Holding

The offence is covered by Section 304 Part I IPC, not Section 302 IPC, and the conviction is altered accordingly.

Summary

Laxminath shot arrows at Mahgin Bai and her mother‑in‑law, Gangadei, during a dispute; one arrow struck Gangadei’s chest and she later died. The trial court convicted Laxminath under Sections 302 (murder) and 324 IPC, sentencing him to life imprisonment and two years respectively, a judgment upheld by the Chhattisgarh High Court. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the act of shooting a single arrow from a distance amounted to murder under Section 302 or to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part I. Relying on the statutory distinctions in Sections 299 and 300 and on precedents, the Court held that the knowledge and probability of death did not reach the high degree required for murder, and the offence fell within Section 304 Part I. Consequently, the conviction was altered to Section 304 Part I IPC with an eight‑year imprisonment, and the appeal was allowed.

Issues considered

Whether the shooting of a single arrow from a distance that caused death is punishable under Section 302 IPC (murder) or Section 304 Part I IPC (culpable homicide not amounting to murder).

Legislation cited

Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 299, s. 300, s. 302, s. 304 Part I, s. 324

Subjects

murderculpable homicide not amounting to murderSection 302 IPCSection 304 Part I IPCintentknowledgeprobability of deathIndian Penal Codecriminal law

Judgment

[2009] 1 S.C.R. 348

A LAXMINATH
v.
STATE OF CHHATTISGARH
(Criminal Appeal No. 75 of 2009)

JANUARY 16, 2009
B
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND DR. MUKUNDAKAM
SHARMA, JJ.]

PENAL CODE, 1860:
c
S.302, 324 - Murder - Conviction - Upheld by High
Court - On appeal, Held: Considering the factual scenario
and the fact that one arrow was shot the offence is covered
by S.304 Part I /PC and not S.302 /PC - Hence conviction
D
altered from S.302 /PC to S.304 Part I /PC - Custodial ,. .
sentence of eight years would meet the ends of justice.

S.304 Part I - Applicability of.

S.299, 300 - Points of distinction between the two
E offences - Discussed.
In this appeal, the question for consideration was
whether in view of the peculiar fact that only one arrow
"f
was shot from a distance, Section 302 IPC is applicable.
F Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1. Clause (4) of Section 300 would be
applicable where the knowledge of the offender as to the
probability of death of a person or persons in general as
G distinguished from a particular person or persons - being
caused from his imminently dangerous act, approximates ,,..
to a practical certainty. Such knowledge on the part of the
offender must be of the highest degree of probability, the
act having been committed by the offender without any
H 348
LAXMINATH v. STATE OF CHHATIISGARH 349

excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such A
injury as aforesaid. The above are only broad guidelines
and not cast iron imperatives. In most cases, their
observance will facilitate the task of the Court. [Paras 17
and 18) [357-H; 358-A-D]
B
1.2. Considering the factual scenario and the facts
that one arrow was shot the offence is covered by Section
304 Part I IPC and not Section 302 IPC. Though it cannot
be laid down that whenever one arrow is shot Section
302 IPC will not apply, on the facts of the present case it C
appears to be so. Therefore, conviction is altered from
Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part I IPC. Custodial
sentence of eight years would meet the ends of justice.
[Para 20) [358-F-GJ

Rajwant and Anr. v. State of Kera/a, AIR 1966 SC 1874; D
Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465; State of
Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya and Anr. 1976 (4)
SCC 382; Abdul Waheed Khan @ Waheed and Ors. v. State
of Andhra Pradesh JT 2002 (6) SC 27 4; Augustine Saldanha
v. State of Kamataka 2003 (10) SCC 472 and Thangaiya v. E
State of Tamil Nadu 2005 (9) SCC 650, relied on.
Case Law Reference:
AIR 1966 SC 1874 relied on Para 11
F
AIR 1958 SC 465 relied on Para 12
1976 (4) sec 382 relied on Para 19
JT 2002 (6) SC 274 relied on Para 19
2003 (10) sec 472 relied on Para 19 G
2005 (9) sec 650 relied on Para 19
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
Nos. 75 of 2009.
H
350 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 1 S.C.R.

A From the Judgment dated 1.3.2006 of the High Court of
Chattisgarh at Bilaspur in Criminal Appeal No. 888 of 1996.

Brij Bhushan for the Appellar.t.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B
DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Leave granted.

2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of the
Division Bench of the Chhattisgarh High Court upholding the
C conviction of the appellant for the offences punishable under
Sections 302 and 324 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short
the 'IPC'). The accused persons were sentenced to undergo
imprisonment for life and for two years respectively for the said
offences.

D 3. Prosecution version as unfolded during trial is as
follows:

Mahgin Bai (PW-1) lodged the F.l.R (Ex. P-1) in the Police
Station Bhairamgarh on 4.2.1993 at about 12.30 p.m. to the
E effect that on 3.2.1993 she was thrashing paddy in the house.
At that time her mother-in-law Gangadei (hereinafter referred
to as the 'deceased') was preparing page. Accused Laxminath
who is husband of her sister-in-law, came and demanded page.
Her mother-in-law gave page to the accused. He thereafter
F demanded tobacco, on which her mother-in-law gave him
tobacco also and accused left the house. Thereafter, the
accused came with bow & arrow and shot the arrow on her,
which hit on h,er left upper ;;irm and blood sta'1ed oozing out of
it. Accused ~lso shot an arrow on her mother-in-law, which hit
on chest, blood started oozing out of the injury and accused ran
G away. Her uncle-in-law Dhaniram (PW2) witnessed the incident,
brought the villagers and by that time, her mother-in-law was
alive. Arrow was stuck in the chest of her mother-in-law.
Villagers took her mother-in-law to Police Station Bhairamgarh
from where they took her to Jagdalpur Hospital, but on the way
H near Mawlibhata Gangadei she succumbed to the injury.
LAXMINATH v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH 351
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
Receiving this report, the police registered the FIR (Ex. P-1). A
The Investigating Officer left for the scene of occurrence and
took into possession the bow under Ex.P-2. The Investigating
Officer gave a written request Ex. P-3 to the Assistant Surgeon,
Primary Health Centre, Bhairamgarh for examination of the
injuries of Mahgin Bai, on which doctor examined and prepared B
the injury report and mentioned that there was one incised
wound over left upper' arm. Arrow, weapon of offence was taken
into possession under Ex.P-4 and the petticoat of deceased
Gangadei was taken into possession under Ex.P-5. Blood
stained soil and plain soil was taken into possession under c
Ex.P-6 from the place of occurrence. Arrow in question was
examined by the doctor on the request of Station House Officer
Ex.P-7 and doctor opined that the injury on the body of Mahgin
Bai could be caused by the said arrow. Panchnama (Ex.P-10)
of the body of Gangadei was prepared after giving notice Ex.P-
D
- -f 9 to the Panchas. Postmortem on the body of deceased
Gangadei was conducted by Dr. S.K. Naik and he prepared
the post mortem report. There was a dying declaration before
PW-6. •

After completion of investigation, charge sheet was filed E
against the accused/appellant iti the Court of learned Additional
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jagdalpur, who in turn committed the
case to learned Sessions Judge, Jagdalpur from where learned
tst Additional Sessions Judge, Jagdalpur received the case
on transfer for trial. As accused pleaded innocence, trial was F
held. Learned trial Judge recorded conviction as noted above.

Before the High Court the basic stand was that the
evidence was not sufficient to fasten guilt on the accused. The
oral dying declaration was not believable.
G
It was also submitted that only one arrow was shot from a
~ distance and, therefore, Section 302 IPC has no application.
The High Court did not accept the plea and upheld the conviction
and the sentence.
H
352 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 1 S.C.R.

A 4. The stand before the High Court was reiterated before
this Court.

5. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand,
supported the judgment of the trial Court as affirmed by the High
Court.
8
6. The basic question is whether Section 302 IPC has
application.

7. In the scheme of the IPC culpable homicide is genus
c and 'murder' its specie. All 'murder' is 'culpable homicide' but
not vice-versa. Speaking generally, 'culpable homicide' sans
'special characteristics of murder is culpable homicide not
amounting to murder'. For the purpose of fixing punishment,
proportionate to the gravity of the generic offence, the IPC
· 0 practically recognizes three degrees of culpable homicide. The
first is, what may be called, 'culpable homicide of the first r ·
degree'. This is the gravest form of culpable homicide, which
is defined in Section 300 as 'murder'. The second may be
termed as 'culpable homicide of the second degree'. This is
E punishable under the first part of Section 304. Then, there is
'culpable homicide of the third ~egree'. This is the lowest type
of culpable homicide and the punishment provided for it is also
the lowest among the punishments provided for the three
grades. Culpable homicide of this degree is punishable under
the second part of Section 304.
F
8. The academic distinction between 'murder' and
'culpable homicide not amounting to murder' has always vexed
the Courts. The confusion is caused, if Courts losing sight of
the true scope and meaning of the terms used by the legislature
G in these sections, allow themselves to be drawn into minute
abstractions. The safest way of approach to the interpretation
and application of these provisions seems to be to keep in
focus the keywords used in the various clauses of Sections 299
and 300. The following comparative table will be helpful in
H appreciating the points of distinction between the two offences.
LAXMINATH v. STATE OF CHHATIISGARH 353
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

Section 299 Section 300 A

A person commits culpable homicide Subject to certain
if the act by which the death is caused exceptions culpable
is done- homicide is murder
if the act by which
B
• the death is
caused is done-

INTENTION
'
(a) with the intention of causing (1) with the intention of c
death; or causing death; or
(b) with the intention of causing (2) with the intention of
such bodily injury as is likely causing such bodily

-
--;
to cause death; or injury as the offender
knows to be likely to
cause the death of the
person to whom the harm
D

is caused;
or
E
(3) With the intention of
causing bodily injury to any
person and the bodily
injury intended to be
inflicted is sufficient in the F
ordinary course of nature
to cause death; or

KNOWLEDGE

**** G
(c) with the knowledge that the (4) with the knowledge that
act is likely to cause death. the act is so imminently
dangerous that it must in
H
354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 1 S.C.R.

A all probability cause death
or such bodily injury as is
likely t<? cause death, and
without any excuse for
incurring the risk of
B causing death or such
injury as is mentioned
above.

9. Clause (b) of Section 299 corresponds with clauses (2)
and (3) of Section 300. The distinguishing feature of the mens
C rea requisite under clause (2) is the knowledge possessed by
the offender regarding the particular victim being in such a
peculiar condition or state of health that the internal harm
caused to him is likely to be fatal, notwithstanding the fact that
such harm would not in the ordinary way of nature be sufficient
D to cause death of a person in normal health or condition. It is
noteworthy that the 'intention to cause death' is not an essential
requirement of clause (2). Only the intention of causing the
-
r .

bodily injury coupled with the offender's knowledge of the
likelihood of such injury causing the death of the particular
E victim, is sufficient to bring the killing within the ambit of this
clause. This aspect of clause (2) is borne out by illustration (b)
appended to Section 300.
10. Clause (b) of Section 299 does not postulate any such
F knowledge on the part of the offender. Instances of cases falling
under clause (2) of Section 300 can be where the assailant
causes death by a fist blow intentionally given knowing that the
victim is suffering from an enlarged liver, or enlarged spleen
or diseased heart and such blow is likely to cause death of that
particular person as a result of the rupture of the liver, or spleen
G or the failure of the heart, as the case may be. If the assailant
had no such knowledge about the disease or special frailty of
the victim, nor an intention to cause death or bodily injury
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the
offence will not be murder, even if the injury which caused the
H death, was intentionally given. In clause (3) of Section 300,
LAXMINATH v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH ' 355
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
instead of the words 'likely to cause death' occurring in the A
corresponding clause (b) of Section 299, the words "sufficient
in the ordinary course of nature" have been used. Obviously,
the distinction lies between a bodily injury likely to cause death
and a bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death. The distinction is fine but real and if overlooked, B
may result in miscarriage of justice. The difference between
clause (b) of Section 299 and clause (3) of Section 300 is one
of the degree of probability of death resulting from the intended
bodily injury. To put it more broadly, it is the degree of probability
of death which determines whether a culpable homicide is of c
the gravest, medium or the lowest degree. The word 'likely' in
clause (b) of Section 299 conveys the sense of probable as
distinguished from a mere possibility. The words "bodily
injury....... sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
death" means that death will be the "most probable" result of
0
~·-i the injury, having regard to the ordinary course of nature.
11. For cases to fall within clause (3), it is not necessary
that the offender intended to cause death, so long as the death
ensues from the intentional bodily injury or injuries sufficient to
cause death in the ordinary course of nature. Rajwant and Anr. E
v. State of Kera/a, (AIR 1966 SC 1874) is an apt illustration of
this point.
12. In Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, (AIR 1958 SC 465),
Vivian Bose, J. speaking for the Court, explained the meaning F
and scope of clause (3). It was observed that the prosecution
must prove the following facts before it can bring a case under
Section 300, "thirdly". First, it must establish quite objectively,
that a bodily injury is present; secondly the nature of the injury
must be proved. These are purely objective investigations.
Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict G
that particular injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or
unintentional or that some other kind of injury was intended.
· .Once these three elements are proved to be present, the
· enquiry proceeds further, and fourthly it must be proved that the
injury of the type just described made up of the three elements H
356 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 1 S.C.R.

A set out above was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary
course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and
inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the
offender.

13. The ingredients of clause "Thirdly" of Section 300, IPC
8
were brought out by the illustrious Judge in his terse language
as follows:

"To put it shortly, the prosecution must prove the following
facts before it can bring a case under Section 300,
c "thirdly".

First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury
is present. -.
Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved. These
D are purely objective investigations.
r
Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to
inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say that it was
not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of
E injury was intended.
Once these three elements are proved to be present, the
enquiry proceeds further and,
Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just
F described made up of th.e three elements set out above
is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.
This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential
and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender."
14. The learned Judge explained the third ingredient in the
G following words (at page 468):

"The question is not whether the prisoner intended to inflict ~
a serious injury or a trivial one but whether he intended to
inflict the injury that is proved to be present. If he can show
H that he did not, or if the totality of the circumstances justify
LAXMINATH v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH 357
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
•
such an inference, then of course, the intent that the section A
requires is not proved. But if there is nothing beyond the
injury and the fact that the appellant inflicted it, the only
possible inference is that he intended to inflict it. Whether
he knew of its seriousness or intended serious
consequences, is neither here or there. The question, so B
far as the intention is concerned, is not whether he intended
... to kill, or to inflict an injury of a particular degree of
seriousness but whether he intended to inflict the injury in
question and once the existence of the injury is proved the
intention to cause it will be presumed unless the evidence c
or the circumstances warrant an opposite conclusion."

15. These observations of Vivian Bose, J. have become
....... locus classicus. The test laid down by Virsa Singh's case
~
(supra) for the applicability of clause "Thirdly" is now ingrained
in our legal system and has become part of the rule of law. D
Under clause thirdly of Section 300 IPC, culpable homicide is
murder, if both the following conditions are satisfied: i.e. (a) that
the act which causes death is done with the intention of causing
death or is done with the intention of causing a bodily injury;
and (b) that the injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the E
ordinary course of nature to cause death. It must be proved that
there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury which,
in the ordinary course of nature, was sufficient to cause death,
viz., that the injury found to be present was the injury that was
intended to be inflicted. F

16. Thus, according to the rule laid down in Virsa Singh's
case, even if the intention of accused was limited to the infliction
of a bodily injury sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course
of nature, and did not extend to the intention of causing death, G
the offence would be murder. Illustration (c) appended to
' "" Section 300 clearly brings out this point.
17. Clause (c) of Section 299 and clause (4) of Section
300 both require knowledge of the probability of the act causing
death. It is not necessary for the purpose of this case to dilate H
358 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009) 1 S.C.R.

A much on the distinction between these corresponding clauses.
It will be sufficient to say that clause (4) of Section 300 would
be applicable where the knowledge of the offender as to the
probability of death of a person or persons in general as
distinguished from a particular person or persons - being
B caused from his imminently dangerous act, approximates to a
practical certainty. Such knowledge on the part of the offender
must be of the highest degree of probability, the act having been
committed by the offender without any excuse for incurring the
risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.
c 18. The above are only broad guidelines and not cast iron
imperatives. In most cases, their observance will facilitate the
task of the Court. But sometimes the facts are so intertwined
and the second and the third stages so telescoped into each
other that it may not be convenient to give a separate treatment
D to the matters involved in the second and third stages. ,,,-
19. The position was illuminatingly highlighted by this Court
in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya and Anr.
(1976 (4) SCC 382), Abdul Waheed Khan@ Waheed and
E Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh (JT 2002 (6) SC 274), and
Augustine Saldanha v. State of Karnataka (2003 (10) SCC
472) and Thangaiya v. State of Tamil Nadu (2005 (9) SCC
€50).

20. Considering the factual scenario and the facts that one
F arrow was shot the offence is covered by Section 304 Part I
IPC and not Section 302 IPC. Though it cannot be laid down
that whenever one arrow is shot Section 302 IPC will not apply,
on the facts of the present case it appears to be so. Therefore,
conviction is altered from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part
G I IPC. Custodial sentence of eight years would meet the ends
of justice. ~

21. Appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.

G.N. Appeal allowed.
H