KIRPAL SINGH, M.L.A.versusUTTAM SINGH & ANR.
- Citation
- 1985 INSC 226
- Decided
- 9 October 1985
- Disposal
- Disposed off
- Bench
- O CHINNAPPA REDDY
Holding
The Court held that the extension of disqualification to employees of public sector undertakings is a legislative policy question for Parliament, and it set aside the High Court's award of costs against the appellant.
Summary
Kirpal Singh was elected to the Punjab Legislative Assembly in 1972, but his election was set aside by the Punjab and Haryana High Court because the nomination of another candidate, Basant Singh, had been improperly rejected on the ground that he was a development officer in the Life Insurance Corporation, a public sector undertaking. The High Court held that the corporation's staff regulations could only subject Basant Singh to disciplinary action and did not disqualify him, leading to the cancellation of Kirpal Singh's election. Kirpal Singh appealed to the Supreme Court under Section 116A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and the Court granted a limited interim order allowing him to attend the Assembly without voting or remuneration. While disposing the appeal, the Court observed that the question of extending disqualification to employees of public sector undertakings under Article 191(1)(e) and Section 10 of the Act is a policy matter for Parliament, not the judiciary. The Court set aside the High Court's award of costs against the appellant and noted that the appeal had become infructuous after three subsequent general elections. No substantive ruling on the disqualification issue was made, and the Court recommended that the matter be examined by the Law Commission.
Issues considered
- Whether employees of public sector undertakings are disqualified from contesting elections under Article 191(1)(e) of the Constitution and Section 10 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
- Whether the High Court was correct in setting aside Kirpal Singh's election on the basis of the improper rejection of another candidate's nomination.
- What interim relief is appropriate when an election is set aside for reasons unrelated to the elected candidate's fault.
- Whether the award of costs against the appellant by the High Court was proper.
Legislation cited
- Constitution of Indias. Article 191(1)(a), s. Article 191(1)(e)
- Representation of the People Act, 1951s. Section 10, s. Section 116A
Subjects
Judgment
022
KIRPAL SINGH, M.L.A.
A
v.
U'ITAM SINGH & ANR.
OCTOJ!El\ 9, 1985
l 0. CHlNNAJ'PA l\EUUY, J; .s. Vt;NKATAlWIIAti, V. llAlAKlUSHNA lillAIJI,
ll
R.Jl. HlSAA ANU V. KHALllJ, JJ.J
Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 191 (1) (a) read
with section 10 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 -
Disqualification for membership, applicability to Public Sector
Undertakings - Right to be elected and Right to speak for the
people are questions to be decided by Parliament and not by the
c Court - Nature of interim orders to be passed by the Court in an
election appeal when the election was set aside on grounds not
covered by part Vll of the Act, explained.
The appellant Kirpal Singh was elected to the Punjab
Legislative Assembly from Majitha constituency at the general
elections held in 1972. His election was set aside by High Court
ll
ill an Election Petition filed by one of the defeated candidates
on the ground that the nomination paper of another candidate was
improperly rejected by the Returning Officer for the reason that
he was a development officer in the employment of the Life
Insurance Corporation under whose Staff Regulations he was
prohibited from seeking election. The High Court was of the view
E
that the staff regulations could, at best, make Basant Singh
liable to disciplinary action only. In the appeal under section
116A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, the Court
passed an interim order enabling the appellant to attend the
assembly and sign the register, without participating in the
proceedings or voting, and without drawing any remuneration.
F
Subsequent to the filing of the appeal, there were three general
elections with the result the appeal became wholly 1nfructuous.
Disposing of the appeal, the Court,
HELD : 1.1. Where an election is set aside for no fault of
G the duly elected candidate, such as a corrupt practice comnitted
by him or his agent or a disqualification suffered by him, but on
the ground that someone else's nomination had been improperly
rejected, the more appropriate interim order would perhaps be to
grant an absolute stay so that the Constituency may not go
unrepresented for no fault of either the elected or those who
H elected. [624 C--D]
KllU'AL SINGI! v. UTTAM SINGH 623
1. 2 The awarding of the cos ts by the High Court, in such
circumstances is uncalled for. The appellant will receive his A
remwieration for the period for which he was elected as a
legislator. t626 C-ll)
1.3 The clear and undoubted object of Article 19l(l)(a) to
(e) and the provisions of the Representation of the People Act
(including section 10) is the preservation of the purity and B
integrity of the election process by preventing Government or
State employees from taking part in the elections. Nowadays the
activities of the State are so manifold and prolific that the
State has been forced, in the interests of better management and
administration and in order to further the Directive Principles
of State POlicy, to set up various Corporations which are but c
mere instrumentalities of . the State. Whether the principle of
Article 19l(l)(a) has to be extended to employees of State
Corporations and other Public Sector Undertakings by suitable
legislation is a question of policy better left to, be decided by
the elected representatives of the people themselves and not to
the Court whose decision can only be confined to interpretation. D
[625 E-H; 626 A)
(The Court recommended to the Government to have several
questions posed before it examined by the Law Commission early.)
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION ·: Civil Appeal No. 650 (NCE) E
of 197 5.
r'rom the Judgment and Order dated 14. 3. 1975 of the Punjab
and Haryana High Court in Election Petition No. 27 of 1972.
K.K. Garg, A.K. Ganguli, M.M. Kshatriya and Mrs. Vandana
Sharma for the Appellant. F
G.L. Sanghi, P.H. Parekh and P.K. Manohar for the
Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G
ClilNNAPPA REDDY, J, Shri Kirpal Singh was elected to the
Punjab Legislative Assembly from Majitha Constituency at the
general elections held in 1972. His election was set aside by
High Court in an Election Petition filed by one of the defeated
candidates on the ground that the nomination paper of another
candidate was improperly rejected by the Returning OffiGer. The
H
624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] SUPP.3 s.c.R.
A
nomination paper of one Basant Singh had been rejected on the
ground that Basant Singh was a development officer in the employ-
ment of the Life Inaurance Corporation and was therefore
ineligible to seek election to the Assembly under the Staff
Regulationa of the Life Inaurance Corporation. The High Court
B took the view that if Basant Singh defied the Staff Regulations
and sought election to the Assembly he might have made himself
liable to disciplinary action but that did not disqualify him
from see~ng election to the Assembly. So the nomination paper of
Basant Singh was held to have been improperly rejected and the
election of Kirpal Singh was set aside. His election having been
set aside he appealed to this Court under Section 116-A of the
c Representation of the People . Act. While admitting the appeal,
this Court made an interim order enabling the appellant to attend
the Assembly and sign the register, without participating in the
proceedings or voting and without drawing any reDllneration. With-
out meaning any disrespect to the learned judges who made the
interim order we think that where an election is set aside for no
fault of his, such as a corrupt practice comnitted by him or his
D agent or a disqualification suffered by him, but on the ground
that someone else's nomination had been improperly rejected, the
more appropriate order would perhaps be to grant an absolute stay
so that the Conatituency may not go unrepresented for no fault of
either the elected or those who elected.
E Subsequent to the filing of the appeal, there have been
three more general electiona. The present appeal has thus beeome
wholly infructuous, indeed a sad commentary on the legal process.
Though the question raised is an important one which may arise
again and again in the future we do not propose to make any
pronouncement upon it since we think the. matter is one which
F should receive the conaideration of the Parliament and suitable
legislation be enacted. Under Art. 191(1) of the Conatitution a
person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being,
a member of the Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of a
State -
G (a) if he holds any office of profit under the
Government of India or the Government of any State
specified in the First Schedule, other than an off ice
declared by the Legislature of the State by law not to
disqualify its holder ;
H (b) if he is of unaound mind and stands so declared by
a competent court;
KIRPAL SINGH v. U'ITAM SINGH [CHINNAPPA REDDY, J. ] 625
(c) if he is an undischarged insolvent; A
(d) if he is not a citizen of India, or has volun-
tarily acquired the citizenship of a foreign State, or
is under any acknowledgement of allegiance or
adherence to a foreign State;
B
(e) if he is so disqualified by or under any law made
by Parliament.
Chapter III of the Representation of the People Act which
certainly is a law made by Parliament within the meaning of Art.
19l(l)(e) of the Constitution enwnerates some further grounds of c
disqualification for nembership of Parliament and State
Assemblies. In particular we may refer to Section 10 which says,
"Disqualification for office under Government Company
- A person shall be disqualified if, and for so long
I as, he is a managing agent, manager or secretary of
any company <1r corporation (other than a co-operative
society) in the capital of which· the appropriate
D
Government has not less than twenty-five per cent
share."
The clear and undoubted object of Art. 19l(l)(a) to (e) and E
the provisions of the Representation of the People Act (including
sec. 10) is the preservation of the purity and integrity cf the
election process by preventing Government or State employees from
taking part in the elections. But then sec. 10 appears to confine
the disqualification, in so far as it relates to employees of
Government Companies to the •top-brass• only if such an uncouth
expression may be allowed to creep into the judgment of a Court. F
Nowadays the activities of the State are so manifold and prolific
that the State has been forced, in the interests of better
management and administration and in order to further the
Di rec tive Principles of State Policy, to set up varlous
Corporations which are but mere instrumentalities of the State.
Is the principle of Art. 191(1)(e) then to be extended to G
employees of State Corporations also by enacting appropriate laws
under Art. 19l(l)(e)? Or are employees of Public Corporations to
be treated differently from employees of the Government? Are not
some of them in a better position to exert undesirable pressure,
than Government employees? On the other hand, are a trerrendously
., large number of employees of Public Corporations to be denied the
opportunity of being chosen, as representatives of the People? Do H
626 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] SUPP.3 s.c.R.
all the considerations applicable to Government Employees equally
A apply to employees of Public Sector Undertakings? ls there no
distinguishing feature. Are a large mass of highly or moderately
literate people to be denied the right to speak for the people?
ls the right to be elected, to be confined, without meaning any
disrespect to anyone to the professional politicians only? These
are some of the vital questions posed and which require to be
B answered. The answer should be best given by the elected
representatives of the people themselves. We are not shirking the
decision of these questions but our decision can only be confined
to interpretation. Not so, Parliament which can decide upon the
Policy. That is why, we recomnend to the Government to have the
c
matter examined by the Law Commission very early. When a suitable
occasion arises in the future we will, of course, deal with the
matter, probably helped by new legislation. l
The High Court has awarded costs against the appellant. That
was uncalled for. We set aside that part of the order. We express
no opinion on the other questions. The appellant will receive his
remuneration for the period for which he was elected as a
JJ legislator.
1
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