Holding

Pending schemes under Section 68‑C of the old Act are saved by Section 217(2)(e) of the Motor Vehicles Act 1988 and must be finalised under Section 100, with the one‑year limitation in Section 100(4) computed from the commencement of the 1988 Act, excluding periods of court‑ordered stay.

Summary

Krishan Kumar, holder of a stage‑carriage permit for the Kota‑Khanpur route, challenged the State of Rajasthan’s decision to grant an exclusive operating right on the overlapping Kota‑Sangod route. The State Road Transport Corporation had issued a notification on 11‑Oct‑1979 under Section 68‑C of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 proposing the exclusive scheme, which was approved by the hearing authority in 1984 but not finalized because the operators sought a fresh hearing. The Motor Vehicles Act 1988 came into force on 1‑July‑1989, repealing the old Act, and the State issued a final notification on 29‑Aug‑1990 under Section 100(3) of the new Act. The appellant argued that the scheme had lapsed due to the one‑year limitation in Section 100(4) and the delay caused by his own representations, seeking a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court held that Section 217(2)(e) of the 1988 Act saves pending schemes under the old Act and mandates their finalisation under Section 100, with the one‑year period computed from the commencement of the new Act and excluding periods of judicial stay. Consequently, the final notification was within the permissible period and the appeal was dismissed with costs.

Issues considered

Whether a scheme proposed under Section 68‑C of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939, pending at the commencement of the Motor Vehicles Act 1988, lapses under the one‑year limitation in Section 100(4) of the 1988 Act.
Whether Section 217(2)(e) of the 1988 Act saves such pending schemes and requires them to be finalised under Section 100, and how the one‑year period should be computed.

Legislation cited

Motor Vehicles Act, 1939s. 68-C, s. 68-D(2), s. 68-D(3)
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988s. 100(1), s. 100(2), s. 100(3), s. 100(4), s. 217(2)(e), s. 99

Subjects

Motor Vehicles ActSection 68-CSection 100Section 217scheme finalisationone‑year limitationharmonious constructionroute nationalisationstage carriage permitwrit petitionArticle 226

Judgment

A KRJSHAN KUMAR
v.
STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND ORS.

AUGUST 9, 1991

B [K.N. SINGH AND P.B. SAWANT, JJ.]

Motor Vehicles Act, 1939-Section 68C-Notification dated
11. 10. 1979 to make a notified route-Delay due to conduct of affected
parties by approaching the Government and the High Court-Coming
into force of the new Act (The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988) w.e.f.
I. 7.1989-Final notification dated 29.8.1990 u/s. 100(3) of the new
c Act-Whether notification dated 11.10. 1979 lapsed or whether within
limitation.

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988-Sections 100, 217(2)-0bject of-
Pending scheme under Section 68C of the old Act (The Motor Vehicles
D Act, 1939)-Final notification issued under Section 100(3) of the new
Act-Limitation-Computation.

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988-Sections JOO, 217(2)-Harmonious
construction-Reasons indicated.

E Interpretation of Statutes-Harmonious Construction-Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988-Sections 100and217(2).

The appellant held a Stage Carriage Permit for plying his vehicle
on the Kota-Khanpur route, which overlaps a portion of the Kota-
Sangod route. The State Road Transport Corporation vide Notification
F dated 11.10.1979 proposed a scheme under Section 68-C of the Motor
Vehicles Act 1939 for the exclusive operation of its vehicles on the
Kota-Sangod route.

The affected operators of the route, including the appellant, filed
their objections against the scheme before the authority appointed by
G the State Government which approved the scheme.

Before the State· Government could issue the final Notification
under Section 68-D(3) of the old Act, the appellant and other affected
operators made representation to !he Minister for Transport for afford-
ing them a fresh opportunity of hearing.
H

500
KRISHAN KUMAR v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 501

Meanwhile, the Motor Vehicles Act 1988 was enforced with effect A
from I. 7.1989 repealing the old Act .
....,
The appellant, thereupon, filed a writ petition before the High
Court for restraining the State Government from issuing the final
Notification on the ground that on the enforcement of the new Act, the
Notification dated U.10.1979 issued under Section 68-C of the old Act B
had lapsed on account of delay in finalisation of the same.

A similar writ petition had been filed earlier in respect of
• -\- Kishangarh-Sarwad route by one affected party, on similar grounds. A
learned Single Judge of the High Court dismissed that writ petition
holding that the draft scheme under the old Act was saved by the new
Act and the same could legally be finalised under the provisions of the
c
new Act. When he filed a Letters Patent Appeal, the Division Bench
dismissed the Appeal as well as the various writ petitions including that
of the appellant by a common order, against which the present appeal
was made.
D
After the judgment of the High Court, the final notification was
published in the Official Gazette on 29.8.1990 u/s. 100(3) of the new Act.

The appellant, contended before the Court that since there was
undue delay of ll years in issuing the final Notification, the scheme as
proposed under Section 68-C ()f the old Act should be deemed to have E
lapsed and the State Government had no authority or jurisdiction to
_,, finalise the same or to issue Notification under Section 100(3) of the new
~
Act; that since the draft scheme dated ll.10.1979 was not finalised
under Section 100(3) of the new Act, the same bad lapsed after one year
from the date of the notification issued u/s. 68-C of the old Act; and that
since period of one year had already expired from the date of the publi- F
cation of the scheme under Section 68-C of old Act, the scheme auto-
matically lapsed and the same could not be finally published under
Section JOO of the new Act.

Dismissing the appeal this Court,
~

--I G
HELD: I.I. The object and purpose of Section 100(4) is to avoid
delay in finalising a scheme. The Parliament was aware that under the
old Act schemes were not finalised for long years as a result of which
public interest suffered, therefore, it prescribed a time frame for the
approval and publication of schemes. Sub-section (4) prescribes a
period of limitation during which the State Government should hear H
502 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 3 S.C.R.

and consider the objections of the objectors and finalise the scheme and
A
publish the same in the Official Gazette and on its failure to do so within
that period, penal consequences would ensue as a result of which the
scheme itselfshall stand lapsed. [507H-508A, 507F-G]

1.2. The Legislative intent is clear that the schemes proposed
B under Section 68-C of the old Act pending on the date of the commence-
men! of the new Act should not lapse instead those schemes should be
finalised in accordance with the provisions of Section 100 of the new
Act. The pending schemes were therefore saved and the same were to be
finalised within one year as contemplated by Section 100(4) of the new
Act. [S09C-D]
r '
c 1.3. Section 217(2)(e) has been enacted to save the schemes
published under Section 68-C of the old Act which were pending on the
date of the commencement of the Act with a further direction that the
same shall be finalised in accordance with Section 100 of the Act. [SIOC]

D 1.4. If the period of one year from the date of the publication of
proposed scheme is applied to the pending schemes under Section 68-C
of the old Act, the purpose and object of saving the old schemes under
Clause (e) of Section 217(2) of the new Act would be frustrated. [509E-F]

2.1. While Section 217(2)(e) permits finalisation of a scheme in
E accordance with Section 100 of the new Act, sub-section (4) of Section
100 lays down that a scheme if not finalised within a period of onr year
shall be deemed to have lapsed. If the period of one year as prescribed
under Section 100(4) is not computed from the date of publication of the .,
.
scheme under Section 68-C of the old Act and instead the period of one
year is computed from the date of commencement of the Act, both the
F provisions could be given full effeet. [SIOF-H]

2.2. While in the case of a scheme under Section 68-C of the
old Act, pending on the dale of enforcement of the new Act, namely,
I. 7.1989, the period of one yeair as prescribed under Section 100(4)
should be computed from the date of commencement of the new Act. [SIID-E]
G y ~

2.3. The appellant was himself responsible for the delay therefore
he is not entitled to complain for the delay. Delay would not automati-
cally render the scheme illegal. [SOOG I

2.4. Since under the old Act no time frame was prescribed for
H finalising a scheme penal consequences could not ensue. Under the old
KR!SHAN KUMAR v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 503

Act a scheme proposed u/s. 68 could continue to remain in force till it
A
was quashed. [505G-H]

2.5. Since the scheme proposed on 11.10.1979 had not been
quashed by any Court, the same continued to be in force on the
date of commencement of the new Act. In the absence of any provi-
sion in the old Act rendering the scheme ineffective on the ground B
of delay, the scheme proposed u/s. 68-C of the old Act could not
lapse ipso facto. [505H-506A]

2.6. In the instant case stay order passed by the High Court
remained iil force from May to 9th August, 1990. On the exclusion of
that period the fmal Notification issued by the State Government under
Section 100(3) of the new Act on 29.8.1990 was well within the pre-
c
scribed period. [512C-D I

Yogeshwar Jaiswal etc. v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal &
Ors., AIR 1985 SC 516; Onkar Singh & Ors. v. Regional Transport
Authority, Agra & Ors., [1986] 3 SCC 259; Devki Nandan v. State of D
Rajasthan & Ors., [1987] SUPPL. SCC 438 and Srichand v. Government
of u. P., [1985] 4 sec 169, distinguished.

Santosh Kumar & Ors. v. Regional Transport Authority, CMWP
No. 21773/89, decided on 16th March, 1990, over-ruled.
E
3. Where there appears to be inconsistency in two sections of the
same Act, the principle of harmonious construction should be followed
in avoiding a head on clash. It shonld not be lightly assumed that what
the Parliament has given with one hand, it took away with the other.
The provisions of one section of statute cannot be used to defeat those of
another unless it is impossible to reconcile the same. The essence of F
harmonious construction is to give effect to both the provisions.

Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore, AIR 1958 SC 225 at
p. 268.-Followed.

'°' '1 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3165 G
of 1991.

From the Judgment and Order dated 9.8.90 of the Rajasthan
High Court in W.P. No. 2009/90.

V.A. Bobde, and Mrs. Rani Chhabra for the Appellant. H
504 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1991] 3 S.C.R.

A Satish Kr. Jain and Mrs. Pratibha Jain for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SINGH, J. Special leave granted.

B This appeal is directed against the judgment and order of the
High Court of Rajasthan dated 9.8.1990 dismissing the appellant's writ
petition made under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the
scheme for nationalisation of the route in dispute.

The appellant holds a Stage Carriage Permit for plying his vehi-
cle on the Kota-Khanpur route, which overlaps a portion of the Kota-
c Sangod route. The _Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation,
Jaipur issued a Notification on 11.10.1979 proposing a scheme under
Section 68-C of the Motor Vehides Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to
as the 'old Act') for the exclusive operation of the vehicles of the State
Road Transport Corporation on the Kota-Sangod route. The existing
D operators as well as the affected operators of the route filed their
objections before the hearing authority appointed by the State
Government of Rajasthan. The hearing authority after considering
those objections approved the scheme under Section 68-D (2) of the
old Act by its order dated 30.11.1984 and submitted the papers to the
State Government for the issue of Notification under Section 68-D (3).
E Before the State Government could issue Notification under Section
68-D (3) of the old Act, the appellant and other affected operators
made representation to the Minister for Transport for affording them a
fresh opportunity of hearing. As a result of which no final Notification
under Section 68-D (3) could be issued. Meanwhile, the Motor Vehi-
cles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the new Act) was enforced
F with effect from 1.7.1989 and the old Act was repealed. The appellant
thereupon filed a writ petition before the High Court under Article
226 of the Constitution for the issue of Mandamus restraining the State
Government from issuing the final Notification, mainly on the ground
that on the enforcement of the new Act, the Notification dated
11. 10. 1979 issued under Section 68-C of the old Act had lapsed on
G account of delay in finalisation of the same. A similar writ petition had
been filed earlier in respect of Kishangarh-Sarwad route by one Sardar
Mohd. on similar grounds. A learned single Judge of the High Court
dismissed that writ petition holding that the draft scheme under the old
Act was saved by the new Act and the same could legally be finalised
under the provisions of the new Act. Sardar Mohd. filed a Letters
H Patent Appeal against the judgment of the learned single Judge. A
..
KRJSHAN KUMAR v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN !S'1NGH, J.) 505

J::'1ivision Bench of the High Court disposed of the Letters Patent A
Appeal of SardaJ Mohd. as well as the various writ petitions including
t,hat of the appellant by a common order dated 9.8. 1990 impugned in
·the present appeal.

J After the impugned judgment of the High Court, the State
f Government approved the Scheme as proposed under 68-C of the old B
·! Act. Final notificqtion approving this Scheme was published in the
Official Gazette on 29.8. 1990 u/s 100(3) of the new Act, as.a result of
1., which the Kota-Sangod route has become a notified route, con-
! sequently the appellant has no right to ply his vehicle on the overlap-
ping portion of that route.

Learned counsel for the appellant urged that since there was.
c
undue: delay of 11 years in issuing the final Notification, the scheme as
prpposed under Section 68-C of the old Act should be deemed to have
.lapsed and· the State Government had no authority or jurisdiction to
finalise the same or to issue Notification under Section 100(3) of the
new Act. He placed reliance on a number of decisions of this Court in D
support of his contention that unreasonable delay in finalising a
scheme proposed under Section 68-C of the old Act rendered the same
illegal. He referred to the decisions of this Court in Yogeshwar Jaiswal
etc. v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal & Ors., AIR 1985 SC 516;
Onkar Singh & Ors. v. Regional Transport Authority, Agra & Ors.,
[ 1986] 3 SCC 259; Devki Nandan v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., [1987] E
Suppl. SCC 438 and Srichand v. Government of U.P., [1985] 4 SCC
169. No doubt in these decisions the Court quashed the schemes pro-
posed under Section 68-C of the old Act on the ground of inordinate
delay for which there was no valid explanation. In the instant case, the
proposed scheme had been approved by the hearing authority under
Section 68-D (2) of the old Act in 1984 within five years of the proposal F
of the scheme but when the matter was placed before the State
Government for issue of final Notification under Section 68-D (3) of
the old Act, the appellant and other affected operators approached the
Minister for Transport and stalled the issue of final Notification as a
'result of which delay was caused. The appellant was himself responsi-
ble for the delay therefore he is not entitled to complain of the delay. G
Moreover this Court has not ruled in the aforesaid.decisions, or in any
other decision that delay would automatically render the scheme
illegal. Since under the old Act no time frame was prescribed for
finalising a scheme penal consequences could not ensue. Under the old
Act a scheme proposed u/s 68 could continue to remain in force till it
was quashed. Since the scheme proposed on 11.10.1979 had not been H
506 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 3 S.CR.

quashed by any Court, the same continued to be in force on the date of
A
commencement of the new Act. In the absence of any provision in tt,1e
old Act rendering the scheme ineffective on the ground of delay, th.~
scheme proposed u/s 68-C of the old Act could not lapse ipso facto.
Moreover, now the State Government has already issued final Notifit
cation under Section 100(3) of the new Act on 29.8.1990, as a result ofi
B ·which the route has been notified. In this view ratio of the aforesaid·
decisions of the Court are not applicable to the instant case at this 1
stage.

Learned counsel for the appellant urged that under Section .f
100(4) of the new Act, if a draft scheme is not finalised and the final
C notification is not issued within one year from the date of the publica-
tion of the proposed scheme, the same would lapse. Since in the
instant case the draft scheme dated 11.10.1979 was not finalised under
Section 100(3) of the new Act the same had lapsed after one year from
the date of the notification issued u/s 68-C of the old AcL In order to
appreciate this contention it is necessary to consider the relevant pro-
D visions of the new Act. Chapter VI of the new Act contains special
provisions relating to State Transport Undertakings. Section 99 con-
fers power on the State Government to propose a scheme for operat-
ing the vehicles of the Stai:e Transport Undertakings to the exclusion
of other persons. The proposed scheme is published in the Gazette.
Section 100 which provides for filing of the objections before the State
E Government and the issue of final notification, is as under:

"IOO. Objection to the proposal-

(1) on the publication of any proposal regarding a scheme
in the Official Gazette and in not less than one newspaper
F in the regional language circulating in the area or route
which is to be covered by such proposal any person may,
within thirty days from the date of its publication in the
Official Gazette, file objections to it before the State
Government.

G (2) The State Government may, after considering the
objections and after giving an opportunity to the objector
or his representatives and the representatives of the State
Transport Undertaking to be heard in the matter, if they so
desire, approve or modify such proposal.

H (3) The scheme relating to the proposal as approved or
KR!SHAN KUMAR v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [SINGH, J.J 507

modified under sub-section (2) shall be published in the
A
Official Gazette by the State Government making such
scheme and in not less than one newspaper in the regional
language circulating in the area or route covered by such
scheme and the same shall thereupon become final on
the date of its publication in the Official Gazette and
shall be called the approved scheme and the area or route B
to which it relates shall be called the notified area or
notified route:

Provided that no such scheme which relates to any inter-
State route shall be deemed to be an approved scheme
unless it has the previous approval of the Central
Government.
c
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section,
where a scheme is not published as an approved scheme
under sub-section (3) in the Official Gazette within a
period of one year from the date of publication of the pro- D
posal regarding the scheme in the Official Gazette under
sub-section ( 1), the proposal shall be deemed to have
lapsed.

Section 100 provides for filing of objections before the State Goyem-
ment within 30 days from the date of the publication of the proposed E
scheme in the Official Gazette. Under sub-section (2) the State
Government may approve or modify the proposed scheme after con-
sidering the objections and hearing the objectors. Under sub-section
(3) the State Government is required to publish the approved scheme
in the Official Gazette and also in one newspaper. On the publication
of the approved scheme in the Official Gazette, the area or route to F
which it relates shall be called the notified area or notified route.
Sub-section (4) lays down that if a scheme is not published as an
approved scheme in the Gazette within one year from the date of pub-
lication of the proposed scheme in the Official Gazette, the proposed
scheme shall be deemed to have lapsed. Sub-section (4) in our opinion
prescribes a period of limitation during which the State Government G
should hear and consider the objections of the objectors and finalise
the scheme and publish the same in the Official Gazette and on its
failure to do so with in that period, penal consequences would ensue as
a result of which the scheme itself shall stand lapsed. The object and
purpose of Section 100(4) is to avoid delay in finalising a scheme. The
Parliament was aware that under the old Act schemes were not H
508 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1991] 3 S.C.R.

finalised for long years as a result of which public interest suffered, there-
A
fore, it prescribed a time frame for the approval and publication of
schemes.

The prov1S1ons of Section 100 are applicable to the schemes
proposed under the new Act. The question is whether it would apply
B to a scheme proposed under Section 68-C of the old Act. The Legisla-
ture was conscious that a number of schemes proposed under the old
Act were pending approval on the date of the commencement of the
Act, it therefore made a provision for saving those schemes by enaet-
ing Section 217 of the Act, which is as under: r ~

"217. Repeal and savings-(1) The Motor Vehicles Act,
c 1939 (4 of 1939) and any law corresponding to that Act in
force irr any State immediately before the commencement
of this Act in that State (hereinafter in this Section referred
to as the repealed enactments) are hereby repealed.

D (2) Notwithstanding the repeal by sub-section (1) of
the repealed enactments-

(a) any notification, rule, regulation, order or notice
issued, or any appointment or dedaration made or exemp-
tion granted, or any confiscation made, or any penalty or
E fine imposed, any forfeiture cancellation or any other thing
done, or any other action taken under the repealed enaet-
ments, and in force immediately before such commence-
ment shall, so far as it is not inconsistent with the provi-
sions of this Act, be deemed to have been issued, made,
granted, done: or taken under the corresponding provision
F of this Act;

···································~················

(e) any scheme made under section 68-C of the Motor
G Vehicles Act, 1939 (4 of 1939) or under the corresponding y ...
law, if any, in force in any State and pending immediately
before the commencement of this Act shall be disposed of
in accordance with the provisions of section 100 of this Act;

(f) the permits issued under sub-section (1-A) of section
H 68-F of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (4 of 1939), or under
KRIS HAN KUMAR v. STA TE OF RAJASTHAN [SINGH, J. J 509

the corresponding provisions, if any, in force in any State A
immediately before the commencement of this Act shall
continue to remain in force until the approved scheme
under Chapter VI of this Act is published.

B
Under sub-section (1) the old Act has been repealed but under sub-
section (2) inspite of repeal the Parliament has made provisions for
saving the schemes proposed under Section 68-C of the old Act.
Clause (e) of Section 217 (2) of the new Act provides that notwith-
standing the repeal of the old Act a scheme proposed under Section
68-C of the old Act, if pending immediately before the commence-
ment of the Act shall be finalised in accordance with the provisions of C
Section 100 of the new Act. The Legislative intent is clear that the
schemes proposed under Section 68-C. of the old Act pending on the
date of the commencement of the new Act should not lapse instead
those schemes should be finalised in accordance with the provisions of
Section 100 of t.he new Act. The pending schemes were therefore D
saved and the same were to be finalised within one year as contemp-
lated by Section 100 (4) of the new Act. Section 100 (4) lays down that
if the proposed sch~me is not finalised within one year from the date of
its publication in the Official Gazette, it shall be deemed to have
lapsed but that applies to a scheme proposed under the new Act and
not to a scheme proposed under Section 68-C of the old Act. If the E

... period c>f one year from the date of the publication of the proposed
scheme is applied to the pending schemes under Section 68-C of the
old Act, the purpose and object of saving the old schemes under
Clause (e) of Section 217 (2) of the new Act would be frustrated.

Learned counsel for the appellant urged that since Section F
217(2)(e) provides for the finalisation of a pending scheme published
under the old Act in accorda:ice with the provisions of Section 100 of
the new Act, the period of limitation of one year prescribed under

..
sub-section (4) of that section would also apply. He further urged that
since period of one year had already expired from the date of the
"· publication of the scheme under Section 68-C of old Act, the scheme
automatically lapsed and the same could not be finally published under
G

Section 100 of the Act.

If the appellant's contention is accepted the schemes published
under Section 68-C of the old Act would lapse after the expiry of the
period of one year from the date of the publication of the scheme in H
510 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1991] 3 S.C.R.

the Official Gazette in accordance with the provisions of the old Act.
A
On the other hand we find that Section 217(2)(e) permits finalisation
of a scheme published under Section 68-C of the old Act if the same ....
was pending on the date of the commencement of the new Act. The
old Act did not provide any period of limitation consequently a
n!lmber of schemes published under Section 68-C of the old Act were
B pending on the date of commencement of the new Act although a
period of one year had already expired. If the Parliament intended to
apply the limitation of period of one year to the pending schemes
published under Section 68-C of the old Act, the new Act could have
made provisions to that effect. On the contrary Section 217(2)(e) has r
been enacted to save the schemes published under Section 68-C of the
old Act which were pending on the date of the commencement of the
'C
Act with a further direction that the same shall be finalised in accor-
dance with Section 100 of the Act. Sub-section (4) of Section 100
provides that where a scheme is not published as approved under
sub-section (3) within period of one year from the date of publication
of the proposal in the Official Gazette under sub-section (1), the pro-
D posal shall be deemed to have lapsed. A scheme published under
Section 68-C of the old Act pending on the date of commencement of
the Act could not be a scheme proposed under sub-section (1) of
Section 100, therefore, the rigour of period of one year as applicable to
a scheme proposed undf:r sub-section (1) of Section 100 could not
apply to a scheme under Section 68-C pending on the date of com-
E mencement of the Act. It was not meant that a scheme u/s 68-C of the
old Act pending on the date of commencement of the new Act may be
approved or finalised with leisure without any time limit.

There appears to be some apparent conflict between Section
'
100(4) and Section 217(2)(e) of the Act. While Section 217(2)(e)
F permits finalisation of a scheme in accordance with Section 100 of
the new Act sub-section (4) of Section 100 lays down that a scheme if
not finalised within a period of one year shall be deemed to have
lapsed. If the appellant's contention is accepted then Section 217(2)(e)
will become nugatory and no scheme published under Section 68-C of

G
the old Act could be finalised under the new Act. On the other hand if
the period of one year as prescribed under Section 100(4) is not com-
puted from the date of publication of the scheme under Section 68-C of
...
the old Act and instead the period of one year is computed from the
date of commencement of the Act both the provisions could be given
full effect.

H It is settled principle of interpretation that where there appears
KRJSHAN KUMAR v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN (SINGH. J.l 511

to be inconsistency in two sections of the same Act, the principle of A
·harmonious construction should be followed in avoiding a head on
clash. It should not be lightly assumed that what the Parliament has
given with one hand, it took away with the other. The provisions of
one section of statute cannot be used to defeat those of another unless
it is impossible to reconcile the same. In Venkataramana Devaru v.
State of Mysore, AIR 1958 SC 225 at p. 268, this Court observed: B

"The rule of construction is weU-settled that when there
are in an enactment two provisions which cannot be recon-
ciled with each other, they should be so interpreted that, if
possible, effect should be given to both. This is what is
known as the rule of harmonious construction."
c
The essence of harmonious construction is to give effect to both.the
provisions. Bearing these principles in mind it is legitimate to hold that
Section 100(4) prescribed period of limitation of one year in respect of
the scheme proposed under the provisions of the new Act, while in the
case of a scheme under Section 68-C of the old Act, pending on the D
date of enforcement of the new Act, namely, 1.7.1989, the period of
one year as prescribed under Section 100(4) should be computed from
the date of commencement of the new Act. This interpretation would
give full effect to both the Sections-Section 100(4) and Section
217(2)(e) of the new Act.
E
Learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on a Division
Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Santosh Kumar & Ors.
v. Regional Transport Authority, CMWP No. 21773/89, decided on
16th March, 1990. In that ease a Division Bench of Allahabad High
Court held that a draft scheme under Section 68-C of the old Act
published in 1986 shall be deemed to have lapsed on the date of the F
enforcement of the new Act in view of the absolute prohibition con-
tained in Section 100(4') of the new Act against the continuance of any
scheme after one year. We have gone through the judgment of the
Division Bench carefully butin our opinion the view taken by the High
Court of Allahabad is unsustainable in law. The learned Judges con-
stituting the Bench failed to notice the legislative intendment under G
Section 217(4)(e) of the new Act which kept alive the scheme pub-
lished under Section 68-C of the old Act for the purposes of being
finalised under the new Act. We are therefore clearly of the opinion
that the view taken by the Allahabad High Court is incorrect.

In the instant case, the appellant had filed a writ petition in May, H
512 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1991] 3 S.C.R.

A 1990 and obtained an interim order from the High Court restraining
the State Government from publishing the final Notification under
Section 100(3) of the new Act. The State Government published the
final notification under Section 100(3) of the new Act on 29.8.1990
after the dismissal of the writ petition by the Division Bench of the
High Court. The period of one year with regard to the pending schrn.~
B expired on l. 7.1990 but since the appellant had obtained stay order
from the High Court, the State Government could not publish final
notification. Explanation to Section 100(4) of the new Act lays down
that in computing the period of one year any period during which the
publication of the approved scheme under Section 100 is held up on
account of any stay or order of any court, shall be excluded. On the
c application of the Explanation the period during which the appellant
had obtained stay order against the State Government is liable to be
excluded in computing the period of one year. Admittedly in the
instant case stay order passed by the High Court remained in force
from May to 9th August, 1990. On the exclusion of that period the
D final notification issued by the State Government under Section 100(3)
of the new Act on 29.8.1990 was well within the prescribed period.

In view of the above discussion, we are of the opinion that the
High Court rightly dismissed the appellant's writ petition. The appeal
fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs.

V.P.R. Appeal dismissed.

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