Holding

The High Court's acquittal was a permissible view of the evidence and not perverse; therefore, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal.

Summary

The trial court convicted the accused of murder and offences under the SC/ST Act, but the Rajasthan High Court acquitted them, finding the prosecution's version of events implausible and the eye‑witness testimony unreliable. The State appealed, arguing that the High Court erred in discarding material evidence. The Supreme Court examined the scope of appellate review of acquittals, emphasizing that while appellate courts may re‑appreciate evidence, interference is warranted only on substantial grounds such as unreasonable conclusions or unjustified exclusion of material. Citing precedents, the Court held that the High Court's view was a permissible interpretation of the evidence and not perverse. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, leaving the acquittal intact.

Issues considered

Whether an appellate court may interfere with a judgment of acquittal on the basis of re‑appraisal of evidence
What constitutes 'substantial reasons' for a higher court to set aside an acquittal
Whether the High Court's assessment of the credibility of eye‑witnesses and the post‑mortem report was perverse or unreasonable

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 313
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 307, s. 323, s. 34
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Acts. 3(2)(5)

Subjects

appeal against acquittalappellate jurisdictionpresumption of innocenceevidence appraisalIPC s302IPC s34SC/ST Actcriminal procedure

Judgment

(2009] 3 S.C.R. 706

A LUNARAM '
v.
BHUPAT SINGH AND ORS.
(Criminal Appeal No. 405 of 2009)
FEBRUARY 27, 2009
8
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND ASOK KUMAR
GANGULY, JJ.] j
<

Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 302 and 323 rlw s.34 -
c Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act - s.3(2)(5) - Trial Court convicted accused-
respondents under s.302134 /PC and s.3(2)(5) of the SC/ST
Act - High Court held that the prosecution version was not
believable and acquitted the respondents - Appeal against
0 acquittal - Held: Generally, order of acquittal is not to be
interfered with as presumption of innocence of accused is
further strengthened by acquittal - Appellate court while
considering appeal against acquittal is to interfere only when
there are substantial reasons for doing so - On facts, the view
E of High Court cannot be termed to be perverse and is a
possible view on the evidence- Hence, interference by
Supreme Court not warranted.

Appeal against acquittal - Powers of appellate court -
Discussed.
•
F
According to the prosecution, the accused-
respondents boarded a bus in which deceased was
seated and caused his death on account of previous
enmity. While some of the purported eye-witnesses stated
G that the deceased died because his ankle was twisted,
the others said that he was strangulated. It was the further
case of the prosecution that the injured witnesses were
thrown out of the bus.

The trial court convicted respondents under ss.302
H 706

-
LUNARAM v. BHUPAT SINGH AND ORS. 707

/ and 323 r/w s.34 IPC and s.3(2)(5) of the Scheduled A
Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities)
Act. The High Court held that the prosecution version was
not believable and accordingly acquitted the
respondents. Hence the present appeal.
B
Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1. There is no embargo on the appellate
court reviewing the evidence upon which an order of
acquittal is based. Generally, the order of acquittal shall
not be interfered with because the presumption of C
innocence of the accused is further strengthened by
acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web
of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two
views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case,
"• one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to D
his innocence, the view which is favourable to the
accused should be adopted. The paramount
consideration of the court is to ensure that miscarriage
of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may
arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the E
conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible
evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate
court to re-appreciate the evidence where the accused
has been acquitted, for the purpose of ascertaining as to
whether any of the accused really committed any offence F
or not. [Para 6] [711-F-H; 712-A-B]

1.2. The principle to be followed by the appellate court
considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal
is to interfere only when there are substantial reasons for
doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly G
unreasonable and irrelevant and convincing materials
have been unjustifiably eliminated in the process, it is a
substantial reason for interference. [Para 6] [712-A-B]

H
708 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 3 S.C.R.

\,
A Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P, 2003 (3) SCC 21; Shivaji
Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra 1973 (2) SCC 793;
Ramesh Babula/ Doshi v. State of Gujarat 1996 (9) SCC 225;
Jaswant Singh v. State of Haryana 2000 (4) SCC 484; Raj
Kishore Jha v. State of Bihar 2003 (11) SCC 519; State of
B Punjab v. Kamai/ Singh 2003 (11) SCC 271; State of Punjab
v. Pho/a Singh 2003 (11) SCC 58; Suchand Pal v. Phani Pal
2003 (11) SCC 527; Sachchey Lal Tiwari v. State of UP. 2004
(11) SCC 410 and Chandrappa and Ors. v. State ofKamataka
2007 (4) sec 415, relied on.
c 2. In the present case, the High Court noted that the
prosecution version was not believable. The doctor who
conducted the post mortem and examined the witnesses
had categorically stated that it was not possible that
somebody would throw a person out of the bus when it
D was in running condition. Considering the parameters of •>
appeal against the judgment of acquittal, this Court is not
inclined to interfere in this appeal. The view of the High
Court cannot be termed to be perverse and is a possible
view on the evidence. [Para 8] [713-E-G]
E
Case Law Reference:

2003 (3) sec 21 relied on Para 6

1973 (2) sec 793 relied on Para 6 •
F 1996 (9) sec 225 relied on Para 6

2000 (4) sec 484) relied on Para 6

2003 (11) sec 519 relied on Para 6

G 2003 (11) sec 211 relied on Para 6

2003 (11) sec 58 relied on Para 6

2003 (11) sec 521 relied on Para 6

2004 (11) sec 410 relied on Para 6
H
LUNARAM v. BHUPAT SINGH AND ORS. 709

/ 2001 (4) sec 415 relied on Para 7 A

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 405 of 2009.

From the Judgment & Order dated 11.09.07 of the High
Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur in DB Criminal B
Appeal No. 603/2001.
f.,.
Amo! Chitale and Rajesh Kumar for the Appellants.

Aishwarya Bhati, Sweta Rani, Rekha Giri, Himanshu
Singh, V. Madhukar, Sumit Ghosh, Jayendra Sevada and
c
Jatinder Kumar Bhatia for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

•, DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Leave granted . D

2. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a
learned Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur
directing acquittal of the respondents 1, 2 and 3. The learned
Special Judge, SC and ST, Prevention of Atrocities Case,
E
Balotara had convicted the respondents and sentenced them
which was set aside by the High Court as noted above.

< 3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:
'
~
~

Complainant Luna Ram lodged an FIR in Police station, F
Bakhasar at about 8.30 a.m. On 31.08.1998, complainant
::::;.'.
reported that almost two months back he alongwith Sugala, Tila
and Lila went to Dhanera, Gujarat, for a job. On 30.08.1998,
they came to Sanchore in a Jeep and, thereafter, by another
Jeep, they went to village Madhav. At around 7.15 P.M., they
G
boarded a Bus from Village Madhav and reached Sata at
-.,;
around 9.30 P.M. From Sata, accused Bhupat Singh, Amrit@

-
"""'
Amiya, Ganu Singh @ Ganpat Singh, Pratap Singh and
Kamiya boarded the bus. After just leaving village Sata, Bhupat
Singh, Rai Singh, Pratap Singh and Ganu Singh came near
H
710 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 3 S.C.R.

'·'
A their seat, as they all four were sitting on the last seat of the
bus. Rai Singh stated that they will kill all the four. Bhupat Singh
caught Lila by holding his neck and, thereafter, Rai Singh,
Pratap Singh and Ganu Singh threw Lila out of bus.
Complainant hid himself out of fear. Thereafter, Suga la and Tila
B were also thrown out of bus as when he left the bus at village
Bakhasar, Sugala and Tila were not found in the bus. The
reason of fight by the accused was also stated to be that almost <
t

10-15 days back, buffaloes belonging to Pratap Singh and
Ganu Singh damaged crop of Nagji and, at that time, when
c Ladha was taking those buffaloes, then Rai Singh had beaten
Ladha. The complainant further stated that he reached his
place at about 12 to 1 O'clock in night and stated all those facts
to Nagji and following morning, it was found that Lila died,
whereas Tila and Sugala received injuries. On the basis of the
report, FIR was lodged under Sections 302, 307 and 352, 323 '
>
D
read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short
the 'IPC') and Section 3(2)(5) of the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act (in short 'SC/
ST Act'). The Police, thereafter, conducted investigation and,
thereafter, filed challan in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, r-
•
E Barmer, from where, the matter was committed to the trial
Court. Charges were framed against four accused under
Sections 302, 307, 323 read with Section 34 of IPC and
Section 3(2)(5) of SC/ST. The charge was read over to the
) .
•
•
accused who denied the charge and claimed trial.
F
At the trial, 27 witnesses were produced and thirty-six
documents were exhibited by the prosecution to prove their
case, whereas, in defence, statement of one witness was
recorded and eight documents were produced. Statements of
,.,

-
..
-

G the accused were recoded under Section 313 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (in short the 'Code'). "'
The learned trial Court convicted accused Bhupat Singh,
Ral Singh and Amiya under Section 302/34 of IPC and Section
3(2)(5) of SC/ST Act. They were sentenced to life imprisonment
H
LUNARAM v. BHUPAT SINGH AND ORS . 711
.....
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
.j
and fine of Rs.500/- each, in default of payment of fine, to further A
suffer one month's imprisonment. They were also convicted
under Section 323 IPC, and sentenced to one month's
imprisonment and a fine of Rs.50/- each, in default of payment
of fine, to further suffer one week imprisonment. These accused
were, however, acquitted from Section 307 read with Section B
34 IPC. Accused Dashrath Giri @ Baba was acquitted
• ">
completely .

The High Court noted that the evidence of PWs 9, 10 and
11 did not have any credibility. It was full of omissions and
contradictions which affected the credibility of their evidence.
c
Contradictions and omissions were held to be not of any minor
nature.

___. 4. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the
', appellant submitted that the evidence of PWs 9, 10 and 11 D
should not have been discarded by the High Court, particularly
as they were injured eye witnesses.

5. Learned counsel for the accused on the other hand
supported the judgment, particularly with reference to the E
evidence of doctor who stated that the scenario as described
by the prosecution witnesses was not physically and practically
.(
possible .
• 6. There is no embargo on the appellate court reviewing
the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based. F
Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with
because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further
strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through
the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if
two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, G
-.,(_ one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his
innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should
be adopted. The paramount consideration of the court is to
ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage
of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less H
--\
712 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 3 S.C.R.

\
A than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where
admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the
appellate court to re-appreciate the evidence where the
accused has been acquitted, for the purpose of ascertaining
as to whether any of the accused really committed any offence
B or not. (See Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P, 2003 (3) SCC
21). The principle to be followed by the appellate court
considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to ,•
interfere only when there are substantial reasons for doing so.
If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable and irrelevant
c and convincing materials have been unjustifiably eliminated in
the process, it is a substantial reason for interference. These
aspects were highlighted by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao
Bobade v. State of Maharashtra (1973 (2) SCC 793), Ramesh
Babula/ Doshi v. State of Gujarat (1996 (9) SCC 225), Jaswant
D
Singh v. State of Haryana (2000 (4) SCC 484), Raj Kishore .' \

Jha v. State of Bihar (2003 (11) SCC 519), State of Punjab v.
Kamai/ Singh (2003 (11) SCC 271 ), State of Punjab v. Pho/a
Singh (2003 (11) SCC 58), Suchand Pal v. Phani Pal (2003
(11) SCC 527) and Sachchey Lal Tiwari v. State of U.P. (2004
c11) sec 410).
E
7. In Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2007
(4) sec 415), the following general principles regarding
powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal
against an order of acquittal were culled out:
F
(1) An appellate court has full power to review,
reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order
of acquittal is founded.

(2) The Code puts no limitation, restriction or condition on
G exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence
...
before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of
fact and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and
H compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong
LUNARAM v. 8HUPAT SINGH AND ORS. 713
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

circumstances'', "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. A
are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate
court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are
more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasise the
reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than
to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to B
come to its own conclusion.
" ~
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in
case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the
accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to
him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence c
that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he
is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the
accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his
innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by
", D
the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis
of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb
the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.
8. The High Court has noted that the prosecution version E
was not clearly believable. Some of the so called eye witnesses
stated that the deceased died because his ankle was twisted
<
-+
by an accused. Others said that he was strangulated. It was the
case of the prosecution that the injured witnesses were thrown
out of the bus. The doctor who conducted the post mortem and F
examined the witnesses had categorically stated that it was not
possible that somebody would throw a person out of the bus
when it was in running condition. Considering the parameters
of appeal against the judgment of acquittal, we are not inclined
to interfere in this appeal. The view of the High Court cannot G
be termed to be perverse and is a possible view on the
evidence.
9. The appeal is dismissed.
8.8.8. Appeal dismissed. H