Holding

Substantial corroboration is not a mandatory requirement for conviction under Section 376 IPC in cases involving a minor; the victim's testimony together with relevant circumstantial evidence is sufficient.

Summary

The petitioner was convicted under Section 376 IPC for raping a girl under 16 years who was sleeping outside her house. He appealed, arguing that the victim's testimony lacked substantial corroboration. The Supreme Court held that in rape cases involving minors, the victim's testimony, when supported by circumstantial evidence such as injuries and blood on clothing, is sufficient and does not require the old‑fashioned rule of mandatory corroboration. The Court emphasized the relevance of human psychology, the improbability of false accusations, and the corroborative value of the victim’s physical injuries. Consequently, the special leave petition was dismissed and the conviction upheld.

Issues considered

What degree of corroboration is required to sustain a conviction under Section 376 IPC when the victim is a minor?
Can a conviction be upheld on the basis of the victim's testimony supplemented by circumstantial evidence without "substantial" corroboration?

Legislation cited

Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 376

Subjects

rapeminorcorroborationvictim testimonySection 376 IPCevidentiary standardsspecial leave petitionSupreme Court

Judgment

305

KRISHAN LAL A
+ v.
STATE OF HARYANA
April 1, 1980
[V. R. KRISHNA !YER AND E. S. VENKATARAM.IAH, JJ.] B

Indian Penal Cade 1860 (XLV of 1860) Section 376-Rape on young girl
-Necessity of corroboration of girl's testimony-Nature and extent of corrcr
boration necessary.
The prosecution alleged that a girl below 16 years of age was sleeping out-
side her hou•e with her family and that the petitioner in the comJ1"11Y of an· C
other (acquitted accused) carried her away under intimidation to a neigh.-
bowing godown belonging to another acquitted accused and in that secluded
venue committed rape on the young woman and afteN\lirds put her back on
her cot.
The trial court convicted the petitioner but on grounds of benefit of doubt
acquitted the other accused. The High Court affirmed this order. D
In the- special leave petition to this Court, it was contended on behalf of
the petitioner that the evidence of the prosecutrix without substantial corro-
boration, was inadequate to rest a conviction under section 376 IPC.
Dismissing the special leave petition,
HEID 1. To forsake vital consideration and go by obsolete demands for E
substantial corroboration is to sacrifice commonsense in favour of an artificial
<:oncoction called 'judicial' probability. [308A]
2. Human psychology and behavioural probability must be borne in mind
when assessing the testimonial potency of the victim's version. What girl
would foster rape charges on a stranger uriless a remarkable set of facts or
clearest motives are made out? The inherent bashfullness, the innocent naivete
and the feminine tendency to conceal the outrage of masculine sexual aggres· F
tion are factors which are relevant to improbabilise the hypothesis of false
implication. The injury on the person of the victim has corroboratb•e value.
[3070] '1
3. The court loses its credibility if it rebels against realism. The Jaw court
io not an unnatural world. [308 BJ
4. Merely because the trial court has ultra-cautiously acquitted someone, G
the higher court must, for that reason, cannot acquit everyone. [308CJ
5. A socially sensitized judge is a better statutory armour against gender
<'41trag'e than Jong clauses of a complex section with oU the protections wri(
into it. [308C]
6. Observation on probative force of circumstances are not universal laws H
of nature but guidelines and good counsel. [307 Fl
Gurcharan Singh v. State of Haryana AIR 1972 SC 2661 referred lo.
306 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1980) 3 S.C.R.

A CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition
(Cr!.) 2599 of 1979.j
From the Judgment and OH'e(C:<~<d 9·7·1~~9 <f tre F1rj<b:rrd i
Haryana High Court in Crl.A. 1228/1976.
S. K. Sabharwa/ and R. C. Kohli for the petitioner. i.
B The Order of the Court was delivered by,
KRISHNA IYER, J, A rapist-if the concurrent findings of the
courts below were correct has chosen to seek special leave to chal-
lenge his crime and punishment, and his counsel has attacked the ver·
diet of culpability as wholly unfounded. Indeed, it is redundant,
c and absent exceptional circumstances, out of bounds, for this Court,
exercising its jurisdiction under Art. 136, to launch upon an explora·
tion and re-appreciation of the evidence, its strengths and weaknesses
with a view to sit in judgment over the holdings of the High Court
in affirmance of those of the trial Court.
D Briefly, we will touch upon one or two circumstances without
claiming to be exhaustive in any manner. One Shashi Bala of Ambala
was sl.eeping, with her mother and other children, outside her house
in hot July (1975). The petitioner, in the company of another (acquit-
ted accused), carried her away under intimidation to a neighbouring
godown belonging to one Tilak Raj (another acquitted accused) and
E in that secluded venue committed rape on the young women. After
subjecting her to these beasteal acts of lust, Shashi Bala, who by then
was nearly· unconscious, was put back in her cot from where she had
been' removed .. In the morning, the mother of the victim found blood
on the daughter's salwar and thereupon she complainingly narrated
the criminal assault of the previous night. On the return of the father,
F P.W. 7, who had been away, the victim went, in his company, to the
police station, lodged a report which was followed by investigation
and chargesheet. The Court, after a trial, convicted the present peti-
tioner but, on grounds of benefit of doubt, acquitted the rest. Medical
evidence showed that the raped girl was below 16 years of age. We
are not too happy about the acquittal but since the State has not cho-
sen to come up in appeal against the acquittal, we do not probe the
matter further.i
Counsel for the petitioner persistently urged that the evidence
of the prosecutrix, without substantial corroboration, was inadequato
to rest a conviction under s. 376 I.P.C. He relied on observations of
D this Court in Gurucharan Singh v. State of Haryana (1) for the pro-
(!) A. I.~R.1972_S.C.2. 2661.
KRISHAN LAL v. HARYANA (Krishna Iyer, J) 307

position that although a prosecutrix is not an accomplice, her evidence, A
+ as a rule of prudence, is viewed by courts unfavourably unless rein-
forced by corroboration "so as to satisfy its conscience that she is
telling the truth and that the present accused of rape on her has not
been falsely implicated". It is true that old English cases, followed
in British Indian courts, had led to a tendency on the part of judge-
, made law that the advisability of corroboration should be present to
the mind of the Judge "except where the circumstance make it safe
to dispense with it". Case-law, even in those days, had clearly spelt
out the following propositions ;
"The tender years of the child, coupled with other
circumstances appearing in the case, such, for example c
as its demeanour, unlikelihood of tutoring and so forth,
may render corroboration unnecessary but that is a question
of fact in every case. The only rule of law is that this rule
of prudence must be present to the mind of the judge or the
jury as the case may be and be understood and appreciated
by him or them. There is no rule of practice that there D
mnst, in every case, be corroboration before a conviction
can be allowed, to stand."
"It would be impossible, indeed it would be dangerous
to formulate the kind of evidence which should, or would,
be regarded as corroboration. Its nature and extent must
necessarily vary with circumstances of each case and also E
according to the particular circumstances of the offence
charged."
Observations on probative force of circumstances are not universal
laws of nature but guidelines and good counsel.
F
We must bear in mind human psychology and behavioural pro-
bability when assessing the testimonial potency of the victim's version.
What girl would foist a rape charge on a stranger unless a remarkable
set of facts or clearest motives were made out? The inherent bash-
fulness, the innocent naivete and the feminine tendency to conceal the

- outrage of mesculine sexual aggression are factors which are relevant
to improbabilise the hypothesis of false implication. The injury
on the person of the victim, especially her private parts, has corre-
borative value. Her complaint to her parents and the presence of
G

blood on her clothes are also testimony which warrents credence.
More than all, it ba!Hes belief in human nature that a girl sleeping
with her mother and other children in the open will come by blood H
on her garments and injury in her private parts unless she has been
subjected to the torture of rape. And if rape has been committed,
308 SUPREME COURT REP<YRTS [1980] 3 S.C.R.

A as counsel more or less conceded, why, of all persons in the world,
should the victim hunt up the petitioner and point at him the accusing -t
finger? To forsake these vital considerations and go by obsolescent
demands for substantial corroboration is to sacrifice commonsence
in favour of an artificial concoction called 'Judicial' probability.
Indeed, the court loses its credibility if it rebels against realism. The
B law court is not an unnatural world.
We are not satisfied that merely because the trial court has ultra-
cautiously acquitted someone, the higher court must, for that reason,
acquit everyone, Reflecting on this case we feel convinced that a
socially sensitised judge is a better statutory armour against gender
c outrage than long clauses of a complex section with all the protections
writ into it.

N.V.K. Petition dismissed.