Holding

The Board’s power to assess and recover damages and to detain a vessel under Section 116 read with Section 65(ii) of the Major Port Trusts Act, and Regulation 43, is valid and not ultra vires, and the absence of a pre‑determination hearing does not contravene natural justice.

Summary

The owners of the vessel M.T. Larnaca entered Cochin Port and damaged an RCC platform, leading the Port Trust to assess damages of Rs. 33.82 lakh and demand an unconditional cash deposit before allowing the ship to depart. The owners challenged the demand, arguing that clause 6 of the 1980 notification and Regulation 43 of 1975 were ultra vires the Major Port Trusts Act and violated natural justice by allowing the Board to fix damages without a pre‑hearing. The Supreme Court examined the powers conferred by Sections 116 and 65(ii) of the Major Port Trusts Act, the authority of the Board to frame regulations under Section 123, and the scheme of Sections 48‑50 and 52. It held that the Board is duly empowered to assess and recover compensation for damage caused by a vessel and to detain the vessel until payment or security is furnished, and that this power is consistent with the Act and does not breach natural justice. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed with costs.

Issues considered

The Board of Trustees of Cochin Port is authorized under the Major Port Trusts Act and related regulations to demand an unconditional cash deposit for damage caused by a vessel and to detain the vessel until payment.
Whether clause 6 of the Notification dated 8 January 1980 and Regulation 43 of the 1975 Cochin Port and Dock Regulations are ultra vires Sections 48, 49, 50 and 123 of the Major Port Trusts Act.
Whether the Board’s power to quantify damages without a pre‑determination hearing violates the principles of natural justice.

Legislation cited

Indian Ports Act, 1908
Major Port Trusts Act, 1963s. 116, s. 123, s. 131, s. 48, s. 49, s. 50, s. 52, s. 65(ii)
Petroleum Act, 1934s. 29(1)

Subjects

Major Port Trusts ActPort authority liabilityVessel damageUnconditional cash depositDetention of vesselNatural justiceSection 116Section 65(ii)Regulation 43Liability of master and owner

Judgment

.. LUGA BAY SHIPPING CORPORATION AND ANR. ETC.
v.
A

THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE PORT
OF COCHIN AND ANR.

NOVEMBER 22, 1996
B
[AM. AHMADI, C.J., S.C. AGRAWAL AND
SUJATA V. MANOHAR, JJ.]

Major Pait T1usts Act, 1963-Ss. 123(/)(n)(o), 116 read with section
65(ii), 48, 49, 50, 52:-Notification dated 8.1.1980-Clause 6--Power of the C
Board-Tofu: the quantum of damages caused by a vessel to any property of
the polt or the Board zmilatera/ly-Demand its unconditional cash deposit
before the vessel leaves the pan-Detain a vessel if the compensation/secwity
is not paid or famished-Held not ultravires sections 48, 49, 50 or S. 123-ls
consistent with the scheme of S. 116 read with S. 65(ii)-Not violative of mies D
of Natural Justice-So also there is no inconsistency in Regulation 43 of the
notification dated 1.1.1975.

The appellants vessel entered the port of Cochin on 6th June 1984
and dashed against the platform which caused 'damage to the tune of Rs.
33.82 lakhs. On 29th June, 1984, a notice demanding an unconditional E
deposit of the said amount was served by the respondent on the appellants.
They were also informed that until the payment was deposited the vessel
would not be allowed to sail from the port.

The appellants challenged the demand of unconditional cash deposit
by the respondent by filing a writ petition in the High Court. The High F
Court dismissed the Writ Petition. The appellant filed the present appeal.

Dismissing the appeal, this court

HELD : 1. The master or owner of a vessel shall be held liable for any
damage caused by the vessel to the works or property of the Board and G
Board is empowered to detain a vessel if the compensation/security is not
paid or furnished. [113-A-B]

2. Section 116 of the Major Ports Act empowers the Board to quantifJ:
the damage and lay claim therefor. If the amount so quantified is not paid,
the Board can invoke section 65(Il) to ensure that port clearance is not H
103
104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.
A granted to the vessel until the amount of damage/compensation due to the
Board has been paid or realised. Section 123 empowers the Board to make •
regulations to ensure the safety of the port, which naturally includes

B
providing for the eventuality of damage caused to the Board's property. Any
such provision, if made, would not be inconsistent with sections 48, 49 and
50 and would certainly be within the scope of section 123(1), (n) and (o) of
..
the Major Port Trusts Act. Therefore, it can not be said that clause (6) of
the notification dated 8.1.1980 is ultravires section 48, 49 and 50 or section
123, it is quite consistent with the scheme of section 116 read with section
65(11) of the Major Port Trusts Act. So there is no inconsistency in Regula-
tion 43 of the notification dated 1.1.1975. [113-A-B; E-G]
c 3.1. In order to protect international trade and at the same time to
ensure that the damage caused to the property of the port is recovered
before the vessel leaves the port, it is essential that the Board should be
empowered to determine the quantum of damages and ensure that the
vessel does not leave the port before depositing cash or providing security
D for the same. [114-C-D]

3.2. Besides, to avoid dislocation of traffic, it is essential that the
damage caused to the port property is repaired without loss of time, for
which funds would be required. It is, therefore, inevitable that the Board
should be given power to quantify the damage and secure the same from
E the offending vessel before it leaves the port. [114-D-E]

3.3. A hearing before quantification of the damages is not possible. If
the master or the owner of the vessel desires to question the quantum of
damages, the law does not preclude the filing of a civil suit in that behalf.
F [115-B; 114-F]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2426 of
1994 Etc.

From the Judgment and Order dated 25.11.93 of the Kerala High
G Court io O.P. No. 5822 of 1984.
S. Venkateshwaran, C.S. Vaidyanathan, Ms. Indu Malhotra and Ms.
Shirio Khajuria for the Appellants.

A!taf Ahmad, Additional Solicitor General and M.P. Viood for the
H Respondents.
LUGA BAYSHIPPING CORPN. ~: BD. OFTRUSTEESOFTilli PORT OF COCHIN [AHMADI, CJ.] 105

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by : A

AHMADI, CJI. These two appeals arise from a common judgment
of the Division Bench of the High Court of Kerala on a reference made to
it by a learned single Judge of that Court. The High Court found itself
confronted with the question whether the Cochio Port Trust is entitled, B
under the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963, (hereinafter referred to as 'the
Major Port Trusts Act') the Indian Ports Act, 1908 (hereinafter referred
to as 'the Indian Ports Act') and the Regulations made thereunder, to
demand an unconditional cash deposit from the owner of a ship which
caused damage to the property of the Port Trust.
c
The appellants in Civil Appeal No. 2427/94, South India Corporatian
(Agencies) Ltd., are the agents of the vessel, M.T. Larnaca. The appellants
in Civil Appeal No. 2426/94, M/s. Luga Bay Shipping Corporation, are the
owners of the said vessel. The respondents are the Board of Trustees of
the Port of Cochin, (hereinafter referre,d to as 'the Port Trust'), and its D
Deputy Conservator. The vessel entered the Port of Cochin on June 6, 1984
and was berthed at Berth No. 2. On June 14, 1984, the vessel, while being
shifted from Berth No. 2 to the North Tanker Berth, dashed against the
northern side of the RCC platform on which the gravity fenders were
suspended, causing damage to the platform. Notice of damage to the
platform was served on June 20, 1984. The appellants do not dispute that E
the vessel was berthed in the North Tanker Berth on June 14, 1984.
However, they deny that any damage was caused by the vessel to any
property of the Port Trust during such berthing. The Port Trust, on the
other hand, claims that the damage assessed by the Port Chief Engineer
was of Rs. 33.82 lakhs. The second respondent, the Deputy Conservator of F
Port Trust, requested the local agents of the vessel, by a notice dated June
29, 1984, to deposit that amount. They were also informed that the vessel
would be allowed to sail from the Port only after the amount was deposited.

The Shippiog Corporation, the petitioner before the Court, filed a
writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India which was G
registered as Original Petition No 5822 of 1984. It prayed for calliog of the
records leading to the issue of notice (Exhibit P. 6) dated June 29, 1984
and to quash the same by an appropriate writ; to declare condition No. 6
of the Notification dated January 8, 1980 fixing the scale of rates and
statement of conditions for levy of charges by the Port Trust under Sections H
106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 9 S.C.R.
A 48, 49 and 50 of the Major Port Trusts Act ultra vires the Act and the
Constitution to declare Regulations No.3 and 43 of Cochin Port Trust •
Regulation, 1975 ultra vires the provisions of the Indian Ports Act and the
Major Port Trusts Act and to restrain the respondents from enforcing the
aforesaid two regulations. We will shortly advert to the impugned
provisions of the Notification dated January 8, 1980 and the Cochin Port
B and Dock Regulation, 1975. The learned single Judge of the High Court
referred the case to a Division Bench. The Division Bench posed the
question whether the Cochin Port Trust is entitled, under the Major Port
Trust Act, the India Ports Act and Regulation made thereunder, to
demand an unconditional cash deposit from the owner of the ship which
C allegedly caused damage to the property of the Port Trust. The Division
Bench examined the provisions of Section 116 of the Major Port Trusts
Act, and came to the conclusion that, in a situation like the one on hand,
the amount of damage must be determined by the Board and that the
liability of the Master and owner of the vessel was absolute. Section 116
D can be reproduced for ready reference:

"116. Recovery of value of damage to property of Board - If, through
the negligence of any person having the guidance or command of
any vessel, or of any of the mariners or persons employed on such
vessel, any damage is caused to any dock, wharf, quay, mooring, stage,
E jetty, pier or other work in the possession of any Board, (or any
movable property belonging to any Board,) the amount of such
damage shall, on the application of the Board be recoverable together
with the cost of such recovery, by distress and sale, under a
Magistrate's warrant, of a sufficient portion of the boats, masts, spares,
ropes, cables, anchors or stores belonging to such vessel :
F
Provided that no Magistrates shall issue such a warrant until
the master of the vessel has been duly summoned to appear before
him and, if he appears, until he has been heard; and provided also
that no such warrant shall issue if the vessel was at the time under
G the orders of a duly authorised employee of the Board and the
damage caused w".s attributable to the order, act or improper
omission of such employee."

The High Court held that the Board needed to approach the Magistrate
H only for effecting the recovery of the amount and that the Magistrate is
LUGA BAY SHIPPll\G CORPN. v. BD. OF TRUSTEES OFTI-IEPORTOF COCHIN [AHMADL CJ.] 107

--
,..._ required to hear the Master of the vessel before issuing a warrant for A
recovery, but not for quantification of the damage. The High Court went
on to examine the provisions of the English Law, as contained in Section
74 of the· Harbours Docks and Piers Clauses Act and the ratio of certain
cases decided thereunder, and came to the conclusion that the liability of
the Master or owner of the vessel with regard to damage caused to dock,
B
wharf, quay, mooring, stage, jetty, pier, etc., is absolute. The High Court
also made a reference to Section 131 of the Major Port Trusts Act and
held that the provision for a civil suit made therein was without prejudice
to any other action that can be taken under that Act and was meant to be
employed when the proceeds of sale of the property of the vessel were
insufficient to meet the penalties payable or recoverable by the Board. The c
High Court also examined the provisions of Clause (6) of the Notification
dated January 8, 1990 which requires the Conservator of Ports to take
necessary steps to ascertain the amount of damages, and to serve a notice
. •;,;.
specifying the amount wherefore he was entitled to seize the vessel which
caused the damage and to detain the same till the amount was paid. That
D
clause further provided that the Conservator could sell the vessel and out
of the sale proceeds, recover the damages as well as the cost of seizure,
detention and sale. The High Court opined that the Master of the vessel
could get the dispute over the quantum of damages resolved by a com-
petent civil court. According to the High Court, in view of the provisions
of the Major Port Trusts Act and the Rules framed thereunder, there was E
no force in the argument of the appellants that assessment of damages
done unilaterally by the respondents were against the rules of natural
justice and, therefore, void.

Before this Court, the appellants disputed the absolute nature of
F
liability as held by the High Court. The vires of clause (6) of the Notifica-
tion mentioned above has also been challenged. Regulation No. 43 of the
Cochin Port and Dock Regulation, 1975 is also challenged as arbitrary.

We can now refer to Clause (6) of the Notification dated January 8,
1980 which is issued "in exercise of powers conferred by Sections 48, 49 G
and 50 of Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 and in supersession of the Cochin
Port Trust Notification dated August 10, 1974."

"Clause (6) - Assessment and recovery of compensation for damage
- If any vessel or drift fouls any pier, wharf, jetty or quay in the H
108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.

A Port of Cochin and thereby causes damage thereto the Conservator
of the Port shall forthwith take the necessary steps to ascertain
the amount of damage so caused. A notice specifying the amount
-
of damage so. ascertained and demanding its payment shall be
served drift. If the damage is caused by a draft and the owner of
such drift is unknown or cannot be ascertained, the notice of the
B demand shall be posted upon a conspicuous place in the Cochin
Port Trust, Deputy Conservator's Office or Custom House. Within
a week after the serving or of the posting of the notice of the
demand, as the case may be, the said amount shall be paid. It shall
be lawful for the Conservator to seize the vessel or drifL which
c caused damage immediately the damage has been caused together
with the tackle, apparel or furniture belonging to the vessel, and
detain the same till the amount together with the cost of seizure
or detention is not paid, the Conservator may sell the vessel or the
tackle, apparel or furniture or the drift and out of such sale
proceeds pay to the Cochin Port Trust the amount of damage and
D
the cost of seizure, detention and sale rendering to the master or
owner, the surplus, if any, on demand, provided that the demand
is made within three years from the date of the sale."

Section 48, 49 and 50 of the Major Port Trusts Act empower every
E Board to frame certain scales of rates and Section 52 of the Act provides
that the date so fixed will have effect only when sanction in this behalf is
given by the Central Government. We may now notice Sections 48, 49 and
52 which read as under :

"48. Scales of rates for services performed by Board or other
F person. - (1) Every Board shall from time to time frame a scale of
rates at which, and statement of the conditions under which, any
of the services specified hereunder shall be performed by itself or
any person authorised under Section 42 at or in relation to the
port or port approaches -
G transhipping of passengers or goods between vessels in
(a)
the port or port approaches;

(b) landing and shipping of passengers or goods from or to
such vessels to or from any wharf, quay, jetty, pier, dock,
H berth, mooring, stage or erection, land or building in
LUGA BA YSHJPPJNG CORPN. v. BO. OFTRUSIBES OF THE PORT OF COCHIN [AHMADi CJ.] 109

the possession or occupation of the Board or at any A
place within the limits of the port or port approaches;

( c) cranage or portrage of goods on any such place;

(d) wharfage, storage or demurrage of goods on any such
place; B
(e) any other service in respect of vessels, passengers or
goods, excepting the services in respect of vessels of
which fees are chargeable, under the Indian Ports Act.

(2) Different scales and conditions may be framed for different C
classes of goods and vessels."

"49. Scale of rates and statement of conditions for use of property
belonging to Board. - (1) Every Board shall, from time to time,
also frame a scale of rates on payment of which, and a statement
of conditions under which, any property belonging to, or in the D
possession or occupation of, the Board, or any place within the
limits of the port or the port approaches may be used for the
purposes specified hereunder :

(a) approaching orlying at or alongside any buoy, mooring, E
wharf, quay, pier, dock, land, building or place as
aforesaid by vessels;

{b) entering upon or plying for hire at or on any wharf,
qnay, pier, dock, land, building, road, bridge or place
as aforesaid by animals or vehicles carrying passengers F
or goods;

(c) leasing of land or sheds by owners of goods imported

- (d)
or intended for export or by steamer agents;

any other use of any land, building, works, vessels or
appliances belonging to or provided by the Board.
G

{2) Differer.! scales and conditions may be framed for different
classes of goods and vessels.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section {1), the H
110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.
A Board may, by auction or by inviting tenders, lease any land or ·•
shed belonging to it or in its possession or occupation at a rate
higher than that provided under sub-section (l)."

"50. Consolidated rates for combination of services. - A Board may,
from time to time, frame a consolidated scale of rates for any
B combination of the services specified in section 48 or for any
combination of such service or services with any user or permission
to use any property belonging to or in the possession or occupation
of the Board, as specified in Section 49."

"52. Prior sanction of Central Govemmellt to rates and conditions.
c - Every scale of rates and every statement of conditions framed by
a Board under the foregoing provisions of this Chapter shall be
submitted to the Central Government for sanction and shall have
effect when so sanctioned and published by the Board in the
Official Gazette."
D
As can be seen from a plain reading of these provisions, Section 48
empowers the Board to frame the scale of rates for providing certain
services while Section 49 empowers the Board to frame the scale of rates
for allowing the use of its property. Section 50 further empowers the Board
E to frame consolidated scale of rates for any combination of services
specified in Section 40 or for any combination of service or services with
the user of any property belonging to the Board. In none of the three
Sections is there any direct mention of recovery of any damage caused by
a vessel to any property of the Port or of the Board.

F The Notification dated January 8, 1980 issued in exercise of powers
conferred by Sections 48, 49 and 50 of the Major Port Trusts Act in
supersession of the Cochin Port Trust Notification dated August 10, 1974
must be read alongside another Notification dated January 1, 1975 issued
in supersession of all previous Notifications issued under Section 6(1) of
the Indian Ports Act and Section 29(1) of the Petroleum Act, 1934 by the
G Cochin Port Trust in exercise of powers conferred by sub-sections (I) to
-
(o) of Section 123 of the Major Port Trusts Act, which inter a/ia provides
by regulation 43 that the "Masters and Owners of vessels shall be held liable
for any damage whatsoever that shall have been caused by their vessels or
servants to any of the works or property of the Board and the Board may
H detain their vessels until compensation claimed by the Board is paid or
LU GABAY SHIPPING CORPN. v. BO. OFTRUSTEES OF THE PORT OF COa-IIN [AHMADi CJ.] 111

,;" .. security has been given for the amount of damage caused." The plain A
language of this regulation therefore shows that the Master or Owner of a
vessel can be held liable in damages for any harm caused to the works or
property of the Board and empowers the Board to detain a vessel if the
compensation/security is not paid or furnished. In substances, the same is
the effect of clause (6) of the Notification dated January 8, 1980 extracted B
earlier. At this stage, reference may be made to Section 65(ii) of the Major
Port Trusts Act which reads as under :

"Section 65. Grant of port-clearance after payment of rates and
realisation of damages, etc. - If a Board gives to the officer of
the Central Government whose duty it is to grant the port- C
clearance to any vessel at the port, a notice stating, -

(i) xxx xxx xxx

(ii) that an amount specified therein is due in respect of D
any damage referred to in section 116 and such amount
together with the cost of the proceedings for the recovery
thereof before a Magistrate under that section has not
been realised,

such officer shall not grant such port-clearance until the amount E
so chargeable or due has been paid or, and the case may be, the
damage and cost have been realised."

This provision, read in conjunction with Section 116, reveals the anxiety of
Parliament to ensure that, before a vessel leaves the Indian port, the F
amount of damages/compensation should be secured. This anxiety is for
the obvious reason that once the vessel leaves the Indian shores, it would
be well-nigh impossible to realise the dues of the Board. To complete the
, narration, we may refer to Section 131 which provides, albeit without
prejudice to any other action that may be taken under the Act, that a Board G
may recover by a suit its dues including damages when the proceeds of
scale are insufficient or any penalties payable to, or recoverable by the
Board under t!ie Act or the regulations made in pursuance thereof, are
insufficient. This provision grants a remedy in addition to the remedy
granted to the Board under the provisions of the Act or the regulations' to
recover the shortfall through a suit. H
112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 9 S.C.R.

A Section 123 of the Major Port Trusts Act confers a general power on
the Board to make regulations. This provision is enacted without prejudice
to any power to make regulations contained elsewhere in the Major Port
Trusts Act and empowers the Board to make regulations consistent with
the provisions of the Act for all or any of the matters enumerated in clauses
(a) to (c) thereof which inter alia include :
B
"(f) for the safe, efficient and convenient use, management and
control of the docks, wharves, quays, jetties, railways tram-
ways, buildings and other works constructed or acquired by,
or vested in, the Board, or of any land or foreshore acquired
c by, or vested in, the Board under this Act;

(n) for ensuring the safety of the port;

( o) generally, for the efficient and proper administration of the
port."
D
The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the scope of sections
48, 49 and 50 being limited, and not embracing the imposition or recovery
of damages, clause (6) of the Notification of January 8, 1980 clearly travels
beyond the scope cf these provisions and was, therefore, ultra vires. Nor
E could the said clause be protected by virtue of the regulations for the
simple reason that even clauses (f), (n) and (o) of Section 123 do not speak
of imposition of damages/compensation for damage caused to the property
of the Board. And, in any event, the conferment of power to fix the
quantum of damages or compensation unilaterally, without affording the
Master or Owner of the vessel an opportunity of being heard, was clearly
F an infraction of the rule of natural justice.

Section 116 extracted earlier, in unmistakable terms states that if,
through the negligence of any person having the guidance or command of
any vessel, any damage is caused to any dock or other property of the
Board mentioned therein, the amount of such damage as is claimed by the
G Board shall be recoverable by distress or sale of a sufficient portion of the
property on board the vessel under Magistrate's warrant. This provision
therefore entitles the Board to quantify the damage and lay a claim
therefor. In the present case, as soon as the damage was noticed on 15th
June, 1984 while the vessel was still in the berth, the Agent and Master of
H the vessel were informed and thereafter the damage was assessed by the
LUGA BAYSHIPPING CORPN. ~- BO. OF1RUSTEESOFTHE PORT OF COCHIN (AHMADL CJ.] 113

Board and claim was made. This action was clearly in terms of the A
afore-quoted Section 116. If the amount so quantified is not paid, the
Board can invoke Section 65(ii) to ensure that port-clearance is not granted
to the vessel until the amount of damage/compensation due to the Board
has been paid or realised. This is the scheme of the Major Port Trusts Act.

Now, we come to the scheme of Sections 4S, 49 and 50 of the said
B
Act. Section 4S empowers the Board to frame a scale of rates and a
statement of conditions under which any of the services shall be performed
by it and these include services to be provided inter alia for landing and
shipping of goods from or to vessels in the port, dock, etc. Besides
prescribing the rates to be charged for such services, the Board is expected c
to frame a statement of conditions under which the services would be
performed and this could provide for the remedy in case of damage to the
Board's property. So also, under Section 49, the Board can frame the rates
and statement of conditions for performing the services set out therein.
Under these provisions, therefore, it is left to the Board not only to frame D
the rates of charges for services rendered, but also to make a statement of
conditions under which the services would be performed.

Next, Section 123 empowers the Board to make regulations, albeit
consistent with the Act, for all or any of the purposes set therein, which
inter alia include the safe, efficient and convenient use, management of E
docks, etc. This would certainly include consequential remedies in the
event of damage to the Board's property. Regulations can be made to
ensure the safety of the port for its efficient and proper administration
which would naturally include providing for the eventuality of damage
caused to the Board's property while providing services to the vessels, etc., F
making use of the port, dock, etc. Any such provision, if made, would not
be inconsistent with Sections 4S, 49 and 50 and would certainly be within
the scope of Section 123(1), (n) and (o) extracted earlier. We are, there-
fore, unable to hold that clause (6) of the Notification dated January 8,
1980 is ultra vires Sections 4S, 49 and 50 or Section 123 and is quite
consistent with scheme of Section 116 read with Section 65(ii) of the Major G
Port Trusts Act. So also, we see no inconsistency in Regulation 43 of the
Notification dated January 1, 1975.

That takes us to the next contention namely, where the unilateral
action taken by the Board in assessing the damages is in violation of the H
114 SUPREME COURT REPOR rs [1996] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.

A principles of natural justice. At first blush, the argument made appears to . .,...
be attractive but, on closer scrutiny and having regard to the purpose and
object of making the said provision entitling the Board to determine _the
quantum of damages, it would appear that the urgency of the situation
demands that the Board should be allowed to determine the liability and
claim payment or security for the same before the vessel leaves the shores
B of the country. We have already pointed out earlier the anxiety of the
legislature to provide for immediate action to be taken before the vessel
leaves the shore. Once it has left the shore, it would be impossible for the
Board to recover the damage caused by the vessel to its property. In order
to protect international trade and at the same time ensure that the damage
c caused to the property of the port is recovered before the vessel leaves the
port, it seems essentialthat the Board should be empowered to determine
the quantum of damages and ensure that the vessel does not leave the port
before depositing cash or providing security for the same. Besides, to avoid
dislocation of traffic, it is essential that the damage caused to the port or
D property of the Board is repaired without loss of time, for which funds
would be required. In the circumstances, it is therefore inevitable that the
power to determine the damage must vest in the Board for, otherwise, the
vessel may leave the port and the Board would be left to suffer the damage
without recovering it from the offending vessel. Therefore, while conceding
that the right to be heard before the quantum of damage is determined is
E an important right, in the very nature of things and having regard to the
urgency of the matter, public interest demands that before the vessel
leaves the shores of the country, the estimated damage is paid to or secured
by the Board. The interests of justice, insofar as the Board is concerned,
would not be safeguarded if this power is not vested in the Bmrd and
F consequently the vessel is permitted to leave the shores of the country
without securing the damage. Besides, if the Master or Owner of the vessel
desires to question the quantum of damages determined by the Board, the
law does not preclude the filing of a civil suit in that behalf. In the Civil
suit, the basis on which the quantum of damages was worked out by the
Board would be fully reviewed and that would provide a post-decisional
G hearing to the Master or Owner of the vessel. We are, therefore, of the
opinion that in the very nature of things, it is not possible that a pre-
decisional hearing should be accorded to the Master or Owner of the vessel
before the Board determines the amount of compensation. Even if the
Board can ensure that a port clearance is not granted to the vessel, that
H would not serve the objective as the continued presence of the vessel at
.
LUGA BAY SHIPPING C0RPN. v. BD. OFTRUSTEE.50FTHE PORT OF COCHIN [AHMADi CJ.} 115

., . the dock or port would block up traffic as urgent repairs would not be
possible aud the presence of the vessel would not permit other vessels to
A

enter that area. In our opinion, therefore, the High Court was right in
coming to the conclusion that in the very nature of things, a hearing before
the quantification of damages by the Board is not possible. We, therefore,
do not see any merit in this contention either.
B
In the result, we see no merit in these appeals. The appeals are
dismissed with costs.

H.K. Appeals dismissed.

•