M.NARAYANDASversusSTATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS.

                         M.NARAYANDAS                                   A
                                  V.

                STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS.

                        SEPTEMBER 19, 2003

               [S.N. VARIAVA AND H.K. SEMA, JJ.]                        B
      Criminal Procedure Code, 1973-Section 482-Appellant filed suit
for permanent injunction in consequence of a previous partition suit-
 Certain documents relied upon in the written statement therein claimed to
 be forged and fabricated by the appellant-Appellant filed a criminal C
complaint and-F.J.R. was registered-High Court quashed the FIR.
holding the complaint as frivolous, vexatious and false-Held, power to
quash to be exercised very sparingly with circumspection in the rarest of
rare cases-Court not justified in embarking upon an inquiry as to
reliabil;ty or genuineness ofallegations in F.J.R. -Examination ofdocuments
to ascertain their veracity before concluding that the complaint was D
vexatious, frivolous and false not justified-Order quashing the FIR.
totally unsustainable-Penal Code-Sections 468, 470, 471 and 120B.

      Sections 195 and 340--Procedure to be followed when forged and
fabricated documents produced as evidence in Court-Provisions inappli- E
cable during investigation and do not control or circumscribe power of
police to investigate-On completion of investigation embargo under
Section 195 applies and court is incompetent to take cognizance-Court
may later file complaint on basis of FIR. and material collected during
 investigation following procedure under Section 340--0nly question at
stage of investigation is whether investigation should be permitted to F
proceed or not.

      The appellant owned a plot of land for which he entered into an
agreement to sell, with his sister, permitting her to reside therein as
a licensee. Later on her family members filed a partition suit, also G
including the said plot ofland. The appellant filed a suit for permanent
injunction apprehending illegal transfer of the said plot of land by the
family members of his sister, in their names. While filing the written
statement the said family members relied on certain documents. The
appellant claimed them to be forged and fabricated and never executed
by him. Thereafter, he filed a criminal complaint and an F.I.R. under H
                                  973
    974                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A Sections 486, 470, 471 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code was
    registered. High Court in a petition under Section 482 of the Criminal
    Procedure Code quashed the F.I.R. Hence this appeal.

          Respondents contended that the High Court was justified in
B concluding that the complaint was false, frivolous and vexatious; that
  as the case fell under Section 195 Cr. PC., provisions of Chapter XXVI
  of the Cr. P.C. would apply to the exclusion of Chapter XII of the Cr.
  P.C. therefore an application was to be made to the Court and it was
  improper to file a complaint directly with the police; that in the process
  they were deprived of the right to appeal under Section 341 Cr.P.C.
C and the right under Article 21 of the Constitution oflndia as the Court
  could not apply its mind on the same; and that as the High Court had
  not considered whether Section 195 Cr. P.C. applied to the case or not,
  it was a fit case for remand.

D         Allowing the appeal, the Court

          HELD: 1.1. The power to quash must be exercised very sparingly
    and with circumspection in the rarest of rare cases. The court would
    not be justified in embarking upon an inquiry as to the reliability or
    genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the F.I.R. The
E   court also cannot inquire whether the allegations in the complaint are
    likely to be established or not. (981-D)

        1.2. High Court considered the case of the appellant in the
  complaint and the case made out by the respondents. It examined
F documents, comparing signatures and concluded that they were not
  false or fabricated and quashed the complaint holding it to be
  vexatious, frivolous and false. High Court did not conclude, as it could
  not, that the allegation made in the complaint, if taken at their face
  value and accepted in their entirety, did not primafacie constitute any
G offence or make out a case against the accused. It also did not conclude,
  as it could not, that the allegations failed to disclose a cognizable
  offence justifying an investigation by the police. The conclusion that
  the complaint was false, vexatious and frivolous was based on material
  produced by the respondents and it was improper to rely upon the
  same without evidence, which makes the order quashing the F.I.R.
H totally unsustainable. (981-G-H, 982-A, BJ
                    M.NARAYANDASv. STATE                           975

     1.3. There were only allegations and recriminations. If there is no A
substance in the complaint the same will be conveyed by the investigation.
It was improper for the High Court to anticipate the result of
investigation or render a finding on question of ma/a fides. Even if the
complaint was made on account of personal vendetta, that by itself was
not a ground to discard the complaint which had to be tested and B
weighed after the evidence was collected. (985-A, B)

     State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, (1992) Supp. 1 SCC 335, relied on.

      2.1. The complaint is not quashed on the ground that Section 195
Cr. P.C. applied and that the procedure under Chapter XXVI of the C
Cr. P.C., specifically Section 340, had not been followed. Sections 195
and 340 do not control or circumscribe the power of the police to
investigate under the Cr.P.C. Once investigation is complete then the
embargo in Section 195 comes into play and the court would not be
competent to take cognizance. The court can later file a complaint for D
the offence on the basis of the F.I.R. and the material collected during
investigation provided the procedure laid. down in Section 340 Cr. P.C.
is followed. Therefore, no right of the respondents, much less the right
to file an appeal under Section 341 is affected. (983-G, H, 984-A)

     2.2. Section 195 has no application at the stage of investigation. E
The question whether Section 195 applies to documents forged/
fabricated prior to their being produced in Court only arises after the
Court takes cognizance. At this stage the only question is whether the
investigation should be permitted to proceed or not. There is no ground
or reason on which the complaint/F.l.R. can be quashed. (985-E, F) F

     State of Punjab v. Raj Singh, (1998) 2 SCC 391, relied on.

     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
I 197 of 2003.
                                                                          G
     From the Judgment and Order dated 27.8.2002 of the Kamataka High
Court in Cr!. P.No. 1975 of 2002.

     Kapil Sibal, Jayant Pattanashetti, S.N. Bhat, N.P.S. Panwar, D.P.
Chaturvedi and K.M. Prakash for the Appellant.                         H
    976                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A       K.K. Venugopal, Sushi! Kumar, M. Srinivas R. Rao, Srinivas Kotni,
    Ms. Neeru Vaid, Sanjay R. Hegde and K. Rajeev for the Respondents.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

          S.N. VARIAVA, J. : Leave granted.
B
          Heard parties.

         This Appeal is against an Order dated 26th August, 2002 whereby
    an FIR has been quashed.
c         Briefly stated the facts are as follows :

  The appellant is the owner of survey No. 66 in Sarakki village. He appears
  to have entered into an agreement to sell dated 18th February, 1988 with
  his sister one Nirmala. This agreement was for 25, 188 sq. ft. in survey No.
D 66. Respondent No. 2 is the son of the said Nirmala. Respondent No. 4
  is the daughter of the said Nirmala. Respondent No. 3 is a daughter-in-law,
  through a deceased son of Nirmala. It is the case of the Appellant that he
  had permitted his sister Nirmala to reside in the plot agreed to be sold to
  her as his licensee. On 7th September, 2000 Respondents 2 to 4 filed a
E suit for partition. Appellant claims that in this suit, partition was also
  claimed of the 25, 188 sq ft. Respondents 2 to 4 deny that the claim in
  partition suit includes this piece of land. We are not concerned with this
  controversy, save and except to note that admittedly the documents set out
  hereunder were not produced or relied upon in this suit. The Appellant
F claims that he learnt that Respondents 2 to 4 were trying to get this piece
  of land transferred to their names on the basis of some partition deed. The
  Appellant thus filed as suit against Respondent 2 to 4 for a permanent
  injunction restraining change of name in the records. Respondents 2 to 4
  filed a written statement wherein they relied upon three documents all dated
  21st October, 1989. The documents are (a) a general power of attorney (b)
G a sale cum possession receipts (c) and affidavits purported to have been
  sworn by the Appellant. The Appellant claims that these documents were
  never executed by him. The Appellant claims that he also found some
  manipulations in the agreement to sell dated 18th February, 1988. The
  Appellant thus filed, on 27th May, 2002, a complaint with the police station
H at Ulsoor complaining that these documents were forged and fabricated.
                  M. NARAYANDAS v. STATE [VARIAVA, J.]                      977

    An FIR under Sections 468, 470, 471 and 1208 Indian Penal Code came A
    to be registered. Respondents 2 and 3 filed a Petition under Section 482
    of the Criminal Procedure Code to quash the FIR. This has been allowed
    by the High Court. Hence this Appeal.

         Before dealing with the High Court judgment, which has been B
    impugned, it is first necessary to set out well settled law. The law has been
    very succinctly set out in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal,
    reported in [1992] Supp. I SCC 335. In this case the High Court had
    quashed an FIR. While setting aside the High Court judgment this Court
    held as follows :
                                                                                  c
            "31. At the stage of registration of a crime or a case on the basis
            of the information disclosing a cognizable offence in compliance
            with the mandate of Section 154(1) of the Code, the concerned
            police officer can not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the
            information, laid by the informant is reliable and genuine or D
            otherwise and refuse to register a case on the ground that the
            information is not reliable or credible. On the other hand, the
            officer in charge of a police station is statutorily obliged to register
            a case and then to proceed with the investigation if he has reason
            to suspect the commission of an offence which he is empowered E
            under Section 156 of the Code to investigate, subject to the
            proviso to section 157. (As we have proposed to make a detailed
            discussion about the power of a police officer in the field of
            investigation of a cognizable offence within the ambit of Sections
            156 and 157 of the Code in the ensuing part of this judgment, we F
            do not propose to deal with those sections in extenso in the present
            context.) In case, an officer in charge of a police station refuses
            to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him and to register a case on
            the information of a cognizable offence reported and thereby
            violates the statutory duty cast upon him, the person aggrieved by
'           such refusal can send the substance of the information in writing G
            and by post to the Superintendent of Police concerned who if
            satisfied that the information forwarded to him discloses a cog-
            nizable offence, should either investigate the case himself or direct
            an investigation to be made by any police officer subordinate to
                                                                                  H
    978                SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A         him in the manner provided by sub-section (3) of Section 154 of
          the Code.

          32. Be it noted that in Section 154 (I) of the Code, the legislature
          in its collective wisdom has carefully and cautiously used the
          expression "information" without qualifying the same as in
B
          Section 41(1)(a) or (g) of the Code wherein the expressions,
          "reasonable complaint" and "credible information" are used.
          E.vidently, the non-qualification of the word "information" in
          Section 154 (1) unlike in Section 41(1 )(a) and (g) of the Code may
          be for the reason that the police officer should not refuse to record
c         an information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence
          and to register a case thereon the ground that he is not satisfied
          with the reasonableness or credibility of the information. In other
          words, 'reasonableness' or 'credibility' of the said information is
          not a condition precedent for registration of a case. A comparison
D         of the present Section 154 with those of the earlier Codes will
          indicate that the legislature had purposely thought it fit to employ
          only the word "information" without qualifying the said word.
          Section 139 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1861 (Act 25
          of 1861) passed by the Legislative Council of India read that
E          'every complaint or information' preferred to an officer in charge
          of a police station should be reduced into writing which provision
          was subsequently modified by Section 112 of the Code of 1872
          (Act 10 of 1872) which thereafter read that 'every complaint'
          preferred to an officer in charge of a police station shall be
          reduced in writing. The word 'complaint' which occurred in
F         previous two Codes of 1861 and 1872 was deleted and in that
           place the word 'information' was used in the Codes of 1882 and
           1898 which word is now used in Sections 154, 155, 157 and
           190(c) of the present Code of 1973 (Act 2 of 1974). An overall
          reading of all the Codes makes it clear that the condition which
G          is sine qua non for recording a first information report is that there
          must be an information and that information must disclose a
          cognizable offence.

          33. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that if any information
H         disclosing a cognizable offence is laid before an officer in charge
      M.NARAYANDASv. STATE[VARIAVA,J.)                        979

of a police station satisfoing the requirements of Section 154(/) A
of the Code, the said police officer has no other option except to
enter the substance thereof in the prescribed form, that is to say,
to register a case on the basis of such information.
                                              (emphasis supplied)
                                                                    B
xxx             xxx            xxx

40. The core of the above sections namely 156, 157 and 159 of
the Code is that if a police officer has reason to suspect the
commission of a cognizable offence, he must either proceed with
the investigation or cause an investigation to be proceeded with C
by his subordinate, that in a case where the police officer sees no
sufficient ground for investigation, he can dispense with the
investigation altogether; that the field of investigation of any
cognizable offence is exclusively within the domain of the
investigating agencies over which the court cannot have control D
and have no power to stifle or impinge upon the proceedings in
the investigation so long as the investigation proceeds in
compliance with the provisions relating to investigation and that
it is only in a case wherein a police officer decides not to
investigate an offence, the concerned Magistrate can intervene E
and either direct an investigation or in the alternative, if he thinks
fit, he himself can, at once proceed or depute any Magistrate
subordinate to him to proceed to hold a preliminary inquiry into
or otherwise to dispose of the case in the manner provided in the
Code.
                                                (emphasis supplied) F

xxx             xxx            xxx

102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant
provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles G
of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating
to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or
the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have
extracted and reproduced above, we give the following C?.tegories
of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be H
    980               SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A         exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or
          otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be
          possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently
          channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulate and to
          give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such
          power should be exercised.
B
          (I) Where the allegations made in the first information report or
          the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
          accepted in their entirety do not primafacie constitute any offence
          or make out a case against the accused.
c
          (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other
          materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a
          cognizable offence, justifying a investigation by police officers
          under Section 156( l) of the Code except under an order of a
D         Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

          (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or
          complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do
          not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case
          against the accused.
E
          (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable
          offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no inves-
          tigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a
          Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
F
          (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so
          absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no
          prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is
          sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

G         (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the
          provisions of the Code of the concerned Act (under which a
          criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance
          of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in
          the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for
H         the grievance of the aggrieved party.




                                                                                  -
              M.NARAYANDASv. STATE[VARIAVA,J.]                        981

         (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with ma/a A
        fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
        ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with
         a view to spite him due to private ar.d personal grudge.

         103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power B
        of quashing a criminal proceeding sh'ould be exercised very
        sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare
        cases; that the count will not be justified in embarking upon an
        enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the
        allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and. that the
        extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary C
        jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice."

It must also be mentioned that it is settled law that the power to quash must
be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection. It must be exercised
in the rarest of rare cases. It is also settled law that the Court would not D
be justified in embarking upon an Inquiry as to the reliability or genuineness
or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR. The Court also cannot
inquire whether the allegations in the complaint are likely to be established
or not.

      Keeping the above-mentioned principles in mind let us now see what E
the High Court has done in the impugned judgment. In the impugned
judgment the High Court proceeds to consider the case of the Appellant
in the complaint and the case made out by the Respondents. The High Court
examines the documents, compare the signatures thereon and then proceeds
to arrive at the conclusion that the documents are not false or fabricated. F
The High Court takes into consideration certain photographs and other
material produced by the Respondents, and concludes that the complaint
was vexatious, frivolous and false. On this basis the High Court proceeds
to quash the complaint and impose cost of Rs. I 0,000 on the appellant. The
High Court does not conclude, as it could not have, that the allegations
made in the complaint, if taken at their face value and accepted in their G
entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case
against the accused. The High Court does not conclude, as it could not
have, that the allegations in the complaint do not disclose a cognizable
offence justifying an investigation by the police officer. The conclusion of
the High Court that the complaint was false, vexatious and frivolous is H
    982                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A based on material produced by the Respondents. One fails to understand
  how without evidence the High Court could have relied on this material.
  It is clear that the impugned order is totally unsustainable. To the credit
  of Counsel, appearing for the Respondents, it must be stated that the
  impugned order was not sought to be supported for the reasons given by
B the High Court in quashing the complaint. It was fairly admitted that the
  reasons given by the High Court, in quashing the complaint, were
  unsustainable.

        On behalf of the Respondents it was submitted that this was a case
  which fell under Section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It was
C submitted that therefore the provisfons of Chapter XXVI of the Criminal
  procedure Code would apply. It was submitted that once the provisions of
  Chapter XXVI applied, impliedly, the provisions of Chapter XII get
  excluded. It was submitted that in such a case the only procedure which
  could be followed was to make an application to the Court. It was submitted
D that by not following the procedure laid down under Chapter XXVI the
  right of the Respondents under Article 21 of the Constitution of India had
  been affected. It was submitted that if an application had been made to the
  Court and the Court had taken a decision then under Section 341 of the
  Criminal Procedure Code an appeal could have been filed. It was submitted
E that by making a complaint to the police, who would then make a report
  to a Court and the Court would take cognizance the Respondents were
  deprived of the right of appeal as provided under Section 341 of the
  Criminal procedure Code.

          We are unable to accept the submissions made on behalf of the
F Respondents. Firstly it is to be seen that the High Court does not quash
  the complaint on the ground that Section 195 applied and that the procedure
  under Chapter XXVI had not been followed. Thus such a ground could not
  be used to sustain the impugned judgment. Even otherwise there is no
  substance in the submission. The question whether Sections 195 and 340
G of the Criminal Procedure Code affect the power of the police to investigate
  into a cognizable offence has already been considered by this Court in the
  case of State of Punjab v. Raj Singh, reported in (1998] 2 SCC 391. In
  this case it has been that as follows :

             "2. We are unable to sustain the impugned order of the High Court
H            quashing the FIR lodged against the respondents alleging
             M. NARAYANDASv. STATE [VARIAVA, J.]                     983

        commission of offences under Sections 419, 420, 467, and 468 A
        !PC by them in course of the proceeding of a civil suit, on the
        ground that Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC prohibited entertainment
        of and investigation into the same by the police. From a plain
        reading of Section 195 CrPC it is manifest that it comes into
        operation at the stage when the court intends to take cognizance B
        of an offence under Section 190(1) Cr. PC; and it has nothin~,
        do with the statutory power of the police to investigate into an FIR
        which discloses a cognizable offence, in accordance with Chapter
        XII of the Code even if the offence is alleged to have been
        committed in, or in relation to, any proceedings in court. In other C
        words, the statutory power of the police to investigate under the
        Code is not in any way controlled or circumscribed by Section 195
        Cr.PC. It is of course true that upon the charge-sheet (challan),
        if any, filed on completion of the investigation into such an
        offence the court would not be competent to take cognizance
        thereof in view of the embargo of Section 195(1)(b) CrPC, but D
        nothing therein deters the court from filing a complaint for the
        offence on the basis of the FIR (filed by the aggrieved private
        party) and the materials collected during investigation, provided
        it forms the requisite opinion and follows the procedure laid down
        in Section 340 CrPC. The judgment of this Court in Gopa/krishna E
        Menon v. Raja Reddy, [1983] 4 SCC 240: [1983] SCC (Cri) 822
        : AIR (1983) SC 1053 on which the High Court relied, has no
        manners of application to the facts of the instant case for there
        cognizance was taken on a private complaint even though the
        office of forgery was committed in respect of a money receipt F
        produced in the civil court and hence it was held that the court
        could not take cognizance on such a complaint in view of Section
        195 Cr.PC."

Not only are we bound by this judgment but we are also in complete
agreement with the same. Sections 195 and 340 do not control or G
circumscribe the power of the police to investigate under the Criminal
procedure Code. Once investigation is completed then the. embargo in
Section 195 would come into play and the Court would not be competent
to take cognizance. However, that Court could then file a complaint for
the offence on the basis of the FIR and the material collected during H
    984                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A investigation provided that procedure laid down in Section 340 Criminal
    Procedure Code is followed. Thus no right of the Respondents, much less
    the right to file an appeal under Section 341, is affected.

         It was next submitted that on the material placed before it the High
B   Court was right in concluding that the comp:aint was false, frivolous and
    vexatious. It was to be noted that the High Court arrived at this conclusion
    on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations made by the Respondents. How
    Courts should deal with such allegations is set out in para I08 of Bhajan
    Lat's case (supra). Para 108 read as follows :

c            "I 08. No doubt, there was no love lost between Shri Bhajan Lal
             and Dharam Pal. Based on this strained relationship, it has been
             then emphatically urged by Mr. K. Parasaran that the entire
             allegations made in the complaint due to political vendetta are not
             only scurrilous and scandalous but also tainted with mala fides,
             vitiating the entire proceedings. As it has been repeatedly pointed
D            out earlier the entire matter is only at a premature stage and the
             investigation is not yet proceeded with except some preliminary
             effort taken on the date of the registration of the case, that is on
             November 21, 1987. The evidence has to be gathered after a
             thorough investigation and placed before the court on the basis
E            of which alone the court can come to a conclusion one way or
             the other on the plea of ma/a fides. If the allegations are bereft
              of truth and made maliciously, we are sure, the investigation will
              say so. At this stage, when there are only allegations and
              recriminations but on evidence, this court cannot anticipate the
              result of the investigation and render a finding on the question of
F
              malafides on the materials at present available. Therefore, we are
              unable to see any force in the contention that the complaint should
              be thrown overboard on the mere unsubstantiated plea of ma/a
             fides. Even assuming that Dharam Pal has laid the complaint only
              on account of his personal animosity, that by itself, will not be
G             a ground to discard the complaint containing serious allegations
              which have to be tested and weighed after the evidence is
              collected. In this connection, the following view expressed by
              Bhagwati, CJ.in Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar, (1987] I
              SCC 288, 318 : [I 987] SCC (Cri) 82 may be referred to : (SCC
H             p. 318, para 16)"



                                                                                    -
                  M. NARA YANDAS v. STATE [VARIAVA, J.]                    985

                 "It is a well established proposition of law that a criminal A
                 prosecution, if otherwise justifiable and based upon adequate


-                evidence does not become vitiated on account of ma/a jides
                 or political vendetta of the first informant or the complaintant."

    For this reason the submission cannot be accepted. If as claimed there is B
    no substance in the complaint the investigation will say so. At this stage
    there were only allegations and recriminations. The High Court could not
    have anticipated the result of the investigation or rendered a finding on
    question of malajides. Even if the Appellant had made the complaint on
    account of personal vendetta that by itself was not a ground to discard the
    complaint which had to be tested and weighed after the evidence was C
    collected.

         It was lastly submitted that the question whether Section 195 Criminal
    Procedure Code applied or not had not been considered by the High Court
    and therefore the case should be sent back to the High Court for D
    consideration thereof. It was submitted that in the petition it has been
    squarely urged that Section 195 applied. It was submitted that the High
    Court should have considered this aspect. It was pointed out that the
    question whether Section 195 applies to documents forged prior to the
    proceedings in which they are tendered has, due to conflict of decisions, E
    been referred to a 5 Judge bench. We see no substance in this submission.
    The law on the point is clear. At the stage of investigation Section 195 has
    no application. We are therefore not concerned with the question whether
    Section 195 applies to documents forged/fabricated prior to their being
    produced in Court. That question only arises after the Court takes
    cognizance. At this stage the only question is whether the investigation F
    should be permitted to proceed or not. As stated above there is no ground
    or reason on which the complaint/FIR can be quashed.

         For the above reasons the impugned order needs to be and is
    accordingly set-aside. The petition for quashing will stand dismissed. The G
    Appeal is allowed accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.

    A.Q.                                                      Appeal allowed.