Holding

A managing director, being the principal officer of a company, is a "person" under section 277 and is liable for false verification of the return; the amendment of section 140(c) does not exempt him.

Summary

M.R. Pratap, the Managing Director of Rayala Corporation Private Ltd., signed and verified the company's income‑tax return for AY 1965‑66, which was later found to be false. He was prosecuted under section 277 of the Income‑Tax Act for wilfully making a false verification. The appellant contended that the term "person" in section 277 referred only to the assessee (the company) and not to a managing director, and that the amendment of section 140(c) replacing "principal officer" with "managing director" exempted him from liability. The Supreme Court held that a managing director is a "principal officer" under section 2(35) and therefore a "person" within the meaning of section 277, making him liable for the offence. The Court further clarified that the 1975 amendment (section 278B) expands liability to all persons connected with the company's affairs but does not relieve the managing director of responsibility. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed.

Issues considered

The meaning of "person" in section 277 of the Income‑Tax Act – whether it includes a managing director who signs the return on behalf of the company.
Whether the substitution of "managing director" for "principal officer" in section 140(c) by the 1975 amendment alters the liability of a managing director under section 277.
The effect of the newly introduced section 278B on the liability of persons connected with the affairs of a company.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 482
Companies Acts. 197A
Income Tax Act, 1961s. 139, s. 140(c), s. 2(20), s. 2(31), s. 2(35), s. 2(7), s. 276, s. 276A, s. 276B, s. 277, s. 278B, s. 278C, s. 279
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 120-B, s. 193

Subjects

Income-taxFalse verificationManaging DirectorPrincipal OfficerSection 277Section 140(c)Section 278BTax return liabilityProsecution

Judgment

M.R. PRATAP A
~ v.
V.M. MUTHUKRISHNAN, INCOME-TAX OFFICER, CENTRAL

-- CIRCLE-III, MADRAS

APRIL 29, 1992
B
A [KULDIP SINGH AND YOGESHWAR DAYAL, JJ .]

Income-tax Act, 1961: Sections 2(7)(20)(31)(35), 139, 140(c) (As
amended by Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975 and 276, 277, 278B and
278C). C
Income-tax-Return-Prosecution for false verification-Private Com-
pany--Managing Director filing Return of Company-Return found
false-Prosecution of Managing Director-Validity of-'Managing Director'
held covered by the word 'person' under section 277 and held liable for
prosecution-Effect of amendment of Section 140(c) and introduction of D
Section 278B explained.

The appellant was the Managing Director of a Private Limited
Company. As a Principle Officer of the Company, he filed a return of the
Income of the company for the assessment year 1965-66 which was verified E
and signed by him. Subsequently it was discovered that the return was
false. He was charged for making wilfully and knowingly false verification
of the Company's return and was thus prosecuted under section 277 of the
.Income-tax Act, 1961.

He filed a petition challening the maintainability of the complaint F
against him as the Managing Director which was dismissed. The High
Court also upheld his prosecution and dismissed his Revision Petition and
the petition filed under section 482 of the Code of Criminal procedure for
quashing the complaint.

In appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant G
that: (t) the word 'person' in section 277 refers only to an assessee and
does not include the person who made the verification on behalf of the
assessee; (ii) the substitution of the word 'Managing Director' for the term
'Prinicpal Officer' in section 140(c) of the Act by the Taxation Laws
(Amendment) Act, 1975 shows that the expression 'Principal Officer' will H
949
950 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992) 2 S.C.R.

A not relate to Managing Director.

Dismissing the appeals, this Court,

HELD : 1. The appellant cannot escape on the plea that the word
'person' used in Section 277 of the Income-tax Aet refers only to an
B assessee but not the person who has made the verification on behalf of the
said assessee. In view of Section 139 read with Section 140(c) of the Act
the return has to be signed by the principal officer of the company. A
statutory obligation is cast on the principal officer to sign the tax returns.
The appellant admittedly was the Managing Director of the Company and
C he was thus the principal officer thereof. [955 B, G-H]

2. The substitution of the words 'Managing Director' for the term
'Principal Officer' in section 140(c) by the Taxation Laws (Amendment)
Act, 1975 will not in any way alter the position with regard to the operation
of the provisions· of the Income-tax Act as against a managing director of
D a company when he has signed the return of the company in such capacity.
The effect of the amended section 140 (c) of the Act is that the company's
return of income should be signed only by the managing director or by any
director, when there is no managing director, and not by the Secretary or
the treasurer, who are however included within the meaning of 'Principal
E Officer' under section 2(35) of the Act. The effect of introduction of Section
2788 by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act of 1975, with effect from lst
October, 1975 is to make every person connected with the affairs of the -y-
company, apart from the managing director who has signed the return,
liable to be proceeded against and punished. [955 H, 956 A-DJ

F Kapurchand Shrimal v. Tax Recovery Officer, Hyderabad and Ors.,
(1969) 72 ITR 623, relied on. ~

Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income·tox v. Chotabhai
Javerl:Jha~ (1941] 8 ITR 604 (Mad.), approved.

G CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal
Nos. 383-384 of 1979.

From the Judgment and Order dated 4.2.1977 of the Madras High
Court in Criminal Misc. Petition No. 4813176 and Crjminal Revision Case ~·
H No. 44 of 1974.
M. R. PRATAP v. I. T. 0. (YOGESHWAR DAYAL, J.] 951

A.T.M. Sam.path for the Appellant. A
Dr. V. Gauri Shankar, S. Rajappa for Ms. A. Subhashini and Raju
Rama Chandran for the Respondent. •

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B
YOGESHWAR DAYAL, J. These appeals are directed against the
judgment of the learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court dated 4th
February, 1977 and arise in the following cir<:Umstances.

The first accused, Sh. M.R. Pratap, who was the Managing Director
of the Company Rayala Corporation Private Ltd., is the appellant in the C
present appeals. The respondent/complainant is the Income-true Officer,
Central Cricle III, Madras.· The appellant is the first accused along with
the second accused. A complaint was filed before the Chief Presidency
Magistrate purporting to be under Sections 277 and 273 of the Income-true
Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and Sections 120-B and 193 D
of the Indian Penal Code, relating to an offence said to have been com-
mitted during the assessment year 1965-66.

According to the complaint the first accused was the Managing
Director of the Rayala Corporation Private Ltd.,. (hereinafter referred to
as 'the Company')and the-seoond accused was the Chief Accountant of the E
said Company. The Company was an assessee under the Act. The return
of the income of the company for the assessment year 1965- 66 dated 17th
November, 1976 was delivered to the respondent on 18th November, 1965
sho\ving a total income of Rs. 21,36,785 for the accounting year ended 31st
March, 1965. The return so submitted was verified and signed by the first F
accused- the appellant herein. The accompanying statements were signed
by the second accused. According to the complaint, as a result of a search
at the premises of the company and the residence of both the accused and
others, made under Section 132 of the Act, it was discovered that the return
of income and the statements accompanying the said return were
deliberately false, being less than the true income by more than Rs. 6 lakhs G
and the expenditure shown in the statements had been obviously inflated
by at least Rs. 2,69,765. The complaint charged the appellant for making
willfully and knowingly false verification of the company's return of income
and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 277 of the Act.
Besides this, the first and the second accused were charged with other H
952 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] 2 S.C.R.

A offences also. However, for the purpose of the present appeals we are not
concerned with the rest of the charges made in the complaint.

The appellant herein fded a miscellaneou8 petition before the
Magistrate as to the maintainability of the complaint against him in bis
capacity as the Managing Director. The Magistrate dismissed the miscel-
B laneous petition by order dated 28th Noverber,1973. Against the said order
the appellant filed a revision petition. The appellant also filed another
petition being Crl. Misc. Petition No. 4813 of 1976 under Section 482 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. praying to quash the complaint and the
proceedings in pursuance thereof.
c The learned Single Judge dismissed both the revision petition as well
:is the petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and
upheld the prosecution of the appellant.

Numerous contentions were urged before the learned Single Judge
D but before this Court really one contention was urged, namely- that the
word "person" occurring in Section 277 of the Act would relate only to an
assessee and not to any person other than the assessee and, therefore, the
appellant who signed the return of income on behalf of the company in the
capacity of Managing Director, cannot be included within the definition of
the word "person" as used in Section 277 and, consequently, if person other
E than the assessee is prosecuted, it would be void, because Section 277
contemplates an offence by an assessee against whom penalty is imposable
and not by any person other than the assessee, viz. the Company.

Before us Mr. Sampath, learned counsel for the appellant, repeated
F the submissions which were urged before the High Court. It was inter alia
submitted by the learned counsel that Section 2(31) of the Act defines the
word "person" and the word "assessee" is defined in Section 2(7) as a
person by whom any tax or any other sum of money is payable under the
Act and includes a person in respect of whom proceedings under the Act
have been taken for the assessment of his income, etc.
G
However, according to learned counsel for the respondent under
Chapter XXII, in Sections 276, 276A, 276B, 277, 278 and 279, the word
"person" is used. He submitted that the word "person" in Section 277 does
not and cannot mean the assessee·. It was submitted on behalf of the
H respondent that the word "person" occurring in Section 277 means the
M. R. PRATAP v. l. T. 0. [YOGESHWAR DAYAL, J.) 953

individual who makes a declaration on oath which he believes to be false A
and he need not necessarily be only the assessee on whom penalty is
leviable under Section 27i (l)(c) for concealment and that the word
"person" occurring in Section 276 means the individual who fails to do the
acts prescribed by the statute and the word "person" occurring in Section
276A means the individual who acts in a manner contrary to the statute B
and the expression "person" used in Section 277 is not used in the sense as
is defined in Section 2(31) of the Act. Support in this behalf wa~ sought
from the decision of the Supreme Court in Kapurchand Shrimal v. Tax
Recovery Officer, Hyderabad, and others (1969) 72 ITR 623 SC. In this case
it was held thus: ...:..
c
"We are unable to hold that the expression 'person' in sections
276, 276A and 277 is us~d in the sense in which it is defined in
section 2(31) of the Act.For each specific act which is deemed
to be an offence under those provisions, and individual who,
without reasonable cause or excuse, fails to do the acts D
prescribed by Statute or acts in a manner contrary to. the
statute, or makes a declaration on oath which he believed to
be false or does not believe to be true, is made liable to be
punished. Section 278 penalises the abetment or inducing any
person to make and deliver an account, statement or declara- E
tion relating to any income chargeable to tax which is false and
which he either knows to be false or does not believe to be
true. In the context in which the expression 'person' occurs in
sections- 276, 276A, 277 and 278, there can be no doubt that it
...... seeks to penalise only those individuals who fail to carry out
the duty cast by the specific provisions of the statute, or are F
otherwise responsible for the acts done."

·Another argument of learned.counsel for the appellant was that the
term "principal officer" is defined in Section 2(35) as the secretary,
treasurer, manager or agent of the company, but would not include Manag- G
ing Director as the said term "managing director" is conspicuously omitted
there and that, therefore, whenever an assessee or any other person is to
be prosecuted or is intended to be subjected to certain obligation, the
statute intends the "company and the principal officer" as mentioned in
Sections 204, 206 and 236 of the Act. It was thus urged that the omission H
954 1SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992) 2 S.C.R.

A of the words "principal officer" or "managing director" in Section 277 is very ~-
significant and the Managing Director cannot at all be prosecuted in a case
where the company itself is an assessee. Therefore, according to the
learned counsel for the appellant the word "person" occurring in Section
277 will incbde neither the managing director nor the principal officer
B nor the representative assessee, and as the definition of "person" includes
only the company, the verification has to be under Section 139 only by the
company and the person who signs that verification is only a signatory
whereas the company is the assessee, the person who is obliged to file the
verified return. He also submitted that according to the newly introduced
C Sections 278B and 278C (Introduced on 1st october, 1975) a director in
the case of the company and a karta in the case of a Hindu Undivided
Family can be prosecuted, and, therefore, by virtue of the said new amend-
ments, the legislature in its wisdom has thought it fit to bring the managing
director also along with the company as accused person only by this
amendment which takes effect from 1st October 1975, and this introduction
D of the amendment will go in support of the appellant'& contention that the
legislature itself had not, during the relevant period in this case. intended
the managing director to be included and so the managing director cannot
be prosecuted at all in this case. It was urged that if the contention of the
prosecution that the managing director can be prosecuted before 1st
E October, 1975 is correct, then there was no necessity for this amendment
to fill up the lacuna, and, therefore, before 1st October, 1975, in view of 1f·
Section 279 (lA), the assessee alone can be prosecuted.

Learned counsel for the respondent in reply to this argument sub-
mitted that the main decision of the Supreme Court in Kapurcltand's case
....
F (supra) that the karta cannot be detained in a civil jail, rests on Section
- 222 which specifically uses the word "assessee" and, therefore, the con-
clusion arrived at in that case, while dealing with Section 222, cannot be
availed of by the appellant in this case. Before the learned Single Judge
reliance was also placed on the decision of the Madras High Court in
G Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax v. Chotabhai Javerbha~ -.
(1941) 9 ITR 604 (Madras) wherein Horwil~ J., while dealing with Section
52 of the Indian Income-true Act, 1922 (corresponding to Section 277 of the
1961 Act), has held that the word "person" in that section does not ,__
- necessarily mean the assessee and that it must be given its ordinary
H
I>
M. R. PRATAP v. I. T. 0. [YOGESHWAR DAYAL, J.] 955

dictionary meaning and that it includes a person duly authorised. A
r- ~ It appears that in view of the dictum of this Court in Kapurchand's
case (supra) we are unable to accept the arguments ac!vanced by the
learned counsel for the appellant. On the other hand we are of the view
that the appellant cannot escape on the plea that the word "person" used
B
in Section 277 refers only to an assessee but not the person who has made
the verification on behalf of the said assessee.

It has been found by the learned Single Judge that the verification of
the return which was signed by the appellant was signed by him in his
~ capacity as principal officer. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted c
) that the Parliament has now, by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act of
1975, which took effect from 1st April, 1976, removed the expression "the
.~ principal officer" occurring in Section 140 (c), in so far as it related to a
company, and instead has . substituted the words "the managing direc-
tor........ or, where there is no managing director, any director thereof''. It D
was thus contended that the substitution of the word "managing director"
for the term "principal offic~r" is an indication to show that the expression
"principal officer" will not relate to the managing director and that is why
the above sustitution has now taken place.
E
We are afraid we cannot also agree with this submission of the
-y- learned counsel for the appellant. Section 2(35) of the Act defines the term
"principal officer" and Section 2(20) of the Act defines the term "director".
Section 2 sub-section (24) of the Companies Act defines the word
,,. "manager". At the relevant time Section 197A of the Companies Act
F
pr?vided that no company shall appoint or employ at the same time more
than one of the following categories of managerial personnel, viz., the
managing director. and the manager. In the present case the appellant
admittedly was the Managing Director of the Company and he was thus
~-(-
the principal officer thereof. Rule 12(1) of the lnc6me-tax l_lules states that
_the return of income shall, in the case of a company, be in Form No. 1 and G
be verified in the manner indicated therein. In view of Section 139 read
with Section 140(c) of the Act the return has to be signed by the principal
officer of the company. A statutory obligation is cast on the principal
'!{!. ~
officer to sign the tax returns. The substitution of the words made under
~ the.new Amendment Act will not in any way alter the position with . regard H
956 SUPREME COURT REPORTS . [1992] 2 S.C.R.

A to the operation of the provisions of the Income-tax Act as against a
managing director of a company when he has signed the return of the
company in such capacity. The effect of the amended Section 140(c) of the
Act is that the company's return of income should be signed only by the
managing director or by any director, when there is no managing director,
>-..
-
B and not by the secretary or the treasurer, who are however included within
the meaning of "principal officer" under Section 2 (35) of the Act. By the
Introduction of Section 278B by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act of
1975, with effect from 1st October, 1975, it is enacted that where an offence
under this ~ct has been committed by a company, every person who, at
the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible
c to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company, •as well as
~

1
the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shali be liable
to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. The effect of the new
~.
section is to make every person connected with the affairs of the company,
apart from the managing director who has signed the return, liable to b~
D proceeded against and punished

We are in complete agreement with the reasonings and conclusion
of the High Court. No other point was urged. The result is that the appeals
fail and are dismissed.

T.N.A. Appeals dismissed.
1- .

. ,...~