Holding

The Supreme Court held that the appellant’s fresh writ petitions were not an "appropriate remedy" and amounted to an abuse of process; he lacked authority to represent the alleged heirs, and the Government memos were not valid orders, leading to dismissal of the appeals.

Summary

K.S.B. Ali claimed title to 1,635 acres of land in Kokapet village on behalf of 203 alleged heirs of Nawab Nusrat Jung‑I, relying on a 1954 Atiyat Court order approved by the Revenue Minister. The Government issued several orders (2002, 2004, 2005) that were later rescinded, and tenders for the land were issued. Ali filed multiple writ petitions challenging the tenders and the orders. The Supreme Court had earlier allowed him to withdraw his 2006 writ petition and seek an "appropriate remedy". He subsequently filed fresh writ petitions on the same facts, which the High Court held to be an abuse of process. The Supreme Court affirmed that the fresh petitions were not an appropriate remedy, that Ali lacked authority to represent the alleged heirs, and that the government memos were not valid orders under Article 166. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed.

Issues considered

The propriety of filing a fresh writ petition after withdrawing a prior petition on the same facts and whether it constitutes an appropriate remedy or abuse of process.
The locus standi and authority of K.S.B. Ali to represent 203 alleged legal heirs of Nawab Nusrat Jung‑I.
The validity and operative force of the Government memos dated 15‑04‑2002, 06‑05‑2004, 31‑07‑2004 and 21‑05‑2005 under Article 166 of the Constitution.
Whether the High Court’s direction to the Government to reconsider after giving hearing violates principles of natural justice.
Whether the State or its officers have jurisdiction to adjudicate questions of title to immovable property under Articles 226/227.

Legislation cited

Abolition of Jagirs Regulation
Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Atiyat Enquiries Act, 1952s. 15(b), s. 9
Constitution of Indias. Article 162, s. Article 166(1), s. Article 166(2), s. Article 166(3), s. Article 226, s. Article 227
Jagir (Commutation) Regulation, 1359‑F
Land Revenue Act, 1317 (Fasli)s. 110

Subjects

writ petitionabuse of processlocus standititle to immovable propertyappropriate remedynatural justiceAtiyat Enquiry Actgovernment ordersArticle 166Article 226land disputecommutation of jagirrepresentation of heirs

Judgment

[2017] 12 S.C.R. 698

A . KSBALI
v.
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH & ORS.
(Civil Appeal Nos. 15571-15572 of2017)
B OCTOBER 04, 2017
[A. K. SIKRI AND ASHOK BHUSHAN, JJ.]
Remedy:
Appropriate remedy - Claim by appellant to the title of
C property in question - On his as well as on behalf of 203 others,
claiming to be legal heir of the owner of the property- Claim based
on order dated 15.02.1954 passed by Atiyat Court which wasfimher
approved by Revenue Minister - By order dated 15.04.2002, the
claim was rejected by Revenue Department - By subsequent Memo
D dated 06.05.2004, order dated 15.04.2002 was withdrawn and
directed to instruct the authorities concerned to implement the orders
ofAtiyat Court- Memo dated 31.07.2004 reiterated the Memo dated
06.05.2004 - Thereafter, Memo dated 21.05.2005 and Order dated .
06.06.2005 concluded interalia that the successors of the property
in question were entitled only to commutation amounts and that the
E issue was finally decided by the order dated 15.04.2002 and the
subsequent orders dated 06.05.2004 and 31.07.2004 were without
jyrisdiction and competence - Subsequently Urban and
Development Authority issued tenders in re.~pect of land in question
-Appellant filed writ petition challenging the tenders and seeking
declaration that the Authority had no right in the property - Petition
F
was dismissed by Single Judge as well as Division Bench of High .
Court in writ appeal - Jn Supreme Court, the appellant (writ
petitioner) withdrew the petition with liberty to pursue the
"appropriate remedy" - Thereafter, several writ petitions were filed
before High Court seeking the same relief and were tagged with
G another writ petition earlier filed b.'v the appellant - Single' Judge
invalidated the memo dated 21.05.2005 on the ground that is was
in violation of principles of natural justice and directing the
Government to reconsider the issue after affording an opportunity
of hearing - The order of Single Judge was challenged by the State,
but not py the appellants/petitioners as against the part of the
H
698
KSB ALI v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 699

judgment which rejected the substantive reliefs sought by the A·
·appellants/petitioners - Writ appeal was allowed by Division Bench
of High Court - On appeal, held: The appellant after having
withdrawn his writ petition, could not have taken recourse to another
writ petition on the same facts and grounds - Another writ petition
could not be called "appropriate remedy" and taking recourse to it
would constitute an abuse of the process of Court - Appellant has
also failed to establish that he was authorised to prepresent the
case of 203 legal heirs - Other petitioners/claimants also failed to
establish the basis of their claims - Single Judge as well as the
Division Bench had not adjudicated upon the merits of the case,
hence the appellants cannot rake up the issues which were not C
decided by courts below - Even the writ petition challenging memo
dated 21. 05.2005 was not maintainable - Andhra Pradesh
(Telangana Area) Atiyat Enquiries Act, 1952.
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
HELD:l. So far as the appellant 'A' (in Civil Appeal No. D
15571-15572 of 2017) is concerned, his writ petition no. 10084
of 2006 which was filed in the High Court after passing of the
order dated 31st July, 2007 in SLP(C) No. 23392 of 2007 by this
Court, was not maintainable. This Court, by the said order, had
permitted him to withdraw his writ petition No; 14434 of 2006 E
and 'to take appropriate remedy'.Obviously, the remedy could
not be in the form of another writ petition on the same facts and
grounds which were pleaded earlier. The High Court has rightly
held that having giYen up his pursuit of public law r\)medy in
earlier abandoned proceedings, filing of the fresh writ petition or
pursue pending writ petition No. 10084 of 2006 would constitute F
an abuse of the process of the Court. Appellant 'A' could not
maintain the writ petition as it was not 'appropriate remedy' as
granted by this Court.[Para 20)(717-G-H; 718-A]
2. The High Court is also right in holding that neither the
appellant 'A' had established by specific pleadii,gs nor by due G
authorisation on record that he was authorised to represent the
case of 203 legal heirs of Nusrat Jung-I. Therefore, his appeals
arc not even maintainable. The High Court has specifically
remarked, and rightly so, that even the other appellants did not
plead or establish the basis of their claims that they arc the heirs H
700 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R.

A of Nusurat Jung I. The High Court has discussed the locus of
these appellants. Entirely chaotic and incoherent state of facts
were pleaded .by all these writ petitioners in their writ petition.
fParas 21, 22)[718-B-D]
3. The judgment of the Single Judge of High Court, insofar
B as it was against the appellants, was never challenged by them by
filing any writ appeal(s). The Single Judge had specifically clarified
that his judgment was not to be treated as a pronouncement for
adjudication of any dispute or questions involved in the matter
and disputes, if any, among them could be adjudicated before a
competent forum. In view of the above, in the appeals filed by
C the State against the judgment of the Single Judge, the Division
Bench was only called upon to decide as to whether the direction
to relegate the matter to the State Government was proper or
not. The High Court has decided that aspect in the impugned
judgment. It is obvious that the appellants cannot rake up those
D issues in these appeals which are not decided either by the Single
Judge or the Division Bench.[Para 23][721-G; 722-F-G]
4. Even the writ petition filed by the petitioners (Writ
Petition No. 3421 of 2008) which inter alia sought to challenge
memo dated 21" May, 2005. issued by the Revenue Department
E as illegal and also sought to implement Muntakhab No. 55 of
1955 dated 7'11 May,1955, by mutating the names of the petitioners
in the Revenue Records and return the custody of the property,
was clearly not maintainable for two reasons. The impugned memo
dated 21" May, 2005, only sought to reinforce the memo dated
15'11 April, 2002, issued by the Government in response to the
F representation made by the appellant 'A'. Therefore, when the
impugned memo dated 21'' May, 2005 was admittedly not issued
at the instance of the writ petitioners, there could not have been
any question of hearing them prior to the same. Further, neither
the impugned memo nor the memo dated 6 111 May, 2004
G (purporting to create rights in favour of the legal heirs of Nawab
Nusrat Jung-I) was communicated to the writ petitioners. Hence,
insofar as the memo dated 21" May, 2005 is concerned, no cause
of action accrued in favour of the writ petitioners to have
approached the High Court and, therefore, the only person, if
any, who could have challenged the same was the appellant 'A'.
H [Para 24)[723-A-E]
KSB ALI v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 701

BSNL v. Telephone Cables Ltd. (2010) 5 SCC 213 : A
[2010] 3 SCR 291; Dattatreya Moreshwar Pangarkar
v. State of Bombay AIR 1952 SC 181 : [1952) SCR
612; John v. State of T.C. [1955] 1 SCR 1011; MRF
Ltd.v. Manohar Parrikar and others Vol IX (2010) SLT
580; Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab and another
B
AIR 1963 SC 395 : [1962) Suppl. SCR 713; Shanti
Sports Club and another v. Union of India and others
(2009) 15 SCC 705 : [2009] 13 SCR 71 O; State of
Andhra Pradesh v. P. Hanumantha Rao (Dead) Through
Lrs. and others (2003) 10 SCC 121 : [2003] 4 Suppl.
SCR 736 - referred to. c
Case Law Reference
[2010] 3 SCR 291 referred to Para9
[1952) SCR 612 referred to Para 10
D
[1955] 1 SCR 1011 referred to Para 10
Vol IX (2010) SLT 580 referred to Para 10
[1962] Suppl. SCR 713 referred to Para 11
[2009] 13 SCR 710 referred to Para 11 E
[2003) 4 Suppl. SCR 736 referred to Para 17
CIVILAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 15571-
15572 of2017.
From the Judgment and Order dated 18.07.2012 of the High Court F
of Judicature at Andhra Pradesh in Writ Appeal No. 1164 of2009.
WITH

C. A. Nos. 15576-15578, 15582, 15579-15581, 15583-15585,
15586-15588, 15589, 15591-15596, 15598, 15573-15575, l5597and 15590 G
of2017.
K. Ramakrishna Reddi, AG/Sr. Adv., Gaurav Pachnanda, P. P. Rao,
Basava Prabhu S. Patil, V. Giri, Sr. Advs., Ramachandra Gurram, Senthil
Jagadeesan, Govind Manoharan, Ms. Shruti Iyer, Ansar Ahmad
Chaudhary, Deeptakirti Verma, Ms. Neha Sharma, Ms. Aparna Iyer, H
702 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2017) 12 S.C.R.

A S. Hariharan, Vikash Singh, Prashant Mishra, Jomol Joy, Ms. Haney
Maini, H. S. Chandhoke, Ms. Parul Kumar, Shalin A., Abhay Kumar,
Vadivelu Deenadayalan, Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar, Ms. Nisha
Mohandas, S. R. Setia, Gautam Narayan, Annam D. N. Rao, V. Sridhar
Reddy, Swarendu Chatterji, M. P. Srivignesh, ·Ms. Ananya Sarkar,
B K. V. V. Satyanarayana, V. N. Raghupathy, Shakil Ahmed Syed, Mohd.
Parvez Dabas, Uzmi Jameel Husain, Venkateswara Rao Anumolu,
Prabhakar Parnam, Aniruddha P. Mayee, Gagan Gupta, T. V. Ratnam,
Dr. Rajaram Punna, Y. Raja Gopala Rao, Vismai Rao, Sharat Kumar,
Ms. Manjeet Kirpal, M/s. Venkat Palwai Law Associates, ·s. Udaya
Kumar Sagar, Mrityunjai Singh, Guntur Prabhakar, Abhijit Sengupta,
C D. Mahesh Babu, P. N. Puri, G. N. Reddy, Ms. Manju Jetley, Advs. for
the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
A. K. SIKRI, J. 1. Leave granted.
D 2. Nawab Nusrat Jung Bahadur-1 (Nusrat Jung-I) had purchased
1635 acres and 34 guntas ofland in Kotham Kunta, also known as Asad
Nagar, which is now renamed as Kokapet village. This land was
purchased way back in l 9'h Century, while sale deed was registered ·
sometime in the year 1852. Nusrat Jung-I died issueless in 1875 and his
widow also died thereafter on 10'" October, 1916. Nusrat Jung-I had
E two cousins, Nawab Ghulam Hussain and Nawab Mohd. Sardar.
Disputes about the aforesaid land (hereinafter referred to as the 'subject
lands') erupted almost 70 years ago and after protracted litigation, which
is having chequered history, the said disputes have finally landed in this
Court. Hundreds of persons claiming themselves to be the successors
F in interest ofN usrat Jung-I have led their claim on the subject lands. On
the other hand, the state of Andhra Pradesh claims that it is the State
. which is the legal owner of the pro\lerty in-question.
3. As mentioned above, these appeals have long history which
has been taken note of, i11 extenso, by the High Court in its impugned
G common judgment dated 18'" July, 2012, whereby numberof writ appeals
have been decided. As the impugned judgment records the chronology
of the relevant facts correctly and no mistake is pointed out by any of
the counsd appearing before us in regard to factual narrative, we can
conveniently and safely reproduce these. facts from the said judgment.

H
KSB ALI v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 703
[A. K. SIKRI, J.]

FACTUAL EVENTS IN BRIEF: A
3.1 Under a sale deed dated 171h Rabi Awai, 1269 H (1852 A.D.)
Nusrat Jung- I purchased the schedule property, of an extent
of Ac.1635.35 gts., from the vendors, the five sons of Mir
Jouhar Ali khan, son ofMir Hussain Ali Khan alias Asad Nawaz
Jung (late), the wives of Mir Jouhar Ali Khan - Imtiazunissa B
Begum, Hayatunissa Begum and the daughters ofRiazunissa
Begum (the wife ofMir Asad Nawaj Jung)-Navrooz Begum
and Moula Begum. The property then known as Koutham
Kunta and thereafter asAsadnagar is presently Kokapet village.
3.2 Nusrat Jung-1 died issueless around 1875 leaving behind the c
widow - Rahimunnisa Begum, who died on 10-10-1916. Nusrat
Jung- I had two paternal first cousins- Nawab Gulam Hussain
and Nawab Md. Sardar.
3.3 On 161h January, 1916 the entire properties of late Nusrat
Jung-1 were taken over by Sarf-e-Khas Mubarak (the private D
secretariat of the Nizam) for supervision. A judicial branch of
Sarf-e-Khas Mubarak initiated succession inquiry which was
later transferred to the Court of Nazim Atiyat which was
constituted under provisions of the I 952 Act.
3.4 In 1920 the heirs of Nusrat Jung-I represented to the Nizam E
for grant ofKokapet Jagir in their favour. By a Firman dated
15'hJamadeeussani-1339-H, the Nizam decreed rejection of
the representation and granted only maintenance allowance,
on compassionate grounds.
3.5 In 1949, Jagirs were abolished under the Abolition of Jagirs
F
Regulation and in 1359F theA.P. (T.A.) Jagirs (Commutation)
Regulation was enacted providing for interim allowance
payable, determination of commutation and abolition of Jagirs.
Then followed the 1952 Act, providing for Atiyat enquiries.
3.6 The Atiyat Court to which inquiry was transferred, as pointed
out above, by its order, dated 15-02-1954 held that lands in G
Kokapet village deserve to be confirmed as Madad-e-Maash
(grant-in-aid) in favour of heirs of the late Nusrat Jung-I; that
though the land enjoyed by the holders as Madad-E-Maash
was subsequently constituted into a separate village; the Maash
H
70'l SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 12 S.C.R.

A (the property) will be deemed to have been continued only as
Arazi (inam lands), is confirmed as such and Kok;ipet was
regarded as a village only for administrative purposes.
3 .7 The Atiyat Court also held that Kokapet was taken over by
the Government under the Abolition of Jagirs Regulation; this
B action was not challenged by Maashadars and the question of
appointing Qabiz for lands included in the vi II age does not arise.
Iri respect of the lands in Bagh-e-Asifnagar (another village
having lands of Nusurat Jung-I), the Atiyat Court held that
each ofMaashadars (holders of the property) is entitled to his
respective share and the extents being small the Collector should
c formulate proposals for disposal oflands by sale or otherwise
after obtaining permission from the Government; should dispose
of the same and distribute the money among the Maashadars.
3 .8 Gulam Mohammed and another, aggrieved by the decision of
the Atiyat Court dated 15'" February, 1954 preferred an appeal
D to the Board of Revenue, which was rejected by the order
dated 241h September, 1954 and the order of the Atiyat Court
was upheld. The order of Atiyat Court was placed before the
Revenue Minister in the form of a note and approved by him
on 22"d December, 1954. The Muntakhab did not set out the
E number of Sendhi (excise) trees on the land and the claimants
were therefore denied their consequent rights.-
3 .9 The claimants applied to the Assistant Nazim Atiyat for
amendment of the Muntakhab (for inclusion ofSendhi trees).
The application was rejected. Claimants then approached the
F Atiyat Court which also rejected their claim. They
unsuccessfully approached the Board of Revenue and
thereafter filed W.P.No. 227 of 1960. On I'' April, 1963 this
Court allowed the writ petition and declared the claimants
entitled .to inclusion of income from Sendhi trees in the
Muntakhab, directed the respondents to amend the Muntakhab
G and awarded Rs.3,980-4-0 as ma.ash. In the judgment in
· W.P.No.227of1960 the High Court however declined to grant
the relief of restoration of the property.
3.10 One Mr. K.S.B. Ali (Mr. Ali) (claiming to represent 203
legal heirs of Nusrat Jung-I) approached the Government
H
KSB ALI v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 705
[A. K. SIKRI, J.]

several times seeking release of lands covered by the A
Muntakhab in favour of the legal heirs.
3.11 Firoz Khan and another filed 0.S.No.512of1973 (originally
O.S.No.10of1967) for a declaration that they are the owners
of the plaint schedule properties in survey Nos.41, 42 and 43
ofKokapct Village. J .H. Krishna Murthy and four others were B
impleadcd as defendants in this suit. Krishna Murthy was
imp leaded as the GPA of the heirs ofNusrat Jung- I. Krishna
Murthy through his written statement claimed entitlement to
the lands on the strength of the GPA granted by the heirs of
late Nusrat Jung- I and relied on the Muntakhab in support of C
the case of the defendants. The plaintiffs also prayed for a
permanent injunction or in the alternative for recovery of
possession of the suit lands.
3.12 By the judgment dated 30 1h June, 1976, the Trial Court
considered the entire evidence and by an elaborately reasoned
order decreed the suit. The Trial Court concluded that the stand D
taken by the defendants was incorrect and observed that the
two Firmans clearly established that the lands in question
(Kokapct lands) were Jagir lands; that the legal heirs ofNusrat
Jung - I had also admitted in cross-examination that some of
them had filed applications for restoration of the Jagir lands to E
the Nizam which was rejected; that the first defendant (Krishna
Murthy) had not produced any evidence to establish that the
suit lands were acquired by Nusrat Jung- I under any purchase;
and that the legal heirs ofNusrat Jung- I were entitled only to
commutation amounts. This judgment became final as the
appeal thcrcagainst by the defendants was dismissed by this F
Court by the judgment dated 11-12-1985 in C.C.C.A.No.142
of 1976.
3.13 170 persons claiming to be heirs of Nusrat Jung-I filed
W.P.No.20298of1993 for implementation of the Muntakhab
as confirmed by the Revenue Minister's order dated 24'h G
December, 1954 and for mutation of their names in respect of
the lands in Kokapet village. Reliance was placed by the
-petitioners (apparently during oral hearing of the writ petition)
on a letter dated 21-06-2000 addressed by the CLR to the
Government expressing an opinion that the Muntakhab must H
706 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R.

A be implemented. By the judgment dated 09-07-200 l a learned
single Judge disposed of the writ petition directing the
Government to consider the report of the CLR and take further
. action in accordance with law, within six months. Thereafter
several representations were made, including by Mr. Ali.
B 3.14 On 15'h April, 2002 the Principal Secretary to Government,
Revenue Department, considered the order of this Court (dated
09-07-2001 in W.P.No. 20298 of 1993) and rejected (by an
elaborately reasoned order) the request of Mr. Ali for release
of the lands as per the Muntakhab. By a subsequent Memo
dated 61hMay, 2004, however, the order dated l 5'h April, 2002
c was withdrawn, again by the Principal Secretary to the
Government. The Memo dated 61h May, 2004 records no
reasons whatsoever for rescinding the earlier elaborate order
and was issued pursuant to representation of Mr. Ali for
reconsideration ofhis request, for implementing the Muntakhab.
D The Memo dated 6"' May, 2004 merely states: Government
after careful examination of the issue as per the Act and Rules
in force, hereby withdraw the orders issued in the Government
Memo l ''cited and the CCLA was directed to instruct the
Collector, RangaReddy District and the concerned authorities
to implement the orders of Atiyat Court issued in Muntakhab
E No. 57 ofl955.
3.15 A Memo dated 31-07-2004 reiterated the order dated 06-05-
2004 and the CLR was directed to implement the earlier Memo
dated 06-05-2004. In tum, the CLR on 07-10-2004 directed
the Collector, Ranga Reddy District to ensure communication
F of the Memo dated 31-07-2004 to the Manda! Revenue Officer,
Rajendranagar for handing over possession of the open land
as per the M.R.0.'s report dated 28-08-1984 and report
compliance.
3.16 Vide Memo dated 2l'' May, 2005 and G.0. Ms. No. 1084
G dated 61h June, 2005 the whole issue was revisited and the
earlier memos dated 61hMay, 2004 and 31 ''July, 2004. In this
order (setting out elaborate reasons) it was concluded that the
finding of the Atiyat Court (in its order dated 15-02-1954) (that
Kokapet village was taken over by the Government under the
H Abolition of Jagirs Regulation and the said action was not
KSB ALI v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 707
[A. K. SIKRI, J.]

challenged by the Maashadars and appointment of Qabiz for A
the lands included in the village does not arise), destroys the
claim of the representationists, of the lands beingArazi Maktha;
that according to provisions of the Abolition ofJagirs Regulation
read with the Jagir(Commutation) Regulations 1359-F,Jagirdar/
Makthadar or his successor on the date of taking over of Jagirs . B
were entitled to only commutation amounts, excepting lands
which were under direct and personal cultivation of the Jagirdars
or their successors as home farm lands under Section 17 of
the Abolition of Jagirs Regulation; that there are no home farm
lands in the name of the claimants as per the revenue and
survey settlement records maintained from 1355-F ( 1945 AD); c
that open land would not fall within the definition of 'Home
Farm Lands' as per provisio to Section 17 of the Regulation;
that the Muntakhab was issued and acted upon by drawing
commutation from the Nizam-e-Atiyat; and therefore there was
no basis for any further claim in the matter. This Memo also . D
concluded that the issue was finally decided by the 15-04-2002
order issued with approval of the competent authority; and
that as the matter was finally decided, the subsequent orders
dated 06-05-2004 and 31--07-2004 were without jurisdiction and
competence.
3.17 Thereafter, tenders were issued by the Hyderabad Urban
E.
Development Authority for sale ofAc. l 00-00 in Kokapet village
which was part of the subject lands and Mr. Ali filed W.P. No.
14439 of 2006 challenging the said tenders and sought a
declaration tqat the said authority had no right in the property
of the petitioners and the auction and sale process was illegal. F
3.18A learned single Judge on 14'h July, 2006 dismissed the writ
petition ruling that under Article 226 of the Constitution an inquiry
as to questions of title in immoveable property cannot be
considered and observed that the petitioner may approach the
Civil Court for appropriate declaration and injunction. G
3.19 Thereagainst W.A.No. 887 of 2006 was filed by Mr. Ali.
This appeal was dismissed by a learned Division Bench of the
High Court, by orders dated 26-10-2007, after contest. Though,
SLP was filed thereagainst in this Court, the writ petitioner/
appellant- Mr. Ali sought leave to withdraw W.P.No.14439 of H
708 SUPREME COURT REPORTS . [2017] 12 S.C.R.

A 2006, W.A.No. 887 of2006 and for rescinding the order in the
writ petition and writ appeal. This request was granted by this
Court with liberty to Mr. Ali to pursue "appropriate remedy",
leaving the issues open.
3.20 However, after the aforesaid order of this Com1 (dated I 3'h
B December, 2007) several writ petitions were filed seeking reliefs
already adve1ied to and these were tagged on to W.P.No. 10084
of 2006, earlier filed by Mr. Ali and were disposed of by the
common judgment dated 02-06-2009 by a Single Judge of the
High Court.
c 4. By the aforesaid common judgment dated 2"d June, 2009, the
learned single Judge invalidated the memo dated 21 ''May, 2005 on the
ground that it was in violation of principles of natural justice and directed
the State to pass fresh orders after issuing notice to the writ petitioners
enabling the petitioners to urge all the grounds before the State. The
order in G.0.Ms.No.1084, dated 06-06-2005 was upheld with a caveat
D that as and when rights of the petitioners in respect of the property in
question are determined intheir favour they may pursue n;medies in this
behalf. It was clarified that the judgment shall not be treated as a
pronouncement or adjudication ofany dispute or question involved in the
matter and the legal representatives of Late Nawab Nusrat Jung
E Bahadur-I or their authorized agent are at liberty to pursue the matter
with the Government; and that disputes, if any, among them (the legal
representatives) could be agitated before a competent forum.
5. Challenging the aforesaid judgment of the learned Single Judge,
writ appeals were filed primarily by the State ofAndhra Pradesh as well
F as Hyderabad Metropolitan Development Authority (HMDA). It is
significant to mention that as far as appellants in these appeals, who
claim themsel vcs to be the legal heirs ofN usrat Jung-I and rightful owner
of the subject land5, are concerned, they did not challenge the order of
the Single Judge in respect of those findings which had been rendered
· against them. Before we take note of the salient features of the decision
G rendered by the Division Bench it would also be apposite to remark that
the core issue is as to whether the subject lands in Kokapet village belong
to the State or-it is the purported legal heirs ofNusrat Jung '-"ho arc
entitled thereto. The chronology of events narrated above would also
make it clear that the claimants have primarily rested their claim on the
H basis of the order dated I 5'h February, 1954 passed by the Atiyat Court 1
KSB ALI v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 709
[A. K. SIKRI, J.]

which held that the subject lands deserved to be confirmed as Mada4-e- A
Maash (grant-in~aid) in their favour. They also argued that the aforesaid
order had been approved by the Revenue Minister on 22"d December,
1954 and, thus, rights in their fi1vour had gotcrystalised. As per them, it
is the Atiyat Court which was competent to decide such a dispute and
once the rights of the appellants were recognised by the Atiyat Court, B
the State Government was bound thereby. Further submission of the
appellants was that memos dated 21'' May, 2005 and G.O. dated 6'h
June, 2005, no opportunity of hearing was given to the appellants and,
therefore, the said memo and G.O. were violative of principle ofnatural
justice (which contention was accepted by the learned Single Judge as
well). C
ISSUE BEFORE THE HlGH COURT:
6. In the aforesaid circumstances, the Division Bench noted that
the generic issue. which fell for consideration was as to whether the
learned Single Judge was right in invalidating the said Memo and GO.,
thereby directing the Government to reconsider the issue after affording D
an opportunity to the appellants herein. It was because of the reason
that insofar as that part of the decision of the learned Single Judge,
rejecting substantive reliefs, namely, implementation of the Muntakhab,
mutation of their names in the Revenue records; restoration of possession
of the subject lands and declining to invalidate G.0. dated 6'h June, 2005 E
are concerned, the appellants herein never challenged that part of the
order.
THE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT :
7. After taking note of the aforesaid generic issue which arose
for consideration,.the High Cg~, at the outset, discussed the validity of F
the direction issued by the learned Single Judge directing the Government
to reconsider the issue after giving opportunity of hearing to the appellants.
In this behalf, it noted that the seminal dispute was as to whether land in-
quest ion belonged to the legal heirs ofNusraj Jung-I or the State. Having
regard to this nature ofdispute, the High Court has concluded that such G
a dispute cannot be decided by the Government inasmuch as deciding
the aforesaid /is between the parties is a judicial function and such a
judicial power, as per our constitutional scheme, rests with the courts
and not the Executive. Therefore, order of the learned Single Judge
• Through Mr. Raghupati, Advocate appearing for some of the appellants has.taken
1

different stance before us, which is noted later at an ·appropriate stage. H
710 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R.

A remanding the matter to the Government for de nova consideration was
of no legal consequence. ~·

8. Thereafter, the High Court delineated various other issues which
arose for consideration and discussed those issues at length and answered
the same. A perusal of the judgment shows that deliberations were
B undertaken on the following questions:
(i) What is the 'appropriate remedy' for Mr. Ali to pursue?
(ii) Whether the impugned memo dated 21st May, 2005 is
unsustainable for violation of principles of natural justice?
C (iii) What was the import and effect of memos dated 15'h April,
2002, 6th May, 2005 and 31st July, 2004 as well as impugned
memo dated 21st May, 2005?
(iv) Who are the appellants?
9. Insofar as question no. (i) is concerned, in essence, it touched
D upon the locus standi ofMr. Ali to file the writ petition. The High Court
noted that this Court vide orders dated 13th February, 2007 had disposed
of the Special Leave Petition filed by Mr. Ali permitting him to withdraw
the writ petition No. 14439 of2006 filed by him in the High Court thereby
setting aside the judgments of the High Court in the said writ petition as
E well as in the_ writ appeal no. 887 of2006 preferred thereagainst and had
accorded permission to Mr. Ali 'to take appropriate remedy'. The High
Court thereafter proceeded to discuss what would be meant by such
'appropriate remedy' which was accorded to Mr. Ali. In this process,
the High Court referred to and relied upon judgment of this Court in
BSNL vs. Telephone Cables Ltd.21 and made the following remarks
F on the said issue:
"In the light of the above facts and circumstances: the substantial
similarity of the two writ petitions (W.P.No. l 0084 of 2006 and
14439 of 2006); the conduct of Sri Ali in having withdrawn the
writ petition while obtaining effacement of the elaborate and
G painstakingjudgment in the writ appeal, without determination of
the merits of that judgment by the Supreme Court; and then pursuing
W.P.No.l 0084of2006 (a writ petition filed earlier to W.P.No.14439
of2006), constitutes in our considered view an abuse of the process
oflaw; wanton litigative behaviour, pejorative to the larger public
H
'(2010) s sec 213 •
KSB ALI v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 711
[A. K. SIKRI, J.]

interest, involving casual and reckless commandeering of scarce A
judicial time. In the li~t of the observations of the Supreme Court
in BSNL, Sri K.S.B. Ali must be held disentitled to pursue remedies
under Article 226 of the Constitution in respect of the grievances
presented in his earlier writ petition (W.P.No.14439 of2006 and
W.A.No.887 of 2006). We hold accordingly."
B
l 0. Insofar as question no. (ii) is concerned, which discussed the
validity of the judgment of the Single Judge holding impugned memo to
be unsustainable for violation of principles of natural justice, the High
Com1 pointed out that through this memo the earlier memos dated 6'h
May, 2004 and 3 l'' July, 2004 were rescinded. However, there was no
question of giving any opportunity of hearing to the appellant because of C
the reason that memos dated 61h May, 2004 and 31 ''July, 2004 remained
uncommunicated and, thus, did not confer or create any rights in favour
of the appellants. Consequently, these could be withdrawn without notice,
since no rights flew from uncommunicated order. For arriving at this
conclusion, the High Court has extensively dealt with the provisions of D
Article 166(1) of the Constitution and the manner in which the aforesaid
provision is dealt with by this Court in the followingjudgments:
(i) Dattatreya Moreshwar Pangarkar vs. State of Bombay3
(ii) John vs. State of T. C. 4
E
(iii) MRF Ltd. vs. Manohar Parrikar and others5
11. Relying upon the aforesaid judgments, the High Court held
that Business Rules framed under the provisions ofArticle 166(3) of the
Constitution are mandatory in nature and have to be strictly adhered to.
The High Court also took note of another judgment of this Court in F
Bac/1/tittar Singh v. State of Punjab and another6 , on the basis of
which it concluded that merely writing something on the file did not
amount to an order and, therefore, noting in the file by the Revenue
Minister, without further action thereupon or issuing another order in the
name of the Governor, as required by Article 166( I) of the Constitution,
did not have any force in law. In the process, reference was also made G
to another judgment of this Court in Shanti Sports C/llb and another v.
'AIR 1952 SC 181
'(1955) 1 SCR 1011
'Vol IX (2010) SLT 580
6
AIR 1963 SC 395
H
712 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R.

A Union ofIndia and others 7 wherein this Court held that notings recorded
in official files by officers qfthe Government at different levels even of
Ministers, do not become decisions of the Government unless same are
sanctified and acted upon by issuing an order in the name of the President
or the Governor as the case may be, authenticated in the manner provided
B in Articles 77(2) and 166(2); and communicated to affected persons.
The High Court also referred to many other judgments in support of its
aforesaid finding.
12. Treating the aforesaid principle oflaw as binding precedents
contained in the aforesaid judgments, the High Court concluded that
none of the memos dated 151h April, 2002, 61h May, 2004, 31" July, 2004
c and 21" May, 2005 would lawfully be considered as constituting Executive
decisions/order of the State Government since they were not authenticated
in the manner mandated by Article 166 of the Constitution. Further
letter dated 61h April, 2004 and memo dated 31 ''July, 2004 were, in any
event, inoperable or inexecutable as they created no rights in favour of
D the appellants.
13. At the end, the High Court considered the status of the
appellants while answering the question 'who are the appellants?' Pointing
out that all the aforesaid memos as well as impugned memo, flow out of
representations made by Mr. Ali who claimed himself to be the sole
E representative of the legal heirs ofNusrat Jung-I, the High Court has
examined the locus of Mr. Ali to espouse the cause of others and found
that he could not produce anythirtg on record to show as to how he was
authorised to plead the case of the purported legal representatives or the
heirs ofNusrat Jung-I. The High Court further noted that other writ
petitions were filed, by other appellants, for implementation of memos
F dated 61h May, 2004 and 31" July, 2004 which memos were issued only
on the basis of Mr. Ali's representation. Therefore, none of the other
appellants could legitimately assert a grievance that impugned memo
was issued without notice or opportunity to them. According to the High
Court, there was absence of clarity as to whether Mr. Ali .and o~ the
G other writ petitioners were even the legal heirs ofNusrat Jung-I or were
lawfully authorised to represent any legal heirs and, therefore, none of
the appellants had any locus to litigate.
14. After answering the questions in the manner stated above, the
High Court has summarised the position as under:
H 1
(2009) I 5 sec 105
KSB ALI v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 713
[A. K. SIKRI, J.]

"SUMMARY OF OUR CONCLUSIONS: A
(a) Neither the State nor any Officer of the State, including the
Principal Secretary or the Special Chief Secretary to the
Government, Revenue Department is conferred judicial or quasi
jud.icial jurisdiction, power or authority, either as Court, a
Tribunal or a persona designata, to adjudicate disputed questions B
of title to immovable property, even where one of the competing
claimants to such title is the State;
· (b) Consequent on conclusion (a)supra, none of the instruments/
decisions/orders dated 15-4-2002; 6-5-2004; 31-7-2004, or the
impugned Memo dated 21-5-2005 (impugned in the writ c
petitions), could be considered as having efficacy or operative
force as determinative or deprivatory of title in or entitlement
to possession of immovable property of an extent of Ac.1635-
.34 guntas in Kokapet village ofRanga Reddy District, in favour
of the State itself or any other private individual or individuals,
including the writ petitioner and/or the non-official respondents D
in this batch of writ appeals;
(c) The decision/order in Memos dated 06-5-2004 and 31-7-2004
were not formally communicated to any of the writ petitioners
including Sri K.S.B.Ali, the representationist at whose instance
and on whose representation these Memos were issued; E
(d) In the light of conclusion (c) above, the Memos dated 6-5-
2004 and 31-7-2004, being uncommunicated administrative
orders, are inoperative, inexecutable and sterile;
(e) The instruments/decisions/orders dated 15-4-2002; 6-5-2004;
F
31-7-2004 or the impugned Memo dated21-5-2005 not having
been expressed or authenticated in the manner ordained by
Article 166 ( l ); or established to have been decisions taken at
the specified level of authority, in accordance with the Rules
of Business issued by the Governor of the State under Article
166 (2) and (3), cannot be regarded as orders issued by the G
State in exercise of its executive power under Article 162 of
the Constitution;
(f) Consequent on conclusions (a) to (e) above, the impugned
Memo dated 21-5-2005 is not susceptible to invalidation by
H
714 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R.

A this Court in exercise of its power of judicial review under
,Article 226 of the Constitution. Since the impugned Memo
rescinds uncommunicated and inoperative Memos dated 6-5-
2004 and 31-7-2004, violation of the audi alterem partem
principle (even ifapplicable in the facts and circumstances of
the case), is of no legal consequence and would not result in
B
resuscitation of the unauthorized and sterile memos dated 6-5-
2004 and 31-7-2004;
(g)Having withdrawn W.P.No.14434 of 2006 and obtained
invalidation of the judgment in the said writ petition and in
W.A.No.887 of2006, in SLP (Civil) No. 23392 of2007, by the
c order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 31-7-2007, while
obtaining permission "to take appropriate remedy", Sri
K.S.B.Ali is disentitled either to file another writ petition for
the same relief as in W.P.No. 14434 of 2006 or to pursue the
pending writ petition No. 10084 of2006, as this would not be
D an appropriate remedy; and pursuit of public law remedy by
Sri K.S.B.Ali, for substantially the same grievance as in the
earlier abandoned proceedings constitutes an abuse of process
of the Court; and
(h)Neither has Sri K.S.B.Ali established by specific pleadings nor
E by due authorization on record that he is authorized to represent
the cause of 203 legal heirs of Nus rat Jung-I; nor have the
other petitioners pleaded or established the basis for their claims,
to be the heirs ofNusrat Jung-I.
(i) In view of the foregoing analyses, for the afore-stated reasons
F and in the light of our conclusions supra, the common judgment
dated 02.06.2009 in W.P.Nos.10084 of2006; 22619 of2007;.
3421, 7747, 8761and12928 of2008; 3750and 6425 of2009 is
set aside and the several writ appeals are allowed, with costs;
and for reasons alike W.P.No.29063 of2009 is dismissed and
with costs."
G
15. On behalf of the appellants, arguments were mainly advanced
by Mr. Ali, who appeared in-person and Mr. V.N. Raghupathy, Advocate
who argued on behalf of some other appellants. The entire thrust of Mr.
Ali's. argument was on the order passed by the Atiyat Court and his
submission was that as per these orders, the appellants were held to be
H
KSB ALI v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 715
[A. K. SIKRI. J.]

owners of the subject lands, as legal heirs of Nusrat Jung-I. Atiyat A.
Court was having requisite jurisdiction to decide this !is and its decision
had not only attained finality, it was accepted by the Finance Minister as
well. Therefore, the same was binding on the State Government.
Mr. Ali, in addition, submitted that special express powers invested in
this Court to go into these issues by virtue of Article 3238 of the
Constitution. He, thus, contended that this Court should enforce the B
order of the Atiyat Court which was a decree under the Atiyat Act,
1952, which was a special Act and displaced the jurisdiction of the Civil
Court. Number of judgments was cited in support of the aforesaid
proposition.
16. Mr. Raghupati, on the other hand, argued that the inquiry into c
succession started on 71h August, 1905. This property is a Royal gift
prior to Ashifsahi dynasty and the sale deed of 1852 contains a recitle
that this prope1ty is exclusion (Kharij - jama) for ever for themselves
from every respect of control of Civil Government of Nizam ul-mulk
AsifJah on the 14 dayofJamadi-Al-Awal 1240 Hand there is certificate D
for exclusion from the Government (Diwani) i.e. Revenue Department
(Sanad-E-Mafee, i.e. Royal Waver (no PAC/CESS). After the demise
ofNusrat Jung Bahadur-I, the enquiry has started on l 7'h August, 1905
with regard to succession only. Circular l 0 of 1338 Fasli came into
force during the pendency of enquiry. It was also argued that according
to Section 15(b) ofAtiyat Enquiry Act, 1952, it is circular 10of1338 that E
applies to pending enquiry oflnam and Succession enquiry. Hence, the
Atiyat Enquiry Act, 1952 has no application. Under Section 9 of circular
10, the Government should have initiated action to avoid this Muntakhab.
Since it failed to do so, the Muntakhab attained finality. Muntakhab was
granted by NazimAtiyat after obtaining approval from Revenue Minister F
under Section S(e) of circular 10of1338F. Thus, the Muntakhab is valid.
document and its validity has not been contested in the writ petition. It
was further submitted that prior to Land Revenue Act, 1317, certain
rules were in force which continued to be in force under Section l (2) of
Land Revenue Act, 1317 Fasli.
G
17. Mr. Raghupati also submitted that temporary attachment of
the subject lands under Section 110 of Land Revenue Act, 13 l7(t) was
of no consequence and it could not divest the onus from their ownership.
He also laid stress on the approval granted by the Revenue Minister on
the basis of which Muntakhab was granted. He argued that it was done
H
716 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R.

A after following due procedure. Reference was made to the judgment of
this Court in State ofAndhra Pradesh v. P. Hanumantlta Rao (Dead)
Through LRs. and others 8 wherein it was held, thus:
"33. No doubt, it was held that neither in exercise of the power of
writ under Article 226 nor in supervisory jurisdiction under Article
B 227, the High Court will convert itself into a court of appeal and
indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence. The power of
the High Court in writ jurisdiction to ii1terfere where important
evidence has been overlooked and the legal provisions involved
arc misinterpreted or misapplied has been recognised even in the
case of Sawarn Singh [(1976) 2 SCC 868: AIR 1976 SC 232]
c on which" strong reliance was placed on behalf of the State. The
relevant observations are:
'"13. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior
tribunal, a writ of ce11iorari can be issued only if in recording
such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evidence which is
D legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence,
or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because
in such cases the error amounts to an error of law."
xxx xxx xxx

E 35. With the growing menace of land-grabbing, the Act of 1982
constitutes Special Courts and ousts jurisdiction of the regular
civil com1s in respect ofland alleged to have been grabbed. Where
the regular remedy provided by general law is ousted by special
law, the provisions of the latter deserve to be construed strictly.
We have examined the scheme and object of the Act and examined
F its relevant provisions. When an occupant of the land is alleged to
be a "land-grabber'', he has to justify his possession and prove his
source of title. Where source of title by an occupant is produced,
the Special Com1 is required to examine it to consider whether on
the basis of evidence of title produced by him, he can be held to
G be not falling in the definition of"land-grabber" under clause (d)
of Section 2 of the Act. In the present case, the occupants had
produced documents to prove their source of title and long
possession of their predecessor-in-title being the original grantee
under a muntakhab issued by the Ruler of the erstwhile Nizam
• (2003J lO sec 121
H
KSB ALI v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 717
[A. K. SIKRI, J.)

State. This title deed with revenue entries based on them produced A
by the occupants should have been treated sufficient for the
. purposes of the Act to treat the occupants of the land to be falling
outside the definition of"land-grabbe('. It is not a case where the
occupants have tried to justify their possession on the basis of a
mere bona fide claim to the land. They have produced oral and B
documentary evidence on the muntakhab and justified their
possession as alienees from the heirs of the original grantees."
18. The learned counsel appealing for the State ofTelangana and
Hyderabad Metropolitan Development Authority (HMDA) strongly
refuted the aforesaid submissions in an attempt to persuade this Court to C
uphold the impugned judgment of the High Court. It was his submission
that the High Com1 had rightly questioned the locus of Mr. Ali and even
before this Court, he could not point out as to how he was competent to
espouse the present litigation and represent the so-called legal heirs of
Nusrat Jung-I. It was also argued that th~ appellants had no right to
even make their submissions on merits as they had not challenged the D
order of the Single Judge refusing to grant them relief. The issue before
the Division Bench, in the appeals filed by the State and HMDA, only
related to the directions given by the Single Judge to the Government to
take a view after giving hearing to the appellants and the High Court in
the impugned judgment had considered the aforesaid aspect, accepting
the plea of the State and allowing its appeals. Therefore, argued the E
learned counsel, that issue decided in the impugned judgment could be
the only subject matter of these appeals.
19. After considering the respective submissions, we find ourscl vcs
in agreement with the contentions advanced by the learned counsel for
respondent. There arc various reasons to dismiss these appeals, which F
are discussed herein below:
20. In the first place, it is to be noticed that as far as Mr. Ali is
concerned, his writ petition no. 10084 of 2006 which was filed in the
High Court after passing of the order dated 31 ''July, 2007 in SLP(C)
No. 23392 of2007 by this Court, was not maintainable. This Court, by G
the said order, had permitted him to withdraw his writ petition no. 14434
of2006 and 'to take appropriate remedy'. Obviously, the remedy could
not be in the form of another writ petition on the same facts and grounds
which were pleaded earlier. The High Court has rightly held that having
given up his pursuit of public law remedy in earlier abandoned H
718 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 12 S.C.R.

A proceedings, filing of the fresh writ petition or pursue pending writ petition
no. l 0084 of2006 would constitute an abuse of the process of the Court.
21. Secondly, the High Court is also right in holding that neither
Mr. Ali had established by specific pleadings nor by due authorisation on
record that he was authorised to represent the case of203 legal heirs of
B Nusrat Jung-I. It is clear from the above that insofar as Mr. Ali is
concerned, his appeals are not even maintainable.
22. Thirdly, the High Court has specifically remarked, and rightly
so, that even the other appellants did not plead or establish the basis of
their claims that they are the heirs ofNusrat Jung-I.
c As pointed out above, the High Court has discussed the locus of
these appellants (writ petitioners in the High Court) under the caption
'who are the writ petitioners?' At this juncture, it would be apt to
reproduce the entire discussion in this behalf which compelled the High
Court to observe that entirely chaotic and incoherent state of facts were
D pleaded by all these writ petitioners in their writ petition since we are in
agreement with the High Court's analysis. Relevant portion of the
impugned judgment, in this behalf, is as under:
"There is another significant but piquant and incomprehensible
circumstance in this lis. The initial order dated I 5-04-2002, the
E subsequent orders dated 06-05-2004 and 31-07-2004 and the
impugned memo, all flow out of representations made by K.S.B.
Ali claiming to be the sole representative of the legal heirs of
Nusrat Jung - I.
The letter dated l 5-04-2002 refers to W.P.No.20298 of 1993 filed
by Mirza Agha Mohammed Ali and 169 others (seeking
F
implementation of the Muntakhab ). These petitioners claimed to
be the successors-in-interest ofNusrat Jung- I. By the judgment
dated 09-07-2001, this Court declined to go into the details of the
case and directed the Government to consider the report of the
CLR and take further action in accordance with law. The letter
G dated 15-04-2002 also refers to a representation dated 04-08-
2001 by Moizuddin Mahamood (also the petitioner in
W.P.No.22619 of2007); and another from K.S.B. Ali, claiming to
be the sole representative of the legal heirs of Nusrat Jung - I.
Qua this letter (dated 15-04-2002) the representation of K.S.B.
Ali was rejected. The memo dated 06-05-2004 was issued on the
H
KSB ALI v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 719
[A. K. SIKRI, J.]

basis of a representation dated 06-01-2003 and further A
representations, only by K.S.B. Ali claiming to be the sole
representative of the legal heirs, seeking implementation of the
Muntakhab and reconsideration of the order dated 15-04-2002.
The basis for the memo dated 31-07-2004 is the same as it is for
the memo dated 06-05-2004, i.e., representations by K.S.B. Ali. B
It is equally not clear by what authority K.S.B. Ali claimed or
continues to claim, to represent all the legal heirs ofNu&Tat Jung ·
- I; and ifhe is a lawfully authorized representative, whether the
170 petitioners (in W.P.No.20298 of 1993) are persons who
additionally ~!aim to be the heirs or these petitioners are renegade
legal heirs who have dis-associated from K.S.B. Ali. Neither a C
power ofattomey nor an authorisation signed by persons asserting
to be legal heirs ofNusrat Jung- I nor the names and particulars
of the legal heirs whose representative Sri K.S.B. Ali claims to be
nor even the legal basis for the claim to be their representative, is
on record.
[)
We have earlier in the narrative herein noticed that the
1" defendant in 0.S.No.512of1973 was.one J.H. Krishna Murthy,
who in his written statement therein claimed to be the GPA of the
heirs of late Nusrat Jung - I. In that capacity he had also though
unsuccessfully preferred the appeal C.C.C.A.No.142 of 1976..
When Sri K.S.B. A\i supplanted J.H ..Krishna Mw1hy, as the E
authorized legal representative of the heirs and by what authority,
is neither pleaded nor clarified.
W.P.No.9551 of2004 was also by K.S.B. Ali claiming to be the
sole representative of the heirs ofNusrat Jung- I. The grievance
in this writ petition was non-communication ofthc memo dated F
06-05-2004 to the District Collector and MRO and for
implementation of the order oftheAtiyat Court. This writ petition
was disposed of at the admission stage directing communication
of the memo dated 06-05-2004 to respondents 2 to 4 therein. Sri
Ali did not plead in this writ petition that the Memo dated 06-05- G
2004 was communicated to him.
W.P.No.14439 of 2006 was again by K.S.B. Ali alone claiming
that he and a large number of (203) persons are the legal heirs of
Nusrat Jung - I. The proposals for sale of 100 acres in Kokapct
village by the RUDA was challenged in this writ petition and title H
720 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R.

A to the said extent as part of the schedule property was claimed by
the petitioner K.S.B. Ali, as the sole representative of the legal
heirs ofNusrat Jung-I. On what basis Ali claimed to be the heir
ofNusrat Jung- I and/or to be authorized to represent all the
legal heirs is not clear. No foundational facts are pleaded nor anf
material furnished to infer with certitude the claim of Sri Ali to
B
represent the legal heirs of Nusrat Jung - I or the claims of the
other writ petitioners to being the legal heirs (ofNusrat Jung- I)
and hence to having a litigable interest in the schedule property.
Against the dismissal of this writ petition (with liberty granted) to
pursue declaratory and injunctory reliefs before the Civil Court,
c K.S.B.Ali preferred writ appeal No.886 of2006. The appeal was
dismissed by the judgment dated 26-10-2007. K.S.B. Ali appealed
to the Supreme Court by Special Leave, pleaded for withdrawal
ofW.P.No.14439 of 2006. By the Order of the Supreme Court,
dated 13-12-2007, the judgments in W.A.No.887 of 2006 and
W.P.No.14439 of2006 were set aside and writ petition dismissed
D
as withdrawn; the issues were left open and the appellant Ali was
preserved the liberty "to take appropriate remedy".
Coming to the several writ petitions and the common judgment
therein (wherefrom the present appeals arise), as already noticed,
W.P.No. l 0084 of2006 is again by K.S.B.Ali, claiming to represent
E
203 legal heirs ofNusrat Jung- I. W.P.No.22619 of 2007 is by
the sole petitioner Moizuddin Mahamood, one of the
representationists referred to in the order dated 15-04-2002. It
does not appear that the memos dated 06-05-2004 and 31-07-
2004 were issued on the basis of the representations by this
F gentleman - Moizuddin Mahamood. W.P.No.3421 of 2008 is by
Malik Sultana and 21 others; W.P.No.7747 of2008 is by Ghouse
Mohiuddin Siddiqui; W.P.No.8761 of2008 is by 13 petitioners;
W.P.No.12928 of2008 is by 9 petitioners; W.P.No.3750 of2009
is by 117 petitioners; and W.P.No.6425 of2009 by 20 petitioners.
If K.S.B.Ali is the sole representative of all the legal heirs of
G Nusrat Jung- I, it is not clear who the other writ petitioners are
or on what basis they claim to be so. Except K.S.B. Ali and
Moizuddin Mahamood and the writ petition filed by Mirza Agha
Mohammed Ali and 169 others, there is no reference to any other
claimants to the schedule property even in the letter dated 5-04-
H
KSB ALI v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 721
[A. K. SIKRI, J.]

2002, whereby the representation ofK.S.B.Ali was rejected. The A
subsequent memos dated 06-05-2004 and 31-07-2004 directing
implementation of the Muntakhab were issued only on the basis
ofK.S.B. Ali's representation and these orders rescinded by the
impugned memo dated 21-05-2005. Neither the 170 petitioners
(whose W.P.No.20298of1993 was referred to in the letter dated B
15-04-2002) or Moizuddin Mahamood whose representation dated
04-08-200 1 was also referred to in this letter (rejecting K. S .B .Ali's
representation for implementation of the Muntakhab and restoration
of possession of the schedule property), have ever challenged the
decision dated 15-04-2002. Neither did Sri K.S.B. Ali.
Since neither the memos dated 06-05-2004 and 31-07-2004 nor C
the re-calling of the orders in these memos by the impugned memo
dated 21-05-2005 is at the instance of any other person except
K.S.B. Ali, none of the other petitioners could legitimately assert
a grievance that the impugned memo was issued without notice
or opportunity to them and on the ground that any rights accrued D
to them under the memos dated 06-05-2004 and 31-07-2004 were
extinguished by the impugned memo.
In the chaotic and incoherent state of facts adverted to above and
absent any clarity as to whether K.S.B.Ali and/or the writ
petitioners arc the legal heirs of Nusrat Jung - I or lawfully E
authorized to represent any legal heirs; and since the writ petitions
are founded on the assertion that the reliefs claimed arc on the
basis that the several petitioners (being successors-in-interest of
Nusrat Jung - I) are entitled to restoration of possession of the
schedule property; we do not consider it prudent or pragmatic
that reliefs should have been granted to petitioners who have failed F
to plead and establish any litigative interest in the subject matter
of the writ petitions; and therefore to a locus to litigate.
23. Fifthly, as pointed out above,. the judgment of the learned Single
Judge insofar as it was against the appellants, was never challenged by
them by filing any writ appcal(s). It would be pertinent to reproduce G
hereunder the conclusions of the learned Single Judge in its judgment
dated 2"'1 June, 2009.
"The writ petitions were allowed with the following directions:
(a) the impugned memo datcd21-05-2005, is set aside, as violative H
722 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R.

A of principles of natural justice;
(b) the Government, in its Revenue Department, shall pass fresh
orders, after issuing notice to the petitioners. It shall be open to
the petitioners to urge all the grounds before the Government.
( c) GO.Ms.No. l 084, dated 06-06-2005, is upheld, however, with
B a rider that as and when the rights of the petitioners vis-vis
the lands are determined in their favour, it shall be open to
them, to.pursue their remedies, in this regard;
(d)This judgment shall not be treated as a pronouncement or
adjudication of any dispute, or question, involved in the matter;
c and
(e)It shall be open to the legal representatives of late Nawab
Nursat Jung Bahadur-1, or their authorized agent, to pursue
the proceedings before the Government, and the dispute, if
any, among them, may be agitated before a competent forurrL
D
As is clear from the observations set out in direction (d) above,
there was noadjudication or determination of any of the substantive
disputes between the parties, particularly with regard to the vitality
of the Muntakhab. These disputes are relegated for de novo
consideration by the Government, and after notice to the
E petitioners."
The learned Single Judge had specifically clarified that his judgment
was not to be treated as a pronouncement for adjudication of any dispute
or questions involved in the matter and disputes, if any, among them
could be adjudicated before a competentforum. In view of the above,
F in the appeals filed by the State against the judgment'of the Single Judge,
the Division Bench was only called upon to decide as to whether the
direction to relegate the matter to the State Government was proper or
not. The High Court has decided that aspect in the impugned judgment.
It is obvious that the appellants cannot rake up those issues in these
G appeals which are not decided either by the learned Single Judge or the
Division Bench.
24. Sixthly, Insofar as the decision of the Division Bench on the
issue raised before it is concerned, no arguments were even advanced
.by the appellants questioning the validity thereof. Even otherwise, having
H gone through the said judgment minutely, we are in complete agreement
KSB ALI v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 723
[A. K. SIKRI, J.]

with the impugned judgement on those aspects, decided by the High A
Court. To recapitulate in brief it is stated that even the writ petition filed
by the petitioners herein (writ petition no. 3421 of 2008) which inter
alia sought to challenge memo dated 21 '' May, 2005 issued by the
Revenue Department as illegal and also sought to implement Muntakhab
.
No. 55 of 1955 dated 7°• May, 1955, by mutating the names of the B
petitioners in the Revenue Records and return the custody of the property
was clearly not maintainable for two reasons. Insofar the memo dated
21 ''May, 2005, was concerned, the main grievance of the writ petitioners
appears to be that the same had been passed without giving any notice
to the writ petitioner and that the same could not have reviewed/rescinded
the memos dated 61h May, 2004. The said arguments are not tenable on C
account of the fact that the impugned memo dated 21" May, 2005, only
sought to reinforce the memo dated 15'h April, 2002, issued by the
Government in response to the representation made by Mr. Ali.
Therefore, when the impugned memo. dated 21" May, 2005 was
admittedly not issued at the instance of the writ petitioners there could D
not have been any question of hearing them prior to the same. Further,
neitherthe impugned memo nor the.memo dated 6th May, 2004 (purporting
to create rights in favour of the legal heirs of Nawab Nusrat Jung-I)
was communicated to the writ petitioners. Hence, insofar as the memo
dated 21" May, 2005 is concerned, no cause of action accrued in favour
of the writ petitioners to have approached the High Court and, therefore, E
the only person, if any, who could have challenged the same was Mr.
Ali. As far as Mr. Ali, is concerned, as already pointed above, he could
not maintain the writ petition as it was not 'appropriate remedy' as granted
by this Court.
25. For all these reasons, these appeals.arc dismissed: However, :F
in the facts and circumstances of this case, we may refrain from awarding
any costs.

Kalpana K. Tripathy Appeals dismissed.