KISHORE CHHABRAversusTHE STATE OF HARYANA & ORS.

                  [2025] 4 S.C.R. 327 : 2025 INSC 419

                            Kishore Chhabra
                                    v.
                       The State of Haryana & Ors.
                       (Civil Appeal No. 8968 of 2013)
                                  01 April 2025
             [B.R. Gavai, Prashant Kumar Mishra* and
                      K.V. Viswanathan, JJ.]


                            Issue for Consideration
       Appellant sought release of his land from acquisition.

                                   Headnotes†
       Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – Punjab Scheduled Roads &
       Controlled Areas Restrictions of Unregulated Development
       Act, 1963 – Appellant is the owner in possession of the land
       in question – The State issued notification u/s.4 of the 1894
       Act for acquisition of the land – The LAC passed an award and
       mentioned that the possession of the land acquired was already
       taken and the same vests with the Government – Appellant
       filed various writ petitions challenging land acquisition
       proceedings, which were dismissed – His last writ petition
       was dismissed mainly on the ground that the possession
       is deemed to have been taken and continuing with physical
       possession would not confer any right whatsoever upon the
       appellant – Correctness:
       Held: In the instant case, by the virtue of the provisions and
       notification any land falling in the area was required to obtain
       Change of Land Use (CLU) for development – The appellant’s
       land fell within this controlled area, yet the appellant did not obtain
       any CLU – The requirement for CLU being a statutory mandate,
       release of land, in the absence of CLU is not permissible – As far
       as appellant’s plea of discrimination is concerned, the appellant’s
       case stands on a different footing in comparison to others
       inasmuch as the appellant has not obtained a valid CLU – Thus,
       the appellant’s plea of discrimination is rejected – However, since
       the appellant claims to be in continuous physical possession of
       the land wherein a factory is in operation and the department
* Author
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       has not satisfactorily controverted this aspect of the matter, on
       the special facts of this case, in exercise of power u/Art.142,
       this Court deems it appropriate to direct that the compensation
       payable to the appellant should be calculated under the Right
       to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
       Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 as on the date of
       commencement of the said Act. [Paras 7,8,10,13]

                               Case Law Cited
       Sube Singh v. State of Haryana (2001) 7 SCC 545; Hari Ram v.
       State of Haryana [2010] 2 SCR 756 : (2010) 3 SCC 621; Sham
       Lal v. State of Punjab (2013) 14 SCC 393; Haryana State Industrial
       Development Corporation v. Shakuntla [2009] 15 SCR 413 : (2010)
       12 SCC 448; Raghbir Singh Sehrawat v. State of Haryana [2011]
       14 SCR 1113 : (2012) 1 SCC 792; Patasi Devi v. State of Haryana
       [2012] 7 SCR 387: (2012) 9 SCC 503; Usha Stud & Agricultural
       Farms (P) Ltd. v. State of Haryana [2013] 5 SCR 645 : (2013) 4
       SCC 210; Women's Education Trust v. State of Haryana (2013)
       8 SCC 99; Siemens Engg. & Mfg. Co. of India Ltd. v. Union of
       India [1976] Supp. 1 SCR 489 : (1976) 2 SCC 981; State of
       Punjab v. Bandeep Singh [2015] 10 SCR 496 : (2016) 1 SCC
       724 – referred to.

                                 List of Acts
       Land Acquisition Act, 1894; Punjab Scheduled Roads & Controlled
       Areas Restrictions of Unregulated Development Act, 1963; Right
       to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
       Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013.

                              List of Keywords
       Acquisition; Land; Release of land from acquisition; Possession of
       land; Physical possession of land; Change of Land Use; Change
       of Land Use being a statutory mandate; Discrimination; Article 142
       of Constitution.

                             Case Arising From
       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 8968 of 2013
       From the Judgment and Order dated 15.09.2011 of the High Court
       of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in CWP No. 17307 of 2011
[2025] 4 S.C.R.                                                          329

                 Kishore Chhabra v. The State of Haryana & Ors.


                            Appearances for Parties
       Advs. for the Appellant:
       Nidhesh Gupta, Sr. Adv., Ms. Jhanvi Dubey, Ms. Vriti Gujral,
       Ms. Pallavi Singh, Ms. Vinny Shangloo, Rishabh Relan, G. Balaji.
       Advs. for the Respondents:
       K. M. Nataraj, A.S.G., B.K. Satija, A.A.G., Samar Vijay Singh,
       Ms. Sabarni Som, Fateh Singh, Aman Dev Sharma, Aashish
       Chopra, J.P. Sharma, Ajit Rajput, Dr. Sushil Balwada.

                    Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                     Judgment

       Prashant Kumar Mishra, J.

1.     Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by the High Court
       of Punjab and Haryana whereby the writ petition of the appellant,
       calling in question the order dated 17.08.2010 passed by the
       respondent/State rejecting his representation for release of his land
       from acquisition, has been dismissed.
2.     Briefly stated, the facts of the matter are that the appellant is the
       owner in possession of the land and constructed area measuring 386
       sq. yards and 3078 sq. yards at Sultanpur, Sonipat, Haryana having
       purchased the same from the owner of M/s. Haryana Kamoplast
       Industries, Sonipat vide sale deed dated 04.08.1986.
       2.1 On 09.11.1992, the State of Haryana issued notification under
           Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 18941 for acquisition of
           land for the development and utilization of land for residential
           and commercial area along with sector road at Sonipat. Amongst
           other villages, the land situated in appellant’s village-Sultanpur
           was also the subject matter of acquisition. The total area being
           329.70 acres as per Section 6 Notification issued on 06.11.1993,
           the appellant’s land was also included in the Notification so
           issued. The appellant claims to have submitted objections
           under Section 5-A of the Act. The Land Acquisition Collector
           passed an Award No. 10 on 05.11.1995 mentioning that the


1    “the Act’
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             possession of the land acquired had already been taken vide
             Rapat Rozanamcha No. 229 dated 05.11.1995 and the same
             vests with the Government.
       2.2 The appellant’s 1st writ petition challenging the land acquisition
           proceedings was dismissed by the High Court and his 2nd writ
           petition filed in the year 2008 was dismissed as withdrawn as
           his representation was pending. The present is the third writ
           petition filed by the appellant seeking release of the land as
           also seeking quashing of the order dated 17.08.2010 whereby
           his request for release of the land was rejected by the State
           Government.
       2.3 The High Court dismissed the writ petition mainly on the
           ground that the possession is deemed to have been taken and
           continuing with physical possession would not confer any right
           whatsoever upon the appellant.

       SUBMISSIONS BY THE APPELLANT
3.     Mr. Nidhesh Gupta, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the
       appellant strenuously urged that in respect of the same Notification
       of the same village the State has released the land, and on the other
       hand, land of the appellant has not been released although the same
       is similarly situated, as such, the appellant has been singled out in
       a discriminatory manner. Learned senior counsel would refer to and
       rely upon various orders passed by the State Government directing
       release of the land both at the pre-award and post-award stage. It is
       further submitted that there is a running factory on the subject land
       since 1970 i.e. even before the issuance of Notification under Section
       4 of the Act, therefore, his case for release of the land squarely falls
       within the parameters set forth in the State Government’s policy dated
       26.10.2007. Learned senior counsel would also urge that the order
       dated 17.08.2010 rejecting appellant’s representation is unsustainable
       as the same has been passed without assigning any reason. Learned
       senior counsel has placed reliance on “Sube Singh vs. State of
       Haryana”,2 “Hari Ram Vs. State of Haryana”,3 “Sham Lal vs State



2    (2001) 7 SCC 545
3    (2010) 3 SCC 621
[2025] 4 S.C.R.                                                             331

               Kishore Chhabra v. The State of Haryana & Ors.


      of Punjab”,4 “Haryana State Industrial Development Corporation
      vs. Shakuntla”,5 “Raghbir Singh Sehrawat vs. State of Haryana”,6
      “Patasi Devi vs. State of Haryana”,7 “Usha Stud & Agricultural
      Farms (P) Ltd. vs. State of Haryana”,8 “Women’s Education Trust
      vs. State of Haryana”,9 “Siemens Engg. & Mfg. Co. of India Ltd.
      vs. Union of India10 & “State of Punjab vs. Bandeep Singh”.11

      SUBMISSIONS BY STATE OF HARYANA
4.    Mr. K.M. Nataraj, learned Additional Solicitor General appearing on
      behalf of the State of Haryana has argued that the writ petition suffers
      from huge delay and laches; possession of the land having already
      been taken, its release is not legally permissible and that even if any
      other land has been wrongly released, the same would not confer
      any legal right upon the appellant for release of his land as his case
      is not covered under the policy. It is also argued that in response to
      notice under Section 9 of the Act, the appellant submitted his claim
      for grant of compensation @ of Rs. 5,000/- per sq. yard without
      praying for release of the land. It is also submitted that in the first writ
      petition the appellant did not make any prayer for release of the land
      and the second writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn. Therefore,
      the present writ petition was not maintainable being barred under
      the principles of res judicata. Countering the appellant’s submission
      of discrimination, Mr. Nataraj has distinguished the release orders
      made in favour of other landowners.

      STATE POLICIES FOR RELEASE OF LAND FROM ACQUISITION:

5.    (i) Policy dated 26.06.1991
      Para 4 of this policy which was prevalent at the relevant time provided
      that the existing factories should not be acquired and should be



4    (2013) 14 SCC 393
5    (2010) 12 SCC 448
6    (2012) 1 SCC 792
7    (2012) 9 SCC 503
8    (2013) 4 SCC 210
9    (2013) 8 SCC 99
10   (1976) 2 SCC 981
11   (2016) 1 SCC 724
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       released from the acquisition proceedings and constructed area of
       ‘A’ and ‘B’ Grade should be left out of acquisition. Para 6 provided
       that the area which is liable to be left out or acquired should be
       decided at the time of the decision on the report under Section 5-A
       of the Act.

       (ii) Policy dated 26.10.2007
       This policy provided that any factory or commercial establishment
       which existed prior to Section 4 Notification will be considered for
       release with further stipulation that the Government may also consider
       release of land in the interest of integrated and planned development
       where the owners have approached the Hon’ble Court with further
       proviso that the Government may release land on the grounds other
       than stated above under Section 48(1) of the Act under exceptionally
       justifiable circumstances for the reasons to be recorded in writing. In
       the opening part of this policy, it is mentioned that no request will be
       considered after one year of the award and only those requests will
       be considered by the Government where objections under Section
       5-A were filed.

       (iii) Policy dated 24.01.2011
       This policy contained similar provisions like the earlier policy dated
       26.10.2007. However, this policy was issued after passing of the
       order dated 17.08.2010, therefore, the appellant’s case would not
       fall under this policy.
6.     The respondent/State is resisting the appellant’s case for release
       of land on the ground that the appellant having not preferred
       any objection under Section 5-A of the Act and his request being
       delayed, he is not entitled for release of land. Objection to release
       appellant’s land is also on the ground that the appellant does
       not have a valid Change of Land Use 12 certificate which is a
       fundamental prerequisite for the release of land. Further objection
       is on the ground that the land falls within a designated green belt
       and substantial government expenditure has already been incurred
       on development.



12   ‘CLU’
[2025] 4 S.C.R.                                                          333

            Kishore Chhabra v. The State of Haryana & Ors.


     ANALYSIS – WHETHER THE APPELLANT POSSESSES A VALID
     CLU.
7.   We shall first deal with the core issue as to whether the appellant
     possesses a valid CLU for running the factory which he claims to be
     running since 1970. The Department of Town & Country Planning,
     Government of Haryana declared, vide Notification no. 2366-2TCP-
     64/24048 dated 23.09.1964, area around Municipal Town Sonipat
     as controlled area under Section 4(1) (a) of the Punjab Scheduled
     Roads & Controlled Areas Restrictions of Unregulated Development
     Act, 1963. By virtue of the said provisions and Notification any land
     falling in the area is required to obtain CLU for development. The
     appellant’s land falls within this controlled area, yet the appellant
     did not obtain any CLU. In the material papers available on record,
     including the pleadings, the appellant has not submitted any CLU
     granted in his favour or in favour of his predecessor. For establishing
     a factory or any other commercial development being valid, a CLU
     is a prerequisite , in the absence of which, running a factory on the
     said land cannot be validated so as to include his case within the
     sweep of the policy dated 26.06.1991 or 26.10.2007
8.   It is the specific stand of the respondent/State in its counter affidavit
     that the appellant has not obtained a CLU to which the appellant has
     not submitted any rejoinder. It is thus manifest that the requirement
     for CLU being a statutory mandate, release of land, in the absence
     of CLU is not permissible.

     PLEA OF DISCRIMINATION
9.   The appellant’s claim release of land on the plea of discrimination upon
     submission that the lands belonging to Devraj Dewan, Northern India
     Carbonates Pvt. Ltd., Gatta Factory, Ashok Kumar Sawing Machine
     and Deewan Palace have been released from acquisitions. However,
     the appellant has been singled out for unfavourable treatment though
     his case is similarly situated.
10. Material on record reveals that the award was passed on 05.11.1995
    and Rapat Roznamcha No. 229 dated 15.11.1995 was prepared much
    later than the order of release dated 08.04.1994 in favour of Devraj
    Dewan. The said Devraj Dewan submitted his application for CLU and
    the State Government took a decision on 31.05.1992 to process the
    matter for grant of CLU and was eventually granted before Section 4
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       Notification, the appellant cannot claim discrimination vis-à-vis Devraj
       Dewan. Similar is the case with Northern India Carbonates Pvt. Ltd
       and moreover such land held by Northern India Carbonates Pvt. Ltd
       which was part of road/green belt was not released. In respect of
       other released lands it is mentioned by the respondent/State in its
       counter affidavit/written submissions that the same are not part of
       the same Notification. It is, thus, apparent that the appellant’s case
       stands on a different footing inasmuch as the appellant has not
       obtained a valid CLU. Thus, the appellant’s plea of discrimination
       is liable to be rejected.

       EXPENDITURE ALREADY INCURRED BY THE STATE
       GOVERNMENT IN DEVELOPMENT OF THE ACQUIRED AREA
11. In its additional affidavit, the respondent/State of Haryana has
    categorically stated that the concerned department of the State
    Government has already incurred huge amount on account of
    development of the Sectors falling under the Notification and total
    expenditure of Rs. 2661.88 lakhs have been incurred towards the
    construction of sector roads, water supply networks, sewerage
    and stormwater drainage systems. Sector-3, which is part of the
    Notification, is commercial sector and the land has been earmarked
    for public utilities i.e. Fire Station, Petrol Pump, Police Station,
    Telephone Exchange, Auto Market etc. and even 21 commercial
    plots of large scale have also been allotted to multiplex developments
    and are being developed, and one Leisure Vally Park has already
    been planned. Thus, release of the subject land will affect the entire
    planning of the land acquired under the Notification. It is also clear
    from the record that the land in question is abutting the institutional
    Plot No. 2, 18-meter-wide road and 30-meter green belt, hence,
    release of the land would affect the green belt/road.

       ISSUE OF DELAY, LACHES AND RES JUDICATA
12. On the issue of delay and laches, suffice it would be to mention
    that the State has been considering the request for release of land
    and change of land use as late as in the year 2020-21 whereas the
    appellant has been pursuing his case for release at least from the
    year 2007-08 onwards. Thus, the appellant’s request does not suffer
    from delay and laches. Insofar as plea of applicability of principles of
    res judicata is concerned, the first writ petition was not for release of
[2025] 4 S.C.R.                                                         335

               Kishore Chhabra v. The State of Haryana & Ors.


     land. The second writ petition was withdrawn because the appellant’s
     representation was pending, and the present writ petition has been
     preferred, after his representation was rejected, impugning the
     rejection order dated 17.08.2010. Thus, the appellant’s request for
     release of land has never been considered on merits by the High
     Court in any of the writ petitions. Thus, the appellant’s prayer for
     release of land cannot be thrown out on principles of res judicata,
     however it is not acceptable on merits.
13. For the above stated reasons, we are not inclined to accept the
    appellant’s prayer for release of land on the ground of discrimination.
    However, since the appellant claims to be in continuous physical
    possession of the land wherein a factory is in operation and the
    department has not satisfactorily controverted this aspect of the
    matter, on the special facts of this case, in exercise of our power under
    Article 142, we deem it appropriate to direct that the compensation
    payable to the appellant should be calculated under the Right to Fair
    Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation
    and Resettlement Act, 2013 as on the date of commencement of
    the said Act. This order is made on the peculiar facts of the case
    and is not to be treated as a precedent to be relied upon in other
    cases. It is ordered accordingly.
     Resultantly, the appeal is disposed of in the above stated terms.
     No order as to costs.

     Result of the case: Appeal disposed of.



     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan