KRISHI UTPADAN MANDI SAMITI AND ANR.versusMAKRAND SINGH AND ORS. ETC.

                    KRISHI UTPADAN MANDI SAMITI AND ANR.                             A
                                     v.
                        MAKRAND SINGH AND ORS. ETC.
~

                                   DECEMBER 1, 1994.

                  [K. RAMASWAMY AN]) N. VENKATACHALA, JJ.]                           B

             Land Acquisition Act. 1894 :

             Sections- 4 (1), 6 (1) and (2), 11 and 11-A-Three years limitation
        period prescribed in clause (i) of the proviso to S. 6 (1) Publications in
        Gazette newspapers and local publication-Date to be taken for computing      c
        the limitation period-Held: Date of declaration published in the Gazette
        would be date for such computation.
~


            Certain lands were notified and published in the State Gazette on
        February 19, 1982 for acquisition to establish Model Market Yard of
        Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Kaimganj. The declaration under s 6 (1) D
        was published in the Gazette on February 7, 1985, in the newspapers on
        June 4, 1987 and the substance in the locality subsequent thereto. The
        respondents who owned about 1 acre and odd land have challenged the
        validity of the declaration on the grouJJ.d that it was published after the
        expiry of three years. That contention was found favour with the High . E
        Court and it had allowed the writ petitions~ Hence these appeals.

             Allowing the appeals , this Court

            HELD : 1. The High Court, was not right in its conclusion that
        since declaration was published in the newspapers on June 4, 1987,
        after the expiry of three years, the dec,aration under s. 6 (1) and the
                                                                                  F
,;;.·
        notification, under s. 4 (1) stood lapsed. It is clearly illegal. [260 B)

              2. It would be seen that the purpose of notification under s. 4 (1) of
          the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is an intimation to the owner or person
          having an interest in the land that government exercised the power of
                                                                                       G
          eminent domain in relation to his land and for public purpose his land
          is needed or likely to be needed; puts an embargo on his freedom to
        · deal with the land as an unencumbered land and also pegs the price of
          the land prevailing as on that date. It also ls a caveat to the Collector to
          make the award under s. 11 as well as to determine the market value
          prevailing as on the last of the dates to be the date and the award H
                                             255
    . 256                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [1994] SUPP. 6 S.C.R

A    should be made within a period prescribed bys. 11-A. Lest the entire
     acquisition shall stand lapsed. The word 'hereinafter' is for such
     purpose as well as for the purpose of determination of the
     compensation under Chapter III of the Act as well. Therefore, the word
     "hereinafter" referred to as the last date of the publication of the
     notification is the date from which the prevailing prices of the land is to
B    he computed etc. [258 G, H, 259 A, BJ

          3. The last date under s. 6 (2) shall be the date for the purposes
     "hereinafter referred to" would be not for computing the period of
     three years prescribed in clause (i) of proviso to s. 6 (1) of the Act as it
     was already done, but for purposes to be followed hereinafter.
c    Otherwise language would have been "hereinbefore done". Sub-s. (2) as
     such did not prescribe any limitation within which the declaration
     under s. 6 (1) or other steps hereinafter to be taken, in other words, the
     steps to be taken thereafter in making the award under s. 11 or in
     computation of the period prescribed in s. llA. The publication of the
     declaration in two daily newspapers having circulation in the locality
D    one of which in the regional language and the publi~tion of the
     substance of the declaration in the locality are ministerial acts and is a
     procedural part. It appears that these publications are required to be
     done to make the declaration published in the manner, to be conclusive
     evidence of the public purpose under s. 6 (1) and also to provide
E    limitation to make the award under s. 11 by the Collector. If this
     consistent policy of the Act is understood giving teeth to the operational
     efficacy to the scheme of the Act and public purpose the Act seeks to
     serve, this Court is of the considered view that publication in the
     official gazette already made under Clause (1) of proviso to sub-section
     (1) of s. 6 is complete, as soon as the declaration under s. 6. (1) was
F    published in the official gazette. That will be the date for the purpose of
     computation of three years period from the last of the. dates .of the
     publication of the notification under s. 4 (1). [259 D to G]

            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 88 of 1995
    Etc.
G
       [From the Judgment and Order dated 22.l.91 of the Allahabad High
    Court in C. M.W.P. No. 4177of1985]

            0. P. Rana and E. C. Agarwala for the Appellants

H           R. D. Upadhyay, R. C.Verma and R. B. Misra for the Respondents.
'·


                           .
                    KRISHl-UTPADAN MANDI SAMITI v. M. SINGH                     257

         The following Order of the Court was delivered :                              A
         Leave granted.

          These appeals by special leave arise from the judgements of the
     Division Bench of the High Court of Allahabad dated January 22, 1991 and ·
     May 13, 1992 made in C. M. W.P. No. 4177/85 and C. M. W. P. B
     No.7146/88. The lands bearing plot No. 325 situated in village Chiloli in
     Dist. Farrukhabad, of a total extent of 5.13 acres out of 8.21 acres was
     notified and published in the State Gazette on February 19, 1982 for
     acquisition to establish Model Market eard of Krishi Utpadan Mandi
     Samiti, Kaimganj in Dist, Farrukhabad. The declaration under s. 6 (1) was
     published in the Gazette on February 71 1985, in the newspapers on June 4, C
     1987 and the substance in the locality subsequent thereto. The respondents
     who owned about l acre and odd land have challenged the validity of the
     declaration on the ground that if was published after the expiry of three
     years. Therefore, the notification under s. 4 (1) and declaration under s. 6
     (1) should be deemed to be void. That contention was found favour with the D
     High Court and it allowed the writ petitions. Thus these appeals by special
     leave.

          The only question is whether the High Court was right in its concluSion
     that the declaration under s. 6 was published after 3 years and the last of the
     publication shall be the last date for the purpose of commuting three years       E
     period envisaged in clause (i) of the proviso to sub-section (1) ofs. 6 of the
     Land -Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, 'the Act') as amended by Land
     Acquisition (Amendment) Act 68 of 1984. Section 6 (1) postulates that
     subject to the provisions of part VII of the Act, when the appropriate
     Government was satisfied, after considering the report, if any made under s.
     5-A (2) that any particular land is needed for a public purpose, or for a         F
     company a declaration shall be made to that effect under the signature of a
     Secretary to such Government or of some officer duly authorized to certify
     its order that any land covered by the same notification under s. 4 (1),
     irrespective of whether one report or different reports has or have been
     made (wherever required) under s. 5-A (2). The proviso itself pfaces an
     embargo and limitation on the exercise of the power under s. 6 (1) and            G
     publication of the declaration in the gazette with the language thus :
     "provided that any land covered by notification 4 (1) published after the
     commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) and Validation
     Ordinance, 1967 (1 of 1967), but before the commencement of the Land
     Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 shall be made after the expiry of three         H
    258                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [1994] SUPP. 6 S.C.R

A   years from the date of the publication of the notification under s. 4 (1). Sub-
    s. (2) provides that every declaration .shall be published in official Gazette,
    in two daily newspapers in the locality in which the land is situated of
    which at least one shall be in the regional language and the Collector shall
    cause public notice of the substance of such declaration to be given at
    convenient places in the said locality (the last of the dates of such
B   publication and the giving of such public notice, being hereinafter referred
    to as the date of the publication of the declaration), and such declaration
    shall state the district or other territorial division in which land is situated,
    the purpose.: for which it is needed, its approximate area, and where a plan
    shall have been made of the land, the place where such plan may be
    inspected. Sub-s. (3) makes such declaration as conclusive evidence that the
c   land is needed for a public purpose or for a company, as the case may be,
    and, after making such declaration, the appropriate government may
    acquire the land in the manner hereinafter appearing. (emphasis suppiied)

         The question, therefore, is that which date of the publications in three
    steps i.e. publication in the Gazette, two newspapers and local publication
D   to be the last date for the purpose of computing three years limitation
     prescribed in Clause (i) of the proviso to s. 6 (1) of the Act. Primafacie, it
    gives an impression that the last of any of three steps puts in motion, the
    running of limitation of three years. But on deeper probe, it does not appear
    to be so and such a construction would easily defeat the public purpose and
    deflects the course of justice. So it is necessary to understand the scheme
E
    and policy of the Act to get the crux of the question. It is seen that sub-S.
    (1) of S.4 gives power of eminent domain to the State to acquire the land,
    whenever it appears to it that the land is needed or likely to be needed for
    any public purpose or for any company, by a notification published in the
    official gazette and two daily newspapers circulating in that area and at
F   least one of them should be in the regional language also the Collector is
    enjoined to cause public notice of the substance of notification to be given
    at convenient places in the said locality in which the land is situated. It is
    also mentioned thereunder that the last date of· such publication and the
    giving of such public notice "being hereinafter refe"ed to" as the date of
    publication of the notification. It would be seen that the purpose of
G   notification under s. 4 ( i) is an intimation to the owner of person having an
    interest in the land that government exercised the power of eminent domain
    in relation to his land and for public purpose his land is needed or likely to
    be needed ; puts an embargo on his freedom to deal with the land as an -
    unencumbered land and also pegs the price of the land prevailing as on that
    date. It also is a caveat to the Collector to make the award under s. 11 as
H   well as to determine the market value prevailing as on the last of the dates
               KRISHI UTPADAN MANDI SAMITI v. M. SINGH                  259

to be the date and the award should be made within a period prescribed by A
s. 11-A. Lest the entire acquisition shall stand lapsed. The word
'hereinafter' is for such purpose as well as for the purpose of determination
of the compensation under Chapter Ill of the Act as well. Therefore, the
word "hereinafter" referred to as the last date of the publication of the
notification is the date from which the prevailing prices of the land is to be
computed etc.                                                                  B
      Clause (i) of the proviso to s. 6 (I) mandates the publication of the
declaration in the official gazette and it should be within three years from
the date of the publication of the notification under s. 4 (I) i.e. the last of
the dates referred to in s. 4 (1). The word 'publish' emphasises the act
accomplished i.e. declaration under s. 6 (I) being published in the official C
Gazette. The last date under s. 6 (2) shall be the date for the purpose
"hereinafter referred to" would be not for computing the period of three
years prescribed in Clause (I) of proviso to s. 6 (I) of the Act as it was
already done, but purposes to be followed hereinafter. Otherwise language
would have been "hereinbefore done". Sub-s. (2) as such did not prescribe
any limitation within which the declaration under s. 6 (I) or other steps D
hereinafter to be taken, in other words, the steps to be taken thereafter in
making the award under s. 11 or in computation of the period prescribed in
s. I IA. The publication of the declaration in two daily newspapers having
circulation in the locality one of which in the regional language and the
publication of the substance of the declaration in the locality are ministerial
acts and is a procedural part. It appears that these publication are required E
to be done to make the declaration published in the manner, to be
conclusive evidence of the public purpose under s. 6 (1) and also to provide
limitation to make the award under s. 11 by the Collector. In other words,
the limitation prescribed under s. 11-A i~ for the purpose of making the
award and if the Collector fails to do so, the entire proceeds under s. 4 ( 1) F
and 6 (1) shall stand lapsed. If this consistent policy of the Act is
understood giving teeth to the operational efficacy to the scheme of the Act
and public purpose the Act seeks to serve, we are of the considered view
that publication in the official gazette already made under Clause (1) of
proviso to sub-s . (I) of s. 6 is complete, as soon as the declaration under s.
6 (1) was published in the official gazette. That will be the date for the G
purpose of computation of three years period from the last of the dates of
the publication of the notification under s. 4 (1). The procedural ministerial
acts prescribed under sub-section (2) are only for the purpose of the
procedure to be followed "hereinafter", in other words, the steps to be taken
 subsequent to the publication of the declaration under s. 6 (1) of the Act.
 We cannot agree with Sri Rana, the learned senior counsel, that the date of H
    260                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [1994] SUPP. 6 S.C.R

A   making the declaration by the Secretary to the Government or the
    auth~rised officer is the date for computing period of three years. Equally,
    we cannot agree with the learned counsel for the respondents, Sri Padhaya,
    that publication of the substance being the last date from which the period
    of three years needs to be computed. Acceptance of either contention would
    easily defeat the public policy under the Act by skilful manner or
B   management with the lower level officials. The High Court, therefore, was
    not right in its conclusion that since declaration was published in the
    newspapers on June 4, 1987, after the expiry of three years, the declaration
    under s. 6 (1) and the notification under s. 4 (1) stood lapsed. It is clearly
    illegal. The further contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that
    other contention raised in the writ petitions need to be dealt with and so the
c   cases need to be remanded, has no force for the reason that though they
    were pleaded but the parties have chosen to argue only the above
    contention. So it is not a fit case for remand. The writ petitions would stand
    dismissed. The appeals are accordingly allowed but in the circumstances
    without costs.

D   G.N.                                                       Appeals allowed.