Holding

The conviction was upheld as the circumstantial evidence satisfied all legal tests and the extra‑judicial confession was voluntary and credible.

Summary

Kusuma Ankama Rao was convicted for murdering Gottapu Adilakshmi after the prosecution presented circumstantial evidence that the accused and the deceased were last seen together and the body was found the next day. The accused also made an extra‑judicial confession before a Village Administrative Officer admitting to strangling the deceased with a towel. The trial court and the Andhra Pradesh High Court upheld the conviction under Section 302 IPC. The Supreme Court examined whether the circumstantial evidence satisfied the established tests and whether the extra‑judicial confession was voluntary and reliable. It held that the evidence met the stringent requirements for a conviction based on circumstantial facts and that the confession was made voluntarily without inducement, thus affirming the lower courts' judgments. The appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

The adequacy of circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction under Section 302 IPC.
The applicability of the 'last seen' theory in the present facts.
The admissibility and voluntariness of the extra‑judicial confession made before a Village Administrative Officer.
Whether the confession, if voluntary, can be relied upon for conviction.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 164, s. 24
Indian Evidence Act, 1872
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302

Subjects

circumstantial evidenceextra‑judicial confessionlast seen theorymurderIPC s.302voluntariness of confessionadmissibility of confession

Judgment

[2008] 10 S.C.R. 89

KUSUMA ANKAMA RAO A
v.
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
(Criminal Appeal No. 185 of 2005)
·JULY 7, 2008
B
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND P.SATHASIVAM, JJ.]

Penal Code, 1860: s. 302 - Last seen theory - Accused
and deceased had illegal intimacy - Accused last seen with
the deceased - Dead body of deceased found next day - Ac- c
cused made extra-judicial confession before Village Admin-
istrative Officer - Circumstantial evidence point guilt towards
accused - No infirmity in conviction ordered by Courts below.
Evidence Act, 1872 : Extra judicial confession - Eviden-
tiary value of D
Prosecution case was that the appellant-accused
had illegal intimacy with the deceased. On the fateful day,
the accused met PW-1, son of the deceased and asked
him to bring bottle of liquor and a beedi packet. PW-1
brought the said items. Thereafter the accused asked the E
whereabouts of the deceased. PW-1 went with the ac-
cused to meet deceased. The deceased met accused and
PW-1 and they went towards fields. The accused then
asked, PW-1 not to follow them and to stop there. PW-1
waited for them for sometime and thereafter returned to F
the hotel where he was working. Next morning he real-
ized that his mother had not returned home. In the mean-
while, they heard the people saying that a dead body was
found in a field. PW-1 and 2 saw the dead body of the
deceased. G
The trial court convicted the accused under s.302
IPC. High Court dismissed the appeal holding that evi- .
dence of PWs 1 and 2 to the effect that the accused and
89 H
90 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 10 S.C.R.

A deceased were last seen, together, the extra judicial con- r
fession made before the Village Administrative Officer and
evidence clearly established the guilt of the accused.
Hence the present appeal.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
B
HELD : 1. Where a case rests squarely on circum-
stantial evidence, the inference of guilt can be justified
only when all the incriminating facts and circumstances
are found to be incompatible with the innocence of the
c accused or the guilt of any other person. The circum-
stances from which an inference as to the guilt of the ac-
cused is drawn have to be proved beyond reasonable
doubt and have to be shown to be closely connected with
the principal fact sought to be inferred from those circum-
stances. [Para 5] [96-D,E & F]
D t
Hukam Singh v. State of Rajasthan AIR (1977) SC 1063;
Eradu and Ors. v. State of Hyderabad AIR (1956) SC 316;
Earabhadrappa v. State of Karnataka AIR (1983) SC 446;
State of UP v. Sukhbasi and Ors. AIR (1985) SC 1224;
E Ba/winder Singh v. State of Punjab AIR (1987) SC 350; Ashok
Kumar Chatterjee v. State of MP AIR (1989) SC 1890; Bhagat
Ram v. State of Punjab AIR (1954) SC 621; C. Chenga Reddy
and Ors. v. State of A. P (1996) 10 SCC 193 ; Padala Veera
Reddy v. State of A.P and Ors. AIR (1990) SC 79; State of
F UP v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava (1992) Crl.LJ 1104 - relied ....,
on.
State of Haryana v. Ved Prakash AIR (1994) SC 468;
Kai/ash Potlia v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR (1996) SC 66 -
..referred to.
G
2.1. Confessions may be divided into two classes i.e.
judicial and extra-judicial. Judicial confessions are those
which are made before a Magistrate or a court in the
course of judicial proceedings. Extra-judicial confessions
H are those which are made by the party elsewhere than

·I.
KUSUMA ANKAMA RAO v. STATE OF AN DH RA 91
PRADESH

'( before a Magistrate or court. Extra-judicial confessions A
are generally those that are made by a party to or before
-.I
a private individual which includes even a judicial officer
in his private capacity. It also includes a Magistrate who
is not especially empowered to record confessions un-
der s.164 Cr.P.C. or a Magistrate so empowered but re- B
ceiving the confession at a stage when s.164 does not
apply. As the section enacts, a confession made by an
accused person is irrelevant in criminal proceedings, if
the making of the confession appears to the court to have
been caused by any inducement, threat or promise, (1) c
having reference to the charge against the accused per-
son, (2) proceeding from a person in authority, and (3)
sufficient, in the opinion of the court to give the accused
person grounds which would appear to him reasonable
,,, for supposing that by making it he would gain any advan-
D
tage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature in reference to
the proceedings against him. It follows that a confession
would be voluntary if it is made by the accused in a fit state
of mind, and if it is not caused by any inducement, threat
or promise which has reference to the charge against him,
proceeding from a person in authority. Whether or not the E
.. confession was voluntary would depend upon the facts
and circumstances of each case, judged in the light of s.24.
[Para 17] [101-A,8,C,D,E,F,G & H]
2.2. If the facts and circumstances surrounding the F
making of a confession appear to cast a doubt on the
veracity or voluntariness of the confession, the court may
.refuse to act upon the confession, even if it is admissible
in evidence. The question whether a confession is vol-
untary or not is always a question of fact. All the factors
G
and all the circumstances of the case, including the im-
portant factors of the time given for reflection, scope of
the accused getting a feeling of threat, inducement or
"' promise, must be considered before deciding whether the
court is satisfied that in its opinion the impression caused
H
92 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 10 S.C.R

A by the inducement, threat or promise, if any, has been fully
removed. A free and voluntary confession is deserving of
the highest credit, because it is presumed to flow from the
highest sense of guilt. It is not to be conceived that a man
would be induced to make a free and voluntary confes-
s sion of guilt, so contrary to the feelings and principles of
human nature, if the facts confessed were not true. Delib-
erate and voluntary confessions of guilt, if clearly proved,
are among the most effectual proofs in law. Every induce-
ment, threat or promise does not vitiate a confession. Since
C the object of the rule is to exclude only those confessions
Which are testimonially untrustworthy, the inducement,
threat or promise must be such as is calculated to lead to
an untrue confession. On the aforesaid analysis the court
is to determine the absence or presence of an inducement,
promise etc. or its sufficiency and how or in what measure
0 t
it worked on the mind of the accused. If the inducement,
promise or threat is sufficient in the opinion of the court, to
give the accused person grounds which would appear to
him reasonable for supposing that by making it he would
gain any advantage or avoid any evil, it is enough to ex-
E elude the confession. The words "appear to him" in the
last part of the section refer to the mentality of the accused.
..
[Para 17] [102-A,B,C,D,E; 103-A,B,C & D]
Woodroffe's Evidence, 9th Edn., p. 284 - referred to.
F 2.3. An extra-judicial confession, if voluntary and true
and made in a fit state of mind, can be relied upon by the
court. The confession will have to be proved like any other
fact. The value of the evidence as to confession, like any
other evidence, depends upon the veracity of the witness
G to whom it has been made. It is not open to any court to
start with a presumption that extra-judicial confession is
a weak type of evidence. It would depend on the nature
of the circumstances, the time when the confession was
made and the credibility of the witnesses who speak to
H such a confession. Such a confession can be relied upon
KUSUMA ANKAMA RAO v. STATE OF ANDHRA 93
'f
PRADESH [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

and· conviction can be founded thereon if the evidence A
about the confession comes from the mouth of witnesses
who appear to be unbiased, not even remotely inimical to
the accused, and in respect of whom nothing is brought
-.I( out which may tend to indicate that he may have a motive
of attributing an untruthful statement to the accused, the B
words spoken to by the witness are clear, unambiguous
and unmistakably convey that the accused is the perpe-
trator of the crime and nothing is omitted by the witness
which may militate against rt. After subjecting the evidence
of the witness to a rigorous test on the touchstone of cred- c
ibility, the extra-judicial confession can be accepted and
can· be the basis of a conviction if it passes the test of
credibility. [Para 18J [103-D,E,F,G,H; 104-A & BJ
-"!
,,, State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram (2003) 8 SCC 180 - re-
lied on. D
3. If the factual scenario is considered it is seen that
the prosecution clearly established the guilt of the ac-

... cused. There is no infirmity in the judgment of the trial
Court as affirmed by the High Court. [Para 19J [104-8 & CJ
CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
E

No. 185 of 2005

I (' From the final Judgment and Order dated 2.9.2004 of the
High _Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Criminal Ap-
peal No. 867 of 2002 F
Sudhir Kulshreshtha for the Appellant.
Debojit Borkakati and D. Bharathi Reddy for the Respon-
dent.
G
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Challenge in this appeal is to
the judgment of a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High
Court upholding the appellant's conviction for offence punish-
able under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short
the 'IPC') for commitilng murder of one Gottapu Adilakshmi H
94 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 10 S.C.R.

A . (hereinafter referred to as ·the 'deceased') by strangulating her
with a towel on 22.2.2001. Learned VI Additional Sessions
Judge (Fast Track Court), Machilipatnam had found the accused
guilty and convicted and sentenced him to imprisonment for life
and fine.
B 2. Prosecution case as unfolded during trial is as follows:
Kusuma Ankama Rao (hereinafter referred to as 'ac-
cused') was a resident of Pedaveedhi of Gudivada Town. He
was a fruit vendor. Sankara Rao (PW-1) and Rama Swamy (PW-
C. 2) are the son and husband of the deceased respectively. The
deceased stayed with her family in the house of M. Simhachalam
(PW-3) in Padamata Veedhi at Gudivada. Accused was hav-
ing illegal intimacy with the deceased. On 22.2.2001 at about
6.30 p.m., the accused met PW-1 (son of the deceased) and
asked him to get a quarter bottle of liquor and a beedi packet
0
and paid Rs.50/- for the purpose. Accordingly, PW-1 brought
the said items. Thereafter, the accused asked the whereabouts
of the deceased. PW-1 took the accused to Gopalakrishna
(A.C.) theatre, where the deceased was working as a labourer
on thatday. On their way to the theatre, they found the deceased
E and some others coming in the opposite direction. At that point
of time, the accused falkedwith the deceased; and the accused,
deceased and PW-1 went to the by-pass road leading to Eluru
and thereafter they further went to the black gram field of one N.
Narasimha Rao. At that point of time the accused asked _PW-1
F not to follow them and to stop there. Accordingly, PW-1 waited
there for half an hour or so and as the deceased and accused
did not return, he returned to the hotel where he was working.
Thereafter, he went to the house late in the night. In the morning
when he found that her mother had not returned home, he stated
G the above facts to his father. In the meanwhile, they heard the
people saying· that· there was a dead body in the field of N.
Narsimha Rao. Then PWs 1 and 2 went there and saw the dead
body of the deceased and PW-2 asked PW-1 to give com-
plaint to the police. Accordingly, PW:-1 went to Town Police,
H Gudivada and gave Ex.P-1 report. On the basis of the said re-
KUSUMA ANKAMA RAO v. STATE OF AN DH RA 95
., PRADESH [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

port, FIR was registered by PW-11. The investigating officer A
(PW-12) on receipt of the FIR went to the place of offence and
conducted Panchanama of scene of offence and thereafter held
inquest over the dead body of the deceased. He also exam-
-It ined the witnesses and seized the towel and other material ob-
jects. In the meanwhile, the accused made an extra judicial con- B
fession before PW-6, the village Administrative Officer to the
effect that he had committed murder of the deceased by stran-
gulation. Immediately, thereafter PW-6 recorded the statement
of the accused duly attested the same by PW-8, the village ser-
vant. He took the accused to the Police Station along with the c
report. The C.I. of police examined Village Administrative Of-
ficer. After completion of investigation, charge sheet was filed
before the learned Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate,
Gudivada, who registered the same as P.R.C. No.30 of 2001.
Since the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC is exclu-
D
sively triable by the Court of Sessions, he committed the same
to the Court of Session, Machilipatnam, who registered the case
as S.C.No.211 of 2001. Thereafter, the case was made over to
the learned VI Additional District and Sessions Judge,

'' Machilipatnam for trial and disposal in· accordance with law.
E
In order to establish its version, prosecution examined 12
witnesses and marked as Exh. P-1 to P-14 documents and
M.Os. 1 to 19 were also marked. The trial Court after consider-
~
ing the evidence on record found the accused guilty and sen-
tenced him as afore-stated. The conviction· was challenged F
before the High Court. The stand before the High Court was
that the prosecution case was based on circumstantial evidence
and the circumstances highlighted do not establish the guilt of
the accused. The State on the other hand referred to the evi-
dence of PWs 1 and 2 and the extra judicial confession made
G
~ before Village Administrative Officer (PW-6) to the effect that
accused and the deceased were last seen together, and the
evidence clearly established the guilt of the accused. The High
Court accepted the stand of the State and disn 1issed the ap-
peal.
H
96 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 10 S.C.R.

A 3. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appel-
lant submitted that the last seen concept is not applicable to the
present case. The so called extra judicial confession was be-
fore a stranger. There is no reason as to why the accused would
make confession before a stranger. Reliance is placed on a
B decision of this Court in State· of Haryana v. Ved Prakash (AIR
1994 SC 468) and Kai/ash Potlia v. State of Andhra Pradesh
(AIR 1996 SC 66).

4. Learned counsel for the respondent-State on the other
hand submitted that the three witnesses i.e. PW 1 (son of the
C deceased) PWs 4 and 5 had seen the deceased and the ac-
cused going together and, thereafter the dead body was recov-
ered. The Village Administrative Officer was not a stranger but
he was incharge of the village and was a person of authority in
that sense. •
D
5. It has been consistently laid down by this Court that
where .a case rests squarely on circumstantial evidence, the
inference of guilt can be justified only when all the incriminating
facts and circumstances are found-to be incompatible with the
innocence of the accused or the guilt of any other person. (See ~
E Hukam Singh v State of Rajasthan AIR (1977 SC 1063); Eradu t,
,
and Ors. v. State of Hyderabad (Al R 1956 SC 316);
..__
Earabhadrappa v. State of Kamataka (AIR 1983 SC 446); State
ofUP v. Sukhbasi and Ors. (AIR 1985 SC 1224); Ba/winder .., ~

Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1987 SC 350); Ashok Kumar
F Chatterjee v. State of M.P (AIR 1989 SC 1890). The circum-
stances from which an inference as to the guilt of the accused .
}--

ls drawn have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and have
I-
to be shown to be closely connected with the principal fact
sought to be inferred from those circumstances. In Bhagat Ram
r
G v. State of Punjab (AIR 1954 SC 621), it was laid down that
~
where the case depends upon the conclusion drawn from cir-
,
cumstances the cumulative effect of the circumstances must "'=
be such as to negative the innocence of the accused and bring 1
,,,
the offences home beyond any reasonable doubt. ...
H I
~

f-
KUSUMA AN KAMA RAO v. STATE OF AN DH RA 97
PRADESH [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

6. We may also make a reference to a decision of this A
Court in C. Chenga Reddy and Ors. v. State of A.P (1996) 10
SCC 193, wherein it has been obseNed thus:
"In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the settled
law is that the circumstances from which the conclusion of
guilt is drawn should be fully proved and such B
circumstances must be conclusive in nature. Moreover, all
the circumstances should be complete and there should
be no gap left in the chain of evidence. Further the proved
circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis
of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his c
innocence .... ".
7. In Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P and Ors. (AIR
1990 SC 79), it was laid down that when a case rests upon
circumstantial evidence, such evidence must satisfy the follow-
-", D
ing tests:
"(1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is
sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly
established;
(2) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency E
unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused;
(3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively $hould form a
chain so complete that there is no escape from the
r
conclusion that within all human probability the crime F
was committed by the accused and none else; and
(4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain
conviction must be complete and incapable of
explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the
guilt of the accused and such evidence should not G
only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but
should be inconsistent with his innocence.
-I
8. In State of UP v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava, (1992 Crl.LJ
1104), it was pointed out that great care must be taken in evalu-
H
98 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 10 S.C.R.

A ating circumstantial evidence and if the evidence relied on is
reasonably capable of twO inferences, the one ih favour of the
accused must be accepted. It was also pointed out that the
circumstances relied upon must be found to have b~en fully es- c.-
tablished and the cumulative effect of all the .facts so, estab-
8 listied must be consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt .
. 9. Sir Alfred Wills in ~is admirable book "Wills' Circum-
stantial Evidence". (Chapte'r VI) lays down the followi.ng rules
specially'to be observed in the case of circumstantial evidence:
(1) the facts alleged as the basis of any legal inference must be
C clearly proved and beyond reasonable doubt connecte~ with
the factum probandum; (2) the burden of proof is always on the
party who asserts the existence of any fact, which infers legal
accountability; (3) in all cases, whether of direct or circumstan"" I
... _
tial evidence the best evidence must be adduced which the na-
0 ture of the case admits; (4) in order to justify the infer~nce.of
guilt; the inculpatory facts must be incompatible with th.e inno- ,..
cence of .the accused and incapable of explanation, upon any \

other reasonable hypothesis than that of his guilt, (5) if there be L
'
any reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused, he is entitled
E as of right to be acquitted".
10. There is no doubt that conviction can be based solely,
on circumstantial evidence but it should b.e tested by the· touch-
stone of law relating to circumstantial evidence Jaid down by
the this Court as far back as in 1952,
F
11. In Hanumant Govind Nargundkar ahdAnr. V State of
Madhya Pradesh, (AIR 1952 SC 343), wherein it was observed
thus: '
~

"It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence
G is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which
the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be in the first
instance be fully established and all the facts so
established should be consistent only with the hypothesis
of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should·
H be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should
KUSUMA ANKAMA RAO v. STATE OF ANDHRA 99
PRADESH [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one A
proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a
chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any
reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the
innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show
that within all human probability the act must have been 8
done by the accused."
12. A reference may be made to a later decision in Sha rad
Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (AIR 1984 SC
1622). Therein, while dealing with circumstantial evidenc~, it
has been held that onus was on the prosecution to prove that C
the chain is complete and the infirmity of lacuna in prosecution
cannot be cured by false defence or plea. The ~onditions pre-
cedent in the words of this Court, before conviction could be
based on circumstantial evidence, must be fully established.
They are: D
(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt
is to be drawn should be fully established. The
circumstances concerned 'must' or 'should' and not
'may be' established;
E
(2) the facts so established should be consistent only
with the hypothesis o~the guilt of the accused, that is
to say, they should not be explainable on any other
~ypothesis except that the accused is guilty;
r
(3) the circumstances shoUld be of a conclusive nature F
and tendency;
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except
the one to be proved; and

(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as G
not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion
consistent with the innocence of the accused and
must show that in all human probability the act must
have been done by the accused.

. H
100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 10 S. C.R.

A 13. These aspects were highlighted in State of Rajasthan
"'

•
v. Rajararri (2003 (8) SCC 180), State of Haryana v. Jagbir
Singh and Anr (2003 (11) SCC 261).
14. So far as the last seen aspect is concerned it.is nee-
essary to take note of two decisions of this court. In State of
B . UP v. Satish [2005 (3) SCC 114] it was noted as fol.lows:

"22. The last seen theory comes into play where the time-
gap between the point of time when the accused and the
deceased were seen last alive and when the deceased is
c found dead is so small that possibility of any person other
than the accused being the author of the crime becomes
impossible. It would be difficult in some cases to positively
establish that the deceased was last seen with the accused
w!Jen there is a long gap and possibility of other persons
coming in between. exists. In the absence of any other ....
D
positive evidence to conclude that the accused anq the
deceased were last seen together, it would be hazardous
to come to a conclusion of guilt iri those cases. ·in this
case there is positive evidence that the deceased and the
accused were seen together by .witnesses PWs. 3 and 5,
E ·in addition to the evidence of PW-2."
15. In Ramreddy Rajesh Khanna, Reddy v. State of A.P
[2006 (10) sec 172] it was noted as follows:)
"27. The last-seen theory, furthermore, comes into play
F where the time gap between the point of time when the '
accused and the deceased were last seen alive and the
deceased is found dead is so small that possibility of any
person other than the accused being the author of the
crime becomes impossible. Even in such a case the courts
G should look for some corroboration".
(See also Bodhraj v. State of J&K (2002(8) SCC 45).)"

H
16. A similar view was also taken in Jaswant Gir v. State
of Punjab [2005(12) SCC 438].
• I,.

-
KUSUMA ANKAMA RAO v. STATE OF ANDHRA 101
PRADESH [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

17. Confessions may be divided into two classes i.e. judi- A
cial and extra-judicial. Judicial confessions are those which are
made before a Magistrate or a court in the course of judicial
proceedings. Extra-judicial confessions are those which are
made by the party elsewhere than before a Magistrate or court.
Extra-judicial confessions are generally those that are made by B
a party to or before a private individual which includes even a
judicial officer in his private capacity. It also includes a Magis-
trate who is not especially empowered to record confessions
under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in
short the 'Code') or a Magistrate so empowered but receiving c
the confession at a stage when Section 164 does not apply. As
to extra-judicial confessions, two questions arise: (1) were they
made voluntarily? and (it) are they true? As the section enacts,
a confession made by an ace.used person is irrelevant in crimi-
nal proceedings, if the making of the confession appears to the
0
court to have been caused by any inducement, threat or prom-
ise, ( 1) having reference to the charge against.the accused
person, (2) proceeding from a person in authority, and (3) suffi-
cient, in the opinion of the court to give the accused person
grounds which would appear to him re·asonable for supposing
that by making it he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil .E
of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against
him. It follows that a confession would be voluntary if it is made
r by the accused in a fit state of mind, and if it is not caused by
any inducement, threat or promise which has reference·to the
charge against him, proceeding from a person in authority. It F
would not be involuntary, if the inducement, (a) does not hav~
reference to the charge against the accused person; or (b) it
does not proceed from a person in authority; or (c) it is not suf-
ficient, in the opinion of the court to give the accused person
grounds which would appear to him reasonable for supposing -G
that, by making it, he would gain any advantage or avoid any
evil of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against
him. Whether or not the confession was voluntary would depend
upon the facts and circumstances of each case, judged in the
light of Section 24. The law is clear that a confession cannot be H -
102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 10 S.C.R.

A used against an accused person unless the court is satisfied
that it was voluntary and at that stage the question whether it is
true or false does not arise. If the facts and circumstances sur-
rounding the making ot·a_c;onfession appear to cast a doubt on
the veracity or voluntariness of the confession, the court may
,<-
B refuse to act upon the confession, even if it is admissible in
evidence. One important question, in regard to which the court ....
has to be satisfied with is, whether when the accused made.the
confession, he was a-Jree man or his movements were con-
trolled by the police either by themselves or through some other
c agency employed by them for the purpose of securing such a f-
confession. The question whether a confession is voluntary or
not is always a question of fact. All the factors and all the cir-
cumstances of the case, including the important factors of the
time given for reflection, scope of the accused getting a feeling ,,._
of threat, inducement or promise, must be considered before
D
deciding whether the court is satisfied that in its opinion the
impression caused by the inducement, threat or promise, if any,
has been fully removed. A free and voluntary confession is de:..
serving ofthe highest credit, because it is pr~sumed to flow
from the highest sense of guilt. It is not to be conceived that a
E man would be induced to make a free and voluntary confession
.of guilt, so contrary to the feelings and principles of human na-
tu re; if the facts confessed were not true. Deliberate. and volun-
tary confessions of guilt, if clearly proved, are among the most
effectual proofs in law. An involuntary confession is one which
F is not the result of the free will of the maker of it. So where the '
statement is made as a result of harassment and continuous
interrogation for several hours after the person is treated as an ·
offender and accused, such statement must be regarded as
involtmtary. The inducement may take the form of a promise or
G . of a threat, and often the inducement
.
involves both promise and
threat, a promise of forgiveness if disclosure is made and threat
of prosecution if it is not. (See: Woodroffe's Evidence, 9th Edn.,
p. 284.) A promise is always attached to the confession alter-
native while a threat is always attached to the silence alterna-
H tive; thus, in one case the prisoner is measuring the net advan-
KUSUMA AN KAMA RAO v. STATE OF ANDHRA' 103
PRADESH [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

tage of the promise, minus the general undesirability of a false A
confession, as against the present unsatisfactory situation; while
inthe other case he is measuring the net advantages of the
present satisfactory situation, minus the general undesirability
of the confession against the threatened harm. It must be borne
in mind that every inducement, threat or promise does not viti- B
ate a cot)fession. Since the object of the rule is to exclude only .
those confessions which are testimonially untrustworthy, the in-
ducement, threat or promise must be such as is calcula'ted to
lead to an untrue confession. On the aforesaid analysis the court
is to determine the absence or presence of an inducement, C
promise etc. or its sufficiency and how or in what measure it
worked on the mind of the accused, If the inducement, promise
or threat is sufficient in the opinion of the court, to give the ac-
cused person grounds which would appear to him reasonable
for supposing that by making it he would gain any advantage o~ D
avoid any evil, it is enough to exclude the confession. The words
"appear to him" in the last part of the section refer to the mental-
ity of t~e a:ccused.
18. An extra-judicial confession, if voluntary and true. and
made in a fit state of mind, can be relied upon by the court. The E
confession will have to be proved like any other fact. The value
of the evidence as to confession, like any other evidence, de-
pends upon the veracity of the witness to whom it has b~en
made. The valµe of the evidence as to the confession depends
on the reliability of the witness who gives the evidence. It is not F
a
open to any court to start with presumption that extra-judicial
confession is a weak type of evidence. It would depend on the
nature of the circumstances, the time when.the confession was .
made and the credibility of the witnesses who speak to such a
confession. Such a confession can be relied upon and convic- G
tion can be founded thereon if the evidence about the confes-
sion comes from the mouth of witnesses who appear to be un-
biased, not even remotely inimical to the accused, and in re-
spect of whom nothing is brought out which may tend to indi-
cate that he may have a motive of attributing an untruthful state-
H
104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 10 S.C.R.
J.

A ment to the accused, the words spoken to by the witness are
clear, unambiguous and unmistakably convey that the accused
is the perpetrator of the crime and nothing is omitted by the
witness which may militate against it. After subjecting the evi-
dence of the witness to a rigorous test on the touchstone of
E;3 credibility, the extra-judicial confession can be accepted and
can be the basis of a conviction if it passes the test of credibil-
ity. (See State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram (2003 (8) SCC 180).
19. If the factual scenario is considered it is seen that the
prosecution clearly established the guilt of the accused. There
c is no infirmity in the judgment of the trial Court as affirmed by t
the High Court. The appeal is without merit, deserves dismissal
which we direct.
..
!"'
D.G. Appeal dismissed.