Supreme Court of India
LANKA VENKATESWARLU (D) BY LRS.versusSTATE OF A.P. & ORS.
- Citation
- 2011 INSC 159
- Decided
- 24 February 2011
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- B SUDERSHAN REDDY
Holding
The High Court’s order condoning the delay is set aside as the discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was exercised unreasonably and without sufficient cause.
Summary
The original plaintiff, Lanka Venkateswarlu, filed a suit for title and injunction which was appealed after his death in 1990. The High Court ordered the government pleader to bring the legal heirs on record within a week, failing which the appeal would be dismissed. The appeal was dismissed on 6 February 1998 for non‑compliance. Years later, the respondents filed applications seeking condonation of a 3,703‑day delay to bring the heirs on record and an 883‑day delay to set aside the dismissal; the High Court, despite its own finding of gross negligence, allowed the applications and restored the appeal. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s condonation was unsustainable, emphasizing that discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act must be exercised reasonably and cannot be exercised where no sufficient cause exists, and it also rebuked the High Court’s intemperate language. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court order and allowed the appeals.
Issues considered
- The High Court’s power to condone an inordinate delay of 3,703 days and 883 days under Section 5 of the Limitation Act despite finding no sufficient cause.
- Whether the High Court’s language and sarcasm towards government pleaders violated principles of judicial restraint and impartiality.
Legislation cited
- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order 1 Rule 10, s. Order 22 Rule 4, s. Order 9 Rule 9, s. Section 151
- Limitation Act, 1963s. Section 5
Subjects
AbatementCondonation of delayLimitation ActJudicial discretionGovernment pleader negligenceJudicial languageOrder 22 CPCSection 5 Limitation ActAppeal abatementLegal heirs
Judgment
[2011] 3 S.C.R. 217
LANKA VENKATESWARLU (D) BY LRS. A
V.
STATE OF A.P. & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 2909-2913 of 2005)
FEBRUARY 24, 2011
B
[B.SUDERSHAN REDDY AND SURINDER SINGH
NIJJAR, JJ.]
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908:
c
Or. 22,r.4 - Abatement of appeal -Inordinate delay in
filing application for bringing legal heirs on record and for
setting aside abatement - High Court passed a conditional
order giving final opportunity to do the needful, failing which ·.
the appeal was to stand dismissed-Order not complied 0
with-Subsequently, High Court allowed. all applications
· condoning 3703 days delay in filing the application to bring
the legal heirs on record and 883 days delay in filing petition
to set aside the dismissal order-Held: Whilst considering
applications for condonation of delay u/s 5 of the Limitation E
Act, the courts do not enjoy unlimited and unbridled
discretionary powers-All discretionary powers, especially
judicial powers, have to be exercised within reasonable
bounds, known to the law-The discretion has to be exercised
in a systematic manner informed by reason-Whims or
fancies, prejudices or predilections can not and should not F
form the basis of exercising discretionary powers-High
Court, having recorded its conclusions and findings on the
unacceptable explanation for delay, should not have
condoned unconscionable delay-Judgment of High Court is
unsustainable either in law or in equity and is set aside- G
Limitation Act, 1963-s. 5.
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE:
217 H
218 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.
A Remarks in judgment of High Court on performance of
government pleaders -Appeal filed by State Government,
before High court-Inordinate delay on the part of
Government pleaders in taking steps to bring heirs and legal
representative of the respondent on record-Remarks made
B by High Court against Government pleaders-Held: High
Court has, rather sarcastically, dubbed the government
pleaders as without merit and ability-The approach adopted
by the High Court tends to show the absence of judicial
balance and restraint, which a Judge is required to maintain
c whilst adjudicating any /is between the parties-The High
Court not being satisfied with the use of mere intemperate
language, resorted to blatant sarcasms-The use of unduly
strong intemperate or extravagant language in a judgment
has been repeatedly disapproved by this Court in a number
of cases-The order of the High Court is based purely on the
0
persona! perceptions and predilections of the Judges on the
bench- The latent anger and hostility ingrained in the
expressions employed in the judgment have denuded the
judgment of impartiality-In its desire to castigate the
government pleaders and the Court staff, the High Court has
E sacrificed the ''iustice oriented approach", the bedrock of which
is fairness and impartiality-The caustic remarks made by the
High Court, against the government pleaders and the Court
staff clearly exhibit a departure from settled principles- The
judgment of the High Court is unsustainable either in law or
F in equity and, as such, is set aside- Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908-0r. 22, r.4 - Strictures - Judicial restraint.
During the pendency of the appeal before the High
Court against judgment and decree in a suit for
G declaration of title and permanent injunction, the plaintiff-
respondent died on 25.2.1990 and his counsel filed a
memo before the High Court giving the said intimation
after notice to the advocate for the appellants. When the
appeal came up for hearing on 24.4.1997, the counsel for
H the plaintiff-respondent again brought to the notice of the
LANKA VENKATESWARLU (D) BY LRS. v. STATE OF 219
AP. & ORS.
High Court the factum of death of his client. Since, inspite A
of the directions of the High Court, no steps wet": taken
to bring the legal heirs and representatives of the plaintiff·
respondent on record, on 6.2.1998, it gave one week's
time for compliance failing which the appeal would stand
dismissed. As the order was not complied with, the s
appeal stood dismissed in terms of the order dated
6.2.1998. In the year 2000, an application was filed by the
judgment-debtors before the High Court seeking
ccndonation of 883 days delay in filing the petition to set
aside the dismissal order dated 6.2.1998. On 17.8.2000 c
another application was filed seeking to condone 3703
days delay to bring the legal representatives on record.
It was accompanied by an application under Order 22 ,
Rule 4, CPC. After several adjournments at the instance
of the judgment-debtors, the appeal was listed for hearing
0
on 19.8.2003 on which date the High Court allowed all the
applications and restored the appeal and posted it for
hearing. Aggrieved, the heirs and legal representatives of
the plaint.iff filed the appeals.
Allowing the appeals, the Court E·
HELD: 1.1. This Court while issuing notice in the SLP
had directed proceedings in the appeal pending in the
High Court to remain stayed meanwhile. Therefore, it is
evident that the situation as on date is as it was when tluf F
order was passed on 06.02.1998 i.e. ' appeal filecrby
respondent Nos. 1 and 2 stood abated and; as such,
dismissed. [Para 16] [229-C]
1.2. Generally speaking, the courts including this
Court, adopt a liberal approach in considering the G
application for condonation of delay on the ground of
sufficient cause u/s 5 of the Limitation Act. [para 19] (230-
C]
Ba/want Singh (dead) Vs. Jagdish Singh, 2010 (8) H
220 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.
A SCR 597 = (2010) 8 SCC 685; N. Bafakrishnan Vs. M.
I Krishnamurthy 1998 (1) Suppl. SCR 403= (1998) 7 sec
123; Mithailal Dalsangar Singh & Ors. Vs. Annabai Devram
Kini & Ors. (2003) 10 SCC 691; and Sardar Amarjit Singh
Katra (dead) by LRs Vs. Pramod Gupta (dead) by LRs. 2002
B (5) Suppl. SCR 350 = (2003) 3 SCC 272; and Collector,
Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Ors. Vs. Katiji & Ors. 1987 (2)
SCR 387= (1987) 2 SCC 107 - referred to.
1.3. Whilst considering applications for condonation
of delay u/s 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the courts do
C not enjoy unlimited and unbridled discretionary powers.
All discretionary powers, especially judicial powers, have
to be exercised within reasonable bounds, known to t}le'
law. The discretion has to be exercised in ..a -~stetiiattc
manner informed by reason. Whims or fancies, prejudices
D or predilections can not and should not form the basis
of exercising discretionary powers. [para 26] [234-G-H;
235-A]
1.4. The High Court, in the instant case, graphically
E narrated the clear dereliction of duty by the government
pleaders concerned in not pursuing the appeal before it
diligently, and set out the different stages at which the
government pleaders had exhibited almost culpable
negligence in performance of their duties. It found the
F justification given by the government pleaders to be
unacceptable. Having recorded such conclusions,
inexplicably, the High Court proceeds to condone the
unconscionable delay. Such a course was not open to
the High Court, given the pathetic explanation offered by
G the respondents in the application seeking condonation
of delay. There does not seem to be any logic or rationale,
which could have impelled the High Court to condone the
delay after holding the same to be unjustifiable. The
concepts such as "liberal approach", "justice oriented
approach", "substantial justice" cannot be employed to
H
LANKA VENKATESWARLU (D) BY LRS. v. STATE OF 221
A.P. & ORS.
jettison the substantial law of limitation. Especially, in A
cases where the court concludes that there is no
justification for the delay. [para 24, 25-26] [234-B-C; 235-
F; 234-D]
2.1. In the opening paragraph of the impugned order 8
the High Court has, rather sarcastically, dubbed the
government pleaders as without merit and ability. The
approach adopted by the High Court tends to show the
absence of judicial balance and restraint, which a Judge
is required to maintain whilst adjudicating any lis C
between the parties. The High Court, not being satisfied
with the use of mere intemperate language, resorted to
blatant sarcasms. The use of unduly strong intemperate
or extravagant language in a judgment has been
repeatedly disapproved by this Court in a /number of
cases. [para 25-26] [233-G; 234-F] D
2.2. The order of the High Court is based purely on
the personal perceptions and predilections of the Judges
on the bench. The latent anger and hostility ingrained in
the expressions employed in the judgment have denuded E
the judgment of impartiality. In its desire to castigate the
government pleaders and the Court staff, the High Court
has sacrificed the "justice oriented approach", the
bedrock of which is fairness and impartiality. It is also
well known that anger deprives a human being of his F
ability to reason. Judges being human are not immune
to such disability. It is of utmost importance that in
expressing their opinions, Judges and Magistrates be
guided only by the considerations of doing justice. The
caustic remarks made by the High Court, against the G
government pleaders and the Court staff clearly exhibit
a departure from the well established principles. [para 27-
28] [235-B-D; 236-D]
State of U.P. Vs. Mohammad Nairn (1964)2 SCR 363 -
relied on. H
222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 3 S.C.R.
A 3. The judgment of the High Court is unsustainable
either in law or in equity and, as such, is set aside. [para
29] (236-E]
Case Law Reference:
B 2010 (8) SCR597 referred to para 18
1998 ( 1 ) Suppl. SCR 403 referred to para 18
(2003) 10 sec 691 referred to para 18
c 2002 (5 ) Suppl. SCR 350 referred to para 18
1987 ( 2) SCR 387 referred to para 19
(1964)2 SCR 363 relied on para 27
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
D 2909-2913 of 2005.
From the Judgment & Order dated 19.08.2003 of the High
Court Judicature Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in CMP Nos.
21114-21118 of 2003.
E
P.S. Narasimha and R. Sundaravardan, M. Srinivas R.
Rao, K. Parameshwar, Sudhu Gupta, G.N. Reddy, V. Pattabhi
Ram, C.K. Sucharita and V. Mohana for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
F
SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J. 1. These appeals are
directed against the order passed by a Division Bench of the
High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in
CMP Nos. 21114, 21115, 21116, 21117 and 21118 of 2003
G dated 19th August, 2003. By the aforesaid order, the High
Court has allowed all the petitions/applications.
2. In the applications/petitions, respondent No.3, herein,
had sought the following directions:-
H "CMP No. 21114/2003: Petition under Order 22 Rule 4
LANKA VENKATESWARLU (D) BY LRS. v. STATE 223
OF A.P. & ORS. [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
of the CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the A
affidavit titled therewith, the High Court will be pleased to
permit the petitioners to bring the above stated persons
as legal representatives of the deceased sole respondent
in Appeal No. 8 of 1985 on the file of the High Court.
B
CMP No. 21115/2003: Petition U/s praying that the High
Court may be pleased to set aside the dismissal Order
dated 6.2.98 in AS No.8of1985 and to restore the appeal
to file.
CMP No. 21116/2003: Petition Under Order 9 Rule 9 read C
with section 151 CPC, praying that the High Court may be
pleased to set aside the abatement caused due to the
death of sole respondent i.e. Lanka Venkateswarlu.
CMP No. 21117/2003: D
Between
Sri D.E.V Apparao ... Petitioner/impleaded
Petitioner in AS No.8 of 1985 on the file of High Court
E
And:
1. The State of A.P. rep. by District Collector,
Visakhapatnam.
2. The Tahsildar, Visakhpatnam F
... Respondent/Appellants
3. Lanka Venkateswarlu (died)
... Respondent G
Petition under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC, prays this Hon'ble
Court may be pleased to permit the petitioners society to
be impleaded as appellant No.3 along with the appellants
H
224 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 3 S.C.R.
A No. 1 and 2 in AS. 8 of 1985 on the file of the Hon'ble Court
to prosecute the appeal.
CMP No. 21118/2003: Petition U/s 5 of Limitation Act
praying the High Court may be pleased to condone the
delay of 883 days in filing the petition seeking to set aside
B
the dismissal order dated 6.2.1998.
These petitions coming on for hearing, upon perusing the
petition and the affidavit filed in support thereof and upon
hearing the arguments of Govt. pll=!ader for Appeal for
c Petitioners in CMP Nos. 21114, 21115, 21116, 21118 of
2003 and of Mr. K. Sarva Bhouma Rao, Advocate for
petitioner in CMP No. 21117 of 2003 and of Mr. M.S.R.
Subramanyam, Advocate for the respondents in CMP Nos.
21114, 21115, 21116, 21118 of 2003 and G.P. for Appeal
D for the respondents in CMP No. 21117 of 2003.
3. We may now briefly notice the relevant facts as stated
in the pleadings of the parties and the impugned order of the
High Court. The predecessor of the appellants, i.e., Shri Lanka
E Venkateswarlu, (hereinafter referred to as 'original plaintiff),
brought a suit O.S. No. 72of1979 before the subordinate judge
Visakhapatnam for the declaration of his title as the absolute
owner of the suit schedule property and for permanent injunction
restraining respondents Nos. 1 and 2 from interfering with his
peaceful possession. The suit schedule property, to the extent
F of 2 acres was, according to the original plaintiff, covered by
survey No. 73/12 in Thokada village. He had purchased the suit
schedule property by a registered sale deed dated 15th July,
1961 from one Gonna Appanna son of Venkataswamy of China
Gantyda village. The original plaintiff was constrained to file the
G aforesaid suit on coming to know that respondent Nos. 1 and
2 were claiming the suit schedule land to be "banjar land" which
vested in the Government. He had also learned that the land
was in imminent danger of being illegally alienated by the
respondent Nos. 1 and 2. They were claiming that the land was
H required to issue Pattas to weaker sections of society.
LANKA VENKATESWARLU (D) BY LRS. v. STATE OF 225
A.P. & ORS. [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
4. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were impleaded as the A
defendants to the suit. Subsequently, the suit was transferred
to the Court of IVth Additional District Judge, Visakhapatnam
and renumbered as O.S. No. 83 of 1981.
5. The aforesaid averments of the original plaintiffs were 8
controverted by the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. It was claimed
that the plaint schedule property was not covered by old survey
No. 73/12 of the original village of Thokada. The boundaries
as well as survey number were stated to be fictitious, forged
and imaginary. Even the ownership of the ancestors of the
vendor of the original plaintiff of the suit schedule land was C
denied. Further, the alleged sale deed dated 15th July, 1961
between the original plaintiff and the vendor was denied. It was
also stated that the original plaintiff was not in possession and
enjoyment of the plaint schedule property.
D
6. On the pleadings of the parties, the trial court framed
six issues. Issue No. 1 pertains to the title of the original plaintiff
to the schedule property. Issues No.2 & 3 were with regard to,
whether the original plaintiff was entitled to relief of declaration
and injunction as prayed for. Issue No.4' was whether the suit E
is not maintainable. A perusal of the judgment of the trial court
shows that the suit was hotly contested on each and every
issue. Issues ·1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 were decided in favour of the
original plaintiff and against the defendants, i.e., respondent
Nos. 1 and 2. Issue No.5 with regard to valuation of the suit was F
not pressed by the government pleader. The suit was decreed
by judgment dated 24th September, 1982.
7. The respondents challenged the aforesaid judgment and
decree by filing an appeal before the High Court of Andhra
Pradesh being A.S. No. 8 of 1985. The sole respondent, i.e., G
original plaintiff died on 25th February, 1990. Therefore, the
Advocate appearing for the deceased original plaintiff being
the 'sole respondent' in the appeal filed a memo before the High
Court giving intimation about the death of his client. The memo
H
226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.
A was filed after giving notice to the advocate for respondent Nos.
1 and 2, who were appellants in the aforesaid appeals. In spite
of such intimation, respondent Nos. 1 and 2 failed to bring the
legal representatives of the deceased original plaintiff on
record.
B
8. From the judgment of the High Court it is apparent that
the appeal came up for hearing on 24th April, 1997. At that
stage, the counsel for the appellants again brought to the notice
of the Court that his client has passed away on 25th February,
C 1990. The High Court directed the government pleader to take
steps to bring on the record the legal representatives of the
original plaintiff and posted the matter for hearing on 16th June,
1997. It appears that no actions were taken by the respondents
to comply with the order passed by the High Court on 24th April,
1997. Therefore, on 6th February, 1998, Justice V. Rajagopala
D Reddy, J. passed the following order:-
"Appeal under Section 96 CPC against the order of the
Court of the IV Addi. District Judge, Visakhapatnam
dt.24.09.1982 in O.S. No. 83/81.
E
This appeal coming on for orders under Rule 64 of the
Appellate Side Rules of the High Court on the failure of
the Appellant herein.
1. To take steps to bring on record the LRs. of the
F deceased sole respondent.
In the presence of G./P. for Excise for the Appellant and
of Mr. M.S.R. Subramanyam, Advocate for the respondent
No.1.
G It is ordered as follows:
1. That the Appellant do within one week from the date
of this order comply with the requisitions of the
Office referred to above and;
H
LANKA VENKATESWARLU (D) BY LRS. v. STATE OF 227
A.P. & ORS. [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
2. That in default of compliance with the said A
requisitions within the time prescribed in clause 1
supra, the Appeal shall stand dismissed as against
the sole respondent herein."
9. The aforesaid order was admittedly not complied with.
8
Consequently, the appeal stood abated in terms of the order
dated 6th February, 1998. It appears that thereafter CMPSR
No. 49656 of 2000 was moved by respondent Nos. 1 and 2
seeking condonation of 883 days delay in filing the petition to
set aside the dismissal order dated 6th February, 1998. The
application was accompanied by an affidavit where it is C
candidly admitted by respondent No.2 that the order dated 6th
February, 1998 was not complied with. It was further admitted
that as the order dated 6th February, 1998 was not complied
with, the default order came into force and the appeal stood
dismissed. D
10. In this affidavit, the explanation given is that the
predecessors of the officer. who affirmed the affidavit dated
11th July, 2000 came to know about the dismissal of the appeal
during the course of investigation in original O.S. No. 6 of 2000 E
which had been filed by the widow and the children of the
deceased original plaintiff, i.e., sole respondent in the appeal.
. It is also admitted that thereafter, an application was filed for
setting aside the order of abatement dated 6th February, 1998,
but, without any application seeking condonation of delay of 883 F
days in filing the petition. To cover the foresaid lapse, CMP No.
21118 of 2003 was filed seeking condonation of delay of 883
days in filing the petition.
11. Thereafter CMPSR No. 58644 of 2000 was filed on
17th August, 2000 with a prayer to condone the delay of 3703 G
days to bring the legal representatives on record. CMPSR No.
58646 of :2000 was filed to bring the legal representatives of
the deceased original plaintiff on record and CMPSR No.
58645 of 2000 to set aside the order of dismissal in AS No. 8
H
228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.
A of 1985 dated 6th February, 1998 was filed. These
applications were subsequently numbered as noted in the
heading of the impugned judgment.
12. It appears from the impugned order of the High Court
and CMPSR No. 58644 of 2000 was numbered as CMP no.
8
17186 of 2000 on 17th August, 2000 and listed before the Court
on 27th September, 2000. The High Court granted two weeks
time for filing the counter. The aforesaid CMP was posted for
hearing before the bench on 16th October, 2000
(Venkatanarayan,J.). At that time, counsel for the deceased
C original plaintiff submitted that his client had died in 1990 and
he had no instructions. Therefore, the Court directed to issue
notice to the parties on the petition. Even at that stage the
government pleader did not bring to the notice of the Court that
the applications filed by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 to set aside
D the order of dismissal and to bring the legal representatives on
record were pending consideration.
13. Thereafter it appears the matter was adjourned on a
number of occasions from 27th June, 2001 to 9th April, 2002.
E Surprisingly, on 3rd June, 2002 the government pleader again
took time from the Court to verify whether any separate
application was filed for restoration of the appeal and whether
any such application was pending or not. Thereafter the matter
was not pursued by the government pleader.
F 14. In the meantime, the alleged beneficiaries to whom
Pattas had been granted by the Government Poramboke in the
year 1979 filed CMP No. 21705 of 2000, seeking permission
of the Court to come on record as the third appellant in the
· appeal. In the impugned order, it is also pointed out that the
G pendency of the applications had come to the notice of the
Court intermittently. It appears that the application to condone
the delay in filing the petition for setting aside the order of
dismissal was filed, when the lapse was pointed by the Court.
H 15. Thereafter, it seems that without the adjudication of any
LANKA VENKATESWARLU (D) BY LRS. v. STATE OF 229
AP. & ORS. [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
of the applications on merits, the appeal was listed for hearing A
· before the Bench, which culminated into passing the judgment
and order dated 19th August, 2003, subject matter of the
present appeal. By the aforesaid judgment, the High Court has
allowed all the applications restored the appeal posted it for
hearing on 25th August, 2003. B
16. This Court while issuing notice in the SLP on 15th
December, 2003 directed that "in the meantime, proceedings
in the appeal pending in the High Court shall remain stayed".
Therefore, it is evident that the situation today is as it was when C
the order was passed on 6th February, 1998, i.e., appeal filed
by the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 stood abated and hence
dismissed.
17. We have heard the learned counsel for parties. Mr.
P.S. Narasimha, senior advocate, appearing for the appellant D
submitted that the impugned order of the High Court cannot be
justified on any legal ground. He submits that the High Court
having itself recorded the utter negligence of the respondents
in pursuing the appeal at every stage, without any justification,
condoned the delay. The learned senior counsel pointed out that E
there was no explanation, much less any plausible explanation
to justify the delay of 3703 days in filing the application for
bringing on record the LRs. of the sole respondent or for the
delay in filing the application for setting aside the order dated
6th February, 1998. It was further submitted that there was no F
justification to permit the respondent No.3 to be impleaded as
a party in the appeal. Learned counsel relied on- the judgment
of thi.s Court in the case of Ba/want Singh (dead) Vs. Jagdish
Singh 1 in support of the submission that the law of limitation
has to be enforced in its proper prospective. Even though the G
Courts have power to condone the delay, it can not be
condoned without any justification. Such an approach would
result in rendering the provisions contained in the Limitation Act
redundant and inoperative.
1. c2010) s sec ess. H
230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011] 3 S.C.R.
A 18. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents
relied on the judgments of this Court in the case of N.
Batakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy2, Mithailat Datsangar
Singh & Ors. Vs. Annabai Devram Kini & Ors. 3 and Sardar
Amarjit Singh Katra (dead) by LRs Vs. Pramod Gupta (dead)
B by LRs. 4 and submitted that the High Court in condoning the
delay has merely advanced the cause of substantial justice.
19. We have considered the submissions made by the
learned counsel. At the outset, it needs to be stated that
C generally speaking, the courts in this country, including this
Court, adopt a liberal approach in considering the application
for condonation of delay on the ground of sufficient cause under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act. This principle is well settled and
has been set out succinctly in the case of Collector, Land
Acquisition, Anantnag & Ors. Vs. Katiji & Ors5•
D
20. In the case of M. Batakrishnan (supra), this Court again
reiterated the principle that rules of limitation are not meant to
destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that the
parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy
E promptly.
21. In the case of Sarclar Amarjit Singh Katra (supra), this
Court again emphasized that provisions contained in the Order
22 CPC were devised to ensure continuation and culmination
F in an effective adjudication and not to retard further progress
of the proceedings. The provisions contained in the Order 22
are not to be construed as a rigid matter of principle, but must
ever be viewed as a flexible tool of convenience in the
administration of justice. It was further observed that laws of
procedure are meant to regulate effectively, assist and aid the
G object of doing a substantial and real justice and not to
2. (1998) 1 sec 123.
3. (2003) 10SCC 691.
4. (2003) 3 sec 212.
H s. (1987) 2 sec 101.
LANKA VENKATESWARLU (D) BY LRS. v. STATE OF 231
A.P. & ORS. [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
foreclose even adjudication on merits of substantial rights of A
citizen under personal, property and other laws. In the case of
Mithailal Da/sangar Singh and Ors. Vs. Annabai Devram Kini
& Ors, (Supra), this Court again reiterated that in as much. as
abatement results in denial of hearing on the merits of the case,
the provision of an abatement has to be construed strictly. On B
the other hand, the prayer of setting aside abatement and the
dismissal consequent upon abatement had to be considered
liberally. It was further observed as follows:-
"The Courts have to adopt a justice oriented approach
dictated by the uppermost consideration that ordinarily a C
litigant ought not to be denied an opportunity of having a
lis determined on merits unless he has, by gross
negligence, deliberate inaction or something akin to
misconduct, disentitled himself from seeking the·
indulgence of the court." D
22.. The concepts of liberal approach and reasonableness·
in exercise of the discretion by the Courts in condoning delay,
have been again stated by this Court in the case of Ba/want
Singh (supra), as follows:- E
"25. We may state that even if the term "sufficient cause"
has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall
within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct
of the party concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal F
construction normally is to introduce the concept of
"reasonableness" as it is understood in its general
connotation."
"26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has
definite consequences on the right and obligation of party G
to arise. These principles should be adhered to and
applied appropriately depending on the facts and
circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has
accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of
the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient H
232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 3 S.C.R.
A cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take
away that right on the mere asking of the applicant,
particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence,
default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to
both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be
a achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in
implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally
unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has
accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly."
23. Let us now examine as to whether the High Court was
C justified in condoning the delay in the peculiar facts of the
presence case. The High Court in its judgment records the
following conclusions:-
"(1) The Government Pleader having filed the appeal on
D 18.2.1983 has taken three long years to get the appeal
numbered.
(2) The sole respondent died in 1990. The learned counsel
for the respondent submits that he served a letter on the
learned Government Pleader bringing to his notice about
E
the death of his client in 1990 itself. Since the letter is not
traced we are not giving much importance to that fact. But
at the same time this fact was brought to the notice of the
Government Pleader on 24.2.1997 when the appeal was
listed for hearing.
F
(3) Even though the Court gave sufficient time the
Government Pleader has not taken any steps to bring LRs.
on record.
G (4) After one year the Court passed a Conditional Order
on 6.2.1998 and the appeal was dismissed for not bringing
the LRs. on record.
(5) After two more years the concerned officials of the
Government and the Government Pleader in office at the
H
LANKA VENKATESWARLU (D) BY LRS. v. STATE OF 233
A.P. & ORS. [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
relevant point of time, filed some applications, which are A
not in order.
(6) Even then they have not bestowed any attention either
to comply with the defects in filing the application or in
getting the orders are passed on these applications. But 8
at the same time they went on taking time without knowing
for what purpose they were taking time.
In the result an appeal which would have been disposed
of in 1997 remained pending all these years mainly due
to the negligence on the part of the Government Pleader C
in office.
Thereafter at the two stages, the High Court records that:-
"ln the normal course we would have thrown out these
0
applications without having second thought in the
matter. ............ ."
"We have already observed that in the normal course we
would have dismissed the applications for severe latches
on the part of the appellants and their counsel." E
24. Having recorded the aforesaid conclusions, the High
Court proceeded to condone the delay. In our opinion, such a
course was not open to the High Court, given the pathetic
explanation offered by the respondents in the application F
seeking condonation of delay.
25. This is especially so in view of the remarks made by
the High Court about the delay being cau$ed by the inefficiency
and ineptitude of the government pleaders. The displeasure of
the Court is patently apparent from the impugned order ·itself. G
In the opening paragraph of the impugned order the High Court
has, rather sarcastically, dubbed the government pleaders as
without merit and ability. Such an insinuation is clearly
discernable from the observation that "This is a classic case,
how the learned government pleaders appointed on the basis H
234 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011] 3 S.C.R.
A of merit and ability (emphasis supplied) are discharging their
function protecting the interest of their clients". Having said so,
the High Court, graphically narrated the clear dereliction of duty
by the concerned government pleaders in not pursuing the
appeal before the High Court diligently. The High Court has set
B out the different stages at which the government pleaders had
exhibited almost culpable negligence in performance of their
duties. The High Court found the justification given by the
government pleaders to be unacceptable. Twice in the
impugned order, it was recorded that in the normal course, the
c applications would have been thrown out without having a
second thought in the matter. Having recorded such
conclusions, inexplicably, the High Court proceeds to condone
the unconscionable delay.
26. We are at a loss to fathom any logic or rationale, which
D could have impelled the High Court to condone the delay after
holding the same to be unjustifiable. The concepts such as
"liberal approach", "justice oriented approach", "substantial
justice" can not be employed to jettison the substantial law of
limitation. Especially, in cases where the Court concludes that
E there is no justification for the delay. In our opinion, the approach
adopted by the High Court tends to show the absence of judicial
balance and restraint, which a Judge is required to maintain
whilst adjudicating any lis between the parties. We are rather
pained to notice that in this case, not being satisfied with the
F use of mere intemperate language, the High Court resorted to
blatant sarcasms. The use of unduly strong intemperate or
extravagant language in a judgment has been repeatedly
disapproved by this Court in a number of cases. Whilst
consideiing applications for condonation of delay under Section
G 5 of the Limitation Act, the Courts do not enjoy unlimited and
unbridled discretionary powers. All discretionary powers,
especially judicial powers, have to be exercised within
reasonable bounds, known to the law. The discretion has to be
exercised in a systematic manner informed by reason. Whims
H or fancies; prejudices or predilections can not and should not
LANKA VENKATESWARLU (0) BY LRS. v. STATE OF 235
A.P. & ORS. [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
form the basis of exercising discretionary powers. A
27. The order of the High Court, in our opinion, is basec:i
purely on the personal perceptions and predilections of the
Judges on the bench. The .latent anger and hostility ingrained
in the expressions employed in the judgment have denuded the
8
judgment of impartiality. In its desire to castigate the
government pleaders and the Court staff, the High Court has
sacrificed the "justice oriented approach", the bedrock of which
is fairness and impartiality. Judges at all levels in this country
subscribe to an oath when entering upon office of Judgeship,
to do justice without fear or favour, ill will or malice. This C
commitment in form of a solemn oath is to ensure that Judges
base their opinions on objectivity and impartiality. The first
casualty of prejudice is objectivity and impartiality. It is also well
known that anger deprives a human being of his ability to
reason. Judges being human are not immune to such disability. D
It is of utmost importance that in expressing their opinions,
Judges and Magistrates be guided only by the considerations
of doing justice. We may notice here the observations made
by a Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of State of
U.P. Vs. Mohammad Naim 6, which are of some relevance in E
the present context. In Paragraph 11 of the judgment, it was
observed as follows:-
"If there is one principle of cardinal importance in the
administration of justice, it is this: the proper freedom and F
independence of Judges and Magistrates must be
maintained and they must be allowed to perform their
functions freely and fearlessly and without undue
interference by any body, even by this Court. At the same
time it is equally necessary that in expressing their opinions G
Judges and Magistrates must be guided by
considerations of justice, fair-play and restraint. It is not
· infrequent that sweeping gen,filr~lisations defeat the very
6. (1964) 2 SCR 363. H
236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.
A purpose for which they are made. It has been judicially
recognised that in the matter of making disparaging
remarks against persons or authorities whose conduct
comes into consideration before courts of law in cases to
be decided by them, it is relevant to consider (a) whether
B the party whose conduct is in question is before the court
or has an opportunity of explaining or defending himself;
(b) whether there is evidence on record bearing on that
conduct, justifying the remarks; and (c) whether it is
necessary for the decision of the case, as an integral part
c thereof, to animadvert on that conduct. It has also been
recognised that judicial pronouncements must be judicial
in nature, and should not normally depart from sobriety,
moderation and reserve."
28. We are of the considered opinion that the caustic
D remarks made by the High Court, against the government
pleaders and the Court staff clearly exhibits a departure from
the principles quoted above.
29. We are of the considered opinion that the judgment of
E the High Court is unsustainable either in law or in equity.
Consequently, the appeals are allowed. The impugned
judgment of the High Court is set aside with no order as to
costs.
R.P. Appeals allowed.
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