Holding

Section 10 bars any injunction or interim relief against orders of the estate officer, permitting only a declaratory adjudication of tenancy.

Summary

Shiva Prasad Tripathi, a former employee of Life Insurance Corporation of India, was allotted corporation premises which he was required to vacate after his service ended. He refused to leave, prompting the Estate Officer to issue a notice and subsequently an eviction order under Section 7 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971. Tripathi challenged the eviction, claiming tenancy rights, and the Bombay High Court directed that the Small Causes Court could adjudicate the tenancy issue and grant interim relief, suspending the eviction orders. The Supreme Court held that Section 10 of the Act bars any injunction or interim order against the estate officer’s orders, allowing only a declaratory determination of tenancy. Consequently, the High Court’s direction was set aside, the writ petition dismissed, but the Court granted Tripathi six months to vacate and ordered the appellant to settle his retirement dues.

Issues considered

Does Section 10 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 prohibit a court from granting injunctions or interim relief against eviction orders issued under the Act?
Can a court adjudicate the question of tenancy and issue interim protection while eviction orders remain pending under the same Act?

Legislation cited

Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971s. 10, s. 7

Subjects

evictiontenancypublic premises actinjunctioninterim reliefdeclaratory judgmentretirement benefits

Judgment

(
A LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA
v.
SHIVA PRASAD TRIPATHI AND ORS.
. ....

JANUARY 18, 1996

B (M.M. PUNCHHI AND K. VENKATASWAMI, JJ.]

Public Premises (Eviction of U11aut/Jorised occupants) Act, 1971 : '\
~

S. J(}-()rders of Estate Officer and appellate authority-Suit for injwic-
lion to negate the orders--Ba1Ted-Adjudicatio11 on the questio11 whether a
c perso11 is a tenant or 1101 is 1101 taken away-Such adjudicatio11 would be
declaratory i11 11ature a11d may sequal/y e11d up in a co11seque11ce-Nothi11g
i11terim obtai11ab/e.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal' No. 2244 of
D 1996.
From the judgment and Order dated 21.2.95 of the Bombay High
Court in C.W.P. No. 276 of 1995.

H.N. Salve, Kailash Vasdev and C.K.. Sasi for the Appellant.
E S.R. Seetharaman for the Respondent No. 1.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :
'
Leave granted. •
F This is.an appeal against the judgment and order of a Division Bench
of the Bombay High Court dated 21.2.1995 passed in Ci;jl Writ Petition
No. 276 of 1995 whereunder certain directions have been made towards
conferral of jurisdiction on the Small Causes Court, Bombay which, p1ima
facie, it is debarred to have.
G The respondent-Shiva Prasad Tripathi-was an employee of the ap-
pellant-Life Insurance Corporation of India and on that basis was allotted ..__,
the premises owned and possessed by it. On expiry of the tenure of his
service, the respondent was required to vacate the premises. When he
refused to do so, the Estate Officer of the Corporation was brought into
H action in issuing a notice to the respondent to show cause why appropriate
760

"
\
L.l.C. OF INDIA v. S.P. TRIPATHI 761

orders under Section 7 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised A
Occupants) Act, 1971 [for short 'the Act'] be not passed against him. The
cause shown by the respondent did not appeal to the Estate Officer and
thus an order of eviction was passed. The said order was unsuccessfully
challenged in appeal by the respondent before the City Civil Court at
Bombay. The plea of the respondent before the appellate court that he was
a tenant in the disputed premises, having security of tenure, was not B
entertained and the matter was left at large.

The respondent then moved the High Court in Writ Jurisdiction so
as to challenge th~ orders of the Estate Officer as also that of the appellate
authority. Though the respondent could not demolish the grounds for
eviction in the High Court, he clung to the plea of despair that if he were
c
to enter the Small Causes Court to establish his tenancy rights, his posses-
sion in the interregnums would not be protected by the Small Causes Court
due to Section 10 of the Act, which reads as follows :

"10. Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, every order D
made by an estate officer or appellate officer under this Act shall
be final and shall not be called in question in any original suit,
application or execution proceeding and no injunction shall be
granted by any court or other authority in respect of any action
faken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or
under this Act. E

The respondent was given a lee-way by the High Court on taking the
view that the question of tenancy pertains to property, which plea was
adjudicable before a court or a competent authority, and that court or
authority could issue an injunction or an interim direction, and no bar
could be erected to stop it towards the grant thereof. It is in these F
circumstances that the High Court directed that the Judge, Small Causes
Court, shall adjudicate on the question of tenancy when raised by the
respondent in the suit and such court, in that event, would be able to issue
any interim order or injunction which the respondent may be found entitled
to. In addition to that the High Court also ordered that the impugned G
' . orders of the Estate Officer and the appellate authority would remain
suspended till the decision of the application for an interim relief was filed
before the Court of Small Causes. This has raised the instant challenge.

We regret to say that the orders of the High Court are bereft of any
reasoning in giving a complete go-by to the bar erected under section 10 H
(
762 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996) 1 S.C.R.

A of the Act. Section 10 had not to be viewed in isolation but had to be
understood in the context of the other provisions of the Act standing in
support thereof. Clearly, a suit for injunction to negate the orders of those
two aut'iorities stood barred under Section 10. The legislative mandate was
that the court by order cannot obstruct the execution of the orders passed
by the Estate Officer and the appellate authority. The court'r. power,
B
otherwise, to adjudicate on the question whether a person was a tenant or
not, in no way, has been taken away by Section 10. The adjudication
however would be declaratory in nature and may sequally end up in a
consequence. Nothing interim however is obtainable. We therefore do not
agree with the High Court that whatever stood achiev.ed by the appellant
C under the Act, would suffer deprival just because the plea of the respon-
dent being a tenant is debatable in the ClUrt. We, therefore, upset the
impugned order of the High Court and dismiss the Writ Petition preferred
by the respondent before the High Coon.

Learned counsel for the respondent, however, has been successful in
D persuading us to grant him a two-fold relief, namely, (i) the respondent
shall not immediately be disturbed and would get six months' time for
vacating the premises; of course, on his executing the usual undertaking
before this Court to vacate the premises, within a period of four weeks
from today, the quantum of rent/damages payable not forming part of, or
E made reference of in that undertaking; and (ii) within a period of two
months, the appellant shall be duty bound to clear the retiral dues of the
respondent such as Provident Fund, gratuity etc., as are legally due to him,
so that he has enough funds in his hands to seek an alternate accommoda-
tion in the meantime.

F The appellant is, accordingly, dfrected.

The question of rent/damages is left open. The appellant .has grace-
fully given out that should the respondent make a representation iOthe
appellant for waiving of rent/damages for the period for which those would
be payable, the appellant undertakes to consider that representation sym-
G pathetically. It is so ordered.

In light of the above, this appeal stands allowed. For the respondent
however, this matter stands concluded finally because of the individual
reliefs we have granted to him. No costs.

H G.N. Appeal allowed.