Holding

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of the father‑in‑law and mother‑in‑law under Sections 304B and 315 IPC, finding that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the dowry demand and harassment leading to the death.

Summary

Reeta Kumari married Manmohan Singh in February 1999 and was repeatedly harassed by her in‑laws for a scooter and a golden bangle as dowry. She died by consuming aluminium phosphide in June 1999 while pregnant. The trial court convicted the father‑in‑law (Kishan Singh) and mother‑in‑law (Bachni Rani) under Sections 304B and 315 IPC, and the husband under Section 498A. The High Court upheld the parents‑in‑law convictions but acquitted the husband for lack of evidence of dowry demand; the State did not challenge this acquittal. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the dowry demand and harassment, affirmed the convictions of the parents‑in‑law, ordered the removal of disparaging remarks on a witness, and dismissed the appeal.

Issues considered

Whether the evidence established the elements of a dowry death under Section 304B IPC.
Whether the possession of a scooter or motorcycle by the accused negates a dowry demand.
Whether the trial court's disparaging remarks on a witness amount to reversible error.
Whether the husband could be convicted under Section 498A IPC (though not challenged).

Legislation cited

Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961s. 2
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 304B, s. 315, s. 498A

Subjects

Dowry deathSection 304B IPCSection 315 IPCDowry harassmentEvidence assessmentJudicial remarksSupreme Court

Judgment

A
KISHAN SINGH AND ANR. A
v.
STATE OF PUNJAB

OCTOBER 12, 2007
B
[C.K. THAKKERANDP.SATHASIVAM,JJ.]
I

,. Penal Code, 1860-ss 304B and 315-Dowry demand-
Conviction under-Correctness of-Held: Prosecution case clearly
established beyond reasonable doubt that victim subjected to cruelty c
and harassment based on dowry demand by accused-mother in law
and father in law, soon before her death-There was repeated dowry
demand-Death caused within seven years of marriage-Thus,
conviction and sentence by courts below uls 304B and 306 justified-
However, High Court acquitted husband ofvictim under s. 498A since D
.. there was no sufficient evidence of dowry demand against him-
Acquittal having not been challenged by State, has attained finality.
.... Judicial restraints-Judicial restraints and discipline are equally
necessary to orderly administration ofjustice-Court should not make
disparaging remark against the witness that there was falsehood on E
his part-Those remarks ordered to be deletedfrom the record

R was married to M-accused No.1 who was serving in Army.
According to the prosecution, R was subjected to cruelty and
harassment by accused - husband, mother - in - law and father- in - F
-~ law in connection with demand ofdowry from the day of her marriage.
... R was told by the accused to get scooter and golden bangle from
her parents and if the demands of the accused would not be met with,
she should not come back to the matrimonial home. The demand was
repeated from time to time. R disclosed the same to her parents G
during her visit to matrimonial home. However, PW-2-mother ofR
and other family members repeatedly assured R that the demand
t would b~ met when Mwould come on leave and pacified her to return
to matrimonial home. R died after consuming some poisonous
155 H
156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 11 S.C.R.

A substance. Dowry demand was repeated 14 clays before the inddent.
Mother of R lodged FIR. At the time of death, R was pregnant with
a child of about 12 weeks. Prosecution witnesses were examined.
Accused were charged under sections 304B, 315 and 498A IPC. Trial
Court convicted and sentenced accused No. 3-father-in-law ofR and
B accused No. 4-mother-in-law ofR, under sections 304B and 315 IPC.
With regard to accuS'ed No.1, trial Court found that he was serving
in Army and was occasionally attending matrimonial home after
taking leave and as such could not be convicted under ss. 304B and
315 IPC. However, it held him liable under s 498A IPC. Aggrieved
c accused filed appeal. High Court upheld the order of trial court with
regard to accused Nos. 3 and 4; however acquitted accused No.1
since from the evidence it was not proved that he was responsible
for committing an offence punishable under s 498A IPC. Hence, the
present appeal.

D Appellants-accused contended that courts below erred in
convicting them for offences punishable under sections 304B and
315 IPC; that there was no demand of dowry by the accused and it
could not be said that death of deceased was due to harassm~mt
because of demand of dowry; that the evidence PW2-mother, PW4-
E cousin brother and PW7-real brother was not reliable and evidence
ought not to have been believed by Courts below ; that there were
material contradictions in their evidence as to when so called demand
of scooter and golden bangle was made; and that from the evidence
of DWl and DW2 it was proved that the accused were having
F scooter an<! motorcycle, if it were so, there was no occasion to demand
scooter.

Respondent-State contended that the order. of conviction and
sentence recorded by the trial ~ourt and upheld by the High Court
did not call for interference; and that from the prosecution evidence,
G it was clearly establi$hed that deceased was mat-treated and
harassed for dowry.

Disposing of the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1. No case has been made out by the appellants so
H
KISHANSINGHv. STATE 157

as to interfere with the decision of Courts below. Both the Courts A
were wholly right and fully justified in recording an order of
conviction and in imposing sentence on appellants-accused Nos. 3-
father-in-law and a~cused No. 4-mother-in-Iaw. There is no infirmity
and the order of conviction and sentence is upheld. Since the
appellants are on bail, they are directed to surrender and to undergo B
the remaining period of sentence.
[Paras 18 and 29] [165-C; 168-G-H]
1.2. From the evidence of PW3-doctor who conducted ·
postmortem, it was proved that R died unnatural death. R was
married to Mand she died within a period of four months. Thus, the C
death was caused 'within seven years of her marriage'. From the
prosecution evidence, it was proved that the deceased R was
subjected to cruelty and harassment by the accused in connection
with demand of dowry from day of her marriage. The demand was
repeated from time to time and it resulted in sad and untimely death D
of a young bride. Both the Courts considered the evidence of
prosecution witnesses and recorded a finding that prosecution was
able to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt as to demand of
dowry by the accused. [Paras 18 and 25] [167-D-F]
1.3. Both the Courts were right in rejecting defence version that E
since the accused possessed scooter as well as motorcycle, there
was no necessity to make demand of scooter. High Court observed
that it was a matter of common knowledge that even if in-laws had
several things in the house, still they demand dowry. Even if one does
not go to that extent, in the instant case, there was sufficient evidence f
in the form of sworn testimony of PW2-mother of R, PW4-cousin of
' R and PW7-brother of R that there was a demand of dowry by
accused and deceased R had made such complaint immediately after
marriage which was repeated and reiterated. The deceased used to
inform about such demand by the accused to her parents. Therefore, G
it is totally irrelevant whether accused possessed motorcycle or
scooter. Demand of dowry was clearly proved and conclusively
established by the prosecution. [Para 26) (167-G-H; 168-A-B]
1.4. The submission that there was material contradiction in the
deposition of prosecution witnesses as to the occasion of making H
-A'
.

158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 11 S.C.R.

A demand, i.e. as shagun or as dowry cannot be accepted. From the
evidence, it is proved that accused persons insisted for scooter and
golden bangle as they had 'obliged' parents ofR by allowing her to
marry to accused No. 1 Therefore, both the Courts were right in
coming to the conclusion that there was demand of dowry by the
B accused. [Para 27] [168-C-D]
1.5. Trial Court convicted accused No.1 for an offence t-
i

punishable under section 498A, IPC. However, High Court, set aside
the conviction observing that he was not regularly staying with Ras
he was serving in Army and used to come only for few days by taking
C leave. Prosecution witnesses have, no doubt, deposed that demand
of dowry was also made by accused No.1 and believing the said
evidence, trial Court convicted him. But the High Court was of ~he
view that there was no sufficient evidence to prove demand of dowry
by accused No.1 and acquitted him. The acquittal is not challenged
D by the State. Thus, that part of the order has become final.
[Para 28] [168-E-F]
2.1. While dealing with a matter, the Presiding Officer of a Co~rt
may extend benefit of doubt to the accused in the light of omissions,
E contradictions or discrepancies in the deposition of prosecution
witnesses. He may also offer comment on the conduct of parties or
witnesses. He may as well make necessary observations keeping·
in view their demeanour. Judges are flesh and blood mortals with
likes and dislikes, preferences and prejudices and they are also
F normal human traits. At the same time, however, it cannot be
overlooked that judicial restraints and discipline are equally
necessary to orderly administration of justice.
[Paras 33 and 36] [170-C-D; G]
2.2. The trial Court did not accept the evidence of PW4-cousin
G ofR as to demand of dowry by accused No.1 husband ofR. It was
because PW4 had stated that accused No.1 ill-treated deceased R
soon before her death. He further stated that 10112 days prior to
the incident, accused No.1 reiterated the demand of scooter and
golden bangle. Accused No.1 stayed with his wife for more than a
H month before reporting for duty, after marriage ceremony on
KISHANSINGHv. STATE 159

February 19, 1999. Thereafter, he again sought leave from June 14, A
1999 to July 9, 1999. According to the trial Court, he must have
reached his village on or after June 16, 1999 from Goa and R died
on June 20, 1999. Thus, according to the trial Court, accused No.I
could not have made the demand "10/12 days prior to the incident".
Therefore, the trial Court did not believe that part of the statement B
ofPW4. [Para30] [168-G-H; 169-A-D]
1
2.3. It is unfortunate that the trial Court made a caustic remark
that there was 'falsehood' on the part of PW4 as to demand of dowry
by accused No.1. A Court oflaw may not accept a particular part of
the evidence considering the other facts and circumstances on record. C .
But that does not necessarily mean that what was stated by the
witness was 'false'. It may be that the witness had committed so°le
mistake in giving the period during which dowry demand was made
by accused No.1. If that part of the evidence is not consistent with
the facts on record, the Court may not accept it. But only for that D
reason, the Court should not make disparaging remarks against ttte
witness. The Court could have acquitted accused No.1. Therefore,
all those remarks were ordered to be deleted from the record.
[Paras 32 and 39] [169-H; 170-A-B; 172-E-F]
E
StateofUP. v.Mohd Nairn, [1964] 2SCR363andStateo/MP.
v. Nandlal, [1986] 4 SCC 566 and A.M Mathur v. Pramod Kumar,
[1990] 2 sec 533, referred to.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
1612of2005. F

From the Judgment and final Order dated 4.5.2005 of the High Court
of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal No. 950-SB/
2002.
R.K. Kapoor, M.K. Verma and Anis Ahmed Khan for the G
Appellants.
Kuldip Singh, R.K. Pandey, T.P. Mishra and H.S. Sandu for the
Respondent.
H
160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 11 S.C.R.

A The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
C.K. THA.KKER, J. 1. The present appeal is filed by the two
appellants against an order of conviction and sentence recorded by the
Addi. Sessions Judge, Gurdaspur on April 30, 2002 in Sessions Case
No. 128 of 1999 and confirmed by the High Court of Punjab & Haryana
B at Chandigarh on May 4, 2005 in Criminal Appeal No. 950-SB of2002.
By the said order, the Courts below convicted the appellants herein for
offences punishable under Sections 304B and 315, Indian Penal Code
(IPC). For an offence punishable under Section 304B, IPC the appellants
were ordered to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years and to
C pay a fine ofRs.1,000/- and in default of payment of fine, to further
undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months, whereas for an offence
punishable under Section 315, IPC, they were ordered to undergo
imprisonment for three years.
D 2. The facts of the case in nutshell are that Reeta Xumari, daughter
of Tilak Singh and Sudershana Rani-PW2, got married to Manmohan Singh
(original accused No.1) on February 19, 1999 as per Hindu rites and
ceremonies. According to the prosecution, sufficient dowry was given by
the parents of Reeta Kumari at the time of marriage as per their financial
E status and capacity. However, Reeta Kumari, immediately after marriage,
disclosed on her first visit to parental home after 3-4 days that the accused
were subjecting her to taunts and harassments for not bringing scooter
and golden bangle (kara) in dowry. The young bride was told in clear
terms that if the demands of the accused of scooter and golden bangle
F would not be met with, she should not come back to matrimonial home.
Even thereafter, during her visit to parental home at 2-3 occasions, Reeta
Kumari informed her family members that the ace.used were repeating their
demand of scooter and golden bangle. She was, however, pacified by
Sudershana Rani and other family members to return to matrimonial home
on an assurance that scooter and golden bangle would be given when
G the complainant's husband (Manmohan Singh) would come on leave. It
may be stated that the husband of deceased Reeta Kumari was serving
in Indian Army. It is further the version of the prosecution that about 14
days prior to the occurrence, PW7-Dharminder Singh, brother of Reeta
Kumari went to village Kahnuwan at the matrimonial home of deceased
H
KISHANSINGHv. STATE[C.K. THAKKER,J.] 161

Reeta Kumari to enquire about the welfare of his sister. On return, he A
infonned his mother Sudershana Rani that Reeta Kumari was being
subjected to mal-treatment by the accused on account of demand of
dowry and that he had brought Reeta Kumari with him to parental home.
Complainant Sudershana Rani, thereafter, had a talk with the accused
persons and assured that their demand of scooter and golden bangle B
would be fulfilled after Manmohan Singh would return. Reeta Kumari was,
therefore, again sent back to matrimonial home along with PW4-Gopal
Singh, cousin of Reeta Kumari. On June 20, 1999, at about 3.30 p.m.,
one Mangat Ram, who acted as mediator for the marriage between Reeta
Kumari and Manmohan Singh, infonned parents of Reeta Kumari :that C
Reeta Kumari died after consuming some poisonous substance. On hearing
the news, Sudershana Rani-complainant, along ·with her son Dharminder
Singh and nephew Daulat Singh went to the house of the accused at village
. Kahnuwan where they found dead body of Reeta Kumari lying in a room.
Statement of Sudershana Rani was recorded at Ex.PB (FIR 111) on the D
same day by PW 9 Swinder Singh (Station Inspector) who met them at
the bus stand, Kahnuwan..
3. The prosecution case also disclosed that at the time of death, .Reeta
Kumari was pregnant with a child of about 12 weeks gestation period in
her womb. It was alleged by the prosecution that death was caused by E
the accused and it was a dowry death. Challan was, therefore, presented
against the accused for offences punishable under Section 304B, 315 and
498A, IPC. Since an offence punishable under Section 304B, IPC was
exclusively triable by a Court of Session, the trial Magistrate committed
the case to the Sessions Court, Gurdaspur. Charge was framed against F
the accused, the contents thereof were read over and explained to them.
The accused pleaded not guilty to the charge and claimed to be .tried.
4. The accused denied to have committed any offence. According
to them, they were falsely implicated by the police. It was further stated
that accused Manmohan Singh and deceased Reeta Kumari (husband and G
wife) had gone to Vaishno Devi and were returning from the temple on
the previous day of the occurrence. When they reached near Pathankot,
the decee).sed insisted that they should first visit her parental village
Kahnuwan whereas husband Manmohan Singh, accused No. l' insisted
H
162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 11 S.C.R.

A that they should go to the matrimonial home first. That was the reason
for consuming Aluminium Phosphate by the deceased Reeta Kumari and
thus the deceased committed suicide.
5. The prosecution, in order to bring home the guilt of the accused,
examined nine witnesses including important witnesses, PW2-Sudershana
B Rani, complainant and mother of deceased Reeta Kumari; PW4-Gopal
Singh, cousin brother of deceased Reeta Kumari and PW7-Dharminder
Singh, brother of deceased Reeta Kumari.
6. The charge was framed against five accused i.e. accused No. I-
C Manrnohan Singh, husband of the deceased; accused No. 2-Janak Singh,
brother-in-law of the deceased, accused No. 3, Kishan Singh, father-in-
law of the deceased, accused No. 4, Bachni Rani, mother-in-law of the
deceased and accused No. 5-Sushma Rani, sister-in-law of the deceased.
7. The trial Court, after appreciating the evidence on record and on
D the basis of depositions of PW2 Sudarshana Rani-complainant, PW 4
Gopal Singh and PW 7 Dharminder Singh held that as far as accused
No. 5-Sushma Rani was concerned, she had already married prior to the
marriage of Manmohan Singh and was staying with her husband and two
children at matrimonial home at village Kaulsher which was at a distance
E of 60-70 KMs. from Kahnuwan. She had been referred to in the FIR as
the sister of accused No. 1, Manmohan Singh. She would not have been
benefited by the demand of dowry of scooter and golden bangles. The
trial Court, therefore, held that it could not be said that she was a party
to demand of dowry as also in causing death of deceased Reeta Kumari.
F She was accordingly ordered to be acquitted by the Court.
8. Regarding Manmohan Singh-accused Nq.l_, husband of Reeta
Kumari, the trial Court observed that he was serving in Indian Anny. He
took leave from February 15, 1999 to March 26, 1999. The marriage
G was performed on February 19, 1999. After the marriage, he again joined
service. Thereafter !le came on leave from June 14, 1999 to July 9, 1999.
In the circumstances, according to the trial Court, it could not be said
that he was responsible for committing offences punishable under Sections
304B and 315, IPC. The Court, however, held that there was demand
of dowry by accused No.1-Manmohan Singh, husband of Reeta Kumari
H
KISHANSINGHv. STATE[C.K. THAKKER,J.] 163

as stated by PW 2 Sudarshana Rani, PW 4 Gopal Singh ad PW 7 A
Dhanninder Singh. Accused No. 1 Manmohan Singh was, therefore, held
liable for an offence punishable under Section 498A, IPC.
9. As to accused No.2-Janak Singh, brother in law of the deceased,
accused No. 3-Kishan Singh and accused No.4-Bachni Rani, fathet-in- B
law and mother-in-law of deceased Reeta Kumari, the Court held that it
was proved beyond reasonable doubt that they had committed offences
punishable under Sections 304B and 315, IPC. As already stated earlier,
sentence was awarded on accused No. 3-Kishan Singh and accused
No.4-Bachni Rani, father-in-law and mother-in-law of the deceased by C
the trial Court. So far as accused No. 2-Janak Singh was concerned,
the trial Court held that he was a juvenile when the offence was committed
which was clear from the perusal of his birth certificate. The Court,
therefore, forwarded him to the Juvenile Court for passing an appropriate
order of sentence in accordance with law.
D
10. Being aggrieved by the order of conviction and sentence, three
accused persons, viz. accused No.1-Manmohan Singh-husband, accused
No. 3-Kishan Singh-father-in-law and accused No.4-Bachni R~ni
mother-in-law preferred an appeal before the High Court. ·
11. The High Court again examined the evidence on record, heard E
the arguments of the parties and considered.the reasons recorded and
conclusions arrived at by the trial Court. It held that as far as accused
Nos. 3 and 4, parents-in-law of deceased Reeta Kumari were concerned,
the trial Court was fully justified in convicting both of them for offences
punishable under Sections 304B and 315, IPC. Accordingly, their F
conviction as well as order of sentence was maintained.
12. As to accused No.1-Manmohan Singh-husband, however, the
High Court held that from the evidence, it was not proved that he was
responsible for committing an offence punishable under Section 498A, G
IPC. The Court observed that he was serving in Indian Army and was
· occasionally attending matrimonial home after taking leave. There was no
sufficient evidence of demand of dowry by accused No. I. The trial Court,
hence, was not right in convicting him under Section 498A, IPC. He was,
therefore, ordered to be acquitted.
H
164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 11 S.C.R. ·

A 13. The order convicting accused Nos. 3 and 4, father-in-law and
mother-in-law of deceased Reeta Kumari under Sections 304B and 315,
IPC recorded by the trial Court and confirmed by the High Court is
challenged in the present appeal.
B 14. On September 23, 2005, notice was issued on Special Leave
Petition as also on the application for bail. On November 28, 2005, leave
was granted and the appellants were directed to be released on bail on
their executing a bond for a sum of Rs. 25,0001-· each to the satisfaction
of the Addi. Sessions Judge, Gurdaspur, Punjab. On September 18,
C 2006, an order was passed by the Court directing the Registry to post
the appeal 'at an early date'. The matter thus has been placed before us.
15. We have P,eard learned counsel for the parties.
16. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that both the
D Courts committed an error in convicting the appellants for offences
punishable under Sections 304B and 315, IPC. According to the learned
counsel, there was no demand of dowry by the accused and it could not
be said that death of deceased Reeta Kumari was due to harassment
because of demand of dowry. It was also urged that the evidence of
PW2-Sudershana Rani, PW4-Gopal Singh and PW7-Dharminder Singh
E was not reliable and they ought not to have been believed by Courts below.
According to the counsel, all the three witnesses were 'interested'
witnesses being close relatives of the deceased, PW2-Sudershana Rani-
mother, PW4-Gopal Singh and PW7-Dharminder Singh-cousin brother
and real brother, respectively. It was also contended that there were
F material contradictions in their evidence as to when so called demand of
scooter and golden bangle was made. According to one version, such
demand was made at the time of shagun, whereas according to other
version, it was towards the do\\'ry. Witnesses were aware that shagun
and dowry were not one and S@ne. Thus, the prosecution was not certain
G as to the occasion of alleged demand. It was also stated that from the
evidence of Harbhajan Singh-DWI and Ramesh Shirodkar-DW2, it was
proved that the accused were having scoo~er as also motorcycle. If it were
so, there was no occasion to demand scooter which was the case of the
prosecution. On all these grounds, it was submitted that both the Courts
H were wrong in convicting the appellants and appeal deserves to be allowed.
KISHANSINGHv. STATE[C.K. THAKKER,J.] 165

17. The learned counsel for the State submitted that the order of A
conviction and sentence recorded by the trial Court and confirmed by
the High Court does not call for interference. According to him, from the
prosecution evidence, it was clearly established that deceased Reeta
Kumari was maltreated and harassed for dowry. Immediately after her
marriage on February 19, 1999, when she came to parental home within B
few days, she complained that dowry demand was made by her in-laws
and even thereafter, the demand was repeated. Reeta Kumari was
pregnant at the time of death. Both the Courts were, therefore, right in
convicting the appellants under Section 304B and 315, IPC. ·
18. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, in our opinion, no C
case has been made out by the appellants so as to interfere with the
decision of the Courts below. Admittedly, Reeta Kumari married to
accused No.1-Manmohan Singh on February 19, 1999. The case of the
prosecution is very clear that in-laws of Reeta Kumari started harassing
her by making demand of dowry. She was told that her parents should D
· give to accused persons scooter and golden bangle. She was also told
.. by the accused that she should not return to matrimonial home if she would
not bring scooter and golden bangle. Both the Courts considered the
evidence of prosecution witnesses and recorded a finding that prosecution
was able to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt as to demand of E
dowry by the accused.
19. Section 3048 (Dowry death) was inserted by Act 43of1986
with effect from November 19, 1986. The said section riads thus:
304B. Dowry death F

(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily
injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within
seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her ·
death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband G
or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any
demand for dowry, such death shall be called ''dowry death'\ and
such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death.
Explanation- For the purpose of this sub-section, "dowry" shall
have the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition H
166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 11 S.C.R.

A Act, 1961 (28of1961).
(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years
but which may extend to imprisonment for life.
B 20. In order that this section may apply, the following ingredients
must be satisfied;
(i) the death of a woman must have been caused by burns or
bodily injury or otherwise than under normal circwnstances;
C (Ii) such death must have occurred within seven years of her
mamage;
(Iii) the woman must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment
by her husband or by relatives of her husband;
D (iv) cruelty or harassment must be for or in connection with
demand for dowry;
(v) such cruelty or harassment is shown to have been meted out
to the woman soon before her death.
E 21. In the instant case, the prosecution has examined PW3-Dr.
Swinder Kumar. He deposed that on June 21, 1999, he conducted the
post mortem on the dead body of Reeta Kwnari and found the following
injuries;
1. 3 x Yz cm. abrasion on right side of the anterior of the middle
F of the neck.
2. 2 x 1 cm. abrasion on right side of the anterior of the middle
of the neck just 1 cm. below injury No. l
3. 4 x 2 cm. abrasion on left side of the anterior of the middle of
the head.
G
22. He deposed;
"On dissection of injuries Nos. 1, 2 and 3, sub-coetaneous
tissues of the neck shows extravagation of blood beneath the
injured areas. On further dissection, fracture of projection in
H
It
\

KISHAN SINGH v. ST ATE [C.K. THAKKER, J.] ~67

,I
laryngeal cartilage seen". A

23. He proceeded to state:
"The time between injuries and death was immediate and
between death and postmortem within 24 hours. In our opinion,
based on the report of the Chemical Examiner, which is Ex.PC, B
the cause of death in this case was ante mortem throttling and
.,.,
constunption of aluminium phosphide, which is a pesticide, Ex.PD
is the correct copy of the postmortem report, the original of which
'r
I have brought today in the Court which is signed by me and Dr.
H.S. Dhillon and Mrs. Raminder Kaler". c
24. In cross-examination, he stated that the injuries near the mouth
were possible if an attempt had been made by someone to prevent taking
tablet or tlying to take it out. Similarly, injury on the neck could be possible
in such a struggle.
D.
,, ..
25. Thus, from the evidence of Dr. Swinder Kumar-PW3, it was
proved that Reeta Kumari died unnatural death. As already noted earlier,
Reeta Kumari married to Mann1ohan Singh on February 19, 1999 and
/
she died on June 20, 1999 i.e. within a period of four months. Tims, tbe
death was caused "within seven years of her marriage". From the E
prosecution evidence, it was proved beyond reasonable doubt that
deceased Reeta Kumari was subjected to cruelty and harassment by the
accused in connection with demand of dowry from day of her marriage.
The demand was repeated from time to time and it resulted in sad and
untimely death of a young bride. But for continuous demand of dowry by F
---; the accused and constant harassment, two lives would have been saved.
"1 We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that both the Courts were
right in convicting the appellants for the offences with which they were
charged.
26. In our judgment, both the Courts were right in rejecting defence G
version that since the accused possessed scooter as well as motorcycle,
I there was no necessity to make demand of scooter. The High Court
observed that it was a matter of common knowledge that even if in-laws
had several things in the house, still they demand dowry. Even if we may
H
168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 11 S.C.R.

A not go to that extent, in our opinion, in the present case, there was sufficient
evidence in the fonn of sworn testimony of PW2-Sudershana Rani, PW4-
Gopal Singh and PW7-Dhanninder Singh that there was a demand of
dowry by accused and deceased Reeta Kumari had made such complaint
immediately after marriage which was repeated and reiterated. The
B deceased used to infonn about such demand by the accused to her parents.
It is, therefore, totally irrelevant whether accused possessed motorcycle
or scooter. Demand of dowry in this case was clearly proved and
conclusively established by the prosecution.
27. We also find no substance in the contention of the appellants
C that there was material contradiction in the deposition of prosecution
witnesses as to the occasion of making demand, i.e. as shagun or as
dowry. From the evidence, it is proved that accused persons insisted for
scooter and golden bangle as they had 'obliged' parents of Reeta Kumari
by allowing her to ma.1-y to accused No.1-Manmohan Singh. In our
D opinion, therefore, both the Courts were right in coming to the conclusion
that there was demand of dowry by the accused.
28. The trial Court convicted accused No.1-Manmohan Singh for
an offence punishable under Section 498A, IPC. The High Court,
E however, set aside the said conviction observing that he was not regularly
staying with Reeta Kumari as he was serving in Army and used to come
only for few days by taking leave. Prosecution witnesses have, no doubt,
deposed that demand of dowry was also made by accused No.1-
Manmohan Singh-husband of Reeta Kumari and believing the said
F evidence, the trial Court convicted him. But the High Court was of the
view that there wa.S no sufficient evidence to prove demand of dowry by
accused No.1-Manmohan Singh and acquitted him. The said acquittal is
not challenged by the State. That part of the order thus has become final.
The matter, therefore, rests there.
G 29. For the foregoing reasons, in our opinion, both the Courts were
wholly right and fully justified in recording an order of conviction and in
imposing sentence on appellants-accused Nos. 3 and 4. We see no
infinnity therein and dismiss the appeal and confirm the order of conviction
and sentence. Sin~e they are on bail, we direct them to surrender to
H undergo the remaining period of sentence.
KISHAN SINGH v. STATE [C.K. THAKKER, J.] 169
I
30. Before parting with the matter, we may advert to one aspect. A
The trial Court, while not accepting the evidence of PW4-Gopal Singh
as to demand of dowry by accused No.1-Manmohan Singh-husband of
Reeta Kumari, had observed that no such demand could have been made
by him. It was because PW4-Gopal Singh had stated that accused Nq.1-
Manmohan Singh ill-treated deceased Reeta Kumari soon after her death. B
He further stated that 10/12 days prior to the incident, accused No.1-
Manmohan Singh reiterated the demand of scooter and golden bangle.
Now, accused No.1-Manmohan Singh was on leave from February 15,
1999 to March 26, 1999. Thus, after marriage ceremony on February
19, 1999, accused No.1-Manmohan Singh stayed with his wife for mqre C
than a month before reporting for duty. Thereafter, he again sought leave
from June 14, 1999 to July 9, 1999. According to the trial Court, he
must have reached his village on or after June 16, 1999 from Goa aµd
Reeta Kumari died on June 20, 1999. Thus, according to the trial Court,
accused No.1-Manmohan Singh could not have made demand of scooter D
and golden bangle "10/12 days prior to the incident". The trial Court,
therefore, did not believe that part of the statement of Gopal Singh.
31. The trial Court, however, proceeded to state;
"But falsehood in this part of the statement of Gopal Singh, E
regarding the demand of scooter and golden kara made by
accused Manmohan Singh, just I 0112 days prior to the death of
deceased is utterly glaring. As already said above the accused
Manmohan Singh had taken leave from 15.2.1999 to 26.3.1999,
for marriage and after that from 14.6.1999 to 9.7.1999. This leave F
record was produced by DW2. If accused Manmohan Singh had
taken leave from 14.6.1999, he must have reached his village from
Goa on or after 16.6.1999. Therefore, the presence ofManmohan.
Singh in his house at village Kahnuwan,just 10/12 days prior to
the alleged occurrence when Gopal Singh made visit does not crop G
up at all".

32. It is unfortunate that the trial Court has made a caustic remark
that there was 'falsehood' on the part of PW4-Gopal Singh as to demand
of dowzy by accused No.1-Manmohan Singh. A Court of law may not
accept a particular part of the evidence considering the other facts and H
170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 11 S.C.R.

A circumstances on record. But that does not necessarily mean that what
was stated by the witness was 'false'. In fact, PW4-Gopal Singh was
believed by the trial Court as well as by the High Court. It may be that
the witness had committed some mistake in giving the period during which
dowry demand was made by accused No.1-Manmohan Singh. Ifthat part
B of the evidence is not consistent with the facts on record, the Court may
not accept it. But only for that reason, the Court should not make
disparaging remarks as has been done by the Court.
33. While dealing with a matter, ·the Presiding Officer of a Court 1

may extend benefit of doubt to the accused in the light of omissions,
C contradictions or discrepancies in the deposition of prosecution witnesses.
He may also offer comment on the conduct of parties or witnesses. He
may as well make necessary observations keeping in view their
demeanour. It has been rightly said that the Judges are flesh and blood
mortals with likes and dislikes, preferences and prejudices and they are
D also normal human traits. "
34. Thomas Reed Powell once said; "Judges have preferences for
social policies as you and I. They form their judgments after the varying
fashions in which you and I form ours. They have hands, organs,
E dimensions, senses, affections, passions. They are warmed by the same
winter and summer and by the same ideas as a layman is."
35. Justice John Clarke has also stated; "I have never known any
judges, no difference how austere of manner, who discharged their judicial
duties in ari atmosphere of pure, unadulterated reason. Alas! we are 'all
F the common growth of the Mother Earth' - even those of us who wear
the long robe. " (emphasis supplied)
36. At the same time, however, it cannot be overlooked that judicial
restraints and discipline are equally necessary to orderly administration
G of justice. One must always keep in view golden advice given by S.K.
Das, J. in State of UP. v. Mohd Nairn, (1964] 2 SCR 363 : AIR (1964)
SC 703;
"If there is one principle of cardinal importance in the
administration of justice, it is this : the pr~per freedom and
H independence of Judges and Magistrates must be maintained and
I

~

KISHAN SINGH v. STA TE [C.K. THAKKER, J.] 171

they must be allowed to perform their functions freely and fearlessly ·A
and without undue interference by anybody, even by this Court.
At the same time it is equally necessary that in expressing their
opinions Judges and Magistrates must be guided by considerations
ofjustice, fair-play and restraint. It is not infrequent that sweeping
generalizations defeat the very purpose for which they are made. B
It has been judicially recognized that in the matter of making
disparaging remarks against persons or authorities whose conduct
comes into consideration before courts of law in cases to be
decided by them, it is relevant to consider (a) whether the party
whose conduct is in question is before the court or has an c
opp01tunity of explaining or defending himself; (b) whether there
is evidence on record bearing on that conduct justifying the
remarks; and (c) whether it is necessary for the decision of the
case, as an integral part thereof, to animadvert on that conduct. It
has also been recognized that judicial pronouncements must D
be judicial in nature, and should not normally depart from
sobriety, moderation and reserve. " (emphasis supplied)

37. In State ofMP. V. Nandlal, [1986] 4 sec 566, while disposing
the writ petition, the High Court made certain sweeping observations
attributing malajides, c01ruption and underhand dealings to the State E
Government. Holding the disparaging remarks as unjustified, hypothetical
and unwarranted, Bhagwati, C.J. observed:
"We may observe in conclusion that Judges should not use
strong and carping language while criticising the conduct of parties F
or their witnesses. They must act with sobriety, moderation and
restraint. They must have the humility to recognise that they are
not infallible and any harsh and disparaging strictures passed by
them against any party may be mistaken and unjustified and if so,
they may do considerable harm and mischief and result in injustice. G
Here, in the present case, the observations made and strictures
passed by B.M. Lal, J. were totally unjustified and unwarranted
and they ought not to have been made".
38. We are reminded of the following observations of Shetty, J. in
A.M Afathur V. Pramod Kumar, [1990] 2 sec 533: JT (1990) 1 SC H
172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 11 S.C.R.

A 545;
"The Judges Bench is a seat of power. Not only do judges
have power to make binding decisions, their decisions legitimate
the use of power by other officials. The Judges have the absolute
and unchallenged control of the Court domain. But they cannot
B
misuse their authority by intemperate comments, undignified banter
or scathing criticism of counsel, parties or witnesses. We concede
that the Court has the inherent power to act freely upon its own
conviction on any matter coming before it for adjudication, but it
is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper
c administration of justice that derogatory remarks ought not
to be made against persons or authorities whose conduct
comes into consideration unless it is absolutely necessary for
the decision of the case to animadvert on their conduct".

D (emphasis supplied)
39. In the case on hand, in our judgment, there was no occasion
for the trial Court to go to the extent of describing the evidence of PW4-
Gopal Singh to be 'false'. Even if it is conceded that in the light of other
evidence on record, the Court was not convinced as to the demand of
E dowry by accused No. 1 Manmohan Singh, '10/12 days prior to the
incident', the Court could have acquitted accused No. l on that ground.
In our considered opinion, however, it was certainly not a case of making
scathing remarks against the witness. All those remarks are, therefore,
ordered to be deleted from the record.
F
40. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.
N.J. Appeal disposed of.