M.D., M/S. T. NADU MAGNESITE LTD.versusS. MANICKAM & ORS.

                        [201 O] 3 S.C.R. 1106


 A             M.D., M/S. T. NADU MAGNESITE LTD.
                                  v.
                       S. MANICKAM & ORS.
                  (Civil Appeal No. 2808 of 2010)

                          MARCH 29, 2010
 B
       [B. SUDERSHAN REDDY AND SURINDER SINGH
                      NIJJAR, JJ.)

          Service law - Re-absorption/re-transfer - Selection/
  C appointment of employees by Government Company - State
     Government implementing a project in joint venture with K
     company - Government Company transferred its permanent
     employees to joint venture company without any monetary
     loss and alteration of service conditions - Subsequent closure
  D of JVC - Employees seeking reversion back to Government '
     Company - Dismissal of writ petition - Direction by Division
   - Bench of High Court to Government Company to absorb the
     employees with continuity of service on basis of promissory
     estoppel - Correctness of - Held: Division Bench erred in
  E issuing such direction - Claim of employees not covered by ·
     the principle of promissory/equitable estoppel - No finding
     recorded by Division Bench as to infringement of legal or
     fundamental right of employees ,_ After permanent transfer,
,    fresh letter of appointment was served upon the employees
  F - Services of employees having been terminated, their lien
     in Government Company also stood terminated - Hence,
     order of Division Bench set aside - Service Rules of the Tamil
     Nadu Magnesite Limited.

       Doctrines - Doctrine of promissory equitable estoppel -
 G Applicability of.
         The appellant-company 'TANMAG' fully owned by the
     State Government, selected and appointed the
     respondents to various posts. The State Government
H                               1106
     M.D., M/S. T. NADU MAGNESITE LTD. v. S.          1107
                 MANICKAM & ORS.

implemented a Project in joint venture with K Company.        A
The appellant transferred the respondents to the Joint
Venture Company-JVC, without any monetary loss and
alteration of service conditions with seniority and other
benefits. After 7 years, the Government decided to close
JVC. The respondents sought reversion back to the             B
appellant-Company but the same was rejected.
Aggrieved, respondents filed writ petition. The Single
Judge of High Court dismissed the same. The Division
BenGh of High Court on basis of the doctrine of
promissory estoppel, directed the appellant to absorb the     c
respondents with continuity of service and other benefits
without back wages. Hence, the present appeals.
    Allowing the appeals, the Court
     HELD: 1.1. The request of the respondents to be
sent on deputation was not accepted by the appellants.        D
By letter dated 11.5.1991, the respondents were informed
that it is not possible to depute them to JVC as per Clause
2.17 of the Service Roles of the Tamil Nadu Magnesite
Limited. The respondents were permanently transferred
to the JVC by letter dated 20.6.1991. They were also          E
informed that the date of joining in service in TANMAG
shall be deemed to be the date of joining at the JVC for
reckoning the length of service for all purposes including
the payment of gratuity. Therefore, it becomes quite
evident that the appellant as well as the respondents         F
were well aware about the nature of terms and conditions
which were protected. After the permanent transfer fresh
letter of appointment dated 25.7.1991 was served upon
the respondents. Therefore, it is clear that the services
of the respondents having been terminated, their lien in      G
TANMAG, also stood terminated. (Para 16] (1115-E-H;
1116-A-C]
      1.2. There was no representation made to
respondent no. 1 that he would be ensured employment
till the age of superannuation with the JVC. The other two    H
    1108    SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2010) 3 S.C.R.


A    respondents have also not referred to any document
     which would indicate that any promise of future
     continuous employment was held out to them by
     TANMAG. In fact they had been earlier categorically
     informed that their services were liable to be terminated
B    as they had become surplus. They were offered an
     alternative to be transferred to the JVC. Therefore, with
     their eyes open, the respondents had accepted the job
     in JVC. Their request for deputation, as provided under
     Clause 2.17 of the Service Rules, had been specifically
c    rejected. They were in danger of losing their jobs under
     Clause 2.14 which enables the company to terminate
    services of the employees by giving three months' notice
    or salary in lieu thereof. They, therefore, accepted the
    alternative of a job with JVC. A job in JVC was better than
     r10 job at all. The Division Bench noticed that the
0
    respondents had accepted the loss of their lien in
    TANMAG. They were seeking re-absorption on the
    closure of the JVC. There was no as:;urance that there
    will be no closure of the JVC under any circumstances.
E   The Division Bench in its anxiety to help the respondents,
    who were in danger of losing their jobs at the age of 50
    years and above, seems to have stretched the principle
    of promissory estoppel beyond the tolerable limits.
    Undoubtedly, while exercising the extraordinary original
    jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of
F   India, the High Court ought to come to the rescue of
    those who are victims of injustice, but not at the cost of
    well established legal principles. [Para 18] [1117-B-G]
       State of Orissa vs. Ram Chandra Dev AIR 1964 SC 685;
G State of WB. vs. Calcutta Hardware Stores (1986) 2 SCC 203,
  referred to.
      1.3. There is no finding recorded by the Division
  Bench as to which legal or fundamental right of the
  respondents has been infringed. The relief is granted only
H on the basis of the doctrine of promissory estoppal. In
     M.D., M/S. T. NADU MAGNESITE LTD. v. S.          1109
                 MANICKAM & ORS.

these circumstances, it was the duty of the High Court        A
to analyze the facts to ensure that the principles of
estoppel could appropriately be invoked in the instant
case to help the respondents. The High Court erred in not
performing this cautionary exercise. In view of the factual
situation, it cannot be accepted that the respondents         B
were put to disadvantage acting upon any unequivocal
promise made by the appellants. On the basis of facts on
record in the instant case, the claim of the respondents
would not be covered by the said principles. In view of
the facts, the Division Bench clearly committed an error      C
of law in concluding that there has been a breach of
principles of promissory/equitable estoppal. Therefore,
the High Court erred in issuing the direction/writ in the
nature of mandamus directing the appellants to re-absorb
                                                              0
the respondents in the service of TANMAG. [Para 18, 19]
[1118-G-H; 1119-A-H]

     Kaniska Trading vs. Union of India (1995) 1 SCC 274,
referred to.
                                                              E
                    Case Law Reference:
    AIR 1964 SC 685            Referred to.       Para 18
    (1986) 2 sec 203          Referred to.        Para 18
                                                              F
    (1995) 1 sec 214          Referred to.        Para 19

    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISD!STION : Civil Appeal No.
2808 of 2010.

    From the Judgment & Order dated 13.3.2007 of the High     G
Court of Madras in W.A. No. 3943 of 2004.

                          WITH

C.A. Nos. 2809 and 2810 of 2010.
                                                              H
    1110    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2010] 3 S.C.R.


A       T. Harish Kumar, Prasanth P. and V. Vasudevan for the
    Appellant.

        K.K. Mani and Ankit Swarup for the Respondents.

        The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B
        SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J. 1. Leave granted.

      2. By this judgment, we shall dispose of the above three
  appeals as the facts and the legal issues involved in all the
C appeals are common. The writ petitioners before the High Court
  have been impleaded as respondent No.1 before this Court.

          3. The appellant herein, TANMAG, is a company fully
    owned by the Government of Tamil Nadu. By G.0.Ms.No.41
D   Industries Department, dated 10.1.1979, it was decided to
    implement the policy decision taken by the Government of Tamil
    Nadu to reserve the mineral prone areas of magnesite for State
    exploitation. TANMAG was accordingly formed for
    implementing the policy. It is the common case of the parties
E   that the respondents were duly selected and appointed, on the
    respective posts, in the aforesaid company. They were
    appointed as Assistant Project Engineer (Mechanical), Junior
    Foreman. (Mechanical) and Deputy Manager (Mechanical)
    respectively by orders dated 12.9.1983, 23.11.1988 and
F   18.8.1989. At the time of joining, the respondents executed
    bonds to serve in TANMAG for a minimum period of three
    years. The TANMAG confirmed the services of the respondents
    through its proceedings dated 25.10.1985, 30.4.1991 and
    24.8.1989 respectively. The respondents were paid the revised
G   pay by the TANMAG as per the Pay Commission's
    recommendations made by the Government of Tamil Nadu.

       4. In the year 1990, through G.O.Ms.No.855 Industries
   (MME. II) Department, dated 16.8.1990 the Government of Tamil
H ·Nadu decided to implement the Chemical Beneficiation Project
   M.D., MIS. T. NADU MAGNESITE LTD. v. S.   1111
 MANICKAM & ORS. [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]

in joint venture with M/s. Kaitan Supermag Limited. The share       A
holding pattern of the joint venture was as follows:

     TANMAG:                          26%

     M/s. Kaitan Supermag Ltd.:~      25%
                                                                    B
     General public:                  49%

     Therefore, TANMAG had control over JVC.

     5. The appellant through letter dated 18.3.1991 conveyed
to the respondents that they are in excess of the cadre strength    C
in TANMAG and called upon them to express their willingness
to work in the Joint Venture Company with the then existing pay
and other facilities without any disadvantage. It was also
mentioned in. the said communication that if no option is given,
the appellant will have no option but to terminate their services   D
under Clause 2.14 of the Service Rules of the Tamil Nadu
Magnesite Limited (hereinafter referred to as the Service
Rules). The respondents were reluctant to leave the service of
TANMAG. However, after prolonged correspondence, the
appellant transferred the respondents to the JVC, without any       E
monetary loss and alteration of service conditions with seniority
and other benefits; by orders dated 20.06.1991 and
31.07.1991 respectively.

     6. On 21.6.1996 respondent No.1 S. Manickam, petitioner        F
in Writ Petition No.3707/2001, represented that since his
transfer to JVC he had been working in the same cadre. Had
he continued in TANMAG he would have become eligible for
promotion. Even though under the transfer order it was provided
that there would be no change in terms and conditions of            G
employment, apart from other facilities he was monetarily losing
more than Rs.2,000/- a month. It was also pointed that since
JVC had not been able to take up any work on chemical
beneficiation project, he was apprehensive about his future
employment prospects. Since there was uncertainty in the            H
    1112    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  (2010] 3 S.C.R.


A   implementation of the project and originally his employment was
    for Rotary Kiln Plant, he be reverted back to TANMAG. It
    appears that no decision was taken on the representation.

       7. By G.0.Ms No 140 dated 11.5.98 it was decided to
B close the JVC. A joint request was made by six employees in
  the letter dated 31.10.1998 including the three respondents
  herein seeking reversion back to TANMAG. By letter dated
  26.11.98 the respondents and the other employees were
  informed that they were permanently transferred to the JVC,
  namely, M/s. India Magnesia Products Limited (hereinafter
C referred to as IMPL). Accordingly, they were relieved from the
  service of the company from the afternoon of 31. 7 .1991. As
  such they have no lien in TANMAG and no right to claim a
  reversion of their services from Mis. IMPL to TANMAG. Thus
  their request was rejected.
D
       8. The order dated 26.11.1998 was challenged by the
  respondents in the respective writ petitions contending that the
  respondents were recruited by TANMAG and were transferred
  with all service benefits, pay protection, etc., to M/s. IMPL (the
E JVC) when it was formed. When it was closed all its assets
  were transferred back to TANMAG. The employees transferred
  from TANMAG to the JVC should also be automatically
  reverted back to TANMAG. The action of TANMAG in not re-
  transferring the respondents to its service is erroneous. They,
F therefore, prayed for quashing the said order dated 26.11.1998
  with a consequential direction to TANMAG to re-transfer/absorb
  the respondents in the service of TANMAG with all benefits such
  as seniority on par with their immediate juniors, arrears of pay
  and allow;:inces with service benefits that would have been
G accrued in favour of the respondents if they had continued in
  the service of TAN MAG.

       9. The TANMAG resisted the writ petitions by filing counter
  affidavit by contending that T ANMAG is a separate entity and
  no writ is maintainable against it. It was pleaded that even
H though the Board of Directrxs are named by the Government,
    M.D .. M/S. T. NADU MAGNESITE LTD. v. S.  1113
  MANICKAM & ORS. [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]

the Company is managed by the Managing Director under the            A
control and superintendence of the Board of Directors. It is· also
stated in the counter affidavit that the respondents were
recruited for the project as per the advertisement. Thereafter
the respondents were transferred to the JVC on the basis of
the advance notice dated 18.3.1991. It was made clear that their     B
services were permanently transferred and they were relieved
from TANMAG from 31.7.1991. It is accepted that their service
conditions were protected at the time of transfer to the JVC.
After the transfer the respondents have lost their lien. They
became the employees of the JVC. Therefore they have no              c
right to demand reversion to TANMAG merely because the JVC
ha.d been closed. It is also stated in the counter affidavit that
the respondents having opted and given their willingness to be
absorbed in the JVC, it was not open to them to claim that they
should be re-transferred to TANMAG on the closure of the JVC.        D
     10. The learned single Judge after considering the rival
submissions held that the respondents have lost the lien in
TANMAG due to their transfer to the JVC. On transfer, they
became the staff of the JVC. The claim of the respondents for
being sent on deputation, under Clause 2.17 of the Service           E
Rules having been rejected they cannot claim that they should
be reverted back to TAN MAG. Consequently the writ petitions
were dismissed.

      11. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment of the           F
 learned single judge respondents filed the three writ appeals.
 On behalf of the respondents it was submitted before the
 Division Bench that TANMAG was a shareholder of JVC. It had
 transferred the land and machinery to the aforesaid company.
 The services of the respondents had been transferred to the         G
JVC as the appellant had an interest in JVC. In such
circumstances the company was not justified in claiming that
the respondents had lost their lien in TANMAG on being
transferred to JVC. They are, therefore, entitled to be reverted
back to TANMAG. It was emphasised that none of the
                                                                     H
    1114     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  (2010] 3 S.C.R.


A   respondents was willing to join the joint venture company. They
    were literally compelled to join in view of the agreement that
    had been signed by them at the time when they initially joined
    the services of TANMAG.

8        12. On the other hand, it was submitted by the appellant
    that on the permanent absorption of the respondents in the
    JVC, they had lost their lien. The closure of the JVC ·cannot
    revive the lien inTANMAG.

          13. The Division Bench upon consideration of the
C   submissions of the parties concluded that the respondents are
    entitled to be taken back by TANMAG in terms of the earlier
    transfer order, which protects the service conditions of the
    respondents. It was further held that TANMAG is· not justified
    in contending that appellants having lost their lien in TANMAG
D   cannot be retransferred. The assurance given in the letter dated
    11.5.1991 clearly states that the transfer of service is without
    any disadvantage. It was, therefore, held that the stand taken
    by TANMAG is contrary to the assurance given to the
    respondents when they were compulsorily transferred to the
E   JVC. It is noticed that all the assets of JVC on its closure have
    been taken over by TANMAG. There is no justification in
    denying absorption of the respondents who are unable to seek
    any other employment at this age of above 50 years. It is held
    that TANMAG is bound by the assurance given to the
F   respondents while seeking their consent for transfer to JVC.
    This is particularly so, as it was stated that the terms and
    conditions of employment enjoyed by them in TANMAG are
    protected. It is further held that since JVC was closed at the
    instance of TANMAG, the appellant has put the respondents
G   in a disadvantageous position. Therefore, TANMAG is
    estopped from contending that the respondents will not be
    absorbed. With these observations the judgment of the learned
    Single judge has been set aside. The appellant has been
    directed to absorb the respondents with continuity of service
    and other attendant benefits without back wages.
H
     M.D., M/S. T. NADU MAGNESITE LTD. v. S.   1115
   MANICKAM & ORS. [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]

          14. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. Mr.   A
    P. P. Rao, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellant
   submitted that the Division Bench has erred in applying the
   principle of estoppal. The only promise made to the
   respondents was that during their services with the JVC their
   terms and conditions and employment will be protected. No           B
   assurance was given that JVC will not be closed down in the
   future at any time. There was also no promise held out that in
   case the company is closed down they would be reabsorbed
   in the appellant. In any event learned senior counsel submitted
   that the writ petition did not even claim the relief on the basis   c
   of the promissory estoppel. There are no pleadings to lay the
   foundation to claim any relief on the basis of the doctrine of
·· promissory estoppal.

      15. Learned counsel for the respondents, however,
  submitted that initially 16 persons had been transferred to the      D
  JVC. Subsequently most of these persons joined some other
  concerns. They are, therefore, not claiming re-absorption. At
  present, there are only three respondents who need to be
  accommodated by the appellant.
                                                                       E
        16. We have considered the submissions made by the
  learned counsel for the parties. A perusal of the
  correspondence would show that initially the respondents were
  reluctant to leave the services of the appellant. However, they
  were aware that their services were liable to be terminated due      F
  to non-availability of work for which they were qualified. On
  2.5.91 respondents addressed a letter to the appellants that
  they would like to continue the services in TANMAG, otherwise
  as per Clause 2.17 of the Service Rules they were wiling to work
  in the JVC. Rule 2.17 of the Service Rules provides as under:        G

             "The Management reserves the Right to depute any
      staff member/officer of the company to any other
      organization, on terms not inferior to those enjoyed by him
      in the company."
                                                                       H
    1116    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2010] 3 S.C.R.


A The request of the respondents to be sent on deputation was
  not accepted by the appellants. By letter dated 11.5.1991 the
  respondents were informed that it is not possible to depute
  them to JVC as per Clause 2.17. The respondents were
  permanently transferred to the JVC by letter dated 20.6.1991.
B They were also informed that the date of joining in service in
  TANMAG shall be deemed to be the date of joining at the JVC
  for reckoning the length of service for all purposes including the
  payment of gratuity. Therefore, it becomes quite evident that
  the appellant as well as the respondents were well aware about
c the nature of terms and conditions which were protected. After
  the permanent transfer fresh letter of appointment dated
  25.7.1991 was served upon the respondents. Therefore, it is
  clear that the services of the Respondents having been
  terminated, their lien in TANMAG, also stood terminated.
D        17. It was only when the respondent No.1 S. Manickam,
  petitioner in Writ Petition No.3707/2001 became apprehensive
  about the closure of the unit, he-submitted a representation on
  21.6.1996 to the respondents seeking re-absorption in
  TANMAG. In this letter, the respondent narrated the entire
E history of his services with TAN MAG. It is emphasized that his
  services were transferred to the JVC under compelling
  circumstances. At that time, he had been assured that there will
  not be any change in the terms and conditions of employment
  as stipulated in TANMAG. It is stated that he had accepted the
F transfer under compelling circumstances and joined JVC on the
  clear understanding that all privileges, perquisites and other
  facilities enjoyed by him in TANMAG shall be protected. His
  grievance was that since his transfer kl JVC, he has been
  working in the same cadre in which he had joined TANMAG in
G 1983. Had he remained in TANMAG, he would have become
  eligible for promotion. He also emphasized that there was a
  loss of more than Rs.2000/- per month in his remuneration.
  Finally, he stated that it has not been possible for the JVC to
  take up the work on Chemical Beneficiation Project. Many of
H the officers whose services had been transferred to JVC along
   M.D., MIS. T. NADU MAGNESITE LTD. v. S.   1117
 MANICKAM & ORS. [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]

with him have left the service. He was therefore apprehensive         A
of his future employment career. Hence, he sought his reversion
back to the respondents.

         18. A perusal of the aforesaid letter makes it abundantly
 clear that there was no representation made to this respondent       B
 that he would be ensured employment till· the age of
 superannuation with the JVC. The other two respondents have
 also not referred to any document which would indicate that any
 µ. -::rriise of future continuous employment was held out to them
 by TANM.AG. In fact they had been earlier categorically              C
 informed that their services were liable to be terminated as they
 had become surplus. They were offered an alternative to be
 transferred to the JVC. Therefore, with their eyes open, the
 respondents had accepted the job in JVC. Their request for
 deputation, as provided under Clause 2.17 of the Service Rules,
 had been specifically rejected. They were in danger of losing        D
 their jobs under Clause 2.14 which enables the company to
 terminate services of the employees by giving three months'
 notice or salary in lieu thereof. They, therefore, accepted the
 alternative of a job with JVC. This was clearly, so to speak,
 "lesser of the two evils". A job in JVC was better than no job at    E
 all. The Division Bench noticed that the respondents had
 accepted the loss of their lien in TAN MAG. They were seeking
 re-absorption on the closure of the JVC. There was no
assurance that there will be no closure of the JVC under any
 circumstances. The Division Bench in its anxiety to help the         F
 respondents, who were in danger of losing their jobs at the age
of 50 years and above, seems to have stretched the principle
of promissory estoppel beyond the tolerable limits.
 Undoubtedly, while exercising the extraordinary original
jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of The Constitution of India       G
the High Court ought to come to the rescue of those who are
victims of injustice, but not at the cost of well established legal
principles. The circumstances in which a High Court could issue
an appropriate writ under these articles was delineated by a
constitution bench of this Court in the case of State of Orissa       H
    1118    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2010] 3 S.C.R.


A   Vs. Ram Chandra Dev, AIR 1964 SC 685 wherein
    Gajendragadkar, J. speaking for the court observed as follows:

        "Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the jurisdiction of the
        High Court is undoubtedly very wide. Appropriate writs can
B       be issued by the High Court under 'the said article even
        for purposes other than the enforcement of the fundamental
        rights and in that sense, a party who invokes the special
        jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is not
        confined to cases of illegal invasion of his fundamental
        rights alone. But though the jurisdiction of the High Court
c       under Article 226 is wide in that sense, the concluding
        words of the article clearly indicate that before a writ or an
        appropriate order can be issued in favour of a party, it must
        be established that the party has a right and the said right
        is illegally invaded or threatened. The existence of a right
D       is thus the foundation of a petition under Article 226."

         The aforesaid settled position was reiterated in the case
    of State of WB. Vs. Calcutta Hardware Stores, (1986) 2 SCC
    203 in the following words:
E
               "Although the powers of the High Court under Article
        226 of the Constitution are far and wide and the Judges
        must ever be vigilant to protect the citizens against
        arbitrary executive action, nonetheless, the Judges have
        a constructive role and therefore there is always the need
F       to use such extensive powers with due circumspection.
        There has to be in the larger public interest an element of
        self-ordained restraint."

  In this case, there is no finding recorded by the Division Bench
G as to which legal or fundamental right of the respondents has
  been infringed. The relief in this case is granted only on the
  basis of the doctrine of promissory estoppal. In these
  circumstances it was the duty of the High Court to analyze the
  facts to ensure that the principles of estoppels could
H appropriately be invoked in this case to help the respondents.
   M.D., M/S. T. NADU MAGNESITE LTD. v. S.   1119
 MANICKAM & ORS. [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]

In our opinion, the High Court erred in not performing this           A
cautionary exercise. In view of the factual situation, as noted
above, we are unable to accept that the respondents were put
to disadvantage acting upon any unequivocal promise made
by the appellants.
                                                                      B
     19. The doctrine of promissory estoppel as developed in
the administrative law of this country has been eloquently
explained in Kaniska Trading Vs. Union of/ndia (1995) 1 SCC
274 by Dr. A.S. Anand, J, in the following words :

      "11. The doctrine of promissory estoppel or equitable           C
     estoppel is well established in the administrative law of the
     country. To put it simply, the doctrine represents a principle
     evolved by equity to avoid injustice. The basis of the
     doctrine is that where any party has by his word or conduct
     made to the other party an unequivocal promise or                D
     representation by word or conduct, which is intended to
     create legal relations or effect a legal relationship to arise
     in the future, knowing as well as intending that the
     representation, assurance or the promise would be acted
     upon by the other party to whom it has been made and has         E
     in fact been so acted upon by the other party, the promise,
     assurance or representation should be binding ori the
     party making it and that party should not be permitted to
     go back upon it, if it would be inequitable to allow him to
     do so, having regard to the dealings, which have taken           F
     place or are intended to take place between the parties."

In our opinion, on the basis of facts on record in this case, the
claim of the respondents would not be covered by the principles
enunciated above. In view of the facts narrated above, the
Division Bench clearly committed an error of law in concluding        G
that there has been a breach of principles of promissory/
equitable estoppel. Therefore, the High Court erred in issuing
the direction/writ in the nature of mandamus directing the
appellants to reabsorb the appellants in the service of
TANMAG.                                                               H
    1120   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2010] 3 S.C.R.


A      20. Before we part with the judgment, it would be
  appropriate to notice that during the hearing of these appeals,
  the respondents had been permitted to make the
  representation to the appellants for reconsideration of their
  request. The respondents had, therefore, submitted           a
B representation on 15.2.2010. Learned counsel for the appellant,
  however, stated that it w~s not possible for the appellant to
  accommodate the respondents, however, in case in future any
  vacancy arises, the request of the respondents may be
  considered.

         21. In view of the above, the appeals are allowed. The
    impugned judgment of the Division Bench under appeal is set
    aside. There will be no order as to costs.

    N.J.                                       Appeals allowed.