Holding

The Court held that the High Court was correct in refusing to quash the proceedings; the terms “husband” and “marriage” in Sections 498A and 3048 must be given a purposive construction and therefore the provisions apply even where the marriage is void or invalid.

Issues considered

The appropriateness of entertaining a petition under Section 482 CrPC to quash criminal proceedings when the factual issue of marriage validity is disputed.
Whether Section 498A IPC and Section 3048 IPC apply to a man who is already married and whose relationship with the complainant is not a legally valid marriage.
Interpretation of the terms “husband” and “marriage” in the context of Sections 498A and 3048 – whether a purposive construction is required.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 482
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961s. 2, s. 4, s. 5, s. 6
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955s. 16, s. 5
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 1138
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 3048, s. 34, s. 494, s. 498, s. 498A

Subjects

Section 482 CrPCSection 498A IPCdowry deathpurposive constructioninterpretation of statuteshusband definitionmarital relationshipdowry prohibitionbigamyvalidity of marriage

Judgment

[2009] 7 S.C.R. 157

KOPPISETTI SUBBHARAO @ SUBRAMANlAM A
v
STATE OF A.P.
Criminal Appeal No. 867 of 2009

APRIL 29. 2009
B
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND ASOK KUMAR
GANGULY, JJ.]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.482 ...;.
Proceedings uls. 498-A /PC - Accused seeking quashing 6f C
the proceedings on the ground that s.49BA was not .applicable
as he being an already married man, complainantwas not his
legally wed wife - Dismissal of petition on the ground that· .
disputed questions of facts involved- On appeal, held: Petition
was rightly dismissed.
D
Penal Code, 1860 - s. 498 and 3048 - Applicability of -
To the accused not legally wed - Held: Applicable to the person
who enters into marital relationship and under the ·colour of
such proclaimed status of husband subjects the woman
concerned to cruelty - Purposive construction has to come
into play in such cases - Interpretation otherwise would defeat E
the object of the legislations introducing these provisions -
Interpretations of statutes.
Interpretation of statutes - Purposive construction -
Heydon's Rule - Applicability of
F
Words and Phrases - 'Husband', 'Marriage' and 'Dowry'
- Meaning of in the context of Penal Code, 1860. ~

Appellant-accused was prosecuted u/s.498A IPC. He
filed petition u/s.482 CrPC for quashing the proceedings
on the ground that as he was already married, his marriage G
with the complainant was not legal and hence s.498A was
not applicable in his case. High Court dismissed the
petition holding that the case involved disputed questions
of fact. Hence the present appeal.
1~ H
158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 7 S.C.R.

A Dismissing the appeal, the court ·
HELD: 1. The High Court was justified in holding that
disputed questions of fact are involved and the application
u/s. 482 CrPC has been rightly rejected. There is no scope
for interference with the order of the High Court. [Para 25] ,
B [17 4-C-D] :
2.1 The concept of marriage to constitute the relation- ·
ship of 'husband' and 'wife' may require strict interpre-
tation where claims for civil rights, right to property etc.
may follow or flow and a liberal approach and different
C perception cannot be an anatheme when the question of
curbing a social evil is concerned. [Para 10] [166-8-C]
Smt. Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav v. Anantrao Shivram
Adhav and Anr. AIR 1988 SC 644 - reffered to.
'

D 2.2 The evil sought to be curbed u/ss. 494, 498A and
3048 IPC are distinct and separate from the persons
committing the offending acts and there could be no
impediment in law to liberally construe the words or
expressions relating to the persons committing the
E offence so as to rope in not only those validly married but
also any one who has undergone some or other form of
marriage and thereby assumed for himself the position
of husband to live, cohabitate and exercise authority as
such husband over another woman. [Para 8] [165-A-C]
F 2.3. If the validity of the marriage itself is under legal
scrutiny, the demand of dowry in respect of an invalid
marriage would be legally not recognizable. Even then
the purpose for which Sections 498A and 3048-IPC and
Section 1138 of Evidence Act, 1872 were introduced
G cannot be lost sight of. Legislations enacted witlT some ·
policy to curb and alleviate some public evil rampant in
society and effectuate a definite public purpose or benefit
positively reqlltres to be interpreted with certain element
of realism too· and not merely pedantically or hyper
H technically. The obvious objective was .to prevent
I KOPPISETII SUBBHARAO @ SUBRAMANIAM V. 159
' STATE OF A.P.
•
harassment to a woman who enters into a marital A
relationship with a person and later on, becomes a victim
of the greed for money. [Para 17) [169-B-D]
2.4 A person who enters into a marital arrangement
cannot be allowed to take a shelter behind a smokescreen
to contend that since there was no valid marriage the 8
question of dowry does not arise. Such legalistic niceties
would destroy the purpose of the provisions. Such
hairsplitting legalistic approach would encourage
harassment to a woman over demand of money. The
legislative intent is clear from the fact that it is not only C
the husband but also his relations who are covered by
Section 498A. [Para 17) [169-D-F]
2.5 Section 16 of the Marriage Act deals with
legitimacy of children of void and voidable marriages. Can
0
it be said that legislature which was conscious of the
social stigma attached to children of void and voidable
marriages closed eyes to plight of a woman who
unknowingly or unconscious of the legal consequences
entered into the marital relationship. If such restricted
meaning is given, it would not further the legislative intent. E
On the contrary, it would be against the concern shown
by the legislature for avoiding harassment to a woman
over demand of money in relation to marriages. The first
exception to Section 494 has also some relevance.
According to it, the offence of bigamy will not apply to F
"any person whose marriage with such husband or wife
has been declared void by a Court of competent
jurisdiction". [Para 17) [169-G-H; 170-A-B]
2.6 It would be appropriate to construe the G
expression 'husband' to cover a person who enters into
marital relationship and under the colour of such
proclaimed or feigned status of husband subjects the
woman concerned to cruelty or coerce her in any manner
or for any of the purposes enumerated in the relevant
H
160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 7 S.C.R:

A provisions - Sections 30481498A, whatever be the
legitimacy of the marriage itself for the limited purpose of
Sections 498A and 3048 IPC. Such an interpretation,
known and recognized as purposive construction has to
come into play in a case of this nature. The absence of a
s definition of 'husband' to specifically include such
persons who contract marriages ostensibly and coha-
bitate with such woman, in the purported exercise of his
role and status as 'husband' is no ground to exclude them
from the purview of Section 3048 or 498A IPC, viewed in
C the context of the very object and aim of the legislations
introducing those provisions. [Para 17] [170-8-E]
Chief Justice of A.P. v. L. VA. Dixitulu 1979 (2) SCC 34;
Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) AIR 1988 SC 1883; District
Mining Officer v. Tata Iron and Steel Co. JT 2001 (6) SC 183;
D Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd., v. State of Bihar and Ors. Al R 1955
SC 661; Goodyear India Ltd. v. State of Haryana and Anr. AIR
1990 SC 781; P.E.K. Kalliani Amma and Ors. v. K. Devi and
Ors. AIR 1996 SC 1963; Ameer Trading Corporation Ltd., v.
Shapporji Data Processing Ltd. 2003 (8) Supreme 634;
E Reserve Bank of India etc. v. Peerless General Finance and
Investment Co. Ltd. and Ors. etc. 1987 (1) SCC 424; S. Gopal
Reddy v. State of A.P. 1996 (4) SCC 596; Reema Aggarwal v.
Anupam (2004 (3) SCC 199 - relied on.
B.S. Lokhande vs. State of Maharashtra (1965) 2 SCR
F 837; Surjit Kaur v. Garja Singh and Ors. (AIR 1994 SC 135) -
Distinguished.
lnderun Valungypoo/yv. Ramaswamy 1869 (13) MIA 141;
Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar and Anr. (AIR 1985 SC 628);
G State of H.P. v. Nikku Ram AIR 1996 SC 67 - referred to.
Heydon's case 3 Co Rep ?a 76 ER 637; Seaford Court ' .
Estates Ltd. v. Asher (1949) 2 All ER 155 (CA); Sastry Ve/aider
v. Sembicutty 1881 (6) AC 364; De Thoren v. Attorney General
1876 (1) AC 686; Piers v. Piers L.R. (2) H.L.C. 331 - referred
H to.
......,_ KOPPISETII SUBBHARAO @ SUBRAMANIAM V. 161
( STATE OF A.P.
~

"Early History of Institution" by Mayne; 'Marriage and A
Stridhan' by Banerjee - referred to.
Case Law Reference
1869 (13) MIA 141 relied on Para 8
B
1881 (6) AC 364 relied on Para 8

1876 (1) AC 686 relied on Para 8
L.R.(2) H.L.C. 331 relied on Para 8
1965 (2) SCR 837 distinguished Para 8 c
AIR 1994 SC 135 distinguished Para 8
AIR 1988 SC 644 referred to Para 10
AIR 1985 SC 628 referred to Para 11
D
AIR 1996 SC 67 referred to Para 12
1979 (2) sec 34 relied on Para 18
AIR 1988 SC 1883 relied on Para 19
E
JT 2001 (6) SC 183 relied on Para 20
3 Co Rep 7a 76 ER 637 relied on Para 21
AIR 1955 SC 661 relied on Para 21
AIR 1990 SC 781 relied on Para 21 F
AIR 1996 SC 1963 relied on Para 21
2003 (8) Supreme 634 relied on Para 21
1987 (1) sec 424 relied on Para 22
G
1949 2 All ER 155 (CA) relied on Para 23
1996 (4) sec 596 relied on Para 24
2004 (3) sec 199 relied on Para 24
H
162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 7 S.C.R.

A CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 867 of 2009
From the Judgement and Order dated 29.03.2006 of the
Hon'ble High Court of Judicature, Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad
in Criminal Petition No. 1786 of 2003.
B
Anil Kumar Tandale, for the Appellant.
D. Bharathi Reddy, for the Respondent.
The Judgement of the Court was delivered by
C DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a
learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court
D dismissing the petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the 'Code'). The prayer in
the petition was to quash the proceedings in C.C.No. 440 of
1999 and CC No.325 of 2001 on the file of 3rc1 Additional Judicial
First Class Magistrate, Kakinada.
E
3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:
A case was registered against three accused persons
including the present appellant for alleged commission of offence
punishable under Section 498-A read with Section 34 of the
F Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC'). Initially, the
presence of A-1 could not be secured and therefore court
separated the case againstA-1 and proceeded the trial against
A-2 and A-3. In the said case A-2 and A-3 were acquitted.
Thereafter, the present application was filed before the High
G Court taking the stand that the complainant was not be the legally
wedded wife of the appellant as he was already married and,
therefore, Section 498-A has no application to the facts of the
case.
The High Court dismissed the application on the ground
H that disputed questions of fact are involved.
KOPPISETII SUBBHARAO @ SUBRAMANIAM V 163
STATE OF AP. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J] .
.-
'

4. Learned counsel fodhe appellant submitted that in view A
of the acquittal of the co-accused persons the proceedings
against the appellant should not proceed.
5. Learned counsel for the respondent-State on the other
hand submitted that whether there was ~alid legal marriage
subsisting qua the appellant is a question of fact and, therefore, 8
the High Court was justified in dismissing the application under
Section 482 of Code.

6. Parties to a marriage tying nuptial knot are supposed
\ to bring about the union of souls. It creates a new relationship of c
love, affection, care and concern between the husband and wife.
According to Hindu Vedic philosophy it is sanskar- a sacrament;
one of the sixteen important sacraments essential to be taken
during one's lifetime. There may be physical union as a result of
marriage for procreation to perpetuate the lineal progeny for
0
ensuring spiritual salvation and performance of religious rites,
but what is essentially contemplated is union of two souls.
Marriage is considered to be a junction of three important duties
i.e. social, religious and spiritual. A question of intricate
i
complexity arises in this appeal where factual scenario has to E
(
be also considered.

7. Stand of the appellant was that it was required to be
shown that the victim-woman was the legally married wife of the
accused. Since victim claim to have married during the lifetime
of the appellant, prosecution has failed to establish that it stood F
dissolved legally. Prosecution having failed to bring any material
record in that regard, Section 498-A has no application.
8. The marriages contracted between Hindus are now
statutorily made monogamous. A sanctity has been attributed
to the first marriage as being that which was contracted from a G
sense of duty and not merely for personal gratification. When
the fact of celebration of marriage is established it will be ·
presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary that all the
rites and ceremonies to constitute a valid marriage ha.ve been ,
gone through. As was said as long as 1869 "when once you get H '
164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 7 S.C.R.

A to this, namely, that there was a marriage in fact, there would be
•
a presumption in favour of there being a marriage in law". (See
lnderun Valungypoo/y v. Ramaswamy (1869 (13) MIA 141.)
So also where a man and woman have been proved to have
lived together as husband and wife, the law will presume, until
B contrary be clearly proved, that they were living together in
consequence of a valid marriage and not in a state of
concubinage. (See Sastry Ve/aider v. Sembicutty (1881 (6) AC
364) following De Thoren v. Attorney General (1876 (1) AC
-
686) and Piers v. Piers (L.R.(2) H.L.C. 331). Where a marriage
c is accepted as valid by relations, friends and others for a long I
time it cannot be declared as invalid. In Lokhande's case
(supra), it was observed by this Court "The bare fact that man
and woman live as husband and wife it does not at any rate
normally give them the status of husband and wife even though
they may hold themselves before the society as husband and
0
wife and the society treats them as husband and wife". These
observations were cited with approval in Surjit Kaur v. Garja
Singh and Ors. (AIR 1994 SC 135). At first blush, it would seem
that these observations run counter to the long catena of
decisions noted above. But on closer examination of the facts
E of those cases it is clear that this Court did not differ from the
views expressed in the earlier cases. In Lokhande's case
(supra), this Court was dealing with a case of prosecution for
bigamy. The prosecution had contended that second marriage
was gandharva form of marriage and no ceremonies were
F necessary and, therefore, did not allege or prove that any
customary ceremonies were performed. In that background, it
was held that even in the case of gandharva marriages,
ceremonies were required to be performed. To constitute
'-.
bigamy under Section 494 IPC, the second marriage had to be
G a valid marriage duly solemnized and as it was not so
solemnized it was not a marriage at all in the eye of law and
was therefore invalid. The essential ingredient constituting the
offence of Bigamy is the "marrying" again during the lifetime of
husband or wife in contrast to the ingredients of Section 498A
H which, among other things, envisage subjecting the woman
KOPPISETTI SUBBHARAO @ SUBRAMANIAM V 165
STATE OF AP. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, Jj

concerned to cruelty. The thrust is mainly "marrying" in Section A
494 IPC as against subjecting of the woman to cruelty in Section
498A. Likewise, the thrust of the offence under Section 3048 is
also the "Dowry Death". Consequently, the evil sought to be
curbed are distinct and separate from the persons committing
the offending acts and there could be no impediment in law to B
liberally construe the words or expressions relating to the
persons committing the offence so as to rope in not only those
validly married but also any one who has undergone some or
other form of marriage and thereby assumed for himself the
position of husband to live, cohabitate and exercise authority c
as such husband over another woman. In Surjit Singh's case
(supra) the stand was that the marriage was in Karewa form.
This Court held that under the custom of Karewa marriage, the
widow could marry the brother or a relation of the husband. But
in that case the man was a stranger. Further even under that D
form of marriage certain ceremonies were required to be
· performed which were not proved. Dealing with the contention
relating to presumption, reference was made to Lokhande's
case (supra). As the parties had set up a particular form of
marriage which turned out to be invalid due to absence of proof
of having undergone the necessary ceremonies related to such E
form of marriage, the presumption of long cohabitation could
not be invoked.
9. The presumption may not be available in a case, for
example, where the man was already married or there was any F
insurmountable obstacle to the marriage, but presumption arises
if there is strong evidence by documents and conduct. Above
position has been highlighted in Mayne's Hindu Law and Usage.
10. The question as to who would be covered by the
expression 'husband' for attracting Section 498A does present G
problems. Etymologically, in terms of the definition of"husband"
and "marriage" as given in the various Law Lexicons and
dictionaries - the existence of a valid marriage may appear to
be a sine qua non for applying a penal provision. In Smt.
Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav v. Anantrao Shivram Adhav and H
166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 7 S. C.R.

:
A Anr. (AIR 1988 SC 644) a woman claimed maintenance under
Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short
the 'Cr.P.C.'). This Court applied the provision of the Marriage
Act and pointed out that same was a law which held the field
after 1955, when it was enacted and Section 5 lays down that
B for a lawful marriage the necessary condition that neither party
should have a spouse living at the time of the marriage is
essential and marriage in contravention of this condition
therefore is null and void. The concept of marriage to constitute
the relationship of 'husband' and 'wife' may require strict
c interpretation where claims for civil rights, right to property etc.
may follow or flow and a liberal approach and different perception
cannot be an anatheme when the question of curbing a social
evil is concerned.
11. The question of origin of dowry or dos has been the
D subject of study by theoreticians. Mayne says that it was a t

contribution by the wife's family, or by the wife herself, intended
to assist the husband in bearing the expenses of the conjugal
household (Mayne on "Early History of Institution" page 319).
While dos or dowry previously belonged to husband, his right
E over it being unrestricted, all the property of the wife not included
in the dowry was called her "paraphra" and was her absolute
property over which her husband had no control. (See Banerjee
on 'Marriage and Stridhan' 345) In Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar
and Anr. (AIR 1985 SC 628) after tracing out the history of
F stridhan it was held that wife is the absolute owner of such
property under Section 27 of the Marriage Act. Property
presented to the husband and wife at or about the time of
marriage belongs to them jointly.
12. The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (in short the 'Dowry
G Act') was introduced to combat the ever-increasing menace of
dowry. The avowed object is prohibition on giving and taking of
dowry. Section 2 defines "dowry". Section 4 provides the penalty
for demanding "dowry", while Section 5 is a significant provision
making agreement for giving or taking dowry to be void. Section
H 6 is another provision which reflects statutory concern for
KOPPISETII SUBBHARAO @ SUBRAMANIAM V . 167
STATE OF AP [DR ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

• prevention of dowry, be it taking or giving. It is provided therein A
that pending transfer of the dowry, the person who received the
dowry holds it in trust for benefit of the woman. Amendment to
Section 2 by Amendment Act 43 of 1986 has made the
provision clear and demand made after the marriage is a part
of dowry, in view of addition of words "at or before or after the B
marriage". (See State of H.P v. Nikku Ram (AIR 1996 SC 67).

-;
13. The definition of the term 'dowry' under Section 2 of
' the Dowry Act shows that any property or valuable security given
or "agreed to be given" either directly or indirectly by one party
)
to the marriage to the other party to the marriage "at or before c
or after the marriage" as a "consideration for the marriage of
•
f the said parties" would become 'dowry' punishabl~ under the
Dowry Act. Property or valuable security so as to constitute
'dowry' within the meaning of the Dowry Act must, therefore, be
given or demanded "as consideration for the marriage." D

.___,_
14. Section 4 of the Dowry Act aims at discouraging the
very "demand" of "dowry" as a 'consideration for the marriage'
~·
between the parties thereto and lays down that if any person
"" after the commencement of the Act, "demands", directly or
E
indirectly, from the parents or guardians of a 'bride' or
.;t, 'bridegroom', as the case may be, any 'dowry' he shall be
~
punishable with, imprisonment or with fine or within both. Thus, it
.r
; would be seen that Section 4 makes punishable the very demand
' of property or valuable security as a consideration for marriage,
~ which demand, if satisfied, would constitute the graver offence F
under Section 3 of the Act punishable with higher imprisonment
and with fine which shall not be less than fifteen thousand rupees
or the amount of the value of such dowry whichever is more.
15. The 'Befinition of the expression 'dowry' contained in
G
Section 2 of the Dowry Act cannot be confined merely to be
'demand' of money, property or valuable security' made at or
after the performance of marriage. The legislature has in its
wisdom while providing for the definition of 'dowry' emphasized
that any money, property or valuable security given, as a
H
168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 7 S.C.R.

A consideration for marriage, 'before, at or after' the marriage
would be covered by the expression 'dowry' and this definition 1-
as contained in Section 2 has to be read wherever the
expression 'dowry' occurs in the Act. Meaning of the expression
'dowry' as commonly used and understood is different than the
B peculiar definition thereof under the Act. Under Section 4, mere
demand of 'dowry' is sufficient to bring home the offence to an
accused. Thus, any 'demand' of money, property or valuable
security made from the bride or her parents or other relatives
by the bridegroom or his parents or other relatives or vice-versa
c would fall within the mischief of 'dowry' under the Act where such \
demand is not properly referable to any legally recognized claim
and is relatable only to the consideration of marriage. Marriage
in this context would include a proposed marriage also more
particularly where the non-fulfilment of the "demand of dowry"
leads to the ugly consequence of the marriage not taking place
D
at all. The expression "dowry" under the Dowry Act has to be
interpreted in the sense which the statute wishes to attribute to
it. The definition given in the statute is the determinative factor.
The Dowry Act is a piece of social legislation which aims to
check the growing menace of the social evil of dowry and it
E makes punishable not only the actual receiving of dowry but also
the very demand of dowry made before or at the time or after j,.
the marriage where such demand is referable to the
consideration of marriage. Dowry as a quid pro quo for marriage
is prohibited and not the giving of traditional presents to the
F bride or the bridegroom by friends and relatives. Thus, voluntary
presents given at or before or after the marriage to the bride or
the bridegroom, as the case may be, of a traditional nature,
which are given not as a consideration for marriage but out of
love, affection or regard, would not fall within th~ischief of the
G expression 'dowry' made punishable under the Dowry Act.
16. Aryan Hindus recognised 8 forms of marriage, out of
which four were approved, namely, Brahma, Daiva, Arsha and
Prajapatya. The dis-approved forms of marriages were
Gandharva, Asura, Rakshasa and Paisacha. In the Brahma form
H
KOPPISETTI SUBBHARAO @ SUBRAMANIAM V 169
STATE OF AP. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

. of marriage, some amounts had to be spent by father/guardian,
>
A
as the case may be, to go ultimately to the spouses. The origin
of dowry may be traced to this amount either in cash or kind.
17. The concept of "dowry" is intermittently linked with a
marriage and the provisions of the Dowry Act apply in relation
to marriages. If the legality of the marriage itself is an issue 8
further legalistic problems do arise. If the validity of the marriage
itself is under legal scrutiny, the demand of dowry in respect of
; 'an invalid marriage would be legally not recognizable. Even then
the purpose for which Sections 498A and 3048-1 PC and Section
c
-· 1138 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for short the 'Evidence
Act') were introduced cannot be lost sight of. Legislations
enacted with some policy to curb and alleviate some public evil
rampant in society and effectuate a definite public purpose or
benefit positively requires to be interpreted with certain element
-; of realism too and not merely pedantically or hyper technically. D
The obvious objective was to prevent harassment to a woman
who enters into a marital relationship with a person and later
on, becomes a victim of the greed for money. Can a·person
'. who enters into a marital arrangement be allowed to take a
shelter behind a smokescreen to contend that since there was E
no valid marriage the question of dowry does not arise? Such
legalistic niceties would destroy the purpose of the provisions.
Such hairsplitting legalistic approach would encourage
~
harassment to a woman over demand of money. The
nomenclature 'dowry' does not have any magic charm written F '·
over it. It is just a label given to demand of money in relation to
marital relationship. The.legislative intent is clear from the fact
;,
that it is not only the husband but also his relations who are
covered by Section 498A. Legislature has taken care of children
born from invalid marriages. Section 16 of the Marriage Act
G
deals with legitimacy of children of void and voidable marriages.
Can it be said that legislature which was conscious of the social
stigma attached to children of void and voidable marriages
/
closed eyes \to plight of a woman who unknowingly or
unconscious of the legal consequences entered into the marital
H ·._
170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 7 S.C.R.

A relationship. If such restricted meaning is given, it would not
further the legislative intent. On the contrary, it would be against
the concern shown by the legislature for avoiding harassment
to a woman over demand of money in relation to marriages.
The first exception to Section 494 has also some relevance.
8 . According to it, the offence of bigamy will not apply to "any person
whose marriage with such husband or wife has been declared
void by a Court of competent jurisdiction". It would be appropriate
to construe the expression 'husband' to cover a person who
enters into marital relationship and under the colour of such
c proclaimed or feigned status of husband subjects the woman
concerned to cruelty or coerce her in any manner or for any of
the purposes enumerated in the relevant provisions - Sections
-
3048/498A, whatever be the legitimacy of the marriage itself
for the limited purpose of Sections 498A and 3048 IPC. Such
an interpretation, known and recognized as purposive
0 I·
construction has to come into play in a case of this nature. The
absence of a definition of 'husband' to specifically include such
persons who contract marriages ostensibly and cohabitate with
such woman, in the purported exercise of his role and status as
'husband' is no ground to exclude them from the purview of
E Section 3048 or 498A IPC, viewed in the context of the very
object and aim of the legislations introducing those provisions.
18. In Chief Justice ofA.P v. L. \I.A. Dixitulu (1979 (2) SCC
34), this Court observed:
F "The primary principle of interpretation is that a
constitutional or statutory provision should be construed
"according to the intent of they that made it" (Coke).
Normally, such intent is gathered from the language of the
provision. If the language or the phraseology employed by
G the legislation is precise and plain and thus by itself
proclaims the legislative intent in unequivocal terms, the
same must be given effect to, regardless of the
consequences that may follow. But if the words used in the
provision are imprecise, protean or evocative or can
H reasonably bear meanings more than one, the rule of strict
. KOPPISETII SUBBHARAO @ SUBRAMANIAM V 171
STATE OF A.P. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

grammatical construction ceases to be a sure guide to A
reach at the real legislative intent. In such a case, in order
to ascertain the true meaning of the terms and phrases
employed, it is legitimate for.the Court to go beyond the
arid literal confines of the provision and to call in aid other
well-recognised rules of construction, such as its legislative 8
history, the basic scheme and framework of the statute as
a whole, each portion throwing light, on the rest, the purpose
of the legislation, the object s9ught to be achieved, and
the consequences that may flow from the adoption of one
in preference to the other possible interpretation. c
19. In Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) (AIR 1988 SC
1883), this Court held:
".... But, if the words are ambiguous, uncertain or any doubt
arises as to the terms employed, we deem it as out
0
paramount duty to put upon the language of the legislature
rational meaning. We then examine every word, every
section and every provision. We examine the Act as a
whole. We examine the necessity which gave rise to the
Act. We look at the mischiefs which the legislature intended
to redress. We look at the whole situation and not just E
one-to-one relation. We will not consider any provision out
of the framework of the statute. We will not view the
provisions as abstract principles separated from the motive
force behind. We will consider the provisions in the
circumstances to which they owe their origin. We will F
consider the provisions to ensure coherence and
consistency within the law as a whole and to avoid
_ undesirable consequences.

"" 20. In District Mining Officer v. Tata Iron & ~tee/ Co. (JT .. G
2001 (6) SC 183), this Court stated:
'The legislation is primarily directed to the proelems before
the legislature based on information derived from past
and present experience. It may also be designed by use
of general words to cover similar problems arising in future: H
172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] ?S.C.R.

A But, from the very nature of thing, it is impossible to
anticipate fully in the varied situations arising in future in
which the application of the legislation in hand may be
called for th1~ words chosen to communicate such indefinite
referents are bound to be in many cases, lacking in charity
B and precision and thus giving rise to controversial
questions of construction. The process of construction
combines both literal and purposive approaches. In other
words, the legislative intention i.e. the true or legal meaning •
of an enactment is derived by considering the meaning of
the words used in the enactment in the light of any
discernible purpose or object which comprehends the
mischief and its remedy to which the enactment is
--. -
directed".
21. The suppression. of mischief rule made immortal in
D Heydon's case (3 Co Rep 7a 76 ER 637) can be pressed into
service. With a view to suppress the mischief which would have
surfaced had ~)Jjteral rule been allowed to cover the field, the
Heydon's Rule has t:Je.en applied by this Court in a number of
cases, e.g. Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd., v. State of Bihar and
E Ors. (AIR 1955SG661), GoodyearlndiaLtd. v. StateofHaryana
andiAnr. (AIR 1900 SC 781), PE.K. Kalliani Amma and Ors. v.
K. Qevi and Ors. (AIR 1996 SC 1963) and Ameer Trading r

Corporation Lt</., v. Shapporji Data Processing Ltd. (2003 (8)
Supreme 634),
F 22. In Reserve Bank of India etc. etc. v. Peerless General
Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. and others etc. etc. (1987
(1) sec 424) while dealing with the question of interpretation
of a statute, this Court observed:
"Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. ~
G
They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say if
the text is the texture, context is what gives the colour.
Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That
interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation
t
match the contextual. A statue is best interpreted when we '
H
KOPPISETTI SUBBHARAO @ SUBRAMANIAM V 173
STATE OF A.P. [DR ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
)
know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute A
must be read, first as a whole and then section by section,
clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. If
a statute is looked at in the context of its enactment, with
the glasses of the statute-maker, provided by such context,
its scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and words may B
take colour and appear different than when the statute is
looked at without the glasses provided by the context.
~
With these glasses we must look at the Act as a whole
and discover what each section,· each clause, each phrase

- and each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into
the scheme of the entire Act. No part of a statute and no
word of a statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes
c

have to be construed so that every word has a place and
everything is in its place."
23. In Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher (1949) 2 All ER D
155 (CA), Lord Denning, advised a purposive approach to the
interpretation of a word used in a statute and observed:
"The English language is not an instrument of mathematical
precision. Our literature would be much the poorer if it
were. This is where the draftsmen of Acts of Parliament E
have often been unfairly criticised. A Judge, believing
himself to be fettered by the supposed rule that he must
look to the language and nothing else, laments that the
draftsmen have not provided for this or that, or have been
guilty of some or other ambiguity. It would certainly save F
the-Judges trouble if Acts of Parliament were drafted with
divine prescience and perfect clarity. In the absence of it,
when a defect appears, a Judge cannot simply fold his
hands and blame the draftsman. He must set to work on
the constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament, G
and he must do this not only from the language of the
statute, but also from a consideration of the social
conditions which gave rise to it cmd of the mischief which
it was P?Ssed to remedy, and then he must supplement
the written word so as to give 'force and life' to the intention H

i.l
174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 7 S.C.R.

A of the legislature ...... A Judge should ask himself the
question how, if the makers of the Act had themselves
come across this ruck in this texture of it, they would have
straightened it out? He must then do so as they would
have doe. A Judge must not alter the material of which
B the Act is woven, but he can and should iron out the
creases."
(underlined for emphasis)
24. These aspects were highlighted by this Court in S.
c Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P. (1996 (4) SCC 596) and Reema
Aggarwal v. Anupam (2004 (3) SCC 199.
25. The High Court was justified in holding that disputed
questions of fact are involved and the application under Section
482 of Code has been rightly rejected. We do not find any scope
D for interference with the order of the High Court. However, we
make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the
merits of the case.
26. The appeal is dismissed.

K.K.T. Appeal dismissed.