LIFE CONVICT BENGAL @ KHOKA @ PRASANTA SENversusB.K. SRIVASTAVA & ORS.

                         [2013) 3 S.C.R. 392


A    LIFE CONVICT BENGAL @ KHOKA @ PRASANTA SEN
                                   v.
                   B.K. SRIVASTAVA & ORS.
           CONTEMPT PETITION (C) NO. 363 OF 2011
                                 IN
B             (Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 279 of 2004)

                        FEBRUARY 13, 2013
    [P. SATHASIVAM AND         JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, JJ.]

c         Penal Code, 1860 - s.57 - Life imprisonment - Meaning
    and effect of -Remission - Entitlement to - Held: Once a person
    is sentenced to undergo life imprisonment unless
    imprisonment for life is commuted by the competent authority,
    he has to undergo imprisonment for the whole of his life - S.57
0   /PC does not, in any way, limit the punishment of
    imprisonment for life to a term of 20 years - In absence of
    subsequent order of remission by the competent Government
    either based on s.57 /PC or any other provision of CrPC, the
    life convict cannot be released - Neither s.57 /PC nor
E   Explanation to s.61 of the WB. Act lays down that a life
    imprisonment prisoner has to be released after completion
    of 20 years - 20 years mentioned in Explanation to s. 61 of
    the WB. Act is only for the purpose of ordering remission -
    On facts, if the State Government taking into consideration
F   various aspects refused to grant remission of the whole period
    then the petitioner cannot take advantage of the above
    Explanation and even s. 57 /PC and seek for pre-mature
    release -Further the question of remission of the entire
    sentence or a part of it lies within the exclusive domain of the
    appropriate Government uls.401 CrPC and neither s.57 /PC
G   nor any rules or local Acts (in the case on hand WB. Act) can
    stultify the effect of the sentence of life imprisonment given
    by the Court under the /PC - West Bengal Correctional
    Services Act, 1992 - ss. 2(c) and 61, Explanation - Code of
    Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.432.
H                                  392
 LIFE CONVICT BENGAL @ KHOKA @ PRASANTA 393
            SEN v. B.K. SRIVASTAVA      .

      Contempt of Court - Life convict filed writ of Habeas A
Corpus for his immediate release stating that he had already
undergone full sentence of 20 years with remission - Supreme
Court directed the respondents- State of West Bengal to
consider the claim and proceed to conclude the sentence for
the purpose of consideration of remission - Contempt petition B
filed by the life convict contending that inspite of the said order
of the Supreme Court and the WB. Act, the respondents had
not granted remission and had not released him - Held: In
West Bengal, there is a duly constituted Sentence Review
Board for consideration of applications for premature release c
made by life convicts - On facts, the State Sentence Review
Board, after careful consideration of all the aspects, had
declined to recommend the petitioner-life convict for his
premature release - State Government accepted the
recommendation of the State Sentence Review Board and 0
communicated its decision to the petitioner - There was no
violation of the order passed by the Supreme Court - No merit
in the contempt petition - West Bengal Correctional Services
Act, 1992 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.432.

     The petitioner - a life convict was convicted under E
Section 302/34 IPC. He filed a writ of Habeas Corpus for
his immediate release stating that he had already
undergone full sentence of 20 years with remission. The
Supreme Court disposed of the writ petition directing the
respondents- State 1,of West Bengal to consider the claim F
of the petitioner and proceed to conclude the sentence
for the purpose of consideration of remission as per the
applicable Statute/Policy.

     The petitioner filed the instant contempt petition G
contending that inspite of the said order of the Supreme
Court and the West Bengal Corr.ectional Services Act,
1992, the respondents had not granted remission and
had not released him. He contended that the respondents
- the State of West Bengal and its officers had disobeyed H
    394     SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2013] 3 S.C.R.

A the order passed by the Supreme Court by not complying
  with the same. The petitioner contended that as per order
  of the Supreme Court, the respondents ought to have
  released the petitioner on completion of a period of 20
  years.
B
        Per. contra, the respondents- State Government
  highlighted that on going into the period of custody, other
  particulars and the provisions of the West Bengal Act, it
  had rejected the prayer of the petitioner for his premature
  release, hence, there was no violation of the order passed
C by the Supreme Court. The respondents contended that
  it cannot be construed that the period of imprisonment
  for life is equivalent to imprisonment for 20 years and that
  in absence of remission order for the whole period by the
  State Government, the petitioner could not be released.
D
        Dismissing the contempt petition, the Court
       HELD: 1.1. In the absence of subsequent order of
  remission by the competent Government either based on
E Section 57 of IPC or any other provision of the Criminal
  Procedure Code, 1973, the life convict cannot be released.
  Neither Section 57 IPC nor Explanation to Section 61 of
  the W.B. Act lays down that a life imprisonment prisoner
  has to be released after completion of 20 years. 20 years
  mentioned in Explanation to Section 61 of the W.B. Act
F is only for the purpose of ordering remission. If the State
  Government taking into consideration various aspects
  refused to grant remission of the whole period then the
  petitioner cannot take advantage of the above
  Explanation and even Section 57 IPC and seek for pre-
G mature release. Further the question of remission of the
  entire sentence or a part of it lies within the exclusive
  domain of the appropriate Government under Section 432
  of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and neither
  ~ection 57 of the IPC nor any rules or local Acts (in the
H
 LIFE CONVICT BENGAL @ KHOKA @ PRASANTA 395
           SEN v. B.K. SRIVASTAVA
case on hand W.B. Act) can stultify the effect of the A
sentence of life imprisonment given by the Court under
the IPC. To put it clear, once a person is sentenced to
undergo life imprisonment unless imprisonment for life ·
is commuted by the competent authority, he has to
undergo imprisonment for the whole of his life. Section B
57 IPC does not, in any way, limit the punishment of
imprisonment for life to a term of 20 years. [Para 16) [412-
F-H; 413-A-B]

    1.2. In the case on hand, it is highlighted by the
counsel for the respondents that in West Bengal there is C
a duly constituted Review Board for consideration of
applications for premature release made by life convicts.
On receipt of the application for premature release except
under Article 161 of the Constitution, the Review Board
would go into all the details and place it before the D
Government. Ultimately on approval of the Hon'ble Chief
Minister, the convict is prematurely released under
Section 432 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.
Insofar as application under Article 161 is concerned, it
was explained that the procedure followed remains the E
same but the file is finally placed before His Excellency
the Governor of the State through the Hon'ble Chief
Minister. In the instant case, it is seen that after careful
consideration of all the aspects, the State Sentence
Review Board in its meeting held on 27.01.2011 did not F
recommend the petitioner for his premature release. The
recommendation of the Review Board was placed before
the State Government and the State Government
accepted the recommendation of the State Sentence
Review Board. The decision of the State Government G
was communicated to the petitioner. In view of the
decision of the State Sentence Review Board, approval
by the State Government and the principles enunciated
in various decisions of this Court including the decision
of the Constitution Bench in Gopal Vinayak Godse's H
    396       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2013] 3 S.C.R.


A case, there is no merit in the contempt petition. [Paras 17,
    18 and 19] [413-C, G-H; 414-A; 415-A-C]

         Gopal Vinayak Godse vs. The State of Maharashtra &
    Ors. AIR 1961 SC 600: 1961 SCR 440 - followed.

B      State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Ratan Singh & Ors. (1976)
  3 SCC 470: 1976 (0) Suppl. SCR 552; Kartar Singh & Ors.
  vs. State of Haryana (1982) 3 SCC 1: 1983 (1) SCR 445;
  Laxman Naskar vs. Union of India & Ors. (2000) 2 SCC 595:
  2000 (1) SCR 796; Mohd. Munna vs. Union of India & Ors.
C etc. (2005) 7 SCC 417: 2005 (3) Suppl. SCR 233 - relied
    on.

          Pandit Kishori Lal vs. King Emperor AIR 1945 PC 64 -
    referred to.
D                          Case Law Reference:
          1961 SCR 440                  followed           Paras 11,12,
                                                           13,19

          1976 (0) Suppl. SCR 552 relied on                Para 12
E
          1983 (1) SCR 445              relied on          Para 13

          AIR 1945 PC 64                referred to        Para 13, 15

          2000 (1) SCR 796              relied on          Para 14
F         2005 (3) Suppl. SCR 233 relied on                Para 14

          CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Contempt Petition
    (Civil) No. 363 of 2011.
                                      IN
G
    Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 279 of 2004.

          Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.

       S.S. Malik, Naveen Sherawat, Chander Shekhar Ashri for
H the Petitioner.
  LIFE CONVICT BENGAL @ KHOKA @ PRASANTA 397
             SEN v. B.K. SRIVASTAVA
     Avijit Bhattacharjee, Bikas Kargupta, Sarbani Kar for the              A
 Respondents.

      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

      P. SATHASIVAM, J. 1. The petitioner - a life convict has
filed this contempt petition against the respondents - the State            B
of West Bengal and its officers for disobeying the order dated
24.11.2010 passed by this Court by not complying with the
same within the prescribed period of eight weeks and failure
to release him in accordance with the statute.
                                                                            c
      2. Brief facts:

       (a) Prior to the above contempt petition, the petitioner filed
  a writ of Habeas Corpus being W.P. (Crl.) No. 279 of 2004 -
  for his immediate release in which it was stated that as per his
                                                                            0
  calculation, he has undergone total sentence of imprisonment
  for a period of 22 years 2 months and 16 days including earned
  remission. According to him, even as per the stand taken by
· the respondents in their counter affidavits, he had undergone
  sentence for a period bf 20 years 1 month an_d 17 days including
  remission and set off as on 31.12.2004. In other words,                   E
  according to the petitioner, he has already undergone full
  sentence of 20 years with remission.

       (b) By order dated 24.11.2010, this Court disposed of W.P.
 (Crl.) Nos. 20 and 279 of 2004 with the following directions:              F
      "In the light of the decision of this Court in State of Haryana
      & Ors. vs. Jagdish, 2010 (4) sec 216 and considering
      the relief prayed in both the writ petitions, we dispose of
      the writ petitions by the following directions:
                                                                            G
            The State of West Bengal is directed to consider the
      claim of both the writ petitioners, life convicts and proceed
      to conclude the sentence for the purpose of consideration
      of remission as per the Statute/Policy applicable on the
      date of conviction and pass appropriate orders in terms
       .                                                                '
                                                                            ti
    398      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    (2013] 3 S.C.R.

A         of the above decision within a period of eight weeks from
          the date of the receipt of the copy of this order.

               The Writ Petitions are disposed of.

                                                      Sd/-
B                                              (P.Sathasivam,J.)
                                                      Sd/-
                                               (Dr. B.S.ChauhanJ.)"

          3. It is the claim of the petitioner that in spite of the said
c   order of this Court dated 24.11.2010 and in view of the West
    Bengal Correctional Services Act, 1992 (West Bengal Act 32
    of 1992) (hereinafter referred to as "the W.B.Act"), the
    respondents have not released him which necessitated him to
    file the above contempt petition.
D      4. Pursuant to the notice issued by this Court, Mr. B.K.
  Srivastava, respondent No.1, Secretary to the Government of
  West Bengal, Judicial Department has filed the counter affidavit
  highlighting their stand. In addition to the same, Dr. G.D.
  Gautama, respondent No.2, Additional Chief Secretary to the
E Government of West Bengal, Home Department and Mr. Biplab
  Das - respondent No.3, Superintendent of the Presidency
  Correctional Home have filed counter affidavits reiterating their
  stand. In these counter affidavits, the State Government has
  highlighted that on going into the period of custody, other
F particulars and the provisions of the West Bengal Act, it
  rejected the prayer of the petitioner for his premature release,
  hence, according to them, there is no violation of order dated
  24.11.2010 passed by this Court and prayed for dismissal of
  the present contempt petition.
G
          5. We heard Mr. B.S. Malik, learned senior counsel for the
    petitioner and Mr. Avijit Bhattacharjee, learned counsel for the
    respondents.

H
 LIFE CONVICT BENGAL @ KHOKA @ PRASANTA                         399
   SEN v. B.K. SRIVASTAVA [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
Discussion:                                                            A
     6. In order to appreciate the claim of both the parties, it is
useful to refer relevant provisions relating to release of prisoners
under the W.B. Act. Section 2(c) of the W.B. Act defines
"correctional home" which reads as under:
                                                                       B
     "2(c) "correctional home" means any place used
     permanently or temporarily under the orders of the State
     Government for detention of persons, whether under-trial
     or convicted, in accordance with any order for confinement
     under any law providing for preventive detention or any           C
   . other law for the time being in force, but does not include
     a place for confinement of a person under the custody of
     the police;"

Chapter XVII of the said Act deals with remission, release and
                                                                       0
parole. Section 58 speaks about remission, Section 59 relates
to special remission to examinees and Section 61, with which
we are concerned, speaks about release. Section 61 contains
6 sub-sections and thereafter Explanation has been appended
to. Mr. B.S. Malik, learned senior counsel for the petitioner          E
heavily relied on the Explanation to Section 61 which reads as
under:

     "Explanation - For the purpose of calculation of the total
     period of imprisonment under this section, the period of
     imprisonment for life shall be taken to be equivalent to the      F
     period of imprisonment for 20 years."

     7. Relying on the Explanation and in view of the fact that
even according to the State, the petitioner has crossed 20
years in correctional home (prison), according to the learned          G
senior counsel, as per order of this Court dated 24.11.2010,
the respondents ought to have released the petitioner on
completion of a period of 20 years. The above claim was
resisted by Mr. Avijit Bhattacharjee, learned counsel for the
respon.dents. According to him, it cannot be construed that the        H
    400       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 3 S.C.R.


A   period of imprisonment for life is equivalent to imprisonment
    for 20 years. He further pointed out that in the absence of
    remission order for the whole period by the State Government,
    the petitioner cannot be released.

        8. Even at the outset. Mr. B.S. Malik, learned senior
B counsel for the petitioner, relied on a decision rendered by this
  Court on 16.09.2011 in Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 38 of 2011 titled
  Harpal Singh vs. State of Haryana & Another. The said writ
  petition, under Article 32 of the Constitution, was filed by one
  Harpal Singh for issuing a writ of Habeas Corpus and to set
C him at liberty forthwith from his illegal det~ntion in the prison
  beyond 20 years of his sentence. This Court, after going into
  the Jail Custody Certificate dated 28.08.2011 issued by the
  Superintendent Central Jail, Ambala and finding that the
  petitioner had undergone imprisonment of more than 20 years
D with remissions, allowed the writ petition and directed the
  authorities to release him forthwith from the jail unless his
  presence in jail is needed with reference to any other case.

        9. After going into the relevant provisions, viz., Section 57
E of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short "IPC"), Sections 2(c)
  and 61 of the W.B. Act as well as various decisions of this Court·
  on this point, we are unable to accept the claim of the petitioner
  for the following reasons.

         10. Before adverting to various decisions, it is useful to
F   reproduce Section 57 of IPC which reads as under:

          "57. Fractions of term of punishment - In calculating
          fractions of terms of punishment, imprisonment for life
          shall be reckoned as equivalent to imprisonment for twenty
G         years."

        11. At the foremost, it is useful to refer the decision of the
    Constitution Bench of this Court in Gopa/ Vinayak Godse vs.
    The State of Maharashtra & Ors., AIR 1961 SC 600. In that
    case, a writ petition, under Article 32 of the Constitution, was
H
 LIFE CONVICT BENGAL @ KHOKA @ PRASANTA 401
   SEN v. B.K. SRIVASTAVA [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
filed for an order in the nature of Habeas Corpus claiming that         A
the petitioner therein has justly served his sentence and should,
therefore, be released forthwith. Among other questions, the
main question considered by the Constitution Bench was
whether there is any provision of law whereunder a sentence
for life imprisonment, without any formal remission by                  B
appropriate Government, can be automatically treated as one
for a definite period? The Constitution Bench, in an answer to
the above question, said "No". The following discussion and
ultimate conclusion are relevant:

          "5 ............ No such provision is found in the Indian
                                                                        c
    Penal Code, Code of Criminal Procedure or the Prisons
    Act. Though the Government of India stated before the
    Judicial Committee in the case cited supra that, having
    regard to Section 57 of the Indian Penal Code, 20 years'
    imprisonment was equivalent to a sentence of                        D
    transportation for life, the Judicial Committee did not
    express its final opinion on that question. The Judicial
    Committee observed in that case thus at p. 10:

            "Assuming that the sentence is to be regarded as            E
            one of twenty years, and subject to remission for
            good conduct, he had not earned remission
            sufficient to entitle him to discharge at the time of
            his application, and it was therefore rightly
            dismissed, but in saying this, Their Lordships are          F
            not to be taken as meaning that a life sentence must
            in all cases be treated as one of not more than
            twenty years, or that the convict is necessarily
            entitled to remission."

            Section 57 of the Indian Penal Code has no real             G
            bearing on the question raised before us. For
            calculating fractions of terms of punishment the
            section provides that transportation for life shall be
            regarded as equivalent to imprisonment for twenty
            years. It does not say that transportation for life shall   H
    402       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2013] 3 S.C.R.

A                be deemed to be transportation for twenty years for
                 all purposes; nor does the amended section which
                 substitutes the words "imprisonment for life" for
                 "transportation for life" enable the drawing of any
                 such all embracing fiction. A sentence of
B                transportation for life or imprisonment for life must
                 prima facie be treated as transportation or
                 imprisonment for the whole of the remaining period
                 of the convicted person's natural life."

                 "7. It is common case that the said rules were made
c         under the Prisons Act, 1894 and that they have statutory
          force. But the Prisons Act does not confer on any authority
          a power to commute or remit sentences; it provides only
          for the regulation of prisons and for the treatment of
          prisoners confined therein. Section 59 of the Prisons Act
D         confers a power on the State Government to make rules,
          inter alia, for rewards for good conduct. Therefore, the
          rules made under the Act should be construed within the
          scope of the ambit of the Act. The rules, inter alia, provide
          for three types of remissions by way of rewards for good
E         conduct, namely, (i) ordinarily, (ii) special and (iii) State.
          For the working out of the said remissions, under Rule
          1419(c), transportation for life is ordinarily to be taken as
          15 years' actual imprisonment. The rule cannot be
          construed as a statutory equation of 15 years' actual
F         imprisonment for transportation for life. The equation is
          only for a particular purpose, namely, for the purpose of
          "remission system" and not for all purposes. The word
          "ordinarily" in the rule also supports the said construction.
          The non obstante clause in sub-rule (2) of Rule 1447
G         reiterates that notwithstanding anything contained in Rule
          1419 no prisoner who has been sentenced to
          transportation for life shall be released on completion of
          his term unless orders of the Government have been
          received on a report submitted to it. This also indicates
H         that the period of 15 years' actual imprisonment specified
LIFE CONVICT BENGAL @ KHOKA @ PRASANTA 403
  SEN v. B.K. SRIVASTAVA [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

  in the rule is only for the purpose of calculating the A
  remission and that the completion of the term on that basis
  does not ipso facto confer any right upon the prisoner to
  release. The order of the Government contemplated in Rule
                      \

  1447 in the case of a prisoner sentenced to transportation
  for life can only be an order under Section 401 of the Code B
  of Criminal Procedure, for in the case of a sentence of
  transportation for life the release of the prisoner can legally
  be effected only by remitting the entire balance of the
  sentence. Rules 934 and 937(c) provide for that
  contingency. Under the said rules the orders of an                 c
  appropriate Government under Section 401 Criminal
  Procedure Code, are a pre-requisite for a release. No other
  rule has been brought to our notice which confers ari
  indefeasible right on a prisoner sentenced to transportation
  for life to an unconditional release on the expiry of a            o
  particular term including remissions. The rules under the
  Prisons Act do not substitute a lesser sentence for a
  sentence of transportation for life.

          8. Briefly stated the legal position is this: Before Act
  26 of 1955 a sentence of transportation for life could be          E
  undergone by a prisoner by way of rigorous imprisonment
  for life in a designated prison in India. After the said Act,
  such a convict shall be dealt with in the same manner as
  one sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for the same term.
  Unless the said sentence is commuted or remitted by                F
  appropriate authority under the relevant provisions of the
  Indian Penal Code or the Code of Criminal Procedure, a
  prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment is bound in law to
  serve the life term in prison. The rules framed under the
  Prisons Act enable such a prisoner to earn remissions -            G
  ordinary, special and State - and the said remissions will
  be given credit towards his term of imprisonment. For the
  purpose of working out the remissions the sentence of
  transportation for life is ordinarily equated with a definite
  period, but it is only for that particular purpose and not for     H
    404       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2013] 3 S.C.R.


A         any other purpose. As the sentence of transportation for
          life or its prison equivalent, the life imprisonment, is one
          of indefinite duration, the remissions so earned do not in
          practice help such a convict as it is not possible to predict
          the time of his death. That is why the Rules provide for a
B         procedure to enable the appropriate Government to remit
          the sentence under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal
          Procedure on a consideration of the relevant factors,
          including the period of remissions earned. The question
          of remission is exclusively within the province of the
          appropriate Government; and in this case it is admitted
c         that, though the appropriate Government made certain
          remissions under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal
          Procedure, it did not remit the entire sentence. We,
          therefore, hold that the petitioner has not yet acquired any
          right to release."
D
    From the above decision, it is clear that in the absence of
    subsequent order of remission by the competent Government
    either based on Section 57 of IPC or any other provision of the
    Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the life convict cannot be
E   released. The above decision of the Constitution Bench has
    been followed in various subsequent decisions.

        12. In State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Ratan Singh & Ors.,
    (1976) 3 SCC 470, following the decision of the Constitution
F   Bench in Gopal Vinayak Godse's case (supra), this Court held
    as under:

                 "4. As regards the first point, namely, that the prisoner
          could be released automatically on the expiry of 20 years
          under the Punjab Jail Manual or the Rules framed under
G         the Prisons Act, the matter is no longer res integra and
          stands concluded by a decision of this Court in Gopal
          Vinayak Godse v. State of Maharashtra where the Court,
          following a decision of the Privy' Council in Pandit Kishori
          Lal v. King-Emperor.AIR 1945 PC 64 observed as follows:
H
LIFE CONVICT BENGAL @ KHOKA @ PRASANTA 405
  SEN v. B.K. SRIVASTAVA [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
  "Under that section, a person transported for life or any    A
  other term before the enactment of the said section would
  be treated as a person sentenced to rigorous
  imprisonment for life or for the said term.
                                     '
  If so, the next question is whether there is any provision of B
  law whereunder a sentence for life imprisonment, without
  any formal remission by appropriate Government, can be
  automatically treated as one for a definite period. No such
  provision is found in the Indian Penal Code, Code of
  Criminal Procedure or the Prisons Act.
                                                               c
        *                     *                 *

         A sentence of transportation for life or imprisonment
  for life must prima facie be treated as transportation or
  imprisonment for the whole of the remaining period of the
                                                               0
  convicted person's natural life."

  The Court further observed thus:

        "But the Prisons Act does not confer on any authority
  a power to commute or remit sentences; it provides only E
  for the regulation of prisons and for the treatment of
  prisoners confined therein. Section 59 of the Prisons Act
  confers a power on the State Government to make rules,
  inter alia, for rewards for good conduct. Therefore, the
  rules made under the Act should be construed within the F
  scope of the ambit of the Act.. .. Under the said rules the
  orders of an appropriate Government under Section 401
  of the Criminal Procedure Code, are a prerequisite for a
  release. No other rule has been brought to our notice which
  confers an indefeasible right on a prisoner sentenced to G
  transportation for life to an unconditional release on the
  expiry of a particular term including remissions. The rules
  under the Prisons Act do not substitute a lesser sentence
  for a sentence of transportation for life.

       The question of remission is exclusively within the     H
    406      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2013) 3 S.C.R.


A         province of the appropriate Government; and in this case
          it is admitted that, though the appropriate Government
          made certain remissions under Section 401 of the Code
          of Criminal Procedure, it did not remit the entire sentence.
          We, therefore, hold that the petitioner has not yet acquired
B         any right to release."

                 It is, therefore, manifest from the decision of this
          Court that the Rules framed under the Prisons Act or under
          the Jail Manual do not affect the total period which the
          prisoner has to suffer but merely amount to administrative
c         instructions regarding the various remissions to be given
          to the prisoner from time to time in accordance with the
          rules. This Court further pointed out that the question of
          remission of the entire sentence or a part of it lies within
          the exclusive domain of the appropriate Government under
D         Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and neither
          Section 57 of the Indian Penal Code nor any Rules or local
          Acts can stultify the effect of the sentence of life
          imprisonment given by the court under the Indian Penal
          Code. In other words, this Court has clearly held that a
E         sentence for life would enure till the lifetime of the accused
          as it is not possible to fix a particular period of the
          prisoner's death and remissions given under the Rules
          could not be regarded as a substitute for a sentence of
          transportation for life. In these circumstances, therefore, it
F         is clear that the High Court was in error in thinking that the
          respondent was entitled to be released as of right on
          completing the term of 20 years including the remissions.
          For these reasons, therefore, the first contention raised by
          the Learned Counsel for the appellant is well founded and
G         must prevail.

          9. From a review of the authorities and the statutory
          provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure the following
          propositions emerge:

H                "(1) that a sentence of imprisonment for life does
LIFE CONVICT BENGAL @ KHOKA @ PRASANTA 407
  SEN v. B.K. SRIVASTAVA [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
       not automatically expire at the end of 20 years        A
       including the remissions, . because the
       administrative rules framed under the various Jail
       Manuals or under the Prisons Act cannot
       supersede the statutory provisions of the Indian
       Penal Code. A sentence of imprisonment for life        B
       means a sentence for the entire life of the prisoner
       unless the appropriate Government chooses to
       exercise its discretion to remit either the whole or
       a part of the sentence under Section 401 of the
       Code of Criminal Procedure;                            c
       (2) that the appropriate Government has the
       undoubted discretion to remit or refuse to remit the
       sentence and where it refuses to remit the sentence
       no writ can . be issued directing the State
       Government to release the prisoner;                    D

       (3) that the appropriate Government which is
       empowered to grant remission under Section 401
       of the Code of Criminal Procedure is the
       Government of the State where the prisoner has         E
       been convicted and sentenced, that is to say, the
       transferor State and not the transferee State where
       the prisoner may have been transferred at his
       instance under the Transfer of Prisoners Act; and

       (4) that where the transferee State feels that the     F
       accused has completed a period of 20 years it has
       merely to forward the request of the prisoner to the
       concerned State Government, that is to say, the
       Government of the State where the prisoner was
       convicted and sentenced and even if this request       G
       is rejected by the State Government the order of the
       Government cannot be interfered with by a High
       Court in its writ jurisdiction."

                                                              H
    408       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2013] 3 S.C.R.


A After holding so, this Court set aside the order of the High Court
  releasing the prisoner therein from Central Jail, Amritsar.

      13. In Kartar Singh & Ors. vs. State of Haryana, (1982)
  3 SCC 1, a Bench of three Judges of this Court while
B considering the similar claim held as under:

                 "6 ...... Further, Section 57 IPC or the remission rules
          contained in Jail Manual (e.g. para 516-B of Punjab/
          Haryana Jail Manual) are irrelevant in this context. Section
          57 IPC provides that imprisonment for life shall be
c         reckoned as equivalent to imprisonment for 20 years for
          the specific purpose mentioned therein, namely, for the
          purpose of calculating fractions of terms of punishment
          and not for all purposes; similarly remission rules contained
          in Jail Manuals cannot override statutory provisions
D         contained in the Penal Code and the sentence of
          imprisonment for life have to be regarded as a sentence
          for the remainder of the natural life of the convict. The Privy
          Council in Pandit Kishori Lal case and this Court in Gopal
          Godse case have settled this position once and for all by
E         taking the view that a sentence for transportation for life
          or imprisonment for life must be treated as transportation
          or imprisonment for the whole of the remaining period of
          the convicted person's natural life. This view has been
          confirmed and followed by this Court in two subsequent
F         decisions - in Ratan Singh case, and Maru Ram case In
          this view of the matter life convicts would not fall within the
          purview of Section 428 CrPC."

  The Bench also considered Gopal Godse case (supra) and the
  decision of the Privy Council in Pandit Kishori Lal vs. King
G Emperor, AIR 1945 PC 64.

        14. In Laxman Naskar vs. Union of India & Ors., (2000)
    2 SCC 595, this Court reiterated the same proposition.

          15. The last decision which is directly on the point similar
H
 LIFE CONVICT BENGAL @ KHOKA @ PRASANTA 409
   SEN v. B.K. SRIVASTAVA [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
to the case on hand is Mohd. Munna vs. Union of India & Ors.          A
etc. (2005) 7 sec     417. The said case arose in a writ petition
filed under Art. 32 of the Constitution. According to the
petitioner therein, the length of duration of imprisonment for life
is equivalent to 20 years' imprisonment and that too subject to
further remission admissible under law. It was further pointed        B
out that on completion of this term, he was liable to be released
under Rule 751 (c) of the West Bengal Jail Code. The petitioner
relied on Explanation to Section 61 of the West Bengal
Correctional Services Act, 1992 (West Bengal Act 32 of 1992)
whereunder imprisonment for life is equated to a term of 20           c
years' imprisonment. As said earlier, it is a case identical to
the case on hand. Here again, Explanation to Section 61 of
the West Bengal Act was pressed into service. After going into
the very same provisions and considering the decision of the
Privy Council in Pandit Kishori Lat's case (supra) as well as
                                                                      0
the decision of the Constitution Bench in Gopa/ Vinayak
Godse's case (supra), this Court concluded thus:

          "13. The counsel contended that by virtue of Rule
    751(c) of the West Bengal Jail Code, the petitioner was
    liable to be released from jail on completion of twenty           E
    years. He also. relied on the Explanation to Section 61 of
    the West Bengal Correctional Services Act, 1992 (W.B.
    Act 32 of 1992) wherein the imprisonment for life is
    equated to a term of twenty years' simple imprisonment
    for the purpose of remission. But there is no provision           F
    either in the Indian Penal Code or in the Code of Criminal
    Procedure whereby life imprisonment could be treated as
    fourteen years or twenty years without there being a formal
    remission by the appropriate Government. Section 57 of
    the Penal Code reads as follows:                                  G

            "57. Fractions of terms of punishment.-ln
            calculating fractions of terms of punishment,
            imprisonment for life shall be reckoned as
            equivalent to imprisonment for twenty years."
                                                                      H
    410      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2013) 3 S.C.R.


A         The above section is applicable for the purpose of
          remission when the matter is considered by the
          Government under the appropriate provisions. This very
          plea was placed before the Judicial Committee of the Privy
          Council in Kishori Lal v. Emperor6 and the Privy Council
B         held as under: (AIR p. 67)

                "Assuming that the sentence is to be regarded as
          one of 20 years, and subject to remission for good conduct,
          he had not earned remission sufficient to entitle him to
          discharge at the time of his application and it was
c         therefore rightly dismissed but, in saying this, Their
          Lordships are not to be taken as meaning that a life
          sentence must and in all cases be treated as one of not
          more than 20 years or that the convict is necessarily entitled
          to remission."
D
          14. The Prisons Rules are made under the Prisons Act and
          the Prisons Act by itself does not confer any authority or
          power to commute or remit sentence. It only provides for
          the regulation of the prisons. and for the terms of the
E         prisoners confined therein. Therefore, the West Bengal
          Correct!onal Services Act or the West Bengal Jail Code
          do not confer any special right on the petitioner herein.

          15. In Godse case 6 , the Constitution Bench of this Court
          held that the sentence of imprisonment for life is not for any
F         definite period and the imprisonment for life must, prima
          facie, be treated as imprisonment for the whole of the
          remaining period of the convicted person's natural life. It
          was also held in AIR para 5 as follows: (SCR pp. 444-45)

G                "It does not say that transportation for life shall be
                 deemed to be transportation for twenty years for all
                 purposes; nor does the amended section which
                 substitutes the words 'imprisonment for life' for
                 'transportation for life' enable the drawing of any
H                such all-embracing fiction. A sentence of
LIFE CONVICT BENGAL @ KHOKA @ PRASANTA                     411
  SEN v. 8.K. SRIVASTAVA [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
        transportation for life or imprisonment for life must     A
        prima facie be treated as transportation or
        imprisonment for the whole of the remaining period
        of the convicted person's natural life."

  16. Summarising the decision, it was held in AIR para 8         B
  as under: {SCR p. 447)

        "Briefly stated the legal position is this: Before Act
        26 of 1955 a sentence of transportation for life
        could be undergone by a prisoner by way of
        rigorous imprisonment for life in a designated prison     C
        in India. After the said Act, such a convict shall be
        dealt with in the same manner as one sentenced
        to rigorous imprisonment for the same term. Unless
        the said sentence is commuted or remitted by
        appropriate authority under the relevant provisions       D
        of the Indian Penal Code or the Code of Criminal
        Procedure, a prisoner sentenced to life
        imprisonment is bound in law to serve the life term
        in prison. The Rules framed under the Prisons Act
        enable such a prisoner to earn remissions -               E
        ordinary, special and State - and the said
        remissions will be given credit towards his term of
        imprisonment. For the purpose of working out the
        remissions the sentence of transportation for life is
        ordinarily equated with a definite period, but it is      F
        only for that particular purpose and not for any other
        purpose. As the sentence of transportation for life
        or its prison equivalent, the life imprisonment, is one
        of indefinite duration, the remissions so earned do
        not in practice help such a convict as it is not          G
        possible to predicate the time of his death. That is
        why the Rules provide for a procedure to enable the
        appropriate Government to remit the sentence
        under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal
        Procedure on a consideration of the relevant
                                                                  H
    412       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2013] 3 S.C.R.


A                factors, including the period of remissions earned.
                 The question of remission is exclusively within the
                 province of the appropriate Government; and in this
                 case it is admitted that, though the appropriate
                 Government made certain remissions under
B                Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it
                 did not remit the entire sentence. We, therefore,
                 hold that the petitioner has not yet acquired any right
                 to release."

          We are bound by the above dicta laid down by the
c         Constitution Bench and we hold that life imprisonment is
          not equivalent to imprisonment for fourteen years or for
          twenty years as contended by the petitioner.

                 17. Thus, all the contentions raised by the petitioner
D         fail and the petitioner is not entitled to be released on any
          of the grounds urged in the writ petition so long as there
          is no order of remission passed by the appropriate
          Government in his favour. We make it clear that our
          decision need not be taken as expression of our view that
E         the petitioner is not entitled to any remission at all. The
          appropriate Government would be at liberty to pass any
          appropriate order of remission in accordance with law."

       16. It is clear that neither Section 57 IPC nor Explanation
F to Section 61 of the W.B. Act lays down that a life imprisonment
  prisoner has to be released after completion of 20 years. 20
  years mentioned in Explanation to Section 61 of the W.B. Act
  is only for the purpose of ordering remission. If the State
  Government taking into consideration various aspects refused
  to grant remission of the whole period then the petitioner cannot
G take advantage of the above Explanation and even Section 57
  IPC and seek for pre-mature release. Further the question of
  remission of the entire sentence or a part of it lies within the
  exclusive domain of the appropriate Government under Section
  432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and neither
H Section 57 of the IPC nor any rules or local Acts (in the case
 LIFE CONVICT BENGAL@ KHOKA@ PRASANTA 413
   SEN v. B.K. SRIVASTAVA [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
                  I
on hand W.B. Act) can stultify the effect of the sentence of life   A
imprisonment given by the Court under the IPC. To put it clear,
once a person is sentenced to undergo life imprisonment
unless imprisonment for life is commuted by the competent
authority, he has to undergo imprisonment for the whole of his
life. It is equally well settled that Section 57 of the IPC does    B
not, in any way, limit the punishment of imprisonment for life to
a term of 20 years.

    17. In the case on hand, it is highlighted by the learned
counsel for the respondents that in West Bengal there is a duly
constituted Review Board for consideration of applications for
                                                                    c
premature release made by life convicts. It consists of:

      1.    Additional Chief Secretary, Home Department -
            Chairman of the Review Board;
                                                                    D
      2.    Commissioner of Police, Kolkata - Member

      3.    Chief Probation Officer, West Bengal - Member

      4.    Inspector General of Prisons, West Bengal -
            Member                                                  E

      5.    Judicial Secretary, West Bengal - Convener

      6.    Director General and Inspector General of Police,
            West Bengal - Member
                                                                    F
      7.    Principal Secretary, Jails Department, West Bengal
            - Member

On receipt of the application for premature release except under
Article 161 of the Constitution, the Review Board would go into     G
all the details and place it before the Government. Ultimately
on approval of the Hon'ble Chief Minister, the convict is
prematurely released under Section 432 of the Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973. Insofar as application under Article
161 is concerned, it was explained that the procedure followed      H
    414          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 3 S.C.R.

A   remains the same but the file is finally placed before His
    Excellency the Governor of the State through the Hon'ble Chief
    Minister.

         18. In the counter affidavits filed by the State, it is pointed
    out that regarding the case of the petitioner -Khoka @ Prasanta
8
    Sen, the Sentence Review Board observed as under:

          "The life convict was convicted on 18.01.1990 under
          Section 302/34 IPC and detained in connection with S.T.
          No. 01 of June 1989. He was released on parole from
C         Presidency Correctional Home on 29.04.2005 in
          compliance with Hon'ble Supreme Court's order in Writ
          Petition (Criminal) No. 279 of 2004. The police authority
          vehemently opposed the premature release of the life
          convict on the following grounds:
D
           (a)     He was a notorious fellow in the area before his
                   conviction.

           (b)     He still maintains relationship with his old
                   associates.
E
           (c)     He is within the age of 52 years with sound health.

           (d)     His socio economic condition is not sound.

           (e)     In case of his premature release there is every
F                  possibility of his reverting to criminality.

           (f)     During his parole he has been technically serving
                   life imprisonment binding him to refrain from
                   criminal activities for the time being. There is every
G                  possibility of his committing further crimes.

                   Considering the above fact, the Review Board did
                   not find any reason to recommend premature
                   release of the life convict now on parole."

H
 ~IFE CONVICT BENGAL@ KHOi<A@ PRASANTA 415
   SEN v. B.K. SRIVASTAVA [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
      It is seen that after careful consideration of all the aspects,   A
the Review Board in its meeting held on 27.01.2011 did not
recommend the petitioner for his premature release. The
recommendation of the Review Board was placed before the
State Government and the State Government accepted the
recommendation of the State Sentence Review Board. The                  B
decision of the State Government was communicated to the
petitioner vide letter No. 790-J dated 09.02.2012.

     19. In view of the decision of the State Sentence Review
Board, approval by the State Government and the principles              c
enunciated in various decisions of this Court including the
decision of the Constitution Bench in Gopal Vinayak Godse's
case (supra), we find no merit in the 9ontempt petition,
consequently, the same is dismissed.

B.B.B.                             Contempt Petition dismissed.         D