Holding

The chain of circumstantial evidence, including motive, reliable dying declarations, medical evidence, the accused’s conduct, and absconding, conclusively proved the appellants’ guilt, warranting conviction under Sections 302 and 34 of the IPC.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined the murder trial of Kundula Bala Subrahmanyam, who died from extensive burns after allegedly being set alight by her husband and mother‑in‑law over a dowry‑related dispute. The prosecution relied on a chain of circumstantial evidence: a clear motive (dowry and land registration), two oral dying declarations implicating the accused, medical testimony confirming death by burns, the accused’s failure to extinguish the fire or render aid, and their subsequent absconding. The Court held that each circumstance was fully proved, consistent only with the guilt of the appellants and inconsistent with any hypothesis of innocence or suicide. It affirmed the admissibility and reliability of the dying declarations under Section 32 of the Evidence Act, finding them trustworthy and corroborated by other evidence. Consequently, the conviction under Sections 302 and 34 of the IPC was upheld and the appeal dismissed.

Issues considered

The adequacy of circumstantial evidence, including motive, dying declarations, medical evidence, conduct at the scene, and absconding, to prove murder beyond reasonable doubt.
The admissibility and reliability of oral dying declarations under Section 32 of the Evidence Act.
Whether the trial court’s acquittal was perverse and the High Court’s conviction justified.
The existence and sufficiency of a dowry‑related motive.
The relevance of the accused’s conduct (failure to help) and their absconding in establishing guilt.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 161, s. 313
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 3, s. 32
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 34

Subjects

murderdowry deathcircumstantial evidencedying declarationmotivemedical evidenceconduct of accusedabscondingIPC 302IPC 34Evidence Act 1872Dowry Prohibition Act

Judgment

A KUNDULA BALA SUBRAHMANYAM AND ANR.
v. .
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

MARCH 26, 1993.

B [DR. A.S. ANAND AND N.P. SINGH, JJ.] •

Evidence Ac4 1872: Section 3-Appreciation of evidence-Criminal
trial-Case based on circumstantial evidence-Proof-Court's duty to scm-
tinize evidence-Motive, oral dying declarations, medical evidence, conduct
C of accused immediately and after the evidence, absconding· of ac-
cused-Whether prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Evidence Ac4 1872: Section 32-Dying declaration-f'roof of-Accep-
tance by Court when-More than two dying declarations-Tmstworthy
.est-Court's duty.
D
171e Dowry Prohibition Ac4 1961: Object and purpose of-Cases relat-
ing to harassment, torture, abeHed suicides and dowry deaths of young
brideS-Causes-Solutions to such situations-court's role what to be.

The prosecution case was that on 23.8.1981 between 12-30 - 1.00 p.m.,
E on hearing screams and cry of the deceased, aged about 18 years, P.W.2
alongwith her father I'W3, and PW4 rushed to the house of the appellant.
They saw the father of appellant No. 1 (father-in-law of the deceased) -
alongwith the husband and mother-in-law of the deceased hurriedly com-
ing ont of the kitchen while the deceased was lying on the Door engulfed
F in Rames.

As the appellant No. 1, did not respond to the request of PW2 to give
her something to extinguish the fire, PW2 requested the father of the
appellant No. 1 to give a bed-sheet or blanket while the father of the
appellant No. 1 was passing on a bed sheet to PW2, the appellant No. 2
G (mother-in-law of the deceased) objected. In the meanwhile PW2 took the
bed sheet from the rather of the appellant No. 1 and tried t 0 extinguish the
fire. The deceased asked PW2 for some water. PW3 removed the burning
petticoat from t.he body of the deceased to save her from further burning.
While doing so be also received some burn injuries. PW2 poured water
H into the deceased's mouth and enquired from her as to what had happened.
666
__._ K.B. SUBRAHMANYAM v. STATE fi67

The deceased told PW2 that her mother-in- law had poured kerosene over A
her and her husband had set fire to her. The deceased asked for more
water, which was again given to her by PW2. The deceased's statement
made to PW2 was overheard by PW3 PWS and some others who also
-,i.. reached the spot on hearing her cries.

PWS went away to inform the matenal uncle of the deceased with one B
Ramakrishna on his motor cycle. There PWS found PWl, the brother of
the deceased and informed about the burning of the deceased and also
what he bad beard the deceased telling PW2.

PWl reached the house of the appellant with Ramakrishna on his c
-~ motor cycle. He saw a number of.persons including PWs 2 and 3 gathered
there. The deceased was lying on the Door and she had no clothes on her.
PWl noticed that she had received burn injuries from her breasts
downwards to her legs. On seeing her plight, PWl started crying and
hitting his head against a piller. When the deceased noticed PWl had
D
come, she asked PW2 to bring her brother inside. PWZ went out and
brought PWl to the kitchen. The deceased took the palm of her brother,
PWl into her own palms and told him to tell mother and father that her
mother-in-law poured kerosene on her and her husband set her or fire.
-_>... She requested him that he should not light, "anyhow she was dying." She
also told PWl to take back the cash given to her and to divide it amongst E
her sisters in equal share and to get them married to nice persons. The

- appellant No. 1, the husband of the deceased came inside the kitchen with
folded hands and begged her for forgiveness saying that he would not
repeat what he had done. PWt got wild and caught hold of the neck of the
appellant No. 1. PW2 and PW3 rushed towards them and released the F
.__...._
~ appellant No. 1 from the hold of PWl. They sent PWl to another uncle's
house and told the uncle to take care of PWl. When PWl returned to the
house of the deceased after one hour he saw that PW6, a local Doctor, was
giving first-aid to the deceased and she was lying on a cot in the verandah.
PW6 advised at about 3.30 p.m. to remove the deceased to the Government
Hospital. The deceased was brought to the hospital at about 5 p.m. At G
>--f about 5.30 p.m., PW9, a doctor examined the deceased and declared her
dead.

PWl along with his uncle went to the Police Station, adjacent to the
hospital and lodged the FIR. A case under section 302 IPC was registered H
66S SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993) 2 S.C.R. ~~
\..

A and police investigation was started.
Botb the appellants were not found in the village when search for ...
them was made by the investigating officer. The appellant No. 1 sur·
rendered in the Court on 10.11.1981 while the appellant No. 2 surrendered
~
in the Court on 7.12.1981.
B
The Trial Court held that there was no motive for the appellant to ?
commit the crime; that the evidence of PWs 2 to 4 could not he relied upon; j
that PWl had made improvements in his statements recorded at the trial
and, therefore the oral dying· declaration made to him could not he relied )
c upon. The Trial Court also held that there was unexplained delay in
lodging report with the policy. It acquitted the appellants, holding that the
case was one of suicide and not of murder.
-r-
The State filed appeal in the High Court. The High Court held that
the chain of the established circumstances was complete and the cir·
D cumstances were sufficient to establish that the appellants alone had t.
committed the crime of murder of the deceased. The High Court convicted 'l.
both the appellants for the offence under section 302/34 IPC and sentenced
each one of them to imprisonment for life.

Hence this appeal before this Court under section 2(a) of the
Jo.... - c
E.
Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, r
-
1970.

The appellants contended that since the Trial Court had acquitted ;

the appellants, the High Court was not justified in recording an order or
F conviction, as the findings recorded by the Trial Court could not be said
~
to be perverse; that the dying declarations were not worthy of reliance and
the motive was feeble and not established; that the surrendering or the
appellants themselves in the court on 10.11.1981 and 7.12.1981 itself was
enough to show that they had no guilty-conscious and the prosecution was
not justified in relying upon this conduct as an adverse conduct against
G the appellants; and that since all neighbours had become hostile, out of
~
fear the appellants did not act either to put off the lire or remove the
deceased to the hospital.

The respondent-State submitted that the findings of the Trial Court
•
~

H were not only conjectural but also perverse and the evidence of the wit·
y

~_....._
KB.SUBRAHMANYAMv. STATE 669
<
nesses was disbelieved on mere surmises; that the Trial Court did ,not A
properly discuss the two dying declarations made by the deceased and
since the dying declarations have been proved by reliable evidence, those
by themselves could form the basis or conviction or the appellants; that the
--+ High Court after a careful appraisal or the evidence had rightly set aside
the judgment or the Trial Court which suffered rrom illegality as well as
manifest error and perversity; and that the prosecution bad established
B
the case against the appellants beyond every reasonable doubt and their
appeal deserved to be dismissed.

Dismissing the appeal, this Court,

-'!-- HELD: 1.01. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the settled
c
law is that the circumstances from which the conclusion or guilt is drawn
should be fully proved and these circumstances must be conclusive in
nature. Moreover, all the established circumstances .should be complete
and there should be no gap in the chain of evidence. The proved cir-
cumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt or the D
accused alone and totally inconsistent with his Innocence. The courts have,
therefore, the duty lo carefully scrutinize the evidence and deal with each
circumstance carefully and thereafter find whether the chain of tlte estab-
- --"·
.. lished circumstances is complete or not before passing.an order of convic-
lion. [679 E-F) E
1.02. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, motive assumes
great signincance as its existence is an enlightening factor in a process or
presumptive reasoning. The motive in this case is alleged to be the greed
or dowry. (679 HJ
'
--~ F
1.03. The evidence led by the prosecution to establish. the existence
of motive is wholly reliable and is also consistent. The prosecution has
successfully established that the appellants had strong and compelling
motive lo commit the crime because or her parents not agreeing to get the
I land registered in the name of the first appellant and their insistence to
have the land registered in the 'name or their own daughter instead. The
G
>~
motive, has, been conclusively established by the prosecution. (682 DJ

1.04. Both the dying declarations are oral. They have been made lo
friends and lo the brother of the deceased respectively. In view of the close
relationship of the witnesses to whom the oral dying declarations were H
670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993] 2 S.C.R.

A made, it becomes necessary for the court to carefully scruitinize and ..
appreciate the evidence of the witnesses to the dying declarations.
(683.8]
1.0S. PWl is the brother of the deceased and therefore a very close
relation, but mere relationship cannot be a ground to discard his tes-
B timony, if it is otherwise found to be reliable and trustworthy. In th.e
natural course of events, the deceased who was on the verge of her death
would have conveyed to her near and dear ones the circumstances leading
to her receiving the burn injuries. PWl has given a very consistent state-
ment and bas reproduced the words of the deceased clearly and truthfully.
C Nothing has been brought out in the cross examination to discredit his
testimony at all [683 C-D]

1.6. Despite searching cross-examination of both PWZ and PW3,
nothing has been brought out in their cross-examination to discredit them
or doubt their veracity at all. After carefully analysing their evidence, it is
D found that PWs 2 and 3 as witnesses worthy of credence and trustworthy.
[684 F]
1.07. From the evidence of PWs 1,2 and 3, both the dying declarations
are proved to have been made by the deceased. They are the statements
made by the deceased and relate lo the circumstances leading to her death. .)... -
E Both the dying declarations are consistent with each other and appear to
have been made by the deceased voluntarily and in the natural course of
even15. They have a ring of truth about them. [684 G]

1.08. The medical evidence, fully corroborates the prosecution case
and lends support to the dying declaration and more particularly the
-
F manner in which the deceased had been set on r.re.:\686 DJ

1.09. The normal human conduct of any person finding someone
engulfed in flames would be to make all efforts to put off the flames and .
save the life of the person. Though, the appellants were the closest rela-
tiollli of the deceased, they did not do anything of the kind. They rendered
G no first-aid to the deceased. Their conduct at the time of the occurrence,
therefore, clearly points towards their guilt and is inconsistent with their
innocence. The appellants did not even accompany the deceased to the
hospital in the metador van. Had the husband not been a party to the
crime, one would have expected that he would be the first person to take
H steps to remove the deceased to the hospital and leave no stone unturned
y

-.J.. KB. SUBRAHMANYAM v. STATE 671

to save her life. An innocent mother-in- law would have also done the same, A
even if she bad no love or emotional feelings for her daughter-in-law.
Neither the husband nnr the mother-In-law of the deceased took any steps
to remove the deceased to the hospital, let alone accompany her to the

-+ hospital. This conduct also is inconsistent with their innocence and coo-
sistent only with the hypothesis, as stated by the deceased lo her dying
B
declarations, that the mother-in-law had poured kerosene on her while her
husband bad lit fire and put her on Rames. [686 H, 687 A-DI

1.10. The prosecution has, thus, successfully established that the
conduct of both the appellants both at the time or the occurrence and
immediately thereafter is consistent only with the hypothesis· of the guilt
of the appellants and inconsistent with their innocence. [688 B)
c
~')--

l.ll. Absconding by itself may not be a positive circumstance con-
sistent only with the hypothesis of guilt of the accused because it is not
unknown that even innocent persons may run away for fear of being falsely
involved in a criminal case and arrested by the police, but coupled with D
the other circumstances, the absconding of the appellants assumes impor-
lance and significance. The prosecution bas successfully established. this
circumstance also to connect the appellants with the crime. [688 E-FJ
- _,;..., 1.12. The prosecution has successfully established all the cir-
cumstances· appearing in the evidence against the appellants by clear, E
cogent aad reliable evidence and the chain of the established circumstan-
ces is complete and has no gaps whatsoever and the same conclusively
establishes that the appellants and appellants alone committed the crime
of murdering the deceased on the fateful day in the manner suggested by
the prosecution. All the established circumstances are consistent only with F
·~- the hypothesis that it was the appellants alone who committed the crime
and the circumstances are inconsistent with any hypothesis other than
their guilt. [688 G-H, 687 A)

2.01. Under Section 32, when a statement ls made by a person, as to G
the cause of death or as to any of the circumstances which result lo bis
~. death, ·in cases in which the cause of that person's death comes into
question, such a statemeot, oral or in writing, made by the deceased to the
witness is a relevant fact and is admissible in evidence. The statemeot
made by the deceased, called the dying declaration, falls in that category
provided it bas been made by the deceased while in a fit mental condition. H
[684 H, 685 A-BJ
672 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993) 2 S.C.R.

A 2.02. A dying declaration made by person on tbe verge of his death
has a special sanctity as at that solemn moment, a person is most unlikely
to make any untrue statement. The shadow of impending death is by itself
the guarantee of the truth of the statement made by the deceased regarding ·
the causes or circumstances leading to his death. A dying declaration,
therefore, enjoys almost a sacrosanct status, as a piece of evidence, coming
B as it does from the mouth of the deceased victim. Once the statement of
the dying person and the evidence of the witnesses testifying to the same
passes the test of careful scrutiny of the courts, it becomes a very impor-
tant and a reliable piece of evidence and if the court is satisfied that the
dying declaration is true and free from any embelishment .such a dying
C declaration, by itself, can be sufficient for recording conviction even
without looking for any coroboration. If there are more than one dying
declarations, then the court has also to scrutinise all the dying declara-
tions to find out if each one of these passes the test of being trustworthy.
The Court must further find out whether the different dying declarations
D are consistent with each other in material particulars before accepting and
relying upon the same. (685 C-E)

2.03. Both the dying declarations are consistent with each other in
all material facts and particulars. That the deceased was in a proper
mental condition to make the dying declaration or that they were voluntary
E has neither been doubted by the defence in the course of cross-examination
of the witnesses nor even in the course of arguments both in the High
Court and before this Court. Both the dying declarations have pas·sed the
test of credit worthiness and they suffer from no infirmity whatsoever.
[685 F-G)
F 2.04. The prosecution has snccessfully established a very crucial piece
of circumstantial evidence in the case that the deceased had volnotarily
made the dying declarations implicating both the appellants and disclosing
the manner.in which she had been put on fire shortly before her death. This
circumstance, therefore, bas been established by the prosecution beyond
G every reasonable doubt by clear and cogent evidence. (685 G·H)

3.01. There has been an alarming increase in cases relating tO -~
harassment, torture, abetted suicides and dowry deaths of young innocent
brides. This growing cult of violence and exploitation of the young brides,
though keeps on sending shock waves to the civilised society whenever it
H happens, continues unabated. There is a constant erosiOn of the basic
y

K.B. SUBRAHMANYAM v. STATE 673

human values of tolerance and the spirit of "live and let live". Lack of A
education and economic dependence of women have encouraged the greedy
perpetrators of the crime. It is the woman who plays a pivotal role in this
crime against the younger woman, as in this case, with the husband either
acting as a mute spectator or even an active participant in the crime, in
utter disregard of his matrimonial obligations. (689 C-DJ
B
3.02. Awakening of the collective consciousness is the need of the day.
Change of heart and attitude is what is needed. If man were to regain his
harmony with others and replace hatred, greed, selfishness and anger by
mutual love, trust and understanding and if woman were to receive educa·
lion and become economically independent, the possibility of this pernicious C
social evil dying a natural death may not remain a dream only. [690··DJ

3.03. The legislature, realising the gravity of the situation bas
amended the laws and provided for stringent punishments in such case
and even permitted the raising of presumptions against the accused in
cases of unnatural deaths of the brides within the llrst seven years of their D
marriage. (690 HJ

3.04. The Dowry Prohibition Act was enacted in 1961 and has been
amended from time to time, but this piece of social legislation, keeping in
view the growing menance of the social evil, also does not appear to have
E
served much purpose as dowry seekers are hardly brought to book and
convictions recorded are rather few. (691 AJ

3.05. Laws are not enough to combat the evil. A wider social move·
ment of educating women of their rights, to conquer the menace, is what
is needed more particularly in rural areas where women are still largely F
uneducated and less aware of their rights and fall an easy prey to their
exploitation. (691 BJ

3.06. The role of courts, under the circumstances assumes greater
importance and it is expected that the courts would deal with such cases
in a more realistic manner and not allow the criminals to escape on G
account of procedural technicalities or insignificant lacune in the evidence
as otherwise the criminals would receive encouragement and the victims
of crime would be totally discouraged by the crime going unpunished. The
courts are expected to be sensiti~e in cases involving crime against women.
(691 CJ H
y

674 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993] 2S.C.R.

A State (Delhi Administration) v. Laxman & Ors., Crl. Appeais 93 and
94 of 1984 decided on 23.9.1985, referred to.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
629 of 1985.

B From the Judgment and Order dated 25.6.1985 of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 637 of 1983.

K Madhava Reddy, A. Subba Rao and A.D.N. Rao for the Appel-

C
lants.

G. Prabhakar for the Respondent.
-
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

DR. ANAND, J. The curse of dowry has claimed yet another victim.
Kundula Bala Suhrahmanyam, the husband of the deceased-Kundula Koti
D Nagbani and his mother Kundula Annapurna (mother-in-law of the
deceased) have filed this appeal .1.1nder Section 2(a) of the Supreme Court
(Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970 against the
judgment of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, dated
25.6.1985, setting aside the judgment of acquittal passed by ~he Sessions
Judge, East Godavari Division and convicting both the ,appellants for an
E
offence under Section 302/34 !PC and sentencing eac~ of them to suffer
imprisonment for life.

On 23rd of August, 1981, between 12.30.1.00 p.m. on hearing screams
and cry of deceased-Kundula Koti Nagban~ at that time aged about 18
F years, Pulapa Lakshmi PW2, Vempati Paparao PW3 and Vempati Radha
PW4, ·1shed to the house of the appellant and found both the appellants
alongwith the father of appellant No. 1 (father-in-law of the deceased)
hurriedly coming out of the kitchen while the deceased was lying on the
floor engulfed in flames. Since, the appellants or the father-in-law of the
deceased were making no attempts to put off the flames, PW2 asked
G appellant No. 1 to give her something so that she could extinguish the fire.
He, however, did not respond. She then requested first app,c;Jlant's father
to give $omething to her so that. the fire could be put off. The father of
appellant No. l enquired if he should get a bucket of water. PW2, there-
upon, requested him to give either a bed-sheet or a blanket. The father of
H appellant No. I then brought out a bed sheet (Bontha) from the cot and
y'

KB.SUBRAHMANYAMv. STATE[DR.ANAND,J.] 675

as he was passing it on 1to PW2, the mother-in-law of the deceased, A
appellant No. 2, told her husband not to give the bontha to PW2. PW2, in
the meanwhile, took the bontha from the father of the first appellant and
tried to extinguish the fire. The deceased turned her side. She was alive.
The deceased asked PW2 for some water. Since, the petticoat of the
deceased was burning, PW3, the father of PW2, who had also rushed along B
with her to the house of the appellant broke the thread of the petticoat to
save her from further burning and threw away the burning garment. In the
prcjcess, he also received some burn injuries. PW2 poured water into the
mouth of the deceased and enquired from her as to what had happened.
The deceased told her that "her mother-in-law had poured kerosene over
her and her husband had set fire to her". The deceased again felt thirsty C
and asked for more water which was again given to her by PW2. The above
statement mad~ by the deceased to PW2 was overheard by PW3 and some
others, who had also reached on hearing the cries. Vempati Nagab-
hushanam PWS, another immediate neighbour of the appellants living only
about 2 yards away also heard the cries of the deceased and rushed to the D
house of the appellant. He noticed PW3 was pulling out the petticoat of
the deceased while PW2 was attempting to extinguish fire. He saw PW2
pouring water into the mouth of the deceased. He also heard the statement
made by the deceased to PW2 about the manner in which she had been
set on fire. PWS thereupon went away to inform the maternal uncle of the E
deceased at Malakapalli. On the way, he met one Ramakrishna coming on
a motor-cycle and at his request Ramakrishna gave him a ride to
Malakapalli. On reaching the house of the maternal uncle of the deceased,
they found the brother of the deceased Vempati Sreerama Krishna
Sreeram PWl was also present there. He conveyed to them the information
regarding the burning of the deceased and also what he had heard the F
deceased telling PW2. Ramarao and PWl then went on the same motor-
cycle to Dharmavaram. PWl reached the house of the appellant and saw
a number of persons including PWs 2 and 3 gathered there. The deceased
was lying on the floor and at that time she had no clothes on her. He
noticed that she had received burn injuries from her breasts downwards to G
her legs. On seeing her plight, PWl started crying and hitting his head
against a pillar. When the deceased noticed that PWl had come, she asked
PW2 to call her brother PWl inside. PW2 thereupon went out and brought
PW! to the kitchen where the deceased took the palm of PWl into her
own palms and told him in Hindi "please tell mother and father as I am H
676 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993] 2 S.C.R.
,.I...~
A telling you. My mother-in- law poured kerosene on me and my husband
set fire. You tell father and mother about this. Don't fight. Anyhow I am
dying." She also told her brother PWl to take -back the cash given to her
and divide it amongst the sisters in equal share and get them married off
to nice persons. At this juncture, the first appellant, husband of the
deceased came inside the kitchen and with folded hands begged the
B ~
deceased for forgiveness saying that he would not repeat what he had done
and therefore he may be pardoned. PWl got wild and caught hold of the
neck of the first appellant. PW2 and PW3 rushed towards them and
released the first appellant from the hpld of PWl and sent PWl to another
uncle's house and told the uncle that since PWl was in an agitated mood
c he should take care-of him. Within an hour, however, PWl went back to
. the house of the deceased and by that time, a local Doctor PW6, Dr. R.
Radhakrishnamurthy had arrived at the house and was giving first-aid to
.
her and she was lying on a cot in the verandah. PW6 at about 3.30 p.m.
.

advised the removal of the deceased to the Government Hospital at
---r~

D Kovvur. A matador van was secured and at about 4.30 p.m. PWl, Ramarao,
his maternal uncle, the wife of Ramarao and someother neighbours took
the deceased to the Government Hospital at Kovvur in the matador van
reaching there at about 5 p.m. At about 5.30 p.m., Dr. K. Parameswaradas
PW9 examined the deceased and declared her dead. PWl thereupon went
to the police station which is adjacent to the hospital alongwith his uncle
E
and lodged the report Ex.P4 with the Head Constable Md. Navabjani
PW12. A case under section 302 !PC was registered and information was
A.. -
sent to Inspector of Police G. Scendavce Rao PW14 on telephone. After
collecting a copy of the FIR, PW14 proceeded to the Government Hospital
and from there went to the scene of occurrence. He seized M.O's 1 to 3,
F drew the site plan of the scene of occurrence and examined PWs 1 to 5 -
and PW9 at Dharmavaram. He a!So held the inquest proceedings from 6.30
a.m. to 8.30 a.m. on August 24 1981 and after getting the post-mortem
conducted handed ewer the dead-body to the family of the deceased. PW9
/--1
Dr. K. Parameswaradas who conducted the post-mortem examination in
G his report Ex.P18 noted extensive burns to the extent of 90% on the body
of the deceased and opined that the deceased had died due to the extensive
burns all over the body and that the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death. During the investigation, the investigating
~
officer made a request for the preservation of viscera _of the deceased so
that it could be sent for chemical examination, as according to the state-
H
K.B. SUBRAHMANYAM v. STATE [DR.ANAND,J.) 677

ment of PW6, the deceased had allegedly told him that she had consumed A
dettol to commit suicide and since she could not bear the pain'she had set
herself on fire. The report of the chemical examiner Ex.P16, however,
revealed that no poison was detected and that the death had been caused
due to extensive burns. Further investigation into the case was carried out
by Md. Baduruddin PW15, Inspector of the Crim~ Branch. During the B
investigation, the father of the deceased Venkataramana handed over
letters Exs.Pl-P3 to the investigating officer. Both the appellants had made
themselves scarce and were not found in the village when search for them
was made by the investigating officer. The first appellant surrendered in
the court on 10.11.1981 while the second appellant surrendered in the court
on 7th of December, 1981. C
After the investigation was over, challan was filed and both the
appellants were sent up for trial in the Court of Sessions Judge East
Godavari Division at Rajahmundry.

At the trial, the prosecution inter alia relied upon the following D
circumstances with a view to connect the appellant with the crime:-

(1) Motive;

(2) Two dying declarations made to PW2 and to PWl;
E
(3) Medical Evidence;

(4) Conduct of the appellant immediately and after the occurrence;

(5) Absconding of the appe.llants.
F
the appellants when examined under Section 313 of the Criminal
Procedure Code denied their involvement and stated the case to be a false
one. They, however, produced no defence.

The learned Trial Court did not accept the prosecution version and
held that there was no motive for the appellant to commit the crime; that G
the evidence of PWs 2 to 4 could not be relied upon; that PWl had made
improvements in his statements recorded at the trial and, therefore, the
oral dying declaration made to ·him could not be relied upon. The Trial
court also held that there had been unexplained delay in lodging report
with the police. The Trial Court placed reliance on the testimony ofhostile H
678 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993] 2 S.C.R.

A witness PW6 and held that the case was one of suicide and not of murder.
On those findings, the learned Sessions Judge acquitted both the appel-
lants.

On an appeal, filed by the State, a Division Bench of the High Court
of Andhra Pradesh set aside the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge
B and convicted both the appellants for an offence under Section 302/34 !PC.
Speaking for the Division Bench, K. Ramaswamy J. (as His Lordship then
wa~) found no hesitation to hold PWl as a witness of truth and a wholly
0

reliable witness and also opined that the evidence of PWs 2 and 3 was
trustworthy and reliable. The dying declarations made by the deceased to
C PW2 and subsequently to PWl were believed and relied upon. It was held
that report Ex.P4 had been given by PWl immediately after the deceased
was declared dead by the Doctor and therefore there was no delay much
less unexplained delay in lodging the report. While dealing with the con-
duct of the the appellant, it was opined that their conduct was inconsistent
D with their innocence and consistent only with the hypothesis that appellant
no. 2 had committed the act of pouring kerosene on the deceased and
appellant No. 1 had lit fire. With regard to the existence of motive, it was
held that the appellants were actuated with a motive to do away with the
life of the deceased for not getting the land registered in the name of the
first appellant. Finally, the High Court found that the chain of the estab-
E lished circumstances was complete and the circumstances were sufficient
to conclusive establish that the appellants and the appellants alone had
committed the crime of murder of the deceased. The High Court held that
the consideration of evidence on record and the reasoning of the Trial
Court was most unsatisfactory and could not be sustained and therefore
set aside the order of acquittal and convicted both the appellants for the
F
offence urtder Section 302134 !PC and sentenced each one of them to
imprisonment for life. ~

Appearing for the appellants before us, Mr. Madhav Reddy, the
G learned Senior Counsel urged that since the Trial Court had acquitted the
appellants, the High Court was not justified in recording an order of
conviction as the findings recorded by the Trial Court could not be said to
be perverse. It was argued that the dying declarations were not worthy of ,_
reliance and the motive was feeble and not established. Learned counsel
submitted that the surrendering of the appellants themselves in the court
H on 10.11.1981 and 7.12.1981 itself was enough to show that they had no
1

K.B. SUBRAHMANY AM,,_ STATE [DR. ANAND, J.] 679

guilty-conscious and the prosecution was not justified in relying upon this A
conduct as an adverse conduct against the appellants. While explaining the
conduct of the appellants at the time of and after the occurrence, he
submitted that since all neighbours had become hostile, out of fear the
appellants did not act either to· put off the fire or remove the deceased to
the hospital.
B
In reply, learned counsel for the State argued that the findings of the
Trial Court were not only conjectural but also perverse and the eviden'<e
of the witnesses was disbelieved on mere ·surmises. It was submitted.that
the Trial Court did not properly discuss the two dying declarations made
by the deceased and since the dying declarati.ons have been ·proved by C
reliable evidence, those by themselves could form the basis of conviction
of the appellants. It was then submitted that the High Court after a careful
appraisal of the evidence had rightly set aside the judgment of the Trial
Court which suffered from illegality as well as manifest error and perver-
sity. Learned counsel submitted that the prosecution had established the D
case against the appellants beyond every reasonable doubt and their ap-
peals deserve to be dismissed.

Admittedly, there is no eye-witness in the case. The case is sought to
be established by the prosecution from circumstantial evidence. In a case
based on circumstantial evidence, the settled law is that the circumstances E
from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn should be fully proved and
these circumstances must be conclusive in nature. Moreover, all the estab-
lished circumstances should be complete and there should be no gap in the
chain of evidence. The proved circumstances must be consistent only with
the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused alone and totally inconsistent with
F
his innocence. The courts have, therefore, the duty to carefully scrutinize
the evidence and deal with each circumstance carefully and thereafter find
whether the chain of the established circumstances is complete or not
before passing an order of conviction. It ·is in the light of the above
principles that we shall deal with various circumstances relied upon by the
prosecution. G

(1) Motive: In a case based on circumstantial evidence, motive as-
sumes great significance as its existence is an enlightening factor in a
process--of presumptive reasoning. The motive in this case is alleged to be
the greed of dowry. H
680 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993] 2 S.C.R.

A On 18.5.1979, marriage between the appellant and the deceased was
solemnised. The deceased aged about 18 years was prosecuting her Inter-
mediate course of study at that time. She was the eldest of the five children
of one Vempati Venkataramana, who at the relevant time was working as
an Assistant Engineer with the Railways at Gorakhpur. At the time of the
marriage, the parents of the deceased had agreed to give Rs. 50,000 in cash,
B
50 soverigns of gold and two acres of land as dowry. The cash was paid at
the time of the marriage itself alongwith 15 soverigns of gold. The parents
of the deceased had promised to give the remaining 35 gold soverigns and
get the land also registered subsequently, though the possession of the land
measuring about 3.70 acres was given to the appellant No. 1. The mother-
c in-law of the deceased and her husband had been pressurising the
deceased all along to bring the remaining soverigns and also to get the land
registered in the name of the fi.rst appellant. She conveyed it to her mother
PW7. While the parents of the deceased agreed to get the land registered
in the name of the deceased, the first appellant and his parents were
D insisting that the land should be got registered in his name and not in the
name of the deceased. Since that desire was not fulfilled, the deceased was
being continuously harassed and ill-treated. A strick vigil was kept on her
at the house of her in-laws and she was not even allowed to meet anybody
nor were the neighbours permitted to come and meet or talk to her. She
E was being prevented from writing letters to her family also, but stealthy,
she wrote letters Exs.Pl-3 and got them posted through a neighbour. The
contents of those letters are rather revealing and expose the extent·of the
harassment to which the deceased was being subjected to by her mother-
in-law and her husband. After seeing the contents of the letters and with
F a view to find out the cause of her distress, PWl, her brother went to
Dharmavaram on August 22, 1981, to the house of the deceased. The
deceased, however, was so terrorised that she could not speak to him
freely. She was surrounded by her husband and her mother-in-law, who did
not talk to PWl at all to show their indifference. From the evidence of the
G prosecution witnesses and particularly that of the mother of the deceased
PW7, the immediate provocation was the insistence of the appellants that
the land be got registered in the name of the husband and the reluctance
of the parents of the deceased to do so and instead their desire to get it
registered in the name of the deceased. The oral evidence led by the
prosecution in this behalf is wholly consistent. In her letter Ex.P2, the
H
..- --.I.. K.B. SUBRAHMANYAM v. STATE [DR. ANAND, J.] 681

deceased had clearly mentioned that she was getting her letters posted A
through PW4. She requested her sisters to write letters to her in Hindi so
that her in-laws, who did not know Hindi, could not know what was being
written. In one of her letters, a part of which was addressed to her sister,
---f. she wrote:

"... .! am not going to anybody's house. One day I went to B
ihe house of sister-in-law Radha to deliver the letter
secretely. Their mood was changed on account of going
to their house. That is why I stopped going:· Do not
mention even a single word in your letter that I have been
writing to you. Ask mother not to worry. On hearing about c
~- ,,._ your results write a letter without fail. If I get an oppor-
tunity I will definately·\Vrite a letter ... "

In her letter Ex.Pl to her fath~r, she wrote:

".... Father I am feeling much bore here because no one D
come to our house nor I am allowed to go their
house ...... Please always write letters. So that I may be
satisfied in seeing your letters. If I may not give reply to
- .J.. your letter then you please don't mind it. You know here's
conditions. Rest is O.K. Father you also take care of your
E
health." '
In the same letter while addressing her sisters, she wrote:

"....The lock is opened. I am writing this letter secretely.
In reply do not write that you have. received the letter. If
F
·~ you write like that these people will become more angry...."

She also wrote to her sister:
11
.I have got chance to write letter. as· mother-in-law is
.: •

not at house and there is no watch over me. I am getting
G
the letters posted through sister-in-law Radha secretely.
>-7 You write letters mostly in Hindi only so that even if they
chanced to fall in the hands of any one, they cannot
understand ..... "

The tenor of her letters disclose the distressing state of affairs at the house H
~
682 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993] 2 S.C.R.

A of her-in-laws. These letters coupled with the evidence of her mother go
to show how the deceased was being tormented and harassed. It is indeed
a shame and pity that ·within just two years of her marriage, her dream of
a happy married life was shattered and she found herself almost as a
prisoner and 'a frightened chicken' who had to write letters to her parents
and sisters 'secretely' for the fear that if her in- laws came to know they
-k·-
B would "become more angry". She had to request her sisters .to reply to her
letters in Hindi so· that "even if they chanced to fall in the hands of anyone,
they cannot understand". One can only imagine the plight of this young
bride and the sadistic behaviour born out of greed for dowry of her
husband and mother-in-law. Not having been able to get the land registered
c in the name of the first appellant appears to have frustrated them to the
extent of murdering the young wife.

The evidence led by the prosecution to establish the existence of
motive is wholly reliable and is also consistent. The prosecution has suc-
D cessfully established that the appellants had strong and compelling motive
to commit the crime because of her parents not agreeing to get the land
registered in the name of the first appellant and their insistence to have
the land registered in the name of their own daughter instead. The motive,
has, been conclusively established by the prosecution and we have no
hesitation to hold that the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the
E existence of the motive for both the appellants to commit I.he crime
conclusively and positively and we agree with the finding of the High Court
in that behalf.

2. Dying Declarations: The next piece of circumstantial evidence relied
F upon by the prosecution are two dying declarations made by the deceased.
According to the prosecution case, the deceased made the first dying declara-
tion before PW2 when she after hearing her cries came to the house and found
both the appellants and the father of appellant No. 1 coming out of the kitchen
and the deceased lying on the floor engulfed in flames. According to PW2, the
deceased told her that her mother- in~law had poured kerosene on her and
G her husband had set her on fire. This statement was also heard by PW3 &
PW5. The second dying declaration was made by the deceased to her brother
PWl, after he was called by her lo the kitchen. The deceased, according to the
prosecution case, on meeting her brother, took the palm of PWl into her own
palms and inter-alia told to him that "her mother-in~law poured kerosene on
H her and her husband set fire to her". The statement made by the deceased to
KB. SUBRAHMANYAM v. STAIB [DR. ANAND, J:] 683

PWl was in Hindi. Both the statements, as noticed above, relate to the cir- A
cumstances leading to the cause of her death, as according to the medical
evidence, the deceased died of90% burn injuries. Both the dying declarations
are oral. They have been made to friends and to the brother of the deceased
respectively. In view of the close relationship of the witnesses to whom the oral
dying declarations were made, it becomes necessary for us to carefully
B
scrutinize and appreciate the evidence of the witnesses to the dying declara-
tion.

We have already adverted to the evidence of these witnesses (PWl,
PW2, PW3) while narrating the prosecution case. Indeed, PWl is the
brother of the deceased and therefore a very close relation, but mere G
relationship cannot be a ground to discard his testimony, if it is otherwise
found to be reliable and trustworthy. In the natural course of events, the
deceased who was on the verge of her death would have conveyed to her
near and dear ones the circumstances leading to her receiving the burn
injuries. PWl has given a very consistent statement and has reproduced the D
words of the deceased clearly apd truthfully. Nothing has been brought out
in the cross examinatiqit'to discredit his testimony at all. He had at the
earliest point of time disclosed as to what the deceased had told to him.
The discrepancy pointed out by learned counsel for the appellants as lo
)_ whether the dying declaration was made to him by his sister when she was
lying on the cot in the verandah, as stated in FIR Ex.P4, or while she was E
lying on the floor of the kitchen, is of an insignificant nature and could be
either out of confusion or the gap of time between the making of the two
statements. Moreover, PWl was not at all cross-examined on ·the alleged
discrepancy when he gave evidence in Court. No explanation whatsoever
was sought from him about the so called discrepancy. PWl, the brother of F
the deceased appears to us to be a truthful witness and his testimony has
impressed us. He did not implicate the father of the appellant and gave
evidence only about what he was actually told by his sister. From our
appreciation of the evidence of PWl, we agree with the view expressed by
the High Court that "considering the case from all perspectives we have no
hesitation to hold that P.W.1 is a witness of truth worthy of acceptance and G
so he is wholly a reliable witness. Ex.P4 is a voluntary statement given by
P.W.l and it lends corroboration to the evidence of P.W.1."

Coming now to the evidence of PWs2 and 3. The substratum of their
evidence with regard to the dying declaration is that while that they were H
684 SUPRf;ME COURT REPORTS [1993) 2 S.C.R.
,,.__.,.
A in the kitchen of their own house, taking tea, they heard the cry of a lady
and rushed to the house of the deceased, being her close neighbours. They
saw the deceased engulfed in flames sprawled on the floor of the kitchen. r
They also saw both the appellants as well as the father of appellant No. 1
coming out of the kitchen to the verandah. The distance between the house -k- \
of PWs2 and 3 from the house of appellant is only 2 yards. After PW2 took
B a bontha from the father-in-law of the deceased, to the annoyance of
appellant No. 2, with a view to extinguish the fu e, the deceased, on enquiry
by the witness as to what had happened told her that 'my mother-in-law
poured kerosene on me and my husband set me on fire'. The deceased had
not implicated.her father-in-law, though he was also present there: PW3,
c father of PW2, had assisted PW2 to extinguish the flame~ and it was he
who broke the string of the petticoat of the deceased and threw it away. -41 "·
In the process PW3 himself suffered burn injuries. His injuries were
examined by the Doctor and found to be caused by fire. The Trial Court
doubted the testimony of PW3 on the ground that he had made some
improvement in his evidence in court when he stated that he had heard the
D
deceased screamming and saying that she was "being killed''. He had not
stated so in his statement recorded during the investigation. This, in our
,..
I
opinion, is hardly an improvement of any consequence because both in his
statement in court as well as the one recorded under Section 161 Cr.PC •
~
~ .-
he has deposed that it was on hearing the 'screams' of the deceased that
E he and his daughter rushed to the house of the decased. In any evel)t the
so called improvement was not sufficient to discard his testimony. Despite
searching cross-examination of both these witnesses, nothing has been •
brought out in their cross-examination to discredit them or doubt their
veracity at all. After carefully analysing their evidence, we find PWs 2 and
3 as witnesses worthy of credence and trustworthy.
F ) -. -
From the evidence o( PW s 1, 2 and 3, both the dying declarations
are proved to have been made by the deceased. They are the statements
made by the deceased and relate to the circumstances leading to her death.
Both the dying declarations are consistent with each other and appear to •
G have been made by the deceased voluntarily and in the natural course of
events. They have a ring of truth about them.
,,__.._ ,.
Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act is an exception to the general rule
that hearsay evidence is not admissible evidence and unless evidence is
H tested by cross-examination, it is not credit-worthy. Under Section 32, when
J K.B. SUBRAHMANYAM v. STATE [DR. ANAND,J.] 685

a statement is made by a person, as to the cause of death or as to any of A
the circumstances which result in his death, in cases in which the cause of
that person's death comes into question, such a statement, oral or in
writing, made by the deceased to the witness is a relevant fact -and is
admissible in evidence. The statement made by the deceased, called the
dying declaration, falls in that category provided it has been made by the B
deceased while in a fit mental condition. A dying declaration made by
person on the verge of his death has a special sanctity as at that solemn
moment, a person is most unlikely to make any untrue statement. The
shadow of impending death is by itself the guarantee of the truth of ihe
statement made by the deceased regarding the causes or circumstances
leading to his death. A dying dedaration, therefore, enjoys almost a C
sacrosanct status, as a piece of evidence, coming as it does from the mouth
of the deceased victim. Once the statement of the dying person arid the
evidence of the witnesses testifying to the same passes the test of careful
scrutiny of the courts, it becomes a very important and a reliable piece of
evidence and if the court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and D
free from any embelishmcnt such a dying declaration, by itself, can be
sufficient for recording conviction even without looking for any corrobora-
tion. If there are more than one dying declarations, then the court has also
to scrutinise all the dying declarations to find out if each one of these
passes the test of being trustworthy. The Court must further find out E
whether the different dying declarations are consistent with each other in
material particulars before accepting and relying upon the same. Having
read the evidence of PWs 1-3 with great care and attention, we are of the
view that their testimony is based on intrinsic truthc Both the dying decla- ,
rations are consistent with each other in all material facts and particulars.
That the deceased was in a proP.er mental condition to make the dying F ·
declaration or that they were voluntary has neither been doubted by the
defence in the course of cross-examination of the witnesses nor even in -ihe
course of arguments both in the High Court and before us. Both the dying
declarations have passed the test of creditworthiness and they suffer from
no infirmity whatsoever. We have therefore no hesitation to hold that the G
prosecution has successfully established a very crucial piece of circumstan-
tial evidence in the_ case that the deceased had voluntarily made the dying
declarations implicating both the appellants and disclosing the manner in
which she had been put on fire shortly before her death. This circumstance,
therefore, has been established by the prosecution beyond every reasonable H

_,_
686 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993] 2 S.C.R.

A doubt by clear and cogent evidence.

3. Medical Evidence: The next circumstance relied upon by the
prosecution is the medical evidence which has been provided by the
testimony of Dr. Parameswaradas PW9. He deposed that the deceased had
died of 90% burns and that kerosene smell was emitting from the dead-
B body. According to the report of the chemical examiner, no poison was
found in the viscera. The chemical examiner's report, coupled with the
other evidence on record belies the suggestion made by the defence during
the cross-examination of some witnesses that with a view to commit suicide,
the deceased had drunk dettol and when she could not bear the pain on
c account of consumption of detto~ ·she herself poured kerosene oil on
herself and set herself on fire. Rightly, this defence case was not pursued
before us with any amount of, seriousness by the learned counsel for the
appellants. The medical evidence, therefore fully corroborates the prosecu-
tion case and lends support to the dying declaration and more particularly
D the manner in which the deceased had been set on fire.

4. Conduct of the appellant immediately and after the evidence:
The conduct of the appellants, son and mother, both at the time when
the deceased lay burning on the floor of the kitchen and afterwards till she
succumbed to the burn injuries is the next circumstance relied upon by the , ,\.. .-
E prosecution to connect the appellants with the crime.

From the testimony of PWs 2, 3 and 4, who are the immediate
neighours of the appellant and the deceased, they had heard the cry of the
deceased and rushed to her house. PWs 2 and 3 found the deceased lying
F on the floor of the kitchen engulfed in flames while both the appellants and
father-in-law of the deceased were coming out of the kitchen in the
verandah. None of the two appellants or· the father-in-law made any
attempt whatsoever to extinguish the fire and save the deceased. The raised
. no alarm. They stood there as if waiting for her death, rather than make
any effort to save her. Their conduct, thus, runs consistent with the
G hypothesis of their guilt and betrays that of an innocent persons. In their
statements under Section 313 of Cr. PC they did not deny their presence
in the house at the time of the occurrence, but denied their involvement in
the crime. The n_ormal human conduct of any person finding someone
engulfed in flames would be to make all efforts to put off the flames and
H save the life of the person. Though, the appellants were the closest relations
KB. SUBRAHMANYAM >·.STATE [DR. ANAND, J.]

of the deceased, they did not do anything of the kind. Let alone making A
any effort to extinguish the fire, according to PW2 when the father-in-law
of the deceased, at her request, was giving her the bontha to extinguish the
flames, appellant no. 2, the mother-in-law of the deceased, objected to the
-·-f· same. This conduct speaks volumes about the extent of hatred which. the
mother-in-law exhibited towards her daughter-in-law. They rendered no B
first-aid to the deceased. Their conduct at the time of the occurrence,
therefore, clearly points towards their guilt and is inconsistent with their
mgnocenceThe appellants did not even accompany the deceased to the
hospital in the metador van. Had the husband not been a party to the
crime, one would have expected that he would be the first person to take
steps to remov~ the deceased to the hospital and leave no stone unturned C
to save her life. An innocent mother-in-law would have also done the same,
even if she had no love or emotional feelings for her daughter-in-law.
Neither the hu~band nor the mother-in-law of the deceased took any steps
to remove the deceased to the- hospital, let alone a~company her to the
hospital. This conduct also is inconsistent with their innocence and consis- D
tent only with the hypothesis, as stated by the deceased in her dying
declarations, that the mother-in-law had poured kerosene on her while her
husband had lit fire and put her on flames. Mr. Reddy, the learned senior
counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that since the neighbours
_} and other relations of the deceased had almost taken over the house and
the person of the daughter-in-law, the appellants were afraid of being E
beaten and as such they rendered no aid to the deceased needs a notice
only to be rejected. No suggestion whatsoever on these lines was made to
any of the witnesses and in any event such an explanation betrays common
sense. Since, the deceased had admittedly suffered burn injuries in the
kitchen of her house, there was an obligation on the part of the appellants F
and the father-in-law of the deceased, who have admitted their presence
in the house at the time of occurrence, to explain the circumstances leading
to the deceased dying of 90% burn injuries. None has been offered. The
theory of suicide was put up only as an argument of despair. While
discussing the motive and the dying declarations, we have come to the
conclusion that the deceased died as a result of the designed move on the G
part of both the appellants to put an end to her life and she did not commit
suicide as was sought to be suggested during cross-examination by the
defence to some witnesses. The theory of suicide has no legs to stand upon.
The conduct of the appellants who did not try to extinguish the fire or
H
688 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993] 2 S.C.R.

A render any first-aid to her, also totally betrays the theory of suicide and we
agree with the High Court that the theory as set up by the appellants is
highly unbelieveable or acceptable. The prosecution has, thus, successfully
established that the conduct of both the appellants both at the time of the
occurrence and immediately thereafter is consistent only with the
hypothesis of the guilt of the appellants and inconsistent with their innon-
B cence.

5) Absconding: Prosecution has also relied upon the circumstances of the
absconding of the appellants to prove its case.

C A closer link with the conduct of the appellants both at the time of
the occurrence and immediately thereafter is also the circumstance relating
to their absconding. Md. Badruddin PW15, the investigating officer,
deposed that he had taken up the investigation of the case and having
examined PWsl-4 had caused search to be made for the accused but they
D were not found in the village and despite search, they could not be traced.
Appellant No. 1 surrendered before the court on 10.11.1981 while appel-
lant No. 2 surrundered in the court on 7.12.1981. No explanation, worth
the name, much less a satisfactory explanation has been furnished by the
appellants about their absence from the Village till they surrendered in the
court in the face of such a gruesome 'tragedy'. Indeed, absconding by itself
E may not be a positive circumstance consistent only with the hypothesis of
guilt of the accused because it is not unknown that even innocent persons .
may run away for fear of being falsely involved in a criminal case and

F
arrested by the police, but coupled with the other circumstances which we
have discussed above, the absconding of the appellants assumes impor-
tance and significance. The prosecut!on has successfully established this
-
circumstance also to connect the appellants with the crime.

In view of the above discussion and our appraisal and analysis of-the
evidence on record, we have no hesitation to hold that the ,prosecution has
successfully established all the circumstances appearing in the, evidence
G against the appellants by clear, cogent and reliable evidence and the chain
of the established circumstances is complete and has no gaps whatsoever
and the same conclusively establishes that the ,appellants and appellants
alone c~mmitted the crime of murdering the deceased on the fateful day
in the manner suggested by the prosecution. All the established circumstan-
H ces are consistent only with the hypothesis that it was the appellants alone
K.B.SUBRAHMANYAMv.STATE[DR.ANAND,J.) 689
.,._A
who committed .the crime· and the circumstances are inconsistent with any A
hypothesis other than their guilt. It is most unfortunate that the husband
of the deceased not only failed to perform his
duties and obligations as
husband to protect and take care of his wife as per the marriage vows and
instead joined his mother in the most degrading and cold blooded murder
of the young innocent bride.
B
Of late there has been an alarming increase in cases relating to harass-
ment, torture, abetted suicides and dowry deaths of young innocent brides.
This growing cult of violence and exploitation of the young brides, though
keeps on sending shock waves to the civilised society whenever it happens,
continues unabated. There is a constant erosion of the basic human values of C
tolerance and the spirit of "live and let live". Lack of education and economic
dependence of women have encouraged the greedy perpetrators of the crime.
It is more disturbing and sad that in most of such reported cases it is the
woman who plays a pivotal role in this crime against the younger woman, as in
this case, with the husband either acting as a mute spectator or even an actiile D
participant in the crime, in utter disregard of his matrimonial obligations. In
many cases, it has been noticed that the husband, even after marriage, con-
tinues to be 'Mamma's baby' and the umbilical cord appears not to have been
cut even at that stage! We are here tempted to recall the observations of R.N.
Mishra,/. (as His Lordship then was) in State (Delhi Administration) v. Lax-
man & Ors. Cr. Appeals 93 and 94 of1984decided on 23.9.1985, while dealing E
with a bride burning case. It was observed:

--
11
Marriage, according to the community to which parties
belong, is sacramental and is believed to have _been or-
dained· in heaven. The religious rites performed at the F
marriage altar clearly indicate that the man accepts the
woman as his better-half by assuring her protection as
guardian, ensuring food and necess_aries of life as the
provider, guaranteeing companionship as the mate and by
resolving that the pleasures and sorrows In the pursuit of
life shall be shared with her and Dharma shall be ob- G
served. If this be the concept marriage, there would be no
scope to look for worldly considerations, particularly
dowry ........................................................................................ .

When a girl is transplanted from her natural setting into H
690 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993] 2 S.C.R.

A an alien family, the care expected is bound to be more
than in the case of a plant. Plant has life but the girl has
a more developed one. Human emotions are unknown to
the plant life. In the growing years in the natural setting
the girl- now a bride-has formed her own habits, gathered
her own impressions, developed her own aptitudes and
B got used to a way of life. In the new setting some of these
have to be accepted and some she has to surrender. This
process of adaptation is not and cannot be one-sided. Give
and take, live and let live, are the ways of life and when
the bride is received in the new family she must have a
c feeling of welcome and by the fond bonds of 11we and
affection, grace and generosity, attaehment and considera- ·
tion that she may r,eceive in the family of the husband, she
will get into a new mould; the mould which would last for
her life. She has to get used to a new set of relationships
- one type with the husband, another with the parents-in-
D
law, a different one with the other superiors and yet a
different·one with the younger ones in the family. For this
she would require loving guidance. The elders in the
family, including the mother-in-law, are expected to show
her the way. The husband has to stand as a mountain of
E support ready to protect .her and espouse her cause where
she is on the right and equally ready to cover her either
by pulling her up or protecting her willingly taking the
responsibility on to himself when she is at fault. The
process has to be a natural one and I.here has to be
exhibition of cooperation and willingness from every side.
F
Otherwise how would the transplant succeed!"

Awakening of the collective consciousness is the need of the day.
Change of heart al\d att~ude is what is needed. If man were to regain his
harmony with others and replace hatred, greed, selfishness and anger by
G mutual love, trust and understanding and if woman were to receive educa-
tion and become economically independent, the possibility of this perni-
cious.social ·evil' dying a natural death may not remain a dream only. The
legislature, realising the gravity of the situation has amended the laws and
provided for stringent punishments in such cases and even permitted the
H raising of presumptions against an accused in cases of unnatural deaths of
K.B.SUBRAHMANYAM v. STATE [DR. ANAND,J.] 691

the brides within the first seven years of their marriage .. The Dowry A
Prohibition Act was enacted in 1961 and has been amended from time to
time, but this piece of soicial legislation, keeping in view the growing
menance of the social evil, also does not appear to have served much
purpose as dowry seekers are hardly brought to book and c@nvii:tions
recorded are rather few. Laws are not enough to combat the evil. A wider
social movement of educating women of their rights, to conquer the . B
menance, is what is needed more particularly in rural areaS where women
are still largely uneducated and less aware of their rights and fall an easy
prey to their exploitation. The role of courts, under the circumstances
assumes greater importance and~t is expected that the courts would deal
with such cases in a more realistic manner and not allow the criminals to C
escape on account of procedural technicalities or insignificant lacunas in
the evidence as otherwise the criminals would receive encouragement and
the victims of crime would be totally discouraged by the crime going
unpunished. The courts are expected to be sensitive in cases involving
crime against women. The verdict of acquittal made by the Trial Court in D
this case i~ an apt illustration of the lack of sensitivity on the part of the
Trial Court. It recorded the verdict of acquittal on mere surmises and
conjectures and disregarded the evidence of the witnesses for wholly
insufficient and insignificant reasons. It ignored the vital factors of the case
without even properly discussing the same.
j. E
The High Court was, therefore, perfectly justified in convicting the
appellants for the offence of murder punishable under Section 302 read-
with Section 34 !PC and sentencing each one of them to suffer imprison-
ment for life.

We uphold the conviction and sentence of the appellants for the F
offence under Section 302/34 !PC and dismiss their appeal. The appellants
were directed to be released on bail by this Court on 30.3.1989. Their bail
bonds are cancelled and they are directed to be taken in to custody to
suffer the remaining period of their sentence.

V.P.R. Appeal dismissed.