Holding

A demand for dowry, even without the complainant's consent, is an offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.

Summary

L.V. Jadhav, the father of the bride, complained that during his daughter's marriage the groom's father and son demanded Rs. 50,000 as dowry, threatening to halt the ceremonies. The Judicial Magistrate issued summonses, but the Bombay High Court quashed the proceedings, holding that no offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was made out because the complaint did not allege the father’s consent to pay. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether a mere demand for dowry, even without consent, constitutes an offence under Section 4. It held that the definition of "dowry" in Section 2 must be given a liberal construction for Section 4, so any demand that, if complied with, would amount to dowry is punishable. The Court also warned that the High Court’s inherent power to quash should be used sparingly. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the magistrate was directed to proceed with the case.

Issues considered

Whether a demand for dowry, without the complainant's consent to pay, constitutes an offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
Whether the definition of "dowry" in Section 2 should be imported into Section 4 for interpreting the offence.
Whether the High Court correctly exercised its inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings.

Legislation cited

Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961s. 2, s. 3, s. 4, s. 5, s. 6, s. 8
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 30

Subjects

Dowry demandSection 4ConsentInterpretation of statutesInherent powers of courtCriminal procedureMarriage

Judgment

762
L. V. JADHAV
A
v.

SHANKARRAO ABASAHEB PAWAR & OTHERS ·.
B August 30, 1983

(S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, A. VARADARAJAN
AND M. P. THAKKAR, JJ.] .

Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961-·Sections 2 and 4 scope of-Demand for
payment of money made during marriage ceremonies-Demand pressed /ater-
Whethe~ Constitutes an offence under section 4.

High Court-ln~erent powe·r-W'hen should be exercised.

·In a con1plaint filed before the Judicial Magistrate the appellant (bride's
D father) alleged that during the marriage ceremOnies the first respondent {bride-
groom's father) had demanded a large sum of money to be paid to him as
dowry and threatened that if the appellant did not pay the sum he would
atop further marriage ceremonies, that even after his daughter had gone to the
first respondent's house after the 1narriage the respondent's continued to -;.
demand payment of money and that this constituted an offence under section 4
of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
E
After verifying the complaint the Judicial Magistrate issued processes to
the respondents and sent summons is to the United States where tht
respondents were.

Allowing the respondent's application impugning the order of the
F Magistrate issuing summonses, the High Court held that since there was nO
allegation in the complaint that the respondents first demanded the dowry and
the appellant had agreed to pay it and the respondents th~reafter demanded it
again, no offence under sect!on 4 was made out.

In the appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant
G that a mere demand for dowry, even if there was no consent to comply with
that demand, would constitute an offence under section 4 of the Act.

,. Allowing the appeal,

B HELD : From a reading of section 2 of the Act, it would appear that
consent to comply with demand for payment -of any property or valuable
securities as 'considerat!on' for the marriage would alone make the property
or \faluable security given or agreed to be given directly or indirectly ",dowry"
L.v. JADHAV v. S.A. I'AWAR ("flaradarajan, J.) 763
within the meaning: of the Act. But having regard to the dominant purpose of
· the Act the entries definition of ''dowry" should not be imported into section 4. A
The dictionary meaning of the word 'bride' is a woman about to marry or has
just been married and a 'bridegroom; is a man who is about to rilarry or has
just been married. If the literal n1eaning of these· words is given to the words
bride and bridegroom used in the section any property or valuable 5ecurity
demanded and consented to be given before the woman had become a bride
.,
or the man had become a bridegroom may not be dowry. The avowed object B
of the Act being to eradicate the evil Of demanding dowry, a liberal construc-
tion has to be given to the word "dowry'' to mean any property or v~luabl•
iiCCurity which if consented to be given on demand would· be dowry within the
meaning of section 2. There .is, therefore, no warrant for· the re,spondents'
contention that initial demand for dowry would not constitute an offence but
that it would be an offence only when the demand was made again after the,
party on whom it was made bad agreed to comply with it. [771 B·H; 722 A] c
lndt:'r Sain and Another v. The State, 1981 Ctl. L.J. 1116 approved.

The inherent power of the High Court must be exercisid sparingly and
,with circumspection when there is reason to believe that the process of law is
being misused to harass a citizen. In this cas~ the High Court should hav1 D
rcfuied to invoke its inherent power at the threshold to quash the proceedings.
[772 B-C]

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JLTR!SD!CTION : Criminal Appea[ No. 494
of 1982.

Appeal by Special leave from the Judgment and Order dated
the 22nd December, 1981 of the Bombay High Court in Criminal
Appln. No. 283 of 19_81.

Y. S. Chitale, V. N. Ganpule, Sirish Gupta and Mrs. V.D. Khanna
for the Appellant. · F·

V. S. Desai and G. B. Sathe for the Respondent.

P. G. Gokhale and M. N. Shroff for the State of Maharashtra.
G
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

VARAD.~RAJAN, J. This appeal by special leave is· -directed
8.gainst the judgment 9f a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court
in Criminal Application No. 283 of 1981, quashing the proceedings
·in Criminal Case No. 1634 of 1980 on the file of the Judicial Magis- H
trate, First Class (Anti Corruption), Pune. The application in the
fli~h <?ourt was filed by the respondents in this ap{leal, who ar~ ti\~
764 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1983) J S.C.R.

two accused in that criminal caserfor quashing the criminal proceed-
A ings as well as the order of the Judicial Magistrate, issuing processes ·
against them in that case.

The ·appellant L. V. Jadhav was the first respondent while
State of Maharashtr'! was the second respol)dent in the application
B before the High Court. The first respondent ~hanlq1rrao Abasa\l~I>
Pawar. is th~ father of the second respondent Pradeep Shankarra
Pawar. There was a proposal to get the appellant's daughter Anita,
a Science Graduate, married to the second respondent, a double
Graduate in Engineering, working jn the United S\ates. After Anita
and the second respondent approved each p~her there was an
c engagement ceremony on 12.6.1978 at Pune and the marriage was
performed at that place on 19.6.1979 after the first respondent came
from the United States in May 1979.

According to the appdlant's complaint, when the marriag~
D ceremonies were in .progress on 19.6.1979, both the respondents
demanded a cash of Rs. 50,000 from the appellant in the
presence of ~espectable P!"sons under the pretext ,that the money
wa> required for the transport of Anita and the second respo!lde11ts
to the United States. The respondent> told the appellant that if he
E did not comply with t/lat demand by way of ~owry further· cere-
monies would not be completed. Some respectable persons who
were present at that. time persuade the respondents to complete the
marriage ceremonies and formalities and thereafter the marriage·
ceremonies were over. The second respondent alone went to the
United States in July j979 as the passport and 'visa f(/r A,njta f-
F had to ·be arranged which was done some time later while Anita was
staying in the house of the first respon~ent. ·Anita was not sent to
the United States and the respondents continued to persist in their
demand for the money when she was staying in the first respondent's
house. The appellant filed a complaint. before the Judicial Magis-
G trate, First Class on 5.6.1980 against both.the respondents, alleging
that they had committed an offence under s. 4 of the Dowry.
Prohibition Act, 1961 by demanding the sum of Rs. 50,000 as
mention~d above. This was done after the app~llant had obtained '
the necessary.sanction required by the proviso to s. 4 of the Act.
H The Judicial Magistrate verified the complaint and issued processes
to the respondents and sent summonses to the United States where·
the first' respondent was staying with the second respondent at th~t
time.
L.V. JADHAV v. S.A. PAWAR (Varadarajan, J.) 765

The respondents challenged the Magistrate's order issuing
summonses to them by filing their application in the High Court. A
The learned Single Judge before whom the application originally
came up for consideration referred to a Division Be.nch. The con·
tention of the \earned counsel for the 'respondeuts before the High
Court was that even if the allegations made in the appellant's
,r complaints were true no offence under s. 4 of the Act is disclosed,
whereas for the appellant. it was contended before the High Court B
that the aforesaid demand for Rs. 50,000 would constitute an offence
under s. 4.

Reading the definition of "dowry" given in s. 2 of the Act into
s. 4, the learned judges held that for bringing a case under_ s. 4 of c
the Act, there must be a demand for dowry as such, that is, for any
property agreed to be given as consideration for the marriage, and
that as there is no allegation in the complaint that the appellant had
agreed to pay the sum of Rs. 50,000 and the respondents thereafter
demanded the same no offence under s. 4 of the Act is disclosed in the D
complaint. In that view the learned judges allowed the respondent's
application and quashed the proceedings in the appellants's complaint
J- and the Magistrate's order issuing the processes to the respondents.
Hence this appeal by special leave.

The question for consideration is whether the allegation m!lde E
in the appellant's complaint that there was a demand by the respon-
dents when the ceremonies ·Of the marriage of Anita with the second
respondent were in progress, for the payment or' Rs. 50,000 to be
11_1ade by the appellant on pain of the marriage ceremonies not being
completed if the demand was not complied with under the pretext F
that the said amount was required for the passage of Anita and the
second respondent to the United States discloses an offence under s. 4
of the Act. It would be necessary to extract the following relevant
ss. 2 to 5 and 8 of the Act for easy reference in order to consider the
question :
G
. "2. In this Act, "dowry means any property or
valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly
or indirectly-

(a) by one party to a m~rria~e tot.he other party to the B
inarriage ; or '
•
766 SUPREME COURT .REPORTS iJ9g3J ~ s.C.R.
(b) by tlie parents of either party to a marriage or by '\..
A any other person, to either party to the marriage or
to any other person ;
'
· at or before or after the marriage as consideration for the
marriage of the said parties, but does not include dower
B or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim
Personal Law (Shariat) applies.
'

Explanation 1-:For the remove! of doubts it is hereby
declared that any presents made at the time of a marriage
to either party to the marriage in the form of cash,
c ornaments, clothes or other articles, shall not be deemed
to be dowry within the meaning of this section, unless
they are made as consideration for the m~rriage of the
said parties.

Explanation II-The expression "valuable security"
D
has the same meaning as in section 30 of the Indian Penal
Code.

3. If any person after the commencement of this
Act, gives or takes or abets the giving or taking of dowry,
E he shall be punishable with imprisonment which· may
extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to
five thousand rupees, or with both.

4. If any person after the commencement of this
F Act, demands, directly or indirectly, from the parents or
guardian of a bride or bridegroom, as the case may be,
any dowry, he shall be punishable with imprisonment
which may extend to six moths, or with fine which may
extend to five thousand rupees, or with both ;

G Provided that no. court shall take cognizance of any
off~nce under this section except with the previous sane"
tion of the State Government or of such officer as the
State Government may, by general or special order,
specify in this behalf.
H
5. Any agreement for the giving· or taking of dowry
~]\all be void.
L.v. JADHAV v. S.A. PA WAR (Vamdarajan, J.) 767

6. Every offence under this Act shall be non-cogniz·
able, bailable and non-compoundable." A
According to the appellant's complaint, when the marriage of
his daughter Anita and the second respondent, the son of the first
respondent, was in progress on 19.6.1979, both the respondents

•
'demanded from him cash of Rs. 50, 000 in the presence of respect·
able persons under the pretext that the amount was required for the B
pa,,age or transport .of Anita and the second respondent to the
United States where the second respondent was employed at that
time and they told him that if he did dot comply with their demand ·
by way of dowry further ceremonies . in the marriage would not be
· completed. It is further alleged that some respectable persons who c
were present at that time persuaded the respondents to complete the
marriage .ceremonies and formalities and thereafter the marriage
ceremonies were completed and that subsequently the second respon·
dent went to the United States in July 1979 alone because .the
passport and ·visa of Anita had to be arranged which was done some
time later while Anita was staying in the house of the first respondent, D
and the respondents continued to persist in their demand fot the
money when Anita was staying in the house of the first respondent
without being sent to the United States. Mr. V. S. Desai, Senior
Advocate, appearing for the respondents invited our at.ention to the
decision of a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in Inder
Sain and another v. The State( 11 and also of another Single Judge of
the Patna High Crnrt in Koshi Prasad and Others v. State of Bihar
and Othas(') and submitted that the demand for Rs. 50,000 alleged
in the complaint would not constitute. an offence under s. 4 of the
Act as there is no allegation in the complaint that the appellant
consented to pay the amoun.t and that ~ith.out .consent io the pay· JI
ment the sum of Rs. 50, 000 alleged to have been demanded does not
become dowry within the meaning of s. 2 of the Act which defines
"dowry" as meaning "any property or valuable security given or
agreed to be given either directly or indirectly-
\ (a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the G
.I marriage ; or
(b) by the. parents of either party to a marriage or by any
other person, to either party to the marriage or to
any other . person ; H
----·--·--
(!) 1981 Crl. L.J. lll6.
(2) 1980 Bihar B.ar Council Journal p. 612.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1983] 3 s.c.R.

at or before or after the marriage as consideration for the
!!larriage ofthe said parties, but does not include dower
or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim
Personal Law (Shariat) applies."

'
Section 2 contains two explanat!ons with which we are not concerned
B in this case. In the Delhi High Court's decision the question for r
consideration was what constituted "consideration" for marri~g~ • ~
within the meaning of s. 2 of tbe Act, and Luthra, J, has observed :
...
, .l~
'.'Thus the definition of the word "consideration'.'
c leads to the conclusion that the property or valuable.
security shi)uld be demanded or given whether in the past,
present or. future for bringing out solemnization of
marriage. After the marriage, giving a property or vain·
abie security by the parents of the bride cannot constitute
a "consideration" for the marriage unless it was agreed at
D the time of or before the· marriage that such property or
valuable security would be given in future."

The complaint in that case did not spell out that the articles
mentioned in the same were given after the marriage as a result_ of
come agreement for the purpose of the marriage. The'allegations in
·th; complaint indicated that thoie.articles were given after the
mariiage with a view to have smooth railing and continuance of good
~~terial relations. The learned Judge, therefore, held that the
articles given. in those circumstances did not constitute dowry within
the meaning of s. ·2 of tlie Act. We think that the learned judge
F is right in holding so, and that it is desirable that eveu such a demand
should
- .be
.
prohibited and made punishable in law.

We are concerned in the present case with a complaint in which
it has been alleged that the demand for the sum of Rs. 50,000 as
G dowry was made when the marriave ceremonies between the appel'
)ant's diiugther Anita aTid tl1e 'econd respondent were in progress,
by both the respondentS: under the pretext that It was required for I.
the passage of the paities to the marriage 10 the United States with
a threat that if the amount was. not paid. the marriage ceremonies
H would not be completed and that there was demand for payment of
the amount even after the marriage ceremonies were over when Anita
was staying in the house of the first respondent after the second
respondent went away alone to the United States_because the;passport
L.V. JADHAV v. S.A PAWAR (Varadarajan, J.) 769

and visa for Anita had not been obtained by then. The decision of
even the'Patna High Court relied upon by Mr. Desai relates only to A
what constitutes "consideration" for the marriage within the meaning
of s 2 of the Act. On the other hand, Dr. Y.S. Chitale, Senior Advo·
cate, appearing for the appellant invited our attention to a decision of
a Division Bench of the Bombay.High Court in Dau/at Mansingh Aher
v. C.R. Bansi. and another(') and submitted that a mere demand for B
money as dowry for completing ihe marriage ceremonies on pain
of not completing the ceremonies if the money was not given is
sufficient to constitute an offence under s. 4 of the Act even though
there was no consent on the part of the appellant to comply with
that demand. · What appeared from the record of the case out of
which. the decision of the Bombay High Court arose, was that the . c
accused-petitioner filed an application on 6.10.1978 raising a conten-
tion that the Court of the Metropolitan Magistrate, Dadar, Bombay
had nojurisdiction to entertain and try the case because the accused
and the complainant were residing ~outside the jurisdiction of that
Court. A contention was also raised that the complaint was barred
by limHation and wa5, therefore; liable to be dismissed. However, D
during the arguments in the High Court it was conceded by the
learned counsel for the accused-petition.er that the complaint was.
filed within the period prescribed. Therefore, the only question that
arose for consideration by t~e learned Judges of the Division Bench ·
was the one relating to the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Magis- E
trate, Dadar. Bombay to entertain and inquire into the complaint.
However, the learned Judges have observed in the judgment after
extracting s. 4 of t)le Act that "what is made punishable under that
provision is the demand itself, whether direct or indirect, from the
parents of a bride or bridegroom". The learned Judges have further
observed thus : .-- F

"On the avetments made in the complaint the
demand is made by the accused by writing a Jetter from.
Wadala, Bombay;31. This demand was made through his
elder brother who is the son·in-law of the complainant G
and resides at Agartala. From Agartala the said letter
}
of demand was forwarded by the s~n-in-law of the
complainant to Andheri. Bombay where the complainant
.. ,' is residing. Therefore, the demand by accused was not
made at Agartala. He had only used the good offices of H

(1) [1980] Cir. U.1171,
770 , SUPREME COURT REPORTS i19g3j 3s.c.11..
. his elder brother to forward the letter. instead of.writin:
A a direct Jetter' to complainant demanding dowry, the
demand was made through the elder brother who is
residing at Agartala. .Still the demand is by accused and
is made from Wadala at Bombay. The demand· became
complete when the complainant received tho letter at
Andheri, Bombay. Hence the dowry was demanded at
B Bombay. The offence was partly committed at Wadala,
Bombay, from VI here the dowry was demanded. It was
also committed at Andheri, Bombay, where the
complainant received the demand letter. It is further·
alleged by the complainant in the complaint that the
c marriage of Atka which was almost settled, could not take
place due to the demand of dowry made by · the accused.
This consequential result or consequence of the demand
·also took place at Bombay. Wadala is within the local
jurisdiction of Metropolitan Magistrate, Dadar. Letter
of demand was actually sent from Wadala, Bombay.
D Hence, in any case it can safely be said that offence as
alleged is partly committed at Wadala also. Though a
contention was raised before the trial court that neither
-J
accused nor complainant arc residing within the jurisdic-
tion of the Dadar Court, now it is an admitted position
l!l that accused resides at Wadala.

Even if it is held that offence became complete when
complainant received letter at Andheri, Bom_bay, still it
will be triable by Bombay Court. Whether it is Dadar or
Andheri Court will' not make any difference. On th•
F other hand we are told that Dadar Court is nearer to the
residence of accused. The point raised is too technical -
and no prejudice will be caused to the accused nor on
that count it could be said that trial is vitiated; or will
result in failure of justice. Hone• there js no substanc•
G in thi& contention".

It appears from a reading of this judgment that it was either '
not disputed· before the learned Judges or that it was· presumed that
a mere demand for property as consideration for the marriage taking
H p!Jlce would constitute an offence under s. -4 of the Act.

The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 is intended to prohibit the
;iving or taking of dowry, and Parliament has mad~ every off'eece
Lv. SADHAV v. s.A. PAWAR (Varadarajan, J.) 771
under the Act non•compoundable by s. 8 of the Act. By s. 5 it has
been enacted that any agreement for the giving or taking of dowry
shall be void. Section 3 makes abefmeht of the giving or taking of
dowry an offence. No doubt, according to s. 2 of the Act '.'dowry"
is any property or valuable security given or agreed to be. given
either directly or indirectly at or before or after the marriage as
consideration for the marriage but does not include dowar or mahr in
the case of person to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) appear
II
applies. It would appear from s. 2' that consent to comply with the
demand for any property as consideration for the marriage would
alone make the property or valuable security given or agreed .to be
given directly or indirectly, ''dowry" within the meaning of the Act.
But having-regard to the dominant object of the Act whichis to stemp c
out the practice of demanding dowry in any shape or .form either
.' before or after the marriage, we are of the opinion that the entire
definition of word "dowry" should not be imported into s. 4 which
lays down that "if any person after the commencement of this Act,
demands, directly or indirectly from the parents or guardian of a
D
bride or bridegroom, as the case may be, any dowry, he shall be
punish~ble with imprisonment which may extend to six months or
with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees or with both".
According to Webestet's N~w Worid Dictionary, 1962 edn .. bride
means a woman who has ju;t been married or it about to be married,
and bridegroom means a man who has just been married or is a,bout E
to be married; If we give this strict meaning of a bride or a ·bride-
groom to the word bride or bridegroom used in s. 4 of the Act
property or valuable security deml\nded and consented to be
given prior to the time when the woman had. become a bride or
the man had become a bridegroom, may not be "dowry" within the
meaning of the Act, We are of the opinion that ha~ing regard to the F
object of the Act a liberal construction has to be given to the word
"dowry" used in s. 4 of the Act tci mean that any property or
valuable security which if consented to be given on the demand being
- made would become dowry within the meaning of s. 2 of the Act.
We are also of the opinion that the object of s. 4 of the Act is to G
discourage .the very demand for perperty or valuable security as
I consideration for a marriage between the parties thereto. Section 4
prohibits the demand for 'giving' property or valuable security which
demand, if satisfied, would constitute an offence under s. 3 read with
1. 2 of the Act. There is no warrant for "taking the view that the H
in;tial demand for giving of property or valuable security would not
constitute an offence and that an offence would take place only whCII
772 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1983} 3 s.c.R.
the demand was Diade again after the party on whom the demand.
was made agreed to comply with it. · The learned Magistrate was,;
therefore, right in proceeding on the basis that the allegations in the
complaint primafacie constitute an offence under s. 4 of the Act and:
issuing processes to the respondents. The High Court, we cannot.
refrain from observing, might well have refused to invoke its inherenr
powers at the very threshold in order to quash the proceedings, for
8 these powers are· meant to be exercised sparingly and with cit'culli-
spectfon when there is renson to believe - that the process of law is
lleing· misused to harass a citizen. The present was not such a case·..
We find that the complaint had been filed after obtaining the previous·
sanction of the State· Government or of such officer as the State
c Government may by general or special order specify in this behalf
as required by the proviso to s. 4 of the Act. Mr. P.G. Gokhale ·who
appeared for the second respondent, State of Maharashtra; was not
in a position to tell us about ·what the exact stand of the State
Government in this. appeal is as to whether it supports or opposes the
contention of the appellant that the allegation made in the complaint
D constitutes an offence under s. 4 of the Act. For the reasons stated
above, we allow the appeal aud direct the learned Judicial Magistrate,
First Class to take further proceedings on the complaint and dispose
of the.case according to .Jaw.

P.B.R. Appeal al/owel'

/

'.

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