. In a given case where on the face of it
           the offence under Section 3 of the Act is found to have not been
           made out and that the accusations relating to the commission
           of such offence are devoid of prima facie merits, the Court has


7    (2020) 10 SCC 710
8    2023 SCC OnLine SC 668
[2025] 9 S.C.R.                                                          297

                    Kiran v. Rajkumar Jivraj Jain & Anr.


           a room to exercise the discretion to grant anticipatory bail to
           the accused under Section 438 of the Code.
     6.2 Non-making of prima facie case about the commission of offence
         is perceived to be such a situation where the Court can arrive
         at such a conclusion in the first blush itself or by way of the
         first impression upon very reading of the averments in the FIR.
         The contents and the allegations in the FIR would be decisive
         in this regard. Furthermore, in reaching a conclusion as to
         whether a prima facie offence is made out or not, it would not
         be permissible for the Court to travel into the evidentiary realm
         or to consider other materials, nor the Court could advert to
         conduct a mini trial.
7.   Reverting to the facts of the present case, the respondent-accused
     was not a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe community.
     The appellant belonged to scheduled caste community known as
     “Mang” or “Matang”. The allegations made in the FIR lodged by the
     complainant was that he was addressed by the accused with abusive
     casteist utterance “Mangatyano, you are became very arrogant,
     you are staying in the village and voting against”. The appellant
     was addressed as above by the accused outside the house of the
     appellant where others were present
     7.1 The accused persons beat the complainant with iron rod and
         threatened to burn the house. The mother and aunt of the
         appellant-complainant were also meted out similar treatment
         with intimidation and were addressed with same casteist slur.
         The use of the word “Mangatyano” was with a clear intention
         to humiliate the complainant because he belonged to the said
         Scheduled Caste community. In the said abusive utterances and
         conduct by the accused, the caste nexus was established. The
         complainant was humiliated with casteist and abusive approach
         for the reason that he did not vote in favour of particular candidate
         one Bahubali-accused No.8 in the Assembly Election as desired
         by the respondent-accused.
     7.2 The incident as above took place outside the house of the
         complainant, it was a place within public view. The term
         “any place within public view” was considered by this Court
         in Swarn Singh (supra) and Hitesh Verma (supra) was
298                                                          [2025] 9 S.C.R.

                               Supreme Court Reports


             also subsequently referred to in the decision of this Court in
             Karuppudayar vs. State Rep. by the Deputy Superintendent
             of Police, Lalguid Trichy & Ors.9 wherein the Court drew
             distinction between “public place” and “any place within public
             view”. It was held that if the offence is committed outside the
             building, for example in the lawn outside the house, and the
             lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lawn outside
             the boundary wall, then the lawn would certainly be a place
             within the public view.
8.     In the present case, as noted above, the incident took place outside
       the house of the appellant which could be viewed by anybody. It was
       indeed a place within public view. There is no gainsaying that in the
       facts of the case all ingredients necessary to prima facie constitute
       offences under Section 3 of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled
       Tribe Act, 1989 as alleged in the FIR stood satisfied. Furthermore,
       the occurrence of incident was fortified by recovery of clothes and
       weapons.
9.     In the above view, there is no escape from the conclusion that offence
       under the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of
       Atrocities) Act, 1989 is made out from the bare reading of the FIR.
       The High Court in proceeding to evaluate the testimony of witnesses
       and to opine on that basis that there were certain discrepancies, no
       offence was made out, committed a manifest error. The anticipatory
       bail granted by overlooking of and disregarding the bar of Section 18
       of the Act was a clear illegality and jurisdictional error committed by
       the High Court. The order of the High Court could not be sustained
       in the eye of law.
10. In the result, the judgement and order dated 29.04.2025 in Criminal
    Appeal No.201 of 2025 passed by the High Court of Judicature at
    Bombay, Bench at Aurangabad is hereby set aside. The Appeal is
    allowed. The anticipatory bail granted to respondent No. 1 stands
    cancelled.
       10.1 It is clarified at this stage that the observations and findings
            recorded in this judgment are of prima facie nature, limited for



9    2025 SCC OnLine SC 2015
[2025] 9 S.C.R.                                                        299

                      Kiran v. Rajkumar Jivraj Jain & Anr.


              the purpose of deciding the question of grant of anticipatory
              bail. The trial shall proceed independently on its own merits,
              uninfluenced by any observations herein.
     In view of the disposal of the main appeal, all the interlocutory
     applications as may be pending stands disposed of.

     Result of the case: Appeal disposed of.




     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan


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KIRAN versus RAJKUMAR JIVRAJ JAIN & ANR. — 2025 INSC 1067 - Legal Desk AI