Supreme Court of India
KULWINDER SINGH &ANR.versusSTATE OF PUNJAB
- Citation
- 2015 INSC 994
- Decided
- 5 May 2015
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- DIPAK MISRA
Holding
The conviction under Section 15 NDPS stands as the court found that in‑court identification was sufficient, the appellants were in conscious possession of the poppy husk, Section 50 does not apply to vehicle searches, and the absence of independent witnesses does not invalidate the trustworthy evidence.
Summary
In 1988 police stopped a truck near Raidhriana village and seized 110 bags of poppy husk. The appellants Kulwinder Singh and Amrik Singh, who were on the truck, fled the scene and were later arrested. They were convicted under Section 15 of the NDPS Act, sentenced to ten years' rigorous imprisonment and a fine, and appealed on grounds that no test identification parade was held, they were not in conscious possession of the narcotics, Section 50 of the NDPS Act was not complied with, and independent witnesses were not examined. The Supreme Court held that in‑court identification by two witnesses sufficed, the appellants' presence and flight demonstrated conscious possession, Section 50 applies only to personal searches and not to vehicle searches, and the prosecution's evidence remained trustworthy despite the non‑examination of independent witnesses. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction.
Issues considered
- The absence of a test identification parade and its effect on the validity of the identification of the accused.
- Whether the appellants were in conscious possession of the poppy husk seized from the vehicle.
- Whether non‑compliance with Section 50 of the NDPS Act vitiates the conviction when the seizure was from a vehicle.
- Whether the failure to examine independent witnesses undermines the reliability of the prosecution's case.
Legislation cited
Subjects
NDPS ActSection 15Section 50conscious possessionidentification paradesearch and seizurevehicle searchevidence admissibilitytest identification paradenarcoticspoppy husk
Judgment
(2015] 6 S.C.R. 175
KULWINDER SINGH &ANR. A
v.
STATE OF PUNJAB
(Criminal Appeal No.681 of2011)
B
MAY05, 2015
[DIPAK MISRA AND N.V. RAMANA, JJ.]
Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act,
1985 - ss. 15, 50- Search and seizure - Recovery of bags c
containing poppy husk from a vehicle -All persons sitting in
the truck ran away except one - Order of conviction and
sentence of the accused for the offence punishable u/s. 15,
on the basis of the evidence on record - On appeal, held:
Courts below correctly relied upon the evidence to record D
their conviction- Evidence was unimpeachable and beyond
reproach - Evidence of the prosecution witnesses and the
official witnesses was trustworthy and credible - There was
no need of holding test identification parade since the two
prosecution witnesses identified the accused in court - It E
was clear from the materials on record show that appellants-
accused were in conscious possession of the said articles -
Bag containing poppy husk were seized from the truck and
was not a case of persona/ search of a person, thus, there
was no need for non-compliance of s. 50- Further, no adveise F
inference could be drawn for non-examination of the
independent witnesses since they had been won over.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
G
HELD: 1.1 The test identification parade was not
held. The two witnesses-PW-2 and PW-3 identified the
accused-appellants in court. As per their evidence they
had seen the accused-appellants in torch light and they
had also seen them running away. They chased them H
175
176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 6 S.C.R.
A but they could not be apprehended. Trial judge as well
as the High Court took note of the fact that it was not all
that dark and with the help of torch light, they could have
identified the accused persons. The suggestion given
to these witnesses was absolutely vague. Nothing really
B was elicited in the cross-examination to discard the
testimony of these witnesses. As the witnesses identified
the accused-appellants in the court and except giving a
bald suggestion that they have not seen the accused
persons, there was nothing in the cross-examination
C thus, the identification in court is accepted. [Paras 8, 13]
[182-B-D; 183-F]
1.2 Once possession is found, the accused is
presumed to be in conscious possession. If the accused
D takes a stand that he was not in conscious possession,
he has to establish the same. There were 110 bags of
poppy husk being carried in the truck. The presence of
accused which has been proven, establishes their
control over the bags. The circumstances clearly
E establish that they were aware of the poppy husk inside
the bags and in such a situation, there can be no iota of
doubt that they were in conscious possession of the
same. [Para 17, 14] [186-F; 184-C-D]
F 1.3 Section 50 of the Narcotics Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 only applies in case
of personal search of a person, but it is not extended to
a search of a vehicle or a container or a bag or premises.
The bag containing poppy husk were seized from the
G truck. It was not a case of personal search of a person.
Non-compliance of s. 50 would not vitiate the conviction.
[Paras 18 and 20] [187-B-C; 189-C]
1.4 What is necessary for proving the prosecution
H case is not the quantity but the quality of the evidence.
KULWINDER SINGH & ANR. v. STATE OF PUNJAB 177
No adverse inference can be drawn for non-examination A
of the independent witnesses since they had been won
over. That apart, the case of the prosecution cannot be
rejected solely on the ground that independent
witnesses have not been examined when, on the perusal
of the evidence on record the Court found that the case B
put forth by the prosecution was trustworthy. When the
evidence of the official witnesses were trustworthy and
credible, there was no reason not to rest the conviction
on the basis of their evidence. The evidence is
unimpeachable and beyond reproach and the witnesses C
cited by the prosecution can be believed and their
evidence has been correctly relied upon by the courts
below to record a conviction. [Para 21, 22) [189-D-F; 190-
H; 191-A]
D
Matru v. State of U.P. 1971 (3) SCR 914: (1971) 2 SCC
75; Santokh Singh v. /zhar Hussain 1974 (1) SCR 78:
(1973) 2 SCC 406; Ma/khan Singh &Others v. State of
M.P. 2003 (1) Suppl. SCR 443: (2003) 5 sec 746;
E
Visveswaran v. State 2003 (3) SCR 978: (2003) 6 SCC
73; Madan Lal v. State of H.P. 2003 (2) Suppl. SCR
716: (2003) 7 SCC 465; Dharampal Singh v. State of
Punjab 2010 (10) SCR 1160: (2010) 9 sec 608;
Mohan Lal v. State of Rajasthan (2015) 5 SCALE 330; F
Ram Singh v. Central Bureau of Narcotics 2011 (5) SCR
967: (2011) 11 SCC 347; Megh Singh v. State of
Punjab 2003 (3) Suppl. SCR 120 : (2003) 8 sec 666;
State of H.P. v. Pawan Kumar 2005 (3) SCR 417 :
G
(2005) 4 SCC 350; Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab
2011 (2) SCR 888 : (2011) 3 SCC 521; Ram Swaroop
v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) (2014) 14 SCC
235; State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) v. Sunil 2000 (5)
Suppl. SCR 144: (2001) 1 SCC 652- referred to. H
178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 6 S.C.R.
A Case Law Reference
1971 (3) SCR 914 Referred to. Para 9
1974 (1) SCR 78 Referred to. Para 10
2003 (1) Suppl. SCR 443 Referred to. Para 10
B 2003 (3) SCR 978 Referred to. Para 12
2003 (2) Suppl. SCR 716 Referred to. Para 15
2010 (10) SCR 1160 Referred to. Para 16
(2015) 5 SCALE 330 Referred to. Para 16
2011 (5) SCR 967 Referred to. Para 17
c 2003 (3) Suppl. SCR 720 Referred to. Para 18
2005 (3) SCR 417 Referred to. Para 19
2011 (2) SCR 888 Referred to. Para 19
(2014) 14 sec 235 Referred to. Para 19
D 2000 (5) Suppl. SCR 144 Referred to. Para 21
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal
Appeal No. 681 of2011
E From the Judgment and Order dated 27.11.2008 of
the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in
Criminal Appeal No. 384-SB of 1998
J. P. Dhanda for the Appellants.
F Jayant K. Sud, AAG, Vishal Dabas, B. Singh, Ajay P.
Tushir, Kavita Wadia for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G DIPAK MISRA, J. - 1. In this appeal, two appellants,
namely, Kulwinder Singh and Amrik Singh faced trial along
with three others for the offence punishable under Section
15 of the Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act,
1985 (for short, "the NDPS Act") before the Special Court,
H Sangrur and were found guilty for the said offence and
KULWINDER SINGH & ANR. v. STATE OF PUNJAB 179
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of A
10 years and to pay a fine of Rs.1 lakh each and, in default of
payment of fine, to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a further
period of one year. The conviction and sentence were called
in question before the High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 384-
SB of 1998 and the High Court after re-appreciating the B
evidence, gave the stamp of approval to the same.
2. The prosecution case, as unfurled, is that on
17.4. 1988, Jarnail Singh, ASI, along with other police officials
was patrolling on the canal bridge in the area of village C
Raidhriana. In the early part of the morning, a truck bearing
no. DIL-781 came from the side of village Raidhriana and it
was proceeding towards the canal bridge. When the truck
reached near the police party, Jarnail Singh, gave a signal
with a torch light and asked the driver to stop. After the D
vehicle stopped, it was circled by the police officials. The
driver of the truck, on enquiry, disclosed his name as Balwinder
Singh and Devender Singh and Bagga Singh were sitting by
his side on the front seat. Jagminder Singh and four others
were sitting on the back side of the truck and on a query being E
made, all except Jag minder Singh jumped from the truck and
took to their heels. Chase by the police party was unsuccessful.
The persons who were successful in running away are Satta
@ Satnam Singh, Amrik Singh, Kulwinder Singh@ Kala and F
Jagdev Singh @ Jagga. The Investigating Officer
apprehended Jagminder Singh, Balwinder Singh, Devinder
Singh and Bagga Singh; and in their presence, the vehicle
was searched. On a search being made, the police found
110 bags of poppy husk and each bag contained 38 kgs. G
Samples were collected from each bag, duly sealed and
recovery memos were prepared and eventually they were sent
for chemical examination. The present accused-appellants
and Satta@ Satnam Singh were arrested on 11.5.1988 by
ASI, Gurdas Singh, PW-1. In course of investigation, the H
180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 6 S.C.R.
A investigating agency recorded statements of certain witnesses,
obtained FSL report and ultimately placed the chargesheet
before the concerned Magistrate, who in turn committed the
matter to the Special Court under the NDPS Act. The accused
persons pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
B
3. The prosecution in order to substantiate the charge,
examined seven witnesses. The main witnesses are ASI,
Gurdas Singh, PW-1, Jagjivan Singh, PW-2, Ajit Singh, PW-
3 and Om Prakash, PW-7. ASI, Jarnail Singh, could not be
C examined as he had expired before the commencement of
the evidence of the prosecution. The accused-appellants took
the plea that they were brought from the village and falsely
implicated in the case and there was no recovery effected
from them. The defence in support of its stand examined
D nine witnesses, DW-1 to DW-9.
4. The learned trial Judge appreciating the evidence
on record found the appellants and two others guilty of the
offence and sentenced them, as has been stated
E hereinbefore. Being dissatisfied with the judgment of
conviction and order of sentence, the appellants along with
two others preferred Criminal Appeal No. 384 of 1998 and
Bagga Singh and Balwinder Singh preferred separate
appeals. It was contended before the High Court that the
F identity of the appellants were not established during the
trial inasmuch as no identification parade was conducted by
the investigating officer; that the prosecution had not proved
that the accused-appellants were in conscious possession
of the poppy husk; that Labh Singh and Harvinder Singh
G though had joined the investigating officer at the time of
alleged search and seizure, they were not examined by the
prosecution; and that the prosecution had miserably failed
to prove the involvement of the appellants in the crime in
H question. The High Court dealt with each of the contentions
KULWINDER SINGH & ANR. v. STATE OF PUNJAB 181
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
and found no merit in any of them and resultantly dismissed A
the appeal.
5. We have heard Mr. J.P. Dhanda, learned counsel for
the appellants and Mr. Jayant K. Sud, learned AAG for the
State. B
6. Learned counsel forthe appellants, apart from raising
the similar contentions which had been raised before the High
Court, has also urged that there has been non-compliance of
Section 50 of the NDPS Act, which vitiates the conviction. He c
has also emphasised on the issue of conscious possession
by the appellants and has seriously criticized non-conducting
of the test identification parade. Learned counsel for the State,
per contra, has contended that in the instant case there was
no need for holding a test identification parade inasmuch as o
PW-2 and PW-3 have identified the accused persons in court
and they had occasion to see the appellants as they had
stopped the truck and had time to see them and their evidence
has not been dented despite roving cross-examination.
Learned counsel for the State would also contend that the E
running away of the accused persons from the spot and their
abscondance thereafter prove the factum of their special
knowledge about the contents in the bags loaded in the truck
and that establishes the conscious state of their mind.
F
7. Resisting the submission about the non-examination
of independent witnesses, namely, Labh Singh and Harvinder
Singh, it is contended by the learned counsel for the State that
as they were won over by the defence, the prosecution though
it appropriate not to examine them as their witnesses and the G
same has been proven to be a fact, for they have been examined
as defence witnesses. As regards non-compliance of Section
50 of the NDPS Act, it is submitted by the learned counsel for
the respondent-State as the recovery was from a truck there
was no need for compliance of Section 50 of the NDPS Act. H
182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 6 S.C.R.
A 8. First, we shall deal with the facet of test identification
parade. There is no dispute that the test identification parade
has not been held in this case. The two witnesses, namely,
PW-2 and PW-3 have identified the accused-appellants in
court. As per their evidence they had seen the accused-
B appellants in torch light and they had also seen them running
away. It has also come in the evidence that they chased
them but they could not be apprehended. Learned trial Judge
as well as the High Court has taken note of the fact that it
was 4:00 a.m. in the month of April and, therefore, it was not
C all that dark and with the help of torch light, they could have
identified the accused persons. The suggestion given to these
witnesses is absolutely vague. Nothing really has been elicited
in the cross-examination to discard the testimony of these
witnesses.
0
9. In Matru v. State ofU.P.', it has been held thatthe
identification test does not constitute substantive evidence
and it is primarily meant for the purpose of helping the
investigating agency with an assurance that their progress
E with the investigation of an offence is proceeding on the right
lines.
10. In Santokh Singh v. /zhar Hussain 2 , it has been
observed that the identification can only be used as
F corroborative of the statement in Court.
11. In Ma/khan Singh & Others v. State of M.P. 3 , it
has been held thus:-
''. ..... The identification parades belong to the stage of
G
investigation, and there is no provision in the Code of
Criminal Procedure which obliges the investigating
agency to hold, or confers a right upon the accused to
1
(1971) 2 sec 1s
H 2 (1973) 2 sec 406
' (2003) s sec 746
KULWINDER SINGH & ANR. v. STATE OF PUNJAB 183
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
claim a test identification parade. They do not constitute A
substantive evidence and these parades are essentially
governed by Section 162 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. Failure to hold a test identification parade
would not make inadmissible the evidence of
identification in court. The weight to be .attached to such B
identification should be a matter for the courts of fact."
12. In this context, a reference to passage from
Visveswaran v. State•, would be apt. It is as follows:-
c
"The identification of the accused either in test
identification parade or in Court is not a sine qua non in
every case if from the circumstances the guilt is otherwise
established. Many a time, crimes are committed under
the cover of darkness when none is able to identify the o
accused. The commission of a crime can be proved also
by circumstantial evidence."
13. In the case at hand, as the witnesses have identified
the accused-appellants in the Court and except giving a bald E
suggestion that they have not seen the accused persons, there
is nothing in the cross-examination we are disposed to accept
the identification in Court. Hence, the submission canvassed
by the learned counsel for the appellants on this score pales
into insignificance. F
14. The next ground of assail pertains to factum of
conscious possession. The submission of the learned
counsel for the appellants is that they were only moving in
the truck and had no knowledge what the bags contained. G
As the evidence on record would show, two of the accused
persons were sitting by the side of the driver and the rest of
the accused persons were sitting on the body of the truck. 110
bags of poppy husk weighing 4180 kgs. were in the truck. At
' c2003) s sec 73 .H
184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 6 S.C.R.
A the instance of the police when the truck was stopped, had the
accused-appellants no knowledge about the contents of the
bags, they would not have run away from the spot. That apart,
they absconded for few days from their village. They have not
taken the plea that they were taking any lift in the truck and
B their presence in the truck has been proven by the prosecution.
It is not a small bag lying in the corner of the truck that the
accused-appellants can advance the plea that they were not
aware of it. In the instant case, there were 110 bags of poppy
husk being carried in the truck. Their presence which has been
C proven, establishes their control over the bags. The
circumstances clearly establish that they were aware of the
poppy husk inside the bags and in such a situation, it is difficult
to accept that they were not in conscious possession of the
said articles.
0
15. In this context reference to the decision in Madan
Lal v. State of H.P. 5 would be fruitful wherein it has been
held thus:-
E "22. The expression "possession" is a polymorphous
term which assumes different colours in different contexts.
It may carry different meanings in contextually different
backgrounds. It is impossible, as was observed in Supdt.
& Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, WB. v. Anil Kumar
F Bhunja 6 to work out a completely logical and precise
definition of "possession" uniformally applicable to all
situations in the context of all statutes.
23. The word "conscious" means awareness about a
G particular fact. It is a state of mind which is deliberate or
intended.
24. As noted in Gunwantlalv. State of M.P 7 possession
5 (2003 >1 sec
465
H 6 (1979)4SCC274
7
(1972) 2 sec
194
KULWINDER SINGH & ANR. v. STATE OF PUNJAB 185
[DIPAK MISRA, J.)
in a given case need not be physical possession but can A
be constructive, having power and control over the article
in the case in question, while the person to whom physical
possession is given holds it subject to that power or
control.
B
25. The word "possession" means the legal right to
possession (see Heath v. Drown 8 ). In ari interesting
case it was observed that where a person keeps his
firearm in his mother's flat which is safer than his own
home, he must be considered to be in possession of
the same. (See Sullivan v. Earl of Caithness9 .)"
16. In Dharampal Singh v. State of Punjab' 0 , it has
c
-
been ruled that the expression "possession" is not capable
of precise and complete logical definition of universal o
application in the context of all the statutes. Recently, in
Mohan Lal v. State of Rajasthan", after referring to certain
authorities, this Court has held as follows:-
"From the aforesaid exposition of law it is quite vivid that E
the term "possession" for the purpose of Section 18 of
the NDPS Act could mean physical possession with
animus, custody or dominion over the prohibited
substance with animus or even exercise of dominion
and control as a result of concealment. The animus F
and the mental intent which is the primary and
significant element to show and establish possession.
Further, personal knowledge as to the existence of the
"chattel" i.e. the illegal substance at a particular location
or site, at a relevant time and the intention based upon G
the knowledge, would constitute the unique relationship
a (1972)2AllER561
~ (1976) 1 All ER 844
10 (201 o) g sec soa
11
(2015) 5 SCALE 330 . H
186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 6 S.C.R.
A and manifest possession. In such a situation, presence
and existence of possession could be justified, for the
intention is to exercise right over the substance or the
chattel and to act as the owner to the exclusion of
•
others. In the case at hand, the appellant, we hold,
B had the requisite degree of control when, even if the
said narcotic substance was not within his physical
control at that moment. To give an example, a person
can conceal prohibited narcotic substance in a property
and move out thereafter. The said person because of
c necessary animus would be in possession of the said
substance even if he is not, at the moment, in physical
control. The situation cannot be viewed differently
when a person conceals and hides the prohibited
narcotic substance in a public space. In the second
D
category of cases, the person would be in possession
because he has the necessary animus and the intention
to retain control and dominion."
17. In view of the aforesaid enunciation of law, once
E possession is found, the accused is presumed to be in
conscious possession as has been held in Ram Singh v.
Central Bureau ofNarcotics 12 . If the accused takes a stand
that he was not in conscious possession, he has to establish
F the same, as has been held in Dharampal Singh (supra).
As the materials brought on record would show, the accused-
appellants were sitting in the truck; their presence in the truck
has been clearly established; and they had run away from
the spot and absconded for some days from the village: It is
G proven that there were 110 bags of poppy husk in the truck
and the accused-appellants were in control of the articles in
the truck. Therefore, there can be no iota of doubt that they
were in conscious possession of the same. In view of the
aforesaid analysis, we do not find any force in the submission
H 12 (2011) 11 sec 347
KULWINDER SINGH & ANR. v. STATE OF PUNJAB 187
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
of the learned counsel forthe appellants. A
18. The next contention that has been raised by the
learned counsel for the appellants relates to non-compliance
of Section 50 of the NDPS Act. It is undisputed that the
bags containing poppy husk were seized from the truck. B
Thus, it is not a case of personal search of a person. In
Megh Singh v. State of Punjab 13 , it has been held that
Section 50 only applies in case of personal search of a
person, but it is not extended to a search of a vehicle or a
container or a bag or premises. C
19. In State of H.P. v. Pawan Kumar14 , it has been
held that:-
"10. We are not concerned here with the wide definition
D
of the word "person", which in the legal world includes
corporations, associations or body of individuals as
factually in these type of cases search of their premises
can be done and not of their person. Having regard to
the scheme of the Act and the context in which it has E
been used in the section it naturally means a human
being or a living individual unit and not an artificial person.
The word has to be understood in a broad common-sense
manner and, therefore, not a naked or nude body of a
human being but the manner in which a normal human F
being will move about in a civilised society. Therefore,
the most appropriate meaning of the word "person"
appears to be - "the body of a human being as
presented to public view usually with its appropriate
coverings and clothing". In a civilised society appropriate G
coverings and clothings are considered absolutely
essential and no sane human being comes in the gaze
of others without appropriate coverings and clothings.
(2003) a sec 666
13
H
14
(2005) 4 sec 350
188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 6 S.C.R.
A The appropriate coverings will include footwear also as
normally it is considered an essential article to be worn
while moving outside one's home. Such appropriate
coverings or clothings or footwear, after being worn, move
along with the human body without any appreciable or
B extra effort. Once worn, they would not normally get
detached from the body of the human being unless some
specific effort in that direction is made. For interpreting
the provision, rare cases of some religious monks and
sages, who, according to the tenets of their religious belief
c do not cover their body with clothings, are not to be taken
notice of. Therefore, the word "person" would mean a
human being with appropriate coverings and clothings
and also footwear.
D 11. A bag, briefcase or any such article or container,
etc. can, under no circumstances, be treated as body
of a human being. They are given a separate name and
are identifiable as such. They cannot even remotely be
treated to be part of the body of a human being.
E Depending upon the physical capacity of a person, he
may carry any number of items like a bag, a briefcase, a
suitcase, a tin box, a thaila, ajhola, a gathri, a holdall, a
carton, etc. of varying size, dimension or weight.
However, while carrying or moving along with them,
F
some extra effort or energy would be required. They
would have to be carried either by the hand or hung on
the_shoulder or back or placed on the head. In common
parlance it would be said that a person is carrying a
G particular article, specifying the manner in which it was
carried like hand, shoulder, back or head, etc.
Therefore, it is not possible to include these articles
within the ambit of the word "person" occurring in
Section 50 of the Act."
H
KULWINDER SINGH & ANR. v. STATE OF PUNJAB 189
[DIPAK MISRA, J.)
Similar view has been expressed in Jarnail Singh v. A
State of Punjab 15 and Ram Swaroop v. State (Government
of NCT of Delhi)1 6 .
20. In view of the aforesaid, the submission that non-
compliance of Section 50 vitiates the conviction, leaves us B
unimpressed.
21. The last plank of submission of the learned
counsel for the appellants is that no independent witness
has been examined to substantiate the allegation of the c
prosecution. It is worth to note that Labh Singh and Harvinder
Singh have not been examined by the prosecution. The
explanation has been offered that the investigating agency
was of the view that they had been won over. The said
explanation has been totally substantiated inasmuch as they o
have been examined as defence witnesses. In such a situation,
no adverse inference can be drawn for non-examination of the
said witnesses. That apart, the case of the prosecution cannot
be rejected solely on the ground that independent witnesses
have not been examined when, on the perusal of the evidence E
on record the Court finds that- the case put forth by the
prosecution is trustworthy. When the evidence of the official
witnesses are trustworthy and credible, there is no reason not
to rest the conviction on the basis of their evidence. In this
regard, it is profitable to reproduce a passage from State F
(Govt. of NCT of Delhi) v. Suni/17 which reads as follows:-
"We feel that it is an archaic notion that actions of the
police officer should be approached with initial
distrust. We are aware that such a notion was lavishly G
entertained during the British period and policemen
also knew about it. Its hangover persisted during
15
(2011) 3 sec s21
is (2014) 14 sec 235
11
(2001 > 1 sec es2 H
190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 6 S.C.R.
A post-independent years but it is time now to start
placing at least initial trust on the actions and the
documents made by the police. At any rate, the court
cannot start with the presumption that the police
records are untrustworthy. As a proposition of law the
B presumption should be the other way around. That
official acts of the police have been regularly
performed is a wise principle of presumption and
recognised even by the legislature. Hence when a
police officer gives evidence in court that a certain
c article was recovered by him on the strength of the
statement made by the accused it is open to the court
to believe the version to be correct if it is not
otherwise shown to be unreliable. It is forthe accused,
through cross-examination of witnesses or through
D
any other materials, to show that the evidence of the
police officer is either unreliable or at least unsafe to
be acted upon in a particular case. If the court has
any good reason to suspect the truthfulness of such
E records of the police the court could certainly take
into account the fact that no other independent person
was present at the time of recovery. But it is not a
legally approvable procedure to presume the police
action as unreliable to start with, nor to jettison such
F action merely for the reason that police did not collect
signatures of independent persons in the documents
made contemporaneous with such actions."
22. In the case at hand, the evidence is unimpeachable
G and beyond reproach and the witnesses cited by the
prosecution can be believed and their evidence has been
correctly relied upon by the trial court and the High Court to
record a conviction. It is well settled in law that what is
necessary for proving the prosecution case is not the quantity
H but the quality of the evidence.
KULWINDER SINGH & ANR. v. STATE OF PUNJAB 191
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
23. In view of the aforesaid premised reasons, we do A
not perceive any merit in this appeal and it is accordingly
dismissed.
Nidhi Jain Appeal dismissed.
B
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