Holding

Section 34 IPC is applicable to all participants acting with a common intention, even without direct injury, and the evidence of PW‑3 and PW‑4 is admissible and credible, thereby upholding the conviction.

Summary

The appellant Lala Ram and others were convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code for the murder of Prabhu and Raghuveer, who were attacked by a large group. The High Court upheld the conviction based on the testimony of PW‑3, who gave water to the dying victims, and PW‑4, a relative of the deceased. The appellant challenged the applicability of Section 34, arguing that he did not personally cause the injury and that the relative's testimony should be deemed unreliable. The Supreme Court held that Section 34 is a rule of evidence that imposes joint liability for a criminal act done in furtherance of a common intention, even if an accused did not inflict the injury himself, and that the credibility of PW‑3 and PW‑4 was not impeached. Consequently, the conviction was affirmed and the appeal dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether Section 34 IPC applies when the accused did not personally cause the fatal injury.
Whether the testimony of a relative of the deceased (PW‑4) is inadmissible or unreliable.
Whether a common intention can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances to sustain conviction under s.302 r.w. s.34.
Whether the conviction under s.302 read with s.34 is legally justified.

Legislation cited

Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 34

Subjects

Section 34 IPCcommon intentionjoint liabilitymurderevidencerelative witnesscredibilityconvictionSupreme Courtappeal

Judgment

LALA RAM A
' --< v.
ST ATE OF RAJASTHAN

JUNE 20, 2007

[DR. ARIJIT PASA YAT AND D.K. JAIN, JJ.] B

,-...,. Penal Code, 1860:
~
s.34-App/icability of-Held: Applicable even when no injury is caused
by particular accused himself-It is not necessary to show overt act on the c
part of accused.

s.302 r!w. s.34.-Murder-One of the prosecution witnesses gave water
to the deceased when he was gasping for breath and was told by the
deceased about the incident and the assailants-Conviction by Courts below-
Held: Evidence of the witness is relevant-Hence conviction justified.
D
-/.
Evidence:

Evidence of relative-Held: There is no proposition in law that relative
to be treated as untruthfitl witness.
E
Prosecution case was that deceased was attacked by group of persons
including appellants on account of personal enmity. Trial Court ordered
conviction of appellant and others under s.302 r.w. s.34 IPC on the basis of
evidence of PW-3 and 4. The High Court found that the evidence of PW 3
was relevant as he had seen the person who saw the deceased persons in F
.... ~ :njured condition and had given water to them while they were gasping for
breath. PW-4 was related to the deceased persons and, therefore, the Court
-- analysed his evidence in detail and found it to be credible.

In appeal to this Court, appellant contended that s.34 IPC has no
application; that the evidence of PWs 3 and 4 cannot be called credible and G
cogent as PW 4 was related to the deceased and there was no reason as to
why the deceased would make any disclosure to PW 3 about the assailants.

-· ,( Dismissing the appeal, the Court

1095 H
~
1096 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007) 7 S.C.R.
\
A HELD: I.I. S.34 has been enacted on the principle of joint liability in yl
the doing of a criminal act The Section is only a rule of evidence and does
not create a substantive offence. The distinctive feature of the Section is the
element of participation in action. The liability of one person for an offence
committed by another in the course of criminal act perpetrated by several
persons arises under s.34 if such criminal act is done in furtherance ofa
B common intention of the persons who join in. committing the crime. Direct ·~
)
proof of common intention is seldom available and, therefore, such intention
can only be inferred from the circumstances appearing from the proved facts
~-
of the case and the proved circumstances. In order to bring home the charge
of common intention, the prosecution has to establish by evidence, whether
r'
C direct or circumstantial, that there was plan or meeting of mind of all the
accused persons to commit the offence for which they are charged with the
aid of s.34, be it pre-arranged or on the spur of moment; but it must
necessarily be before the commission of the crime. [Para 71 [1099-D-FJ

1.2. The existence of a common intention amongst the participants in
D a crime is the essential clement for application of this Section. It is not
necessary that the acts of the several persons charged with commission of an
offence jointly must be the same or identically similar. The acts may be _
different in character, but must have been actuated by one and the same
common intention in order to attract the provision.
[Para 71 (1099-G-H; 1100-AI
E
Ashok Kumar v. State of Punjab, AIR (1977) SC 109, relied on.
Mahbub Shah v. Emperor, AIR (1945) Privy Council 118, referred to.
1.3. The Section does not say "the common intention of all", nor does it
say "and intention common to all". Under the provisions of s.34 the essence
F of the liability is to be found in the existence ofa common intention animating
the accused leading to the doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such
intention. As a result of the application of principles enunciated in s. 34,
when an accused is convicted under s.302 read with s.34, in law it means that
the accused is liable for the act which caused death of the deceased in the
G same manner as if it was done by him alone. The provision is intended to meet
a case in which it may be difficult to distinguish bdween acts of individual.
members of a party who act in furtherance of the common intention of all or -
to prove exactly what part was taken by eac~ of them. S.34 is applicable even
if no injury has been caused by the particular accused himself. For applying
s.34 it is not necessary to show some overt act on the part of the accused. If
H the factual scenario as noted above is considered in the background of legal .
t,
LALA RAM v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [PASAYA T, J.] 1097

~ principles set out above,1he inevitable conclusion is that s.34 has been rightly A
applied. !Paras 10 and 12111100-C-E, GI

2. There is no proposition in law that relatives are to be treated as
untruthful witnesses. On the contrary, reason has to be shown when a plea of
partiality is raised to show that the witnesses had reason to shield actual
culprit and falsely implicate the accused. No evidence has been led in this B
regard. So far as PW 3 is concerned, he was the person who gave water to
the deceased while he was gasping for breath and only he lent helping hand
- .,; and tried to find out how the injuries were sustained. The deceased persons
told the witness that they were given beatings near the temple of Peerji on
the road. He was also told who the assailants were. In that view of the matter
the judgment and conviction of the High Court does not suffer from any
c
infirmity to warrant interference.
tparas 6 and 13111099C; 1100-H; 1101-A)

Ch. Pu/la Reddy and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR (1993) SC
1899; Anil Sharma and Ors. v. State ofJharkhand, 1200415 SCC 679; Harbans D
Kaur v. State of Haryana, 12005) 9 SCC 195 and Amit Singh Bhikamsingh
-·1-
Thakur v. State of Maharashtra, (20071 2 SCC 310, relied on.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 1116 of
2006.
E
From the Judgment and Order dated of the 1.12.2005 of the High Court
of Rajasthan, Bench at Jaipur in Crl. A.No. 499 of 200 I.

Shakeel Ahmed, (SCLSC) and Arna Das for the Appellant.

V. Madhukar, Sumit Ghosh, Sanjay Jha and Aruneshwar Gupta for the F
.,. ~
Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

DR ARIJIT PASA YAT, J. I. Three appellants before the Rajasthan High
Court alongwith one Giluda faced trial for alleged offence under Section 302
G
read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (in short the '!PC'). A Division
Bench of the Rajasthan High Court Jaipur Bench directed acquittal of the

- ~
Giluda and upheld the conviction so far as the appellants before it are
concerned. Each one of them was found guilty of offence punishable under
Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and was sentenced to undergo
imprisonment for life. 23 persons were named in the First Information Report H
+- }
1098 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007) 7 S.C.R.

A (in short the 'FIR') but after investigation police filed charge sheet agains~
seven of them. The appellants before High Court along with three others,
namely, Babu Ram, Raghuveer and Kailash faced trial. Said Babu Ram,
Raghuveer and Kailash were acquitted by the trial court. Each of the appellants
was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life each to pay fine about
B Rs.1,000/- with default stipulation. Only the present appellant has questioned
legality of the judgment of the High Court.

2. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

On 1.4.2000 at 4.30 p.m. First Information Report (in short the 'FIR') with
regard to the incident came to be lodged on the same day .at 7.30 p.m. by
C Bhonr Singh, brother of deceased Prabhu and Reghuveer. It was a written
report on the basis of which formal FIR came into being. Bhonr Singh in the
FIR lodged by him stated that between 4 to 5 in the evening on I .4.2000, his
brother Prabhu and Raghuveer were coming back from Thanagazhi after
attending hearing of a case. When they were going from Mandawara to
D Talvriksha, on the outskirts of the village, because of personal enmity, Girdhari
son of Dola Ram Rebari, Hanuman, Lala and their younger brother's sons of
Girdhari Rebari, Tulsa wife ofGirdhari, Hardeva, Giluda, Gopal, Shimbhu sons
of Hardeva, Santi wife of Hardeva and Hardeva himself, Ramjilal, Manaram,
Pancha, Yada sons of Bhora Jat, Prabhu, Maharam sons of Shankar and
relations of Girdhari Rebari whose names he did not know, Dhoti wife of
E Sunda Ram, Sundaram and his four sons started beating Prabhu and Raghuveer
with lathis, farsi, Jell etc. and injured them. At the spot, the occurrence was
witnesses by Ranveer, son ofDilip Singh, Hanuman, son ofGangaram, Girvar
Singh, son of Mukhram Singh, Bhima, son of Mukhram, Harinarain Gujar and
Ramniwas, sons of Phoola Gujar. He was taking bath in Talviksha when the
F occurrence had taken place. He was told about this occurrence by Sugla
Dhankar who told him that above named persons had beaten his brothers. He
then straightway went to lodge the report.

3. After completion of investigation charge sheet was filed. Accused
persons pleaded innocence.
G
4. Placing reliance on the evidence of PWs. 3 & 4 the trial court
recorded conviction of the appellant and others, while directing acqui~al of
Giluda. It is to be noted that before PW 3- the deceased persons purportedly
made dying declaration while PW4 was stated to be an eye witness. The High
Court found that the evidence of PW 3 to be relevant as he is the person who
H
LALA RAM v. STATEOFRAJASTHAN I PASAYA T.J.) 1099

saw the deceased persons in injured condition and gave water to them while A
they were gasping for breath. So far as PW 4 is concerned he was related
to the deceased persons and. therefore. the Court analysed his evidence in
detail and found it to be credible.

5. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted
that the evidence of PWs 3 & 4 cannot be called credible and cogent. PW B
4 was related to the deceased. There was no reason as to why the deceased
would make any disclosure to PW 3 about the assailants. Further, Section 34
has no application. Learned counsel for the State supported the judgment.

6. There is no proposition in law that relatives are to be treated as C
untruthful witnesses. On the contrary, reason has to be shown when a plea
of partiality is raised to show that the witnesses had reason to shield actual
culprit and falsely implicate the accused. No evidence has been led in this
regard.

7. Section 34 has been enacted on the principle of joint liability in the D
doing of a criminal act. The Section is only a rule of evidence and does not
create a substantive offence. The distinctive feature of the Section is the
element of participation in action. The liability of one person for an offence
committed by another in the course of criminal act perpetrated by several
persons arises under Section 34 if such criminal act is done in furtherance of
a common intention of the persons who join in committing the crime. Direct E
proof of common intention is seldom available and, therefore, such intention
can only be inferred from the circumstances appearing from the proved facts
of the case and the proved circumstances. In order to bring home the charge
of common intention, the prosecution has to establish by evidence, whether
direct or circumstantial, that there was plan or meeting of mind of all the F
accused persons to commit the offence for which they are charged with the
aid of Section 34, be it pre-arranged or on the spur of moment; but it must
necessarily be before the commission of the crime. The true contents of the
Section are that if two or more persons intentionally do an act jointly, the
position in law is just the same as if each of them has done it individually
by himself. As observed in Ashok Kumar v. State of Punjab, AIR (1977) SC G
I 09, the existence of a common intention amongst the participants in a crime
is the essential element for application of this Section. It is not necessary that
the acts of the several persons charged with commission of an offence jointly
must be the same or identically similar. The acts may be different in character,
but must have been actuated by one and the same common intention in order H
1100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS --(2007) 7 S.C.R.

A to attract the provision.
8. As it originally stood, Section 34 was in the following terms:

"When a criminal act is done by several persons, each of such
persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if the act was done
B by him alone."

9. In 1870, it was amended by the insertion of the words "in furtherance
of the common intention of all" after the word "persons" and before the word )

"each", so as to make the object of Section 34 clear. This position was noted
in Mahbub Shah v. Emperor, AIR (l 945) Privy Council 118.
c
10. The Section does not say "the common intention of all", nor does
it say "and intention common to all". Under the provisions of Section 34 the
essence of the liabiiity is to be found in the existence of a common intention
animating the accused leading to the doing of a criminal act in furtherance
of such intention. As a result of the application of principles enunciated in
D Section 34, when an accused is convicted under Section 302 read with Section
34, in law it means that the accused is liable for the act which caused death
of the deceased in the same manner as if it was done by him alope. The
provision is intended to meet a case in which it may be difficult to distifiguish
between acts of individual members of a party who act in furtherance 'of the
E common intention of all or to prove exactly what part was taken by each of
them. As was observed in Ch. Pu/la Reddy and Ors. v. State of Andhra
Pradesh, AIR (1993) SC 1899, Section 34 is applicable even if no injury has
been caused by the particular accused himself. For applying Section 34 it is
not necessary to show some overt act on the part of the accused.

F 11. The above position was highlighted recently in Anil Sharma and
Ors. v. State of Jharkhand, [2004] 5 SCC 679, in Harbans Kaur v. State of
Haryana, [2005] 9 SCC 195 and Amit Singh Bhikamsingh Thakur v. State of
Maharashtra, [2007] 2 SCC 310.

12. If the factual scenario as noted above is considered in the background
G of legal principles set out above, the inevitable conclusion is that Section 34
has been rightly applied.

13. So far as PW 3 is concerned he was the person who gave water to
the deceased while he was gasping for breath and only he lent helping hand
H and tried to find out how the injuries were sustained. The deceased persons
LALARAMv.STATEOFRAJASTHANWASAYAT.J.J 1101
told the witness that they were given beatings near the temple of Peerj i on A
.......... the road. He was also told who the assailants were. ln that view of the matter
the judgment and conviction of the High Court does not suffer from any
infinnity to warrant interference.

14. We record our appreciation for the able manner in which Mr. Shakeel
Ahmed, learned Amicus Curiae assisted the Court. ·B

15. Appeal stands dismissed.

D.G. Appeal dismissed.