Supreme Court of India
M/S A.P. ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT CORPORATIONversusTHE TAHSILDAR & ORS. ETC.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 274
- Decided
- 27 February 2025
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- B PARDIWALA
Holding
The State failed to establish actual physical possession of the excess land and the notices were invalid, so the appellant is entitled to the benefit of section 3 of the Repeal Act and the Division Bench’s reversal of the Single Judge’s order is set aside.
Summary
The appellant, A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation, owned a large parcel of land in Hyderabad that was declared excess under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. The State issued a notice under section 10(5) on 5 January 2008, affixed it on 8 January, and after alleged non‑compliance issued an order under section 10(6) on 5 February 2008 together with a panchnama dated 8 February, claiming to have taken physical possession. The appellant challenged these proceedings before the High Court, which a Single Judge held that the notices were defective, the panchnama did not prove actual possession, and therefore the appellant was entitled to the benefit of section 3 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999. The Division Bench set aside that judgment, but the Supreme Court examined whether the State had established actual physical possession and whether the procedural requirements of sections 10(5) and 10(6) were complied with. The Court concluded that the State failed to prove de‑facto possession and that the notices were invalid, so the appellant could claim relief under the Repeal Act. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals, restored the Single Judge’s order and set aside the Division Bench’s decision.
Issues considered
- Whether the State actually took physical possession of the excess vacant land before the Repeal Act, 1999 came into force
- Whether the notice under section 10(5) and the order under section 10(6) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 were validly served
- Whether the panchnama dated 08.02.2008 constitutes valid evidence of possession
- Effect of section 3 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 on the vesting and possession of the land
- Whether the Division Bench erred in overturning the Single Judge’s findings
- Whether an intra‑court appeal can set aside a Single Judge’s order on the basis of a patent error
Legislation cited
- U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950s. 117(1)
- Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976s. 10(3), s. 10(5), s. 10(6)
- Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999s. 3, s. 4
Headnote
Issue for Consideration Whether in the instant case, single Judge of the High Court was right in holding that the appellant herein is entitled to get the benefit of s.3 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999. Whether the Division Bench of the High in upsetting the findings recorded by the Single Judge. Headnotes† Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 – Sub-section (5) of section 10 and sub-section (6) of s.10 – Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 – s.3 – The Competent Authority
Subjects
Section 3 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999sub‑sections (5) and (6) of s.10 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976excess vacant landpossessionpaper possessionde facto possessionvesting of vacant landwrit jurisdictiondisputed question of factmixed question of law and factintra‑court appealtwo inconsistent decisions of Supreme CourtArticle 226 of the Constitution
Judgment
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1625 : 2025 INSC 274
M/s A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation
v.
The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc.
(Civil Appeal No(s). 4526-4527 of 2024)
27 February 2025
[J.B. Pardiwala* and R. Mahadevan, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether in the instant case, single Judge of the High Court was
right in holding that the appellant herein is entitled to get the benefit
of s.3 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act,
1999. Whether the Division Bench of the High Court committed
any error in upsetting the findings recorded by the Single Judge.
Headnotes†
Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 – Sub-section (5)
of section 10 and sub-section (6) of s.10 – Urban Land (Ceiling
and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 – s.3 – The Competent
Authority issued notice u/s.10(5) of the ULC Act directing the
appellant to surrender the excess vacant land within 30 days –
According to respondents, the appellant’s factory was closed
and the said notice was fixed on the main door of factory
premises – Due to non-compliance of the aforementioned
notice, order u/s.10(6) of the ULC Act was issued on 05.02.2008
authorising the enquiry officer to take over the possession of
the surplus land – Accordingly, the Enquiry Officer took over
the possession of the surplus land on 08.02.2008 by way of
a panchnama – However, it is the case of appellant that the
respondents allegedly took only symbolic possession of the
subject land – Thereafter, the State brought into force the
Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 with
effect from 27.03.2008 – Writ petition by appellant against
illegal attempts of dispossession – The Single Judge of the
High Court allowed the writ petitions filed by the appellant
and held that order u/s.10(6) was void, illegal and bad in
law – However, the Division Bench of the High Court allowed
both the appeals filed by the State and thereby set aside the
judgment and order passed by the Single Judge – Correctness:
* Author
1626 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Held: The issue as to whether actual possession of land declared
excess under the Act has been taken over or not assumes great
significance after the coming into force of the Repeal Act, 1999
inasmuch as if possession has not been taken over, the proceedings
would abate u/s.4 of the Repeal Act, 1999 and the ownership of
the land, if vested in the State Government u/s.10(3) of the Act,
1976 would be required to be restored to the original land-holder
subject to repayment of any amount that has been paid by the
State Government with respect to such land – The “vesting” in
sub-section (3) of section 10 means vesting of title absolutely
and not possession though nothing stands in the way of a person
voluntarily surrendering or delivering possession – Surrendering
or transfer of possession under sub-section (3) to Section 10 can
be voluntary so that the person may get the compensation as
provided under Section 11 of the Act, 1976 early – Once there is no
voluntary surrender or delivery of possession, necessarily the State
Government has to issue notice in writing under sub-section (5)
to Section 10 to surrender or deliver possession – Sub-section (5)
of Section 10 visualizes a situation of surrendering and delivering
possession, peacefully while sub-section (6) of Section 10
contemplates a situation of forceful dispossession – The State has to
establish that there has been a voluntary surrender of vacant land or
surrender and delivery of peaceful possession under sub-section (5)
of Section 10 or forceful dispossession under sub-section (6) of
Section 10 – On failure to establish any of those situations, the
landowner or holder can claim the benefit of Section 3 of the Repeal
Act, 1999 – In the case on hand, the State Government has not
been able to establish any of those situations – The mere paper
possession would not save the situation for the State Government
unless the State is able to establish by cogent evidence that actual
physical possession of the entire land was taken over by evicting
each and every person from the land – The onus is on the State
to establish that actual physical possession of the excess vacant
land was taken over before the repeal – Hence, the Single Judge
was right in holding that the appellant herein is entitled to get the
benefit of Section 3 of the Repeal Act, 1999. [Paras 20, 29, 36,
38, 39]
Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 – Sub-section (5)
of section 10 and sub-section (6) of section 10 – Statute
contemplates:
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1627
M/s A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc.
Held: On a plain reading of the sub-section (5) of section 10
and sub-section (6) of section 10, it is apparent that the statute
contemplates giving an opportunity to the landholder or any
person in possession of excess vacant land to surrender or
deliver possession thereof to the State Government and for this
purpose provides for giving notice in writing, ordering such person
to surrender or deliver possession of such land – It is only when
pursuant to such notice, such person refuses or fails to comply with
an order under sub-section (5) within a period of thirty days of the
service of notice, that the competent authority is required to take
over possession of the vacant land and for that purpose may use
force, if necessary – Therefore, the provisions of sub-section (6)
are to be resorted to only when there is refusal or non-compliance
of an order under sub-section (5) of Section 10 of the Act, 1976
within the prescribed period. [Para 22]
Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 – Possession
of subject land – Paper possession:
Held: The dictum, as laid in Hari Ram case, is that where the
possession of the subject land has not been taken over by the
State Government or by any person duly authorised by the State
Government in this behalf or by the competent authority, the
proceedings under the Act would not survive and mere vesting of
the vacant land with the State Government by operation of law,
without actual possession, is not sufficient – To put it in other
words, the mere paper possession would not save the situation
for the State Government unless the State is able to establish
by cogent evidence that actual physical possession of the entire
land was taken over by evicting each and every person from the
land – The onus is on the State to establish that actual physical
possession of the excess vacant land was taken over before the
repeal. [Para 29]
Precedent – Two inconsistent decision of Supreme Court –
The High Court to reconcile and respect both:
Held: If two decisions of this Court appear inconsistent with each
other, the High Courts are not to follow one and overlook the other,
but should try to reconcile and respect them both. [Para 35]
Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 – Effect
of:
1628 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Held: The effect of Repeal Act, 1999 is clear – If the landowner
remains in physical possession, then irrespective of his land being
declared surplus and/or entry being made in favour of the State
in revenue records, he will not be divested of his rights – Even if
compensation is received that also will not dis-entitle him to claim
the benefit if compensation is refunded, provided he is in actual
physical possession – Payment of compensation has no co-relation
with the taking of actual physical possession as with the vesting
land compensation becomes payable which can be paid without
taking actual physical possession. [Para 40]
Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 – Urban Land
(Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 – The propositions of
law governing the issue of possession in context with ss. 10(5)
and 10(6) respectively of the Act, 1976 r/w. s.3 of the Repeal
Act – Summed up:
Held: (1) The Repeal Act, 1999 clearly talks about the possession
being taken u/s.10(5) or s.10(6) of the Act, 1976, as the case may be;
(2) It is a statutory obligation on the part of the competent authority
or the State to take possession strictly as permitted in law;
(3) In case the possession is purported to have been taken u/s.10(6)
of the Act, 1976 the Court is still obliged to look into whether
“taking of such possession” is valid or invalidated on any of the
considerations in law; (4) The possession envisaged u/s.3 of the
Repeal Act, 1999 is de facto and not de jure only; (5) The mere
vesting of “land declared surplus” under the Act without resuming
“de facto possession” is of no consequence and the land holder is
entitled to the benefit of the Repeal Act, 1999; (6) The requirement
of giving notice under sub-sections (5) and (6) of s.10 respectively
is mandatory – Although the word “may” has been used therein, yet
the word “may” in both the sub-sections should be understood as
“shall” because a Court is obliged to decide the consequences that
the legislature intended to follow from the failure to implement the
requirement; (7) The mere vesting of the land under sub-section (3)
of s.10 would not confer any right on the State Government to
have de facto possession of the vacant land unless there has
been a voluntary surrender of vacant land before 18.03.1999;
(8) The State has to establish by cogent evidence on record that
there has been a voluntary surrender of vacant land or surrender
and delivery of peaceful possession under sub-section (6) of s.10
or forceful dispossession under sub-section (6) of s.10. [Para 41]
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1629
M/s A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc.
Appeal – Intra-Court Appeal – Scope of:
Held: An intra-court appeal is really not a statutory appeal preferred
against the judgment and order of an inferior to the superior Court –
The appeal inter se in a High Court from one court to another is
really an appeal from one coordinate bench to another coordinate
bench and it is for this reason that a writ cannot be issued by
one Bench of the High Court to another Bench of the High Court
nor can even the High Court issue writ to a High Court – Thus,
unlikely an appeal, in general, an intra court appeal is an appeal
on principle and that is why, unlike an appeal, in an ordinary
sense, such as a criminal appeal, where the whole evidence on
record is examined afresh by the appellate court, what is really
examined, in an intra court appeal, is the legality and validity of a
judgment and/or order of the Single Judge and it can be set aside
or should be set aside only when there is a patent error on the face
of the record or the judgment is against the established or settled
principles of law – If two views are possible and a view, which is
reasonable and logical has been adopted by a Single Judge, the
other view howsoever appealing may be to the Division Bench, it
is the view adopted by the Single Judge, which should, normally,
by allowed to prevail. [Para 42]
Jurisdiction – Writ Jurisdiction – Power of writ Court to
determine disputed question of fact:
Held: The disputed questions of fact are not investigated or
adjudicated by a writ court while exercising powers under Article 226
of the Constitution of India – But the mere existence of the disputed
question of fact, by itself, does not take away the jurisdiction of
this writ court in granting appropriate relief to the petitioner – In a
case where the Court is satisfied, like the one on hand, that the
facts are disputed by the State merely to create a ground for the
rejection of the writ petition on the ground of disputed questions of
fact, it is the duty of the writ court to reject such contention and to
investigate the disputed facts and record its finding if the particular
facts of the case, like the one at hand, was required in the interest
of justice – There is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to
indicate that the High Court in the proceedings, like the one on
hand, is debarred from holding such an inquiry – The proposition
that a petition under Article 226 must be rejected simply on the
ground that it cannot be decided without determining the disputed
question of fact is not warranted by any provisions of law nor by
1630 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
any decision of this Court – A rigid application of such proposition or
to treat such proposition as an inflexible rule of law or of discretion
will necessarily make the provisions of Article 226 wholly illusory
and ineffective. [Paras 48, 49]
Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 – Sub-section (5)
of s.10 and sub-section (6) of s.10 – Whether actual physical
possession of excess land is a mixed question of law and fact:
Held: The issue as regards taking over of the actual physical
possession of the excess land in accordance with the provisions of
sub-sections (5) and (6) of s.10 of the Act, 1976 could be said to be
a mixed question of law and fact and not just a question of fact –
Mixed question of law and fact refers to a question which depends
on both law and fact for its solution – In resolving a mixed question
of law and fact, a reviewing court must adjudicate the facts of the
case and decide relevant legal issues at the same time. [Para 54]
Case Law Cited
Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. [2002] Supp.
4 SCR 517 : (2003) 2 SCC 111; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Hari
Ram [2013] 2 SCR 301 : (2013) 4 SCC 280; Vipin Chandra Vadilal
Bavishi v. State of Gujarat [2016] 1 SCR 283 : (2016) 4 SCC 531;
Rajendra Kumar v. Kalyan (Dead) by L.Rs. [2000] Supp. 2 SCR
114 : (2000) 8 SCC 99; State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei
[1967] 2 SCR 625 : AIR 1967 SC 1269; Gunwant Kaur v. Bhatinda
Municipality (1969) 3 SCC 769 : AIR 1970 SC 602; State of U.P.
& Anr. v. Ehsan & Anr., 2023 INSC 906 : [2023] 13 SCR 905;
Kolkata Municipal Corporation and Another v. Bimal Kumar Shah
and Others [2024] 5 SCR 831: (2024) 10 SCC 533 – relied on.
Gajanan Kamlya Patil v. Additional Collector and Competent
Authority (ULC) and Ors. [2014] 1 SCR 1032 : (2014) 12 SCC 523;
State of Assam v. Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma [2014] 14 SCR 1451 : (2015)
5 SCC 321; Vinayak Kashinath Shilkar v. Deputy Collector and
Competent Authority and Ors. [2012] 2 SCR 219 : (2012) 4 SCC
718; State of Gujarat v. Kamuben, 2019 SCC OnLine Guj 4941;
Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab [1962] Supp. 3 SCR 713 :
AIR 1963 SC 395; Sethi Auto Service Station and Another v. Delhi
Development Authority and Others [2008] 14 SCR 598 : (2009) 1
SCC 180; Jasbir Singh Chhabara and Others v. State of Punjab
and Others (2010) 4 SCC 192; State of Uttaranchal and Another v.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1631
M/s A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc.
Sunil Kumar Vaish and Others [2011] 13 SCR 754 : (2011) 8 SCC
670; Pimpri Chinchwad New Township Development Authority v.
Vishnudev Cooperative Housing Society and Others [2018] 11
SCR 310 : (2018) 8 SCC 215; Sita Ram Bhandari Society, New
Delhi v. Lieutenant Governor of NCT of Delhi [2009] 14 SCR 507 :
(2009) 10 SCC 501; Omprakash Verma v. State of A.P. [2010] 15
SCR 302 : (2010) 13 SCC 158; Balmokand Khati Educational and
Industrial Trust v. State of Punjab [1996] 2 SCR 643 : (1996) 4
SCC 212; Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. A. Viswan [1996] 2 SCR
402 : (1996) 8 SCC 259; State of Assam v. Bhaskar Jyoti Sharma
[2014] 14 SCR 1451 : (2015) 5 SCC 321; State of Maharashtra v.
B.E. Billimoria [2003] Supp. 2 SCR 603 : (2003) 7 SCC 336;
Raghbir Singh Sehrawat v. State of Haryana, 2012 AIR SCW 240;
Maharaj Singh v. State of UP [1977] 1 SCR 1072 – referred to.
State of Telangana v. Southern Steels Limited, W.A. 1975 of
2017; The Principal Commissioner v. M. Venkataraman, 2014
SCC OnLine Mad 4505; P. Laxmi Kantha Rao and Others v.
Government Of Andhra Pradesh, 2014 SCC OnLine Hyd 1348;
J Sarada Govardhini v. Special Officer and Competent Authority,
Writ Petition No. 9680 of 2006; Gonguluri Srinivasa Sharma and
Anr. v. Government of AP and Ors., Writ Petition No. 28883 of
2011; Dip Co. Op. Hsg. Society Ltd. through Purshottam S. Patel v.
State of Gujarat and Others, 2020 SCC OnLine Guj 693; Dip
Co. Op. Hsg. Society Ltd. through Purshottam S. Patel v. State of
Gujarat and Others, 2024 SCC OnLine Guj 3034; Privy Council in
Punjab Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Commr. of Income Tax, Lahore,
AIR 1940 PC 230 – referred to.
Quinn v. Leathern, 1901 AC 495 at p.506; Privy Council in Alexander
Rodger Charles Carnie v. Comproir D’Escompte De Paris, 1871
Law Reports 3 Privy Council 475 – referred to.
List of Acts
Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976; Urban Land (Ceiling
and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999; U.P. Zamindari Abolition and
Land Reforms Act, 1950.
List of Keywords
Section 3 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act,
1999; sub-sections (5) and (6) of s.10 of the Urban Land (Ceiling
and Regulation) Act, 1976; Excess vacant land; Possession; Actual
1632 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
possession; Paper possession; de facto possession; Vesting of
the vacant land; Writ Jurisdiction; Disputed question of fact; Mixed
question of law and fact; Intra-Court Appeal; Two inconsistent
decision of Supreme Court; Article 226 of Constitution.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No(s). 4526-4527
of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 14.02.2023 of the High
Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad in WA Nos. 665
and 670 of 2022
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
N.K. Kaul, Mukul Rohatgi, V. Ramesh, Sr. Advs., M/s. Khaitan &
Co., Sanjeev K Kapoor, Aakash Bajaj, Dhritiman Roy, Ms. Sania
Abbasi, R Ashwanth.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Raju Ramachandran, Sr. Adv., Somanadri Goud Katam, Ms. Neha
Agarwal, Vikram, Sirajuddin.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
J.B. Pardiwala, J.
1. Since the issues raised in both the captioned appeals are same, the
parties are also same and the challenge is also to the self-same
judgment and order passed by the High Court, those were taken up
for hearing analogously and are being disposed of by this common
judgment and order.
2. “…..One of the first and highest duties of all courts is to take care
that the act of the Court does no injury to any of the Suitors, and
when the expression ‘the act of the Court’ is used, it does not mean
merely the act of the Primary Court, or of any intermediate Court of
appeal, but the act of the Court as a whole, from the lowest Court
which entertains jurisdiction over the matter up to the highest Court
which finally disposes of the case.” [Privy Council in Alexander
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1633
M/s A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc.
Rodger Charles Carnie v. Comproir D’Escompte De Paris, 1871 Law
Reports 3 Privy Council 475]
3. These appeals arise from a common judgment and order passed
by the High Court for the State of Telangana and Hyderabad dated
03.01.2022 in Writ Appeal No. 665 of 2022 and Writ Appeal No. 670
of 2022 respectively by which both the writ appeals filed by the State
came to be allowed thereby setting aside the judgment and order
passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court allowing the
writ petitions filed by the appellants-herein.
4. The facts giving rise to these appeals may be summarized as under:-
i) M/S A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation (Now known as
‘ECE INDUSTRIES LIMITED’), hereinafter the appellant is a
company engaged in the business of manufacture and sale
of power transformers and other electrical equipment. For the
purpose of establishing its manufacturing unit, the appellant
company had purchased land measuring 1,63,764 (Sq. yards
in Survey Nos 74,75,76, 78, 79) (‘Subject Land’) and the same
is the subject matter of the present appeals.
ii) The subject land is situated in Fatehnagar Village Balanagar
Mandal, Rangareddy District.
iii) Following the enactment of the Urban Land (Ceiling and
Regulation) Act, 1976 (for short, ‘the Act, 1976’), the appellant
filed a declaration in Form I under Section 6(1) of the Act, 1976
whose declaration was taken up as C.C. No. 10571 of 1976
by the special officer and competent authority of urban land
ceiling department for utilization of excess land. The declaration,
which covered the appellant’s holdings in Hyderabad and
Visakhapatnam, was duly processed by the authorities.
iv) Lands held by the appellant at Hyderabad are as under:
S. Properties Area
No (in Sq. Mtrs)
1. Total extent in Sy. Nos- 74/P, 75/P, 163679
76/P, 78 & 79 in Fathenagar (Vg)
2. Extent covered by GVM road in Sy. 163679-5088 =
No. 78 & 79 in T.S. No. 3 & 6 of 158591
Block A = 5088 Sq Meters
1634 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
3. Extent exempted by the Government 158591-51580 =
u/s 20(1)(a) vide G.O.Ms No. 1729 dt 107011
23.11.82 = 51580.00 Sq meters
4. Extent Exempted u/s 21 under 107001-
Housing Scheme in Sy. Nos .74/P, 56730.57 =
75/P = 56730.57 Sq Mtrs 50280.43
5. Total Extent exempted i.e.
(108310.57 Sq Mtrs)
6. Extent Effected by Roads in Sy. 50280.43-3742 =
No. 74/P, 75, 76 as per MCH Plan, 46538.43
3742.00 Sq Mtrs out of 50283.00 Sq
Mtrs
7. Surplus extent in Sy.No. 74/P, 75/P & 46538.43
76/P (Fatehnagar)
v) In respect of the Hyderabad holdings, the appellant’s submission
led to the issuance of Government Orders, notably GO Ms. No.
1729 (dated 27 November 1982), whereby the exemptions were
granted under Section 20(1)(a):-
a. The entire land in Surveys 78 and 79 was exempted on
the ground that a factory had been constructed there;
b. A portion of the land in Surveys 74, 75 and 76 measuring
approximately 48,859.50 square metres was exempted
subject to the condition that separate industrial structures
be constructed within a prescribed period;
c. The appellant had also filed a declaration under Section
21(1) of the ULC Act and the same declaration was taken
up as for accommodation of weaker sections to an extent
of 56,730.57 square meters out of the aforesaid land.
Accordingly, permission was accorded by the Special
Officer and Competent Authority under Section 21(1) of
the ULC Act on 04.02.2001. While granting the permission,
a condition was imposed on the appellant that the
construction of the dwelling units shall be for the weaker
sections of the society and the same should be completed
within 5 years. It was alleged that the appellant had failed
to construct the dwelling units within the specified period
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1635
M/s A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc.
thereby violating the condition while granting permission
under Section 21(1) of the ULC Act.
vi) In respect of the land in Survey Nos. 74, 75 and 76 respectively,
the Government had issued G.O.Ms No. 303 dated 07.04.1990
withdrawing the exemption granted earlier under G.O.Ms.
No. 1729.
vii) The stance of the Respondents is that the failure on the part
of the appellant to utilize the 48,859.50 sq. m. portion in the
prescribed manner led to the withdrawal of the exemption for
that land, as affected by GO Ms. No. 303. On April 7, 1992,
the Special Officer and the Competent Authority for Urban
Land Ceiling, Hyderabad, issued a draft statement under
Sections 8(1) and 8(3) of the Act, 1976 respectively, provisionally
categorizing the appellant as holding surplus land amounting
to 1,01,645 sq. m.
viii) Later, on 03.04.2005, the Special Officer issued an order under
Section 8(4) determining that the excess vacant land in the
Hyderabad Urban Agglomeration measured 46,538.53 sq. m. of
this total, the appellant was entitled to retain 1,000 sq. m. under
Section 4(1)(b) of the ULC Act, leaving a balance of 45,538.43
sq. m. as vacant hand.
ix) Aggrieved by the order dated 03.04.2005, the appellant
approached the Appellate authority by way of an appeal under
Section 33 bearing no. Hyd/11/2005. The Appellate authority vide
order dated 28.07.2005, set aside the order appealed against
and remanded the matter to the special officer and competent
authority for fresh computation. After due enquiry, a revised order
under Section 8(4) of the ULC Act and final Statement under
Section 9 of the ULC Act were issued on 20.03.2007 which
determined the surplus at 46,538. 43 sq. mts. which was separate
from the land exempted under Section 21 of the ULC Act.
x) It is the case of the Respondents that the Government of Andhra
Pradesh issued a notification under Section 10(1) of the ULC
Act, in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette inviting claims from persons
interested in the Subject land measuring 46,538.43 sq. mts.
It is also the stance of the Respondents that the said gazette
notification was never challenged by the appellant.
1636 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
xi) After completion of such computation, notification under
Section 10(3) of the ULC Act was published in the Andhra
Pradesh State Gazette dated 03.10.2007, wherein an extent
of 46,538.43 square meters in survey nos. 74/P, 75/P and 76/P
of the Fatehnagar Village in Balanagar mandal was declared
to have been acquired by the State Government, with effect
from 12.07.2007. It is the case of the appellant-herein that the
aforesaid notification failed to note that the surplus land was only
to the extent of 45,538.43 sq. mts. and not 46,538.43 sq. mts.
xii) It is the case of the appellant that the Competent Authority
purportedly issued a notice under Section 10(5) of the ULC Act
dated 05.01.2008 directing the appellant-herein to surrender the
excess vacant land within thirty days. Further, according to the
Respondents since the appellant’s factory was closed due to
lockout on 05.01.2008 the said notice was affixed on the main
door of the factory premises on 08.01.2008. The operative
portion of the notice is reproduced herein below:-
“Whereas the lands in sy.Nos. 75/p, 75/p, 76/p
to an extent of£ 46538.43 Sq/Mtrs. Fatehnagar
vg., Balanagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy District,
Marripalen vg. Visakhapatnam District in Sy. No.
59/3, 8437.48 Sq. Mtrs. (B Category) equivalent
to 12,656.22 Sq. Mtrs. (C- Category) and which
are in your possession are deemed to have vested
absolutely in the State Government free from all
encumbrance with effect from the 12.07.2007 under
Sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the Urban land
(Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 (Central Act 33 of
1976) vide Notification No. G 1/10571/76, published
at pages 1 of part-II Extraordinary of the Andhra
Pradesh Gazette No. 288 dated 3.10.2007. Now,
therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by
sub-section (5) of section 10 of the Urban Land
(Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (Central Act, 33
of 1976), I hereby order you to surrender/deliver
possession of the said land to Sri S.A. Khader,
Deputy Tahsildar of this office within thirty days of
the service of this Notice.”
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1637
M/s A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc.
xiii) According to the Respondents due to non-compliance of the
aforementioned notice, order under Section 10(6) of the ULC
Act was issued on 05.02.2008 authorising the enquiry officer to
take over the possession of the Surplus Land. Accordingly, the
Enquiry Officer took over the possession of the surplus land on
08.02.2008 to the extent of 46,538.43 Square Meters in Survey
Nos. 74/P, 75P and 76P in Fatehnagar Village, Balanagarmandal,
Ranga Reddy District.
5. The operative part of the order is reproduced hereinbelow:-
“Notice U/s 10(5) of the Act was issued to the M/s A.P.E.E.C
Fathenagar Balangar Mandal, RR Dist. asking them to
deliver the possession of the following surplus land withing
30 days from the date of the service of notice u/s 10(5)
of the Act.
Sl. Description of Location Extent in Sq. Mtrs
No. the Property
1 Sy. Nos. 74/P, Fathenagar 46538.43 Sq Mtrs
75/P, 76/P vg. Balanagar,
Mandal, Ranga
Reddy District. 8437.48 Sq Mts
(B-Category)
equivalent to
Marriapalem vg. 12656.22 Sq Mtrs
Visakhapatnam (C Category)
District
The 30-days time given in the notice U/s 10(5) of the Act
expired on 01-10-2008 buy they failed to deliver possession
before the expiry date. Hence Sri SA Khader Enquiry officer
of this office is authorized to take over the possession of
land in question U/s 10(6) of the Act and hand over the
same to the Mandal Revenue Officer concerned and report
compliance within one week positively.”
xiv) According to the Respondents, the enquiry officer in pursuance
of the order dated 05.02.2008 took over the actual physical
possession of the surplus Subject Vacant Land on 08.02.2008
by way of a panchnama. It is the case of the Respondents that
1638 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
the panchnama was prepared by the Deputy Tahsildar and
enquiry officer in the presence of three panchas and the said
possession was taken over by drawing a valid panchnama. The
relevant extracts of the panchnama is reproduced herein below:-
Sl. Panchas Name Aged Occupation Residence
No.
1 Ramaiah 50 Business Fathenagar
2 Yashwanadham 45 Coolie Fathenagar
3 Jagadeesh 25 Carpenter Fathenagar
We three panchas under the call from Deputy
Tahsildar and Inquiry Officer, Urban Land Ceiling,
Hyderabad present at site at Rangareddy District,
Balanagar Mandai, Fathonagm: village limits sy.nos.
74/8, 75/8and 76/f3. There the Deputy Tahsildar over
the said survey nos. land holding the ownership
rights their land under Urban land ceiling act 1976
(46538.435 mtrs.) is identified as excess land vide
Special Officer, Urban Land Ceiling Hyderabad
orders No.F1/G1/10571/71/76 dated : 5.2.08 through
the said land owners are excess land owners as
confirmed said. Such excess land ext.46538.42
sq.mtrs. handover to government, the said ceiling
act sec.1 0(5) the file no.F1/G1/10571/76/76 dated
: 5-1-08 through to the land owners issued the
notice. But according to that notice the said land
though the stipulated is completed, the said excess
land not handed over to the government Hence in
the said ceiling act sec.1 0(6) tl1e said excess land
to take possession by the government the Deputy
Tahsildar permitting to the Inquiry Officer file no.F1/
G1/10571/76 dated : 9-2-08 through the Special
Officer issued the orders. Hence the inquiry officer
according to the orders, today i.e. on 8-2-08 in the said
survey nos. 46538.43 sq.mts. excess land according
to sub division sketch after fixing the boundaries
by the surveyor, he himself personally to take into
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1639
M/s A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc.
govt. possession in our panchas presence taken
into possession. Hence this excess land from today
onwards is in the govt. possession as confirmed.
This excess land vacant/making plots /made the
constructions/structures. This panchnama took place
in our presence is true. Read over in Telugu, as all the
above contents are true believing we signed below.”
6. It is the case of the appellant-herein that the purported “panchnama”
dated 08.02.2008 was prepared in a printed form, and the
Respondents allegedly took symbolic possession of the Subject
Land. Admittedly, the actual physical possession of the Subject Land
is with the appellant till date. A copy of the purported panchnama, a
printed Form with gaps filled in, was handed over to the appellant
for the first time on 14.09.2010, when the writ petition was filed
before the High Court.
7. On 22.04.2008 the State of Andhra Pradesh brought into force the
Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 (for short,
“the Repeal Act, 1999”) with effect from 27.03.2008.
8. According to the appellant in or around 2009, the Respondents
attempted to take action under the purported acquisition proceedings
in respect of the Subject Land. The appellant filed a writ petition
before the High Court being Writ Petition No. 11293 of 2009, against
illegal attempts of dispossession by the Tahsildar. The High Court
issued notice in the said Writ Petition and granted interim injunction
in favour of the appellant.
9. According to the appellant the copies of the purported Section
10(5) Notice, Section 10(6) Order and the panchnama (collectively,
“Section 10 Notices”) were handed over to the appellant for the first
time on 14.09.2010.
10. On 20.09.2010 the appellant preferred another writ petition being
Writ Petition No. 23477 of 2010, inter alia assailing the purported
panchnama. In Writ Petition No. 23477 of 2010, the High Court
directed that pending further orders, the appellant shall not be
dispossessed from the Subject Land. 10. The learned Single Judge
adjudicated both the writ petitions filed by the appellants and allowed
those vide common judgment and order dated 03.01.2022. The
learned Single Judge held as under:-
1640 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
“From the sum and substance of the above said judgments
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and various other Courts, it
is clear that the official respondents after issuing notices
under Section 10(1) and 10(3) have to issue notice
under Section 10(5) directing the party to surrender the
possession of the land, within a period of thirty days, and
if voluntary possession of the same is not given, then the
official respondents are obligated to issue notice under
Section 10(6) to the petitioner and then take possession.
The above judgments also make it abundantly clear that
mere issuance of the notice under Section 10(3) does
not automatically entitle the official respondents to take
possession of the notified lands, but the authorities have
to necessarily issue notice under Section 10(5) to the
land owner or any other interested person. The Courts
have also held that the taking over of the possession
has to be actual physical possession and not mere de
jure possession. Having regard to the above laid proposition
of law, the question now before this Court is to see as to
whether the notifications issued under Section 10(5) and
10(6) by the authorities and the panchnama stand to the
legal scrutiny of this Court?
31. The documents filed, more particularly, the notice
issued under Section 10(6) of the Act reveals that in the
said notice, two dates are mentioned i.e. 05.02.2008 and
08.02.2008.
32. Even if the contention of the official respondents that
the 10(5) notice dated 05.01.2008 is sent through registered
post is taken to be true, it will take minimum two or three
days time for the said notice to reach the office of the
petitioner. As per the requirement of ULC Act, the time
period of thirty days is prescribed for issuance of 10(6)
notice after issuance of 10(5) notice. If that be so, the
10(6) notice should be dated 08.02.2008. But a perusal of
the 10(6) notice shows that two dates are written on the
said notice i.e. the dates of 05.02.2008 and 08.02.2008,
which clearly shows that the date 10(6) notice has been
prepared even before the expiry of 30 days. Moreover, in
the said notice it is mentioned as under:
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1641
M/s A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc.
“The 30-days time given in the notice U/s 10(5) of the
act expired on 01-10-2008 but they failed to deliver
possession before the expiry date. Hence Sri. S.A.
Khader, Enquiry Officer of this office is authorized to
take over possession of land in question U/s 10(6)
of the Act and hand over the same to the Mandal
Revenue Officer concerned and report compliance
within one week positively.”
(Emphasis Added)
33. The above extracted portion of the 10(6) notice
clearly reveals that the notices are back-dated for the
purpose of preparing the said notice and panchanama.
It is beyond comprehension and not understandable as
to how the date of 01.10.2008 can be mentioned while
calculating the expiry date of thirty days from either
05.01.2008 or 08.01.2008, as the case may be. Evidently
the person who was preparing the 10(6) notice did so
after the Repeal Act was enacted and adopted by the
then Government of Andhra Pradesh. Even in the counter
filed by the Special Officer & Competent Authority, it is
stated as under:
“18………… A notice U/s. 10(5) of the Act was issued
on 5-1-08 asking the declarant to surrender the
excess vacant, land within (30) days from the date of
its receipts. The company was under lockout, hence
the notice issued U/s 10(5) of the Act was affixed on
the main door on 8-1-08. The time stipulated in the
notice expired but the declarant failed to surrender
the land. Hence order U/s 10(6) of the Act was
issued on 5-2-08, authorizing the Enquiry Officer
of this office to take over possession of the surplus
land and hand it over to the MRO, concerned. The
Enquiry Officer of this office took over possession of
the surplus land on 8-2-2008 to an extent of 46538.43
sq.mtrs. in Sy. Nos. 74/p, 75/p and 76/p, in Fathenagar
Village, Balanagar Mandal and Special Officer, ULC,
Visakhapatnam accordingly took over possession of
the surplus land to an extent of 8437.48 sq. mtrs.
1642 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
in Sy. No. 59/3, Marripalem village, Visakhapatnam
on 12-3-2008.”
(Emphasis Added)
34. Even if the above averments made in the counter are
taken to be true and correct, the very admission on the
part of the official respondents that the notice was served
on 08.01.2008 and Section 10(6) notice is issued on
05.02.2008 confirms that the mandatory period of 30 days
between Sections 10(5) and 10(6) notices is not met and
the same has to be held void, illegal and bad. Besides,
when pointed out by this Court about the discrepancies
with regard to the dates mentioned in the 10(6) notice and
also the non-service of the notice under Section 10(5) to
the petitioner in-person, the learned Special Government
Pleader tried to brush out the same as some clerical
errors and argued that the same has to be ignored as
a minor procedural lapse. The two dates mentioned in
10(6) notice belie the claim of the official respondents
that they have taken over the physical possession of
the subject land on 08.02.2008. There is no whisper or
explanation forthcoming from the authorities as to how
the date of 01.10.2008 is mentioned in the 10(6) notice
while calculating the expiry of 30 days period from either
05.01.2008 or 08.01.2008. Even a perusal of the 10(5)
notice shows that the same has not been served on the
petitioner, but was affixed on the gate of the factory only
on 08.01.2008. There is no signature on the said notice
as to who has received the same except a name has
been scribbled (which is not legible). Having regard to
the overwhelming evidence to show that the physical
possession of the land is still with the petitioner, this Court
is of the considered view that the valuable rights of the
parties cannot be allowed to be defeated on the basis of
the documents prepared after the Repeal Act has come
into force and the stand of the Government that the dates
shown in the documents are only clerical errors, cannot
be accepted and is hereby rejected. In the absence of
any cogent and convincing evidence or document to show
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1643
M/s A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc.
that the Government has taken physical possession of
the subject land as contended or any other material to
show that the notices under Sections 10(3), 10(5) and
10(6) were validly prepared and served on the petitioner,
both the Section 10(6) notice and panchanama dated
08.02.2008 have to be taken as a bogus and fabricated
one, prepared after the Repeal Act come into force. The
material placed before this Court clinchingly establishes
that the physical possession of the subject premises
has not been taken over by the official respondents as
claimed and absolutely there is no material to show that
the subject land is in their physical possession even as
on date. The panchanama dated 08.02.2008, on which
the independent witnesses are stated to have affixed
their signatures, relied by the official respondents to
substantiate that the officials went to the site and taken
physical possession, do not contain either the addresses
of the panchas or their description and do not instill any
confidence in the Court that they are genuine. The official
respondents did not even bother to file affidavits of the
so-called panchas to show that they were present at the
site and the panchanama was prepared in their presence.
Admittedly, there is no signature of the land owner on the
alleged panchanama dated 08.02.2008 or the site map
annexed thereto. Even the description of the panchas or
their addresses or even their temporary addresses are
not shown therein. In the Absence of the signatures of
the land owner on the panchanama, the panchanama
and the site map will have to be considered as having
been prepared behind the back of the petitioner and in
the office of the authorities. The documents filed by the
petitioner establish beyond any doubt that the factory is
still running, number of apartments are constructed in
part of the land and that the physical possession has not
been taken over by the Government, as contended, but
the same is still with the petitioner Company. No affidavit
of any of the panchas has been filed to show that the
authorities have physically gone to the subject land and
taken over the possession in the presence of the owner.
1644 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
The entire exercise of affixing signatures and taking over
the possession of the land appears to have been done
sitting in the office of the authorities and only on paper.
35. It is apt to note that the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in Barangore Jute Factory (referred supra) has held that
where the Statute requires a particular act to be done
in a particular manner, the same has to be done in that
manner alone. It is obvious from the record that the official
respondents did not follow the procedure contemplated
under the ULC Act, but acted contrary to it. Once the
ULC Act was repealed by the Central Government and
the same has been adopted by the State Government and
physical possession of the land is still with the petitioners,
the preparation of notices under Sections 10(5) and 10(6)
and the panchanama of taking possession is void ab
initio and non est in the eye of law. The bare perusal of
the panchanama, notices under Sections 10(5) and 10(6)
of the ULC Act, do not inspire any confidence in the Court,
which warrants any indulgence of this Court in favour of
the official respondents.
x x x x
38. The documents filed by the petitioner clearly establish
the fact that the physical possession of the land has not
been taken over by the respondents. The photographs filed
by the petitioner show that there is a factory in existence,
beside number of multi storied residential buildings have
already been constructed in a part of the said land, entire
land is encompassed with compound wall and gate manned
by security guards. In the absence of any material to show
that the procedure as contemplated under the ULC Act,
more particularly sections 10(1), 10(5) and 10(6) thereof,
has been followed in its true letter and spirit, the irresistible
conclusion that can be drawn from the record filed by the
petitioner is that the 10(5) and 10(6) notices are backdated
and panchanama has been prepared in the office of the
authorities after the Repeal Act has come into force and
the physical possession of the subject land is still with the
land owner only. It is also pertinent to mention that G.O.Ms.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1645
M/s A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc.
No. 1534 dated 20.12.2008 wherein the Government
sought to resume the surplus land has been set aside
by a learned Single Judge of this Court vide order dated
26.10.2009 in W.P. No. 3140 of 2009. Relevant portion of
the said order reads as under:
“… it is clear that possession was not taken under
the Act and proceedings under Section 10(5) and
10(6) have not been initiated insofar as the subject
land is concerned. Therefore, the impugned order
passed by first respondent in directing the Special
Officer and Competent Authority to take possession
from the first petitioner though the petitioners 2 and
3 are in possession of the subject land is arbitrary
and illegal, particularly when the 1976 Act has no
application by virtue of Repeal Act, 1999, which was
adopted by the State of Andhra Pradesh with effect
from 27.03.2008 i.e. much prior to issuance of the
impugned G.O.
In view of the above, I am of the opinion that
the impugned G.O. is liable to be set aside and
accordingly set aside. The writ petition is accordingly
allowed. No order as to costs.”
(Emphasis supplied)
11. Thus, what is discernible from the judgment rendered by the learned
Single Judge referred to above is as under:-
i. Under Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act, 1976 the State is
required to take over physical possession of vacant land in a
cogent and convincing manner. As per the decisions of this Court
in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Hari Ram, (2013) 4 SCC 280, and
Gajanan Kamlya Patil v. Additional Collector and Competent
Authority (ULC) and Ors., (2014) 12 SCC 523 respectively,
unless actual physical possession of the Subject Land is taken
over prior to the Repeal Act, 1999 all proceedings shall stand
abated upon its enactment.
ii. Mere issuance of a notice under Section 10(3) of the Act, 1976
does not automatically entitle the officials of the Respondents
to take possession. The requirement of giving notice under
1646 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act, 1976 respectively is
mandatory.
iii. The documents on record establish beyond any doubt that the
factory is still running, number of apartments are constructed
in part of the Subject Land and that the physical possession
has not been taken over by the Government, as contended,
but the same is still with the Appellant.
iv. In the absence of any cogent and convincing evidence or
document to show that the Government has taken actual physical
possession of the Subject Land as contended or any other
material to show that the notices under Sections 10(5) and 10(6)
respectively were validly prepared and served on the Appellant,
both the order under Section 10(6) and the panchnama have to
be treated as bogus and fabricated. In other words, prepared
after the Repeal Act, 1999 came into force.
v. Even taking the Respondents’ case at the highest, the mandatory
30-day period provided to the landholders between a notice
under Section 10(5) and a notice under Section 10(6) was
not complied with, making the order under Section 10(6) void,
illegal and bad in law.
vi. Even a bare perusal of the Section 10(5) Notice shows that the
same has not been served on the Appellant but was affixed
on the gate of the factory only on 08.01.2008. There is no
signature on the said notice as to who had received the same
except some name has been scribbled (which is not legible).
vii. The valuable rights of the parties cannot be allowed to be
defeated on the basis of documents prepared after the Repeal
Act, 1999 has come into force. The stand of the Respondents
that the dates shown in the documents are only clerical errors,
was rejected.
viii. The inconsistencies and lacunae in the panchnama do not instil
any confidence that the same is genuine.
ix. There is no signature of the landowner or any responsible officer
or person on the panchnama dated 08.02.2008.
12. The respondents being dissatisfied with the judgment and order
passed by the learned Single Judge preferred two writ appeals
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1647
M/s A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc.
i.e. Writ Appeal No. 665 of 2022 and Writ Appeal No. 670 of 2022
respectively.
13. The Division Bench of the High Court allowed both the appeals filed
by the State and thereby set aside the judgment and order passed
by the learned Single Judge allowing the two writ petitions filed by
the appellant herein. The Division Bench held as under:-
“17.2. Claim of the appellants that notice under Section
10(5) was issued on 05.01.2008 was denied by the
respondent. 05.01.2008 was a Saturday. It was the duty of
the appellants to establish that 05.01.2008 was a working
day and that notice dated 05.01.2008 was despatched
from the office on a working day. It is also the duty of
the competent authority to establish the exact date of
service of notice under Section 10(5) and service on the
noticee were conspicuously absent in the counter affidavit.
Appellants merely stated that notice under Section 10(5)
was issued on 05.01.2008. Since the respondent was
under lockout, the notice was affixed on the main door
on 08.01.2008. In the absence of dispatch of notice by
registered post with acknowledgement due, the service
would be deemed to be in violation in terms of Rule 5
of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Rules, 1976
(briefly, ‘the ULC Rules’ hereinafter). That apart, it was
reiterated that there was no lockout in the establishment of
the respondent at the relevant point of time; rather it was
fully operational for which respondent relied upon various
documentary evidence including returns filed before the
Employees’ State Insurance Corporation for the period
from 01.10.2007 to 31.03.2008.
17.3. While denying that notice under Section 10(5) was
served on 08.01.2008 as claimed by the appellants, it
was averred that the thirty days period mentioned in the
said notice to surrender possession voluntarily would
have expired only on 07.02.2008. Right of the competent
authority to take further action under Section 10(6) would
accrue only after 08.02.2008. Therefore, no reliance could
be placed on the alleged order dated 05.02.2008 passed
under Section 10(6) of the ULC Act. That apart, order
1648 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
dated 05.02.2008 containing more than one date with
overwriting did not inspire any confidence at all.
17.4. Further attempt by the appellants to show that they
had taken over possession of the excess vacant land on
08.02.2008 by relying on the purported panchanama does
not inspire any confidence. It is contended that when the
order under Section 10(6) of the ULC Act dated 05.02.2008
was of no legal consequence, the alleged taking over of
possession on 08.02.2008 on the strength of the order
dated 05.02.2008 would also be of no consequence.
Besides, a bare perusal of the panchanama would reveal
that it was prepared in a printed format to suit the case of
the appellants. A careful reading of the panchanama itself
would indicate that it was a fabricated document without
furnishing details of the three panchas, as a result of which
the panchas were not identifiable.
17.5. Appellants claimed to have taken over possession
of 46,538.43 square meters on 08.02.2008 which included
1000 square meters of land conferred on the respondent
under Section 4(1) of the ULC Act. This only goes to show
that appellants had not applied their mind and had just
produced some documents to show that they had taken
over possession.
17.6. Respondent’s name was shown as owner in
possession and enjoyment of the lands including the
excess vacant land in the revenue record which only goes
to show possession of the respondent, besides pahanis
stand in the name of the respondent in respect of the
subject land. Therefore, the theory of possession put forth
by the appellants is contrary to the record.
18. Learned Single Judge after narrating the relevant facts
and after adverting to the submissions made by learned
counsel for the parties had examined various provisions
of the ULC Act, more particularly Sections 10(1), 10(3),
10(5) and 10(6) of the ULC Act as well as the Repeal
Act which was adopted by the Government of undivided
Andhra Pradesh on 27.03.2008 vide G.O.Ms.No.603
dated 22.04.2008. Learned Single Judge examined the
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1649
M/s A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc.
claim of the appellants of having taken over possession
of the subject land under Section 10(6) of the ULC Act
as well as the contents of the panchanama observed that
whenever a panchanama is prepared, the same has to be
done duly putting the actual owner/interested person on
notice; panchas should be reputed and respectable persons
of the locality; date and time on which the panchanama
was prepared as well as the name, age and address of
the panchas should be mentioned in the panchanama.
Thereafter, learned Single Judge held that unless and
until actual physical possession of the subject land was
taken over, the taking over proceedings under the ULC
Act would stand abated on coming into force of the Repeal
Act. After referring to various decisions, learned Single
Judge held that after issuing notice under Sections 10(1)
and 10(3) of the ULC Act, competent authority under the
said Act would have to issue notice under Section 10(5)
directing the party to surrender possession of the excess
land within a period of thirty days. If voluntary possession
of the same is not given, then the authorities are under
obligation to issue notice under Section 10(6) and thereafter
take possession. Mere issuance of notice under Section
10(3) would not automatically entitle the authorities to
take over possession of the notified lands; the authorities
would have to necessarily issue notice under Section 10(5)
of the ULC Act to the land owner or any other interested
person. Taking over of possession has to be actual physical
possession and not mere de jure possession.
18.1. After referring to the alleged anomalies noticeable
in Section 10(6) notice, learned Single Judge came to
the conclusion that very admission on the part of the
appellants that the notice was served on 08.01.2008,
whereafter Section 10(6) order was passed on 05.02.2008
would clearly show that the mandatory period of thirty
days between the two provisions was not met. Learned
Single Judge further noted that there was no explanation
forthcoming as to how the date “01.10.2008” appeared in
the Section 10(6) notice. Thus, learned Single Judge vide
the judgment and order dated 03.01.2022 came to the
1650 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
conclusion that physical possession of the subject land
was still with the respondent. There was no cogent and
convincing evidence to show that State Government had
taken over physical possession of the subject land. That
apart, learned Single Judge found that the panchanama
dated 08.02.2008 did not inspire the confidence of the
Court. Further, from the documentary evidence, it was
proved beyond any doubt that the factory of the respondent
was still functional, a number of apartments had been
constructed. Therefore, physical possession of the subject
land had not been taken over by the government but was
still with the respondent. Learned Single Judge also referred
to an order of this Court dated 26.10.2009 in writ petition
No.3140 of 2009, whereby government sought to resume
the surplus land of the respondent by issuing G.O.Ms.
No.1534 dated 20.12.2008. In the said order, this Court
had set aside G.O.Ms.No.1534 holding that possession of
the subject land was not taken over by the government.
Accordingly, both the writ petitions were allowed and the
panchanama dated 08.02.2008 was set aside.
19. Mr. Raju Ramachandran, learned Senior Counsel for
the appellants submits that learned Single Judge was not
at all justified in setting aside the panchanama proceedings
dated 08.02.2008 and interfering with the action of the
State in taking over possession of the surplus land of
the respondent under the ULC Act. In the course of his
arguments, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants has
placed before the Court a flow chart of land belonging to
the respondent covered by the final statement made under
Section 8(4) of the ULC Act. He submits that respondent
had declared under Section 6(1) of the ULC Act a total of
1,63,679 square meters of land in Survey Nos.74/P, 75/P,
76, 78 and 79. Out of the aforesaid land, 5,088 square
meters was covered by GVM Road leaving land to the
extent of 1,58,591 square meters. By G.O.Ms.No.1729,
an extent of land measuring 51,580 square meters in
Survey Nos.78 and 79 was allowed to be retained by
the respondent to run the industry for manufacturing
electrical meters. Though an extent of land admeasuring
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1651
M/s A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc.
48,859.90 square meters was allowed to be retained by
the respondent for establishing fan factory, later on the
exemption was withdrawn vide G.O.Ms.No.303. Excluding
51,580 square meters from the total extent of 1,58,591
square meters surplus excess land with the respondent
was quantified at 1,07,011 square meters. Out of this
extent, 56,730.57 square meters in Survey Nos.74, 75
and 76 was exempted under Section 21 of the ULC Act
leaving balance extent of 50,280.43 square meters for
computation under Section 8(4) of the ULC Act. After
excluding an extent of 3,742 square meters, which was
affected by road, the extent of surplus land quantified by
the competent authority under the ULC Act was estimated
at 46,538.43 square meters as per revised order of the
competent authority dated 20.03.2007.
19.1. Because of clerical mistakes, learned Single Judge
ought not to have disbelieved the notice issued under
Section 10(5) of the ULC Act as well as the order passed
under Section 10(6) of the ULC Act, more so when learned
Single Judge did not requisition the record. While admitting
that appearance of the date “01.10.2008” in the order
dated 05.02.2008 is inexplicable, Mr. Raju Ramachandran,
learned Senior Counsel for the appellants submits that
that by itself would not justify the conclusion reached by
the learned Single Judge that the aforesaid notice and
order were antedated and thus discarded. He submits that
learned Single Judge was also not justified in disbelieving
the panchanama dated 08.02.2008 and thereafter declaring
the notices under Section 10(5) and 10(6) as well as the
panchanama as void ab initio. He further submits that
learned Single Judge committed a manifest error in holding
that physical possession of the surplus vacant land had
not been taken over by the appellants.
x x x x
29.2. We have already extracted the provisions of
subsections (5) and (6) of Section 10 of the ULC Act and
made an analysis of the same. Section 10(5) contemplates
service of notice calling upon the person in possession of
1652 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
the excess vacant land to surrender or deliver possession
thereof to the State Government within thirty days of
service of notice. If he fails to do so then under sub-
section (6) of Section 10, the competent authority may
take over possession of the excess vacant land for which
purpose such force as may be necessary may be used.
Though issuance and service of notice on the person in
possession of the excess vacant land under sub-section (5)
of Section 10 is mandatory as held by the Supreme Court
in Hari Ram (supra) however, sub-section (6) of Section
10 nowhere says that after the period of thirty days of
service of notice under Section 10(5), another order has
to be passed or another notice has to be given. Question
of once again putting the parties on notice at the stage
of subsection (6) of Section 10 is not statutorily provided.
Therefore, learned Single Judge fell in error in taking
the view that at the stage of Section 10(6), the owner or
person in possession of the excess vacant land has to be
again put on notice. There is no such legal requirement.
29.3. Insofar preparation of panchanama is concerned, the
same is not statutorily provided either in the ULC Act or in
the ULC Rules. Therefore, we fail to understand as to how
learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that while
preparing the panchanama the site map also needs to be
prepared and both would have to be attested not only by
the panchas and the person preparing the same but also
by the land owner. We are afraid learned Single Judge fell
in complete error in coming to the aforesaid conclusion as
there is no such statutory prescription. The panchanama
comes into the picture at the stage of Section 10(6) when
the owner or person in possession of the excess vacant
land fails to comply with the notice under Section 10(5).
Therefore, to expect such a person to put his signature
on the panchanama is wholly unrealistic.
29.4. In fact, in Sita Ram Bhandar Society, New Delhi
(supra) Supreme Court in the context of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894, after referring to previous judgments held that
one of the accepted modes of taking over possession
of the acquired land is recording of a memorandum
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1653
M/s A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc.
or panchanama by the land acquisition officer in the
presence of witnesses signed by them and that would
constitute taking possession of the land. It is difficult to
take physical possession of the land under compulsory
acquisition. The normal mode of taking possession is
drafting the panchanama in the presence of panchas,
taking possession and giving delivery to the beneficiaries
which is the accepted mode of taking possession of the
land. While taking possession of a large area of land, a
pragmatic and realistic approach has to be taken. One of
the methods of taking possession and handing it over to the
beneficiary department is the recording of a panchanama
which can in itself constitute evidence of the fact that
possession had been taken and that the land had vested
absolutely in the government.
29.5. This position has been reiterated by the Supreme
Court in Omprakash Verma (supra). This was a case under
the ULC Act. In the facts of that case, Supreme Court
reiterated that it is settled law that where possession is
to be taken of a large tract of land then it is permissible
to take possession by a properly executed panchanama.
30. Proceeding further, we find that in paragraph 30
of the judgment and order, learned Single Judge once
again reiterated that after expiry of the period of thirty
days as contemplated under sub-section (5) of Section
10, if voluntary possession of excess vacant land is not
handed over then the authorities are obligated to issue
notice under Section 10(6) to the land owner and then
take possession. Having held so, learned Single Judge
proceeded to frame the question as to whether notifications
issued under Section 10(5) and 10(6) by the authorities
and the panchanama would stand to legal scrutiny.
30.1. As already discussed above, there is no statutory
requirement under sub-section (6) of Section 10 to once
again put the defaulting owner or the person in possession
on notice. After the thirty days period following service
of notice under Section 10(5) of the ULC Act is over, it
is open to the authority to take over possession of the
1654 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
excess vacant land forcibly, if necessary even by using
force. Therefore, the very basis of the learned Single Judge
framing the above question does not stand to legal scrutiny,
the same being contrary to the legal requirement which
has vitiated the impugned judgment and order.
31. In paragraph 31 of the judgment under appeal, learned
Single Judge has mentioned that the notice issued under
Section 10(6) of the ULC Act has two dates in it i.e.,
05.02.2008 and 08.02.2008. As already mentioned above,
there is no legal requirement for passing any order or
issuing further notice under Section 10(6) of the ULC Act.
Therefore, the order dated 05.02.2008 at page 234 of the
paper book (W.A.No.670 of 2022) is really not material; in
fact the same is of no legal consequence. Though below
the date 05.02.2008, ‘08’ is written, who has written it is
not known. There is also no initial by the side of the figure
‘08’. But one thing is certain; there is no date ‘08.02.2008’,
therebeing only one date i.e., 05.02.2008. However, what
is evident therefrom is that notice under Section 10(5) is
dated 05.01.2008. If we contrast this notice at page 234 of
the paper book with the order (notice) dated 05.02.2008 at
page 334 of the paper book (W.A.No.670 of 2022), there
is no figure ‘08’ below 05.02.2008. This is a signed order
of the special officer and competent authority which is
missing at page 234. Besides, this document is attested
by the Special Tahsildar, Urban Land Ceiling (Wing),
Medchal Malkajgiri District. Be that as it may, there is one
date which has remained unexplained. As a matter of fact,
Mr. Raju Ramachandran, learned Senior Counsel for the
appellants frankly told the Court that it is inexplicable as
to how the date ‘01.10.2008’ appears in the last paragraph
of the order (notice) dated 05.02.2008. Appearance of this
date cannot be explained. The last paragraph of the order
(notice) dated 05.02.2008 says that thirty days time given in
the notice under Section 10(5) expired on ‘01.10.2008’. As
seen from the aforesaid order (notice) itself, notice under
Section 10(5) is dated 05.01.2008. As such, there is no
question of expiry of thirty days period on ‘01.10.2008’.
In any case, the order or notice dated 05.02.2008 does
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1655
M/s A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc.
not have any legal sanction or even necessity as Section
10(6) does not require issuance of a fresh order or a notice
before taking forcible possession. Therefore, either the
order dated 05.02.2008 can be ignored or if taken at its
face value, it does not convey an irregularity or illegality
of a magnitude which may render taking over of forcible
possession invalid.
X x x
35. This brings us as to how learned Single Judge dealt
with the panchanama dated 08.02.2008. Learned Single
Judge held as under:
“34. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx The panchanama dated
08.02.2008, on which the independent witnesses are
stated to have affixed their signatures, relied by the
official respondents to substantiate that the officials
went to the site and taken physical possession, do not
contain either the addresses of the panchas or their
description and do not instill any confidence in the
Court that they are genuine. The official respondents
did not even bother to file affidavits of the so-called
panchas to show that they were present at the site
and the panchanama was prepared in their presence.
Admittedly, there is no signature of the land owner
on the alleged panchanama dated 08.02.2008 or the
site map annexed thereto. Even the description of the
panchas or their addresses or even their temporary
addresses are not shown therein. In the absence of
the signatures of the land owner on the panchanama,
the panchanama and the site map will have to be
considered as having been prepared behind the back
of the petitioner and in the office of the authorities.
The documents filed by the petitioner establish beyond
any doubt that the factory is still running, number of
apartments are constructed in part of the land and
that the physical possession has not been taken over
by the Government, as contended, but the same
is still with the petitioner Company. No affidavit of
any of the panchas has been filed to show that the
1656 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
authorities have physically gone to the subject land
and taken over the possession in the presence of the
owner. The entire exercise of affixing signatures and
taking over the possession of the land appears to
have been done sitting in the office of the authorities
and only on paper.
35.1. According to the learned Single Judge, the
panchanama does not contain the addresses of the
panchas or their description. Affidavits of the panchas were
not filed, describing the panchas as so called panchas.
Further, according to the learned Single Judge, there
was no signature of the land owner in the panchanama.
Therefore, such a panchanama would have to be
considered having been prepared behind the back of the
respondent and in the office of the authorities.
35.2. We have already held that neither the ULC Act nor
the ULC Rules provide for the procedure for service of
notice under Section 10(5) of the ULC Act. However, as
discussed above, it is judicially recognised that taking over
of possession of large tracts of land by way of panchanama
is an acceptable mode. There is no requirement under
the statute for obtaining the signature of the land owner
in the panchanama or filing of affidavits by the panchas.
Such finding of the learned Single Judge in our considered
opinion is not based on any materials on record.
36. Having said so, we may examine the panchanama
which is at pages 89 to 91 of the paper book (W.A.No.670
of 2022). While page 89 is the Telugu and original version
of the panchanama, the translation copy thereof is at page
90 and page 91 contains the site plan. A reading of the
panchanama would go to show that the same was prepared
by the Deputy Tahsildar and Enquiry Officer in presence
of three panchas viz., 1) Ramayya, 2) Viswanadham
and 3) Jagdish, whose addresses were mentioned in the
panchanama. Two persons by name Venkateshwar Rao
and Mallayya stood as witnesses. As per the panchanama,
notice under Section 10(5) dated 05.01.2008 was served
upon the land owner. When possession was not handed
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1657
M/s A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc.
over to the Government even after expiry of the time
limit, order was passed by the competent authority on
05.02.2008 directing the Deputy Tahsildar and Enquiry
Officer to take over possession. Pursuant to such order,
the Enquiry Officer had taken over possession of the land
to the extent of 46,538.43 square meters on 08.02.2008
after identification and fixation of boundary by the
surveyor in presence of the panchas, who certified that
the panchanama was prepared in their presence.
37. As already discussed above, there was no requirement
of passing an order or issuing further notice under Section
10(6) of the ULC Act. Therefore, the order or notice dated
05.02.2008 is of no legal consequence. But the fact
remains that according to the version of the appellants,
Section 10(5) notice is dated 05.01.2008 which was affixed
at a conspicuous place of the premises on 08.01.2008,
whereafter possession was taken over on 08.02.2008
as per the panchanama dated 08.02.2008. Therefore,
there was no breach of the thirty days period. To our
mind, learned Single Judge committed a manifest error
in declaring the notice under Section 10(5) as well as the
panchanama as void ab initio and non est in the eye of
law. If the correctness or genuineness of the same were
disputed by the respondent, then it would be a case of
disputed and contentious facts. A proceeding under Article
226 of the Constitution of India is not the proper forum
to adjudicate such disputed and contentious facts. As
pointed out by the Supreme Court in Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma
(supra), such seriously disputed questions of fact would
not be amenable to a satisfactory determination by the
High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction.
38. That being the position, we have no hesitation in our
mind that learned Single Judge had erred on facts as
well as in law in declaring the notice dated 05.01.2008
under Section 10(5) of the ULC Act as well as the
panchanama dated 08.02.2008 being void ab initio and
non est in the eye of law and thereafter in setting aside
the panchanama.”
(Emphasis supplied)
1658 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
14. Thus, what is discernable from the aforesaid discussion in the
impugned judgment is as under:-
i. Taking over of possession of land by way of panchnama under
the Act is an acceptable mode. Consequently, the impugned
judgment does not in any manner consider the effect of Section
3(2) of the Repeal Act, 1999. The impugned judgment does not
in any manner deal with the judgments in Hari Ram (supra)
and Gajanan Kamlya Patil (supra); and
ii. The Division Bench further said that there is no legal requirement
under Section 10(6) of the Act, 1976 for passing any order or
issuing any further notice to the affected parties under Section
10(6) of the Act, 1976. Therefore, in the present case, the
Section 10(6) Order is of no legal consequence. On this basis,
the Division Bench en bloc rejected the issues regarding the
legality /validity of the Section 10(6) Order and the panchnama
thereafter.
It is relevant to note at this stage that the impugned judgment does
not in any way disturb the factual findings recorded in the judgment
of the learned Single Judge as regards the factory very much in
operation and also that the physical possession of the land remains
with the appellant.
15. In such circumstances referred to above, the appellant is here before
this Court with the present two appeals.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
16. The written submissions of the appellant read as under:-
“I. It is a statutory mandate to issue an order under Section
10(6) after proper and effective service of notice under
Section 10(5) of the Act.
17. The Impugned Judgment suffers from a patent error
insofar as it holds that there is no statutory requirement
under Sections 10(5) and 10 (6) of the Act to issue or
serve a notice to the affected/concerned parties.
18. On this erroneous premise, the impugned judgment has
brushed aside all the illegalities and/or statutory lacunae
in the Section 10(5) Notice and the Section 10(6) Order.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1659
M/s A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc.
19. It is trite law that the requirement of issuance of notice
under Section 10(5) and order under Section 10(6) of the
Act is mandatory under law. Refer to : Hari Ram (supra)
and State of Telangana v. Southern Steels Limited, W.A.
1975 of 2017.
20. Significantly, the judgments in Hari Ram (supra) as well
as Southern Steel Limited (supra) were relied upon by the
Appellants before the Hon’ble Division Bench. However,
the impugned judgment while coming at a diametrically
opposite finding, fails to deal with the judgments in Hari
Ram (supra) and Southern Steel Limited (supra) in any
manner whatsoever.
21. Before this Hon’ble Court, the Respondent had sought
to contend that this settled legal position has been disturbed
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Assam v. Bhaskar
Jyoti Sarma, (2015) 5 SCC 321. The same is not correct.
The facts in Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma were completely different
and the same are not in any manner applicable in the case
at hand. In Bhaskar Jyoti Sharma, this Hon’ble Court held
that where possession is stated to have been taken long
ago and there is undue delay on the part of the landholder
in approaching the writ court, in such a case attraction
of the prescribed procedure for taking possession would
not be a determining factor, inasmuch as it can be taken
that the persons for whose benefit the procedure existed
have waived his right thereunder.
In that case, the original landowner sold the excess vacant
land to six people after a notification under Section 10(1) of
the Act had been published. In the first round of litigation,
the purchasers questioned the acquisition, and this came
up to this Hon’ble Court, wherein such challenge was
dismissed in 2002. Thereafter, in 2003, the excess vacant
land was allotted to Guwahati Metropolitan Development
Authority and mutated accordingly. After coming into effect
of the Repeal Act in Gujarat in 2003, a writ was again
filed by the legal heirs of the original landowner. This was
the second round of litigation. Such challenge was also
dismissed by this Hon’ble Court, holding that the original
1660 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
landowner had waived his right by not questioning the
aspect of possession under Section 10(5) of the Act, despite
possession having been taken as early as on 07.12.1991.
22. In the present case, it is not even Respondents’ case
nor is there any finding to this effect in the impugned
judgment that the Appellants have waived their right in any
manner whatsoever or have delayed in approaching the
writ court. In fact, in 2009, as soon as the attempts were
made by the Respondents to dispossess the Appellant from
the Subject Land, the Appellant immediately approached
the writ court.
23. Hence, the said finding in the impugned judgment
regarding Sections 10(5) and 10 (6) of the Act is ex facie
unsustainable in law.
II. The acquisition proceedings are de hors the Act, more
particularly Section 10 of the Act.
24. The purported Section 10 Notices suffer from glaring
illegalities. This clearly reflects that the said purported
Section 10 Notices are de hors the Act, fictitious and non
est in law.
25. The purported Section 10 Notices were never
contemporaneously served nor received by the Appellant.
The Appellant was made aware of the Section 10 Notices
for the first time only on 14.09.2010. A bare perusal of the
same would demonstrate that the Section 10 Notices are
not prepared contemporaneously.
26. Such glaring illegalities at each stage of the said
acquisition proceedings are evident from the statements
that follow:-
STAGE ILLEGALITIES / LACUNAE
Purported a. The Appellant never received the Section
Notice 10(5) Notice contemporaneously. The Appellant
under was made aware of this notice for the first time
Section on 14.09.2010.
10(5) of the
Act
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1661
M/s A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc.
b. In any event, the Section 10(5) Notice is
dated 05.01.2008. As per the Respondents, it
was affixed on the main gate on 08.01.2008
on the false pretext that there was a lockout in
the factory.
c. The Respondent has miserably failed to
establish that on the said date, there was a
lockout in the factory. Even from a bare perusal of
the purported Section 10(5) Notice, it is clear that
the same has not been served on the Appellant
in any manner whatsoever. There is no signature
on the said notice as to who has affixed the
same, except a name has been scribbled, which
is not legible. The Respondents have also failed
to show that any attempt was made by them to
carry out service of the Section 10(5) Notice by
any other means in any manner whatsoever.
d. Even in the situation of lockout, it is implausible
that the Respondent authorities were not able
to locate any personnel or individual for the
purported service of the Section 10(5) Notice.
e. It is well settled that affixing of notices, as the
Respondents suggest having done, should only
be a last resort. ➢ The Government of Tamil
Nadu v. Nandagopal, 2011 (3) CTC 843
f. Therefore, it is clear that the so-called stand
regarding affixing of the Section 10(5) Notice on
the main door of the factory is concocted and
nothing but a cock and bull story.
g. Moreover, such stand of the Respondents
themselves runs counter to their core contention
that the factory was not on the Subject Land.
Purported a. The Appellant never received the Section
Order under 10(6) Order contemporaneously. The Appellant
Section was made aware of this order for the first time
10(6) of the on 14.09.2010.
Act
b. There is no reasonable or justifiable explanation
for the two dates which are “05.02.2008” and
“08.02.2008”.
1662 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
c. Pertinently, the Respondents were unable to
explain the date of “01.10.2008” which was also
mentioned in the Section 10(6) Order. Admittedly,
there is no explanation for the same.
d. Further, the Section 10(6) Order states
that the 30-day time given in the Section
10(5) Notice expired on 01.10.2008, after the
enforcement of the Repeal Act. This is completely
incomprehensible.
e. Moreover, the copy of the Section 10(6)
Order provided to the Appellant on 14.09.2010
and the copy filed by the Respondents as part
of the Compilation of Copies of Original Record
dated 23.02.2024, reveal further discrepancies
in relation to execution of the said order. For
instance, the date of “08.02.2008” is missing
from the said copy supplied to the Appellant
as part of the Compilation of Copies of Original
Record and it only mentions the date [or date
of purported issuance] of “05.02.2008”. These
discrepancies clearly demonstrate that the record
of proceedings is tampered with and cannot be
relied upon in any manner whatsoever.
f. In any event, even as per the Respondents, the
Section 10(6) Order was issued on 05.02.2008
and the Section 10(5) Notice was affixed on the
wall on 08.01.2008.
g. Therefore, even as per the Respondents,
30 days had not lapsed between the purported
service of the Section 10(5) Notice, i.e.,
08.01.2008 and alleged issuance of the Section
10(6) Order, i.e., 05.02.2008. It is mandatory to
have a gap of 30 days between a notice under
Section 10(5) of the Act and an order under
Section 10(6) of the Act.
¾ T h e P r i n c i p a l C o m m i s s i o n e r v. M .
Venkataraman, 2014 SCC OnLine Mad 4505;
¾ P. Laxmi Kantha Rao and Others v.
Government Of Andhra Pradesh, 2014 SCC
OnLine Hyd 1348
h. The Ld. Single Judge rightly held that the
Section 10(6) Order is bad in law.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1663
M/s A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc.
Panchnama a. The Appellant never received this anchnama
contemporaneously. The Appellant was made
aware of this purported Panchnama for the first
time on 14.09.2010.
b. It is a printed form where gaps have been
filled up.
c. The purported Panchnama lacks fundamental
particulars of a Panchnama such as:
- The purported Panchnama did not contain
either the address or the description of panchas;
- No affidavit was filed by the panchas to
evidence that they were present at the site and
the Panchnama was prepared in their presence;
- There is no signature of the landowner on the
Panchnama; and
- The purported Panchnama did not contain
any site map or distinctive boundaries with sub-
divisions, whatsoever. It may be noted that the
entire extent of 1,63,679 square meters is bound
by one compound wall.
d. The Ld. Single Judge rightly held that the
purported Panchnama is bad in law.
27. Crucially, the concocted and spurious nature of the
Notices is evident from the fact that such acts have been
carried out by the Respondents against various other
entities/individuals in the same region wherein the Subject
Land is situated.
¾ J Sarada Govardhini v. Special Officer and Competent
Authority, Writ Petition No. 9680 of 2006
¾ Gonguluri Srinivasa Sharma and Anr. v. Government
of AP and Ors., Writ Petition No. 28883 of 2011.
28. In light of the above, it is clear that the purported Section
10(5) Notice, Section 10(6) Order and the Panchnama are
ex facie bad in law and de hors the provisions of the Act.
The same cannot be relied upon in any manner whatsoever.
In view thereof, the question of the Respondents having
1664 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
taken over possession of the Subject Land in any manner
whatsoever does not arise.
29. Hence, the so-called acquisition proceedings stand
abated by virtue of Section 3 of the Repeal Act.
II. In any event, the actual or physical possession of
the Subject Land has admittedly not been taken by the
Respondents and consequently, the said acquisition is hit
by the Repeal Act.
30. It is an admitted position that physical or actual
possession of the Subject Land has not been taken over
by the State Government at any point in time. Even as
per the Respondents, they have only taken symbolic/paper
possession by way of the Panchnama.
31. It is also an admitted position that the mandatory 30-
day period between the alleged issuance of the Section
10(5) Notice and purported issuance of the Section 10(6)
Order had not lapsed.
32. It is admitted by the Respondents that the Appellant is
still running a factory over the Subject Land. Further, it is
also admitted that number of apartments are constructed
on a part of the Subject Land. Most significantly, it has
been admitted that physical possession of the Subject
Land has not been taken over by the Respondents.
33. In fact, the Ld. Single Judge, after consideration of
the documents on record, has categorically held that
the Appellants have established that the factory is still
running on the Subject Land and a number of multi-storied
residential buildings have also been constructed therein.
It has also been held that the entire land is encompassed
by a boundary wall and the gate is manned by security
guard. Resultantly, it has been conclusively held that the
actual physical possession of the Subject Land is still
with the Appellant and has not been taken over by the
Respondents.
34. Hence, admittedly, the actual physical possession of the
Subject Land has not been taken over by the Respondents
and the same is with the Appellant.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1665
M/s A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc.
35. Significantly, Section 3(1)(a) of the Repeal Act provides
that restoration of land to the Government shall not take
place if “possession” was not taken over by the Government
prior to coming into force of the Repeal Act.
36. In relation to the term ‘possession’ under Section
3 of the Repeal Act, courts have consistently held that
‘possession’ therein means actual physical possession
or de facto possession and not mere paper or de jure
possession. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the
following judgments:
¾ Vinayak Kashinath Shilkar v. Deputy Collector and
Competent Authority and Ors., (2012) 4 SCC 718
¾ Gajanan Kamlya Patil v. Additional Collector and
Competent Authority (ULC) and Ors. (supra)
¾ State of Gujarat v. Kamuben, 2019 SCC OnLine Guj
4941
¾ Dip Co. Op. Hsg. Society Ltd. through Purshottam S.
Patel v. State of Gujarat and Others, 2020 SCC OnLine
Guj 693
¾ Dip Co. Op. Hsg. Society Ltd. through Purshottam S.
Patel v. State of Gujarat and Others, 2024 SCC OnLine
Guj 3034
37. It is important to note that impugned judgment errs
in not adopting the settled legal position under the Act.
On the contrary, the impugned judgment has wrongly
applied the legal position under the Land Acquisition
Act, to the acquisition proceedings concerned in relation
to the Subject Land. The legal position under the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894, or the Right to Fair Compensation
and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation
and Resettlement Act, 2013 (“Land Acquisition Acts”),
regarding the effect of repeal of a statute vis-à-vis
possession is wholly inapplicable to acquisition under
the Act, i.e., the Urban Land (Ceiling and Reform) Act,
1976. This is another fundamental fallacy in the impugned
judgment. In fact, reliance placed by the Respondents
1666 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
on judgments in relation to the Land Acquisition Acts is
a complete red herring and is absolutely misplaced in
the present case
38. Therefore, in the present case, as admittedly the actual
or physical possession of the Subject Land is not taken by
the State Government, the acquisition proceedings stand
abated. The impugned judgment deserves to be set aside
on this ground alone.
39. In light of the above, it is submitted that the instant
acquisition proceedings are hit by Section 3 of the Repeal
Act. Accordingly, the acquisition proceedings in relation to
the Subject Land ought to stand abated.”
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS
17. The written submissions filed on behalf of the State read thus:-
“Writ Proceedings before the Hon’ble High Court –
Appellant did not challenge Notice u/s 10(5) or order
passed u/s 10(6) of the ULC Act
10. The Appellant filed W.P. 11293/2009 challenging the
Respondent’s alleged interference with the possession
and enjoyment of Petitioner w.r.t. 30181.10 sq. yds. in
survey no. 76. The Appellant also filed W.P. 23477/2010
challenging the panchnama proceedings dated 08.02.2008
taking over possession of 46,538 sq. mts. land in survey
nos. 74 to 76.
11. Admittedly, the challenge before the Hon’ble High Court
in the writ proceedings was with regards to the taking over
of possession of the Subject Vacant Land by execution
of panchnama. The Appellant did not seek the relief for
quashing of notice under Section 10(5) or order passed
under Section 10(6) of the ULC Act.
12. The Ld. Single Judge passed a combined order dated
03.01.2022. The Respondents filed W.A. 665/2022 and
W.A. 670/2022 before the Division Bench of the High
Court. The Division Bench of the High Court passed the
Impugned Judgment on 14.02.2023.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1667
M/s A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc.
Submissions:
13. Physical possession of the Subject Land was validly
taken over by the Respondent inaccordance with the
ULC Act before the Repeal Act. The Appellant has
alleged that there were some discrepancies / illegalities
in the process adopted under Section 10(5) and 10(6) of
the ULC Act. Each of the alleged illegalities is dealt as
under:
I. Issuance of Notice and Service thereof was in
accordance with Section 10(5)
14. The Appellant has alleged that the notice dated
05.01.2008 issued under Section 10(5) is illegal on the
ground that the said notice was not received by the
Appellant who was made aware of the said notice only on
14.09.2010, and it was merely affixed on the main gate
of the Existing Factory on 08.01.2008 without any service
through registered post.
15. In this regard, it is submitted that:-
a) The notice under Section 10(5) of the ULC Act is dated
05.01.2008, calling upon the Appellant to surrender the
Subject Vacant Land.
b) The said notice was served upon the Appellant by way
of affixation on the main gate of the Existing Factory on
08.01.2008. The Existing Factory was locked / closed on
the said date. Since there was no other means to effect
service upon the Appellant, the said notice was affixed
on the main door of the Existing Factory, belonging to the
Appellant, which is adjacent to the Subject Vacant Land.
It is submitted that such affixation of notice is deemed
service upon the Appellant.
c) Furthermore, the Subject Vacant Land being a large tract
of vacant land in the present case, service of the notice by
affixing it on the door of the Existing Factory belonging to
the Appellant is a valid mode of service. In the absence of
any rule or prescribed procedure for service of the notice,
it was served by affixation.
1668 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
d) It is submitted that Rule 5 and 6 of the Urban Land
(Ceiling and Regulation) Rules, 1976 recognize affixation
as a valid mode of service.
e) In any case, the Appellant was very well aware of the
proceedings under ULC Act. In fact, the Appellant had
also challenged the order dated 03.04.2005 passed by
the Special Officer and Competent Authority under Section
8(4) of the ULC Act before the Appellate Authority.
16. Despite being well aware of the proceedings under
ULC Act, the Appellant has mischievously denied service
of notice under Section 10(5), due to the fortuitous
circumstance of the Repeal Act w.e.f. 27.03.2008, thereby,
tempting the Appellant to raise the issue of service under
Section 10(5).
II. Order under Section 10(6) dated 05.02.2008 to
take possession was lawful
17. The Appellant has challenged the order dated
05.02.2008 under Section 10(6) on the ground that the
said order was not received by the Appellant it came to
knowledge of the Appellant on 14.09.2010. The Appellant
has further pointed out certain alleged discrepancies
such as the mentioning of the date ‘01.10.2008’ in the
said order and non-mentioning of the date ‘08.02.2008’.
Alternatively, the Appellant has suggested that the order
dated 05.02.2008 was issued prior to the expiry of the 30
days period from the date of service of the notice under
Section 10(5) on 08.01.2008 when the said notice was
affixed on the main gate of the Existing Factory.
18. It is submitted that the Order under Section 10(6) is
legal:
(a) There is no statutory requirement to send another notice
under Section 10(6) after the expiry of 30 days from the
date of service of notice under Section 10 (5).
(b) As such, the order dated 05.02.2008, is immaterial and
thus, the alleged discrepancies, if any, are of no relevance
and cannot have any legal consequence.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1669
M/s A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc.
(c) The internal notings in a departmental file do not
have the sanction of law to be an effective order. It is for
internal use and consideration of the other officials of the
department and for the benefit of final decision making.
These notings are not meant for outside exposure. It
is possible that after expressing of an opinion on a
particular matter by one officer, another officer may
express a different opinion. Reliance is placed upon
Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1963 SC 395
relevant para at 10; Sethi Auto Service Station and
Another v. Delhi Development Authority and Others
(2009) 1 SCC 180 relevant para at 14, 15, 16 and 17;
Jasbir Singh Chhabara and Others v. State of Punjab
and Others, (2010) 4 SCC 192 relevant para at 35; State
of Uttaranchal and Another v. Sunil Kumar Vaish and
Others, (2011) 8 SCC 670 relevant para at 24; Pimpri
Chinchwad New Township Development Authority v.
Vishnudev Cooperative Housing Society and Others,
(2018) 8 SCC 215 relevant para at 35 and 36.
(d) Without prejudice, the internal notings which culminated
into the order dated 05.02.2008 under Section 10(6)
does not have any discrepancy. It is submitted that the
mentioning of date ‘01.08.2008’ is immaterial and has no
legal consequence.
(e) The order under Section 10(6) is dated 05.02.2008
but was issued on 08.02.2008 when the panchnama was
executed and possession was as such taken over only
after the competition of 30 days from the date of service
of notice on 08.01.2008.
19. Appellant’s challenge to order under Section 10(6) is
irrelevant and baseless. It is a desperate attempt of the
Appellant to take disadvantage of the alleged discrepancy,
if any, in the internal notings made by the officials of the
State Government, so as to illegally hold the excess vacant
land admeasuring 46,538.43 sq. mts. despite its failure
to comply with the condition of constructing the Proposed
Fan Factory.
1670 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
III. Panchnama dated 08.02.2008 is a valid mode
of taking possession
20. The Appellant has suggested that it became aware of
the panchnama issued on 08.02.2008, only on 14.09.2010.
Even otherwise, it is alleged the said panchnama is
defective since it does not contain the addresses or
description of the panchas, or signatures of the landowner,
site map, and further there is no affidavit on record by the
panchas to evidence that they were present at the site
and panchnama was prepared in their presence.
21. Upon failure of the Appellant to comply with the notice
under Section 10(5) of the ULC Act, the Respondents
were compelled to take over the possession of Subject
Vacant Land by recording of panchnama. The aforesaid
allegations of the Appellant are incorrect and baseless. It
is submitted that:
(a) Panchnama was legally prepared by the Deputy
Tahsildar and Enquiry Officer in the presence of three
panchas, namely, (i) Ramayya, (ii) Viswanadham and
(iii) Jagdish, whose addresses are mentioned in the
panchnama.
(b) Two persons stood as witnesses – Venkateshwar Rao
and Mallaya.
(c) Panchnama records that the notice under Section 10(5)
was served upon the Landowner.
(d) Pursuant to the expiry of 30 days from the date of
service of the notice under Section 10(5) on 08.01.2008,
the enquiry officer took over possession of the Subject
Vacant Land after identification and fixation of boundary
by the surveyor in the presence of panchas, who certified
that the panchnama was prepared in their presence.
(e) There is no requirement of preparation of a site map
along with the panchnama in the absence of any statutory
provision or judicial precedent. The Appellant has failed
to establish that the panchnama was not prepared as per
the mandate.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1671
M/s A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc.
(f) The suggestion of signature of landowner on the
panchnama is also without any substance in the absence
of any statutory mandate and furthermore, it is unpragmatic
to expect from a landowner who is not willing handing
over possession of the excess vacant land to sign on the
panchnama.
22. It is a settled principle of law that possession of a land
can be taken over by execution of a proper panchnama
or memorandum. Panchnama is evidence in itself that
possession has been taken over and land vests in the
government absolutely. In this regard, reliance is placed
upon para 30 in the judgment of Sita Ram Bhandari Society,
New Delhi v. Lieutenant Governor of NCT of Delhi (2009)
10 SCC 501: “It is also clear that one of the methods of
taking possession and handing it over to the beneficiary
Department is the recording of a panchnama which can
in itself constitute evidence of the fact that possession
had been taken and the land had vested absolutely in
the Government...”
23. In Omprakash Verma v. State of A.P. (2010) 13 SCC
158, the same position of law was reiterated, in the context
of ULC Act, in Para 85, and it was held: “It is settled law
that where possession is to be taken of a large tract of
land then it is permissible to take possession by a properly
executed panchnama”
24. Reliance is also placed upon Balmokand Khati
Educational and Industrial Trust v. State of Punjab (1996)
4 SCC 212 and Para 9 of Tamil Nadu Housing Board v.
A. Viswan (1996) 8 SCC 259.
25. In view of the above settled position of law, the Division
Bench of the High Court rightly relies upon Sita Ram (supra)
as well as upon Omprakash Verma (supra) to hold that while
taking possession of a large area of land, a pragmatic and
realistic approach has to be taken and one of the methods
of taking possession and handing it over to the beneficiary
department is the recording of panchnama which constitutes
evidence of the fact that the possession has been taken
and land vests absolutely with the government.
1672 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
26. Furthermore, it is submitted that Appellant cannot
belatedly contend that Section 10(5) of the ULC Act, has
been breached. A bare perusal of the relief sought by the
Appellant in W.P. 23477/2010 filed before the Hon’ble High
Court shows that the challenge was only to the taking over
of possession by way of panchnama dated 05.02.2008.
Reliance in this regard is placed upon State of Assam v.
Bhaskar Jyoti Sharma (2015) 5 SCC 321 [Para 14 to 17]
wherein it is held that in the event of belated challenge
to notice under Section 10(5), the landowner is presumed
to have waived his right under Section 10(5) of the Act.
27. Thus, the panchnama having been validly executed
and in terms of the settled position of law, the Respondent
has taken over valid and legal possession of the Subject
Vacant Land in terms of Section 10(5) and (6) of the ULC
Act. It is further submitted that while service of notice is
mandatory under Section 10(5) in terms of the judgment
in Hari Ram (supra), there is no requirement of service
of notice under Section 10(6).
28. It is reiterated that the present case concerns a huge
tract of land admeasuring 46,538.43 sq. mts. i.e., the
Subject Vacant Land, wherein the Appellant was granted
exemption for an area admeasuring 48,859.90 sq. mts under
Section 20 (1) (a) subject to the condition of construction of
a Proposed Fan Factory, and it was only due to the failure
of the Appellant to comply with the said condition that the
exemption was later withdrawn by the State Government.
29. In view of the above, it is submitted that the possession
of the Subject Vacant Land has been validly taken by the
Respondents by issuing of notice and service thereof under
Section 10(5) and possession was validly taken over in
compliance with Section 10(6) of the ULC Act prior to the
coming into force of the Repeal Act, and thus, the Appeal
deserves to be dismissed with heavy costs.”
ANALYSIS
18. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and
having gone through the materials on record, the only question that
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1673
M/s A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc.
falls for our consideration is whether the Division Bench of the High
Court committed any error in upsetting the findings recorded by the
learned Single Judge.
19. Before adverting to the rival submissions canvassed on either side,
we must look into few relevant provisions of the Repeal Act, 1999
which read as under:-
“Section 3. Savings—
(1) The repeal of the principal Act shall not affect—
(a) the vesting of any vacant land under sub-section (3) of
Section 10, possession of which has been taken over by
the State Government or any person duly authorised by
the State Government in this behalf or by the competent
authority;
(b) the validity of any order granting exemption under sub-
section (1) of Section 20 or any action taken thereunder,
notwithstanding any judgment or any Court to the contrary;
(c) any payment made to the State Government as a
condition for granting exemption under sub-section (1) of
Section 20.
(2) Where—
(a) any land is deemed to have vested in the State
Government under sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the
Principal Act but possession of which has not been
taken over by the State Government or any person duly
authorised by the State Government in this behalf or by
the competent authority; and
(b) any amount has been paid by the State Government
with respect to such land, then such land shall not be
restored unless the amount paid, if any, has been refunded
to the State Government.
Section 4. Abatement of legal proceedings:—All
proceedings relating to any order made or purported to
be made under the principal Act pending immediately
before the commencement of this Act, before any Court,
Tribunal or any authority shall abate;
1674 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Provided that this section shall not apply to the proceedings
relating to Sections 11, 12, 13 and 14 of the principal Act
insofar as such proceedings are relatable to the land,
possession of which has been taken over by the State
Government or any person duly authorised by the State
Government in this behalf or by the competent authority.”
20. Thus, by virtue of the provisions of Section 3 of the Repeal Act, 1999,
if possession of vacant land has been taken over on behalf of the
State Government before the coming into force of the Repeal Act,
1999, the repeal of the Principal Act would not affect the vesting of
such land under sub-section (3) of Section 10 of Act, 1976. Hence,
the issue as to whether actual possession of land declared excess
under the Act has been taken over or not assumes great significance
after the coming into force of the Repeal Act, 1999 inasmuch as if
possession has not been taken over, the proceedings would abate
under Section 4 of the Repeal Act, 1999 and the ownership of the
land, if vested in the State Government under Section 10(3) of the
Act, 1976 would be required to be restored to the original land-holder
subject to repayment of any amount that has been paid by the State
Government with respect to such land.
21. Sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 10 of the Act, 1976 respectively
which are relevant for the purpose of deciding the present Appeals
read as under:
“10. Acquisition of vacant land in excess of ceiling limit—
(5) Where any vacant land is vested in the State
Government under sub-section(3),the competent authority
may, by notice in writing, order any person who may be in
possession of it to surrender or deliver possession thereof
to the State Government or to any person duly authorized
by the State Government in this behalf within thirty days
of the service of notice.
(6) If any person refuses or fails to comply with an order
made under sub section (5), the competent authority
may take possession of the vacant land or cause it to
be given to the concerned State Government or to any
person duly authorised by such State Government in this
behalf and may for that purpose use such force as may
be necessary”.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1675
M/s A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc.
22. On a plain reading of the aforesaid provisions, it is apparent that
the statute contemplates giving an opportunity to the landholder or
any person in possession of excess vacant land to surrender or
deliver possession thereof to the State Government and for this
purpose provides for giving notice in writing, ordering such person
to surrender or deliver possession of such land. It is only when
pursuant to such notice, such person refuses or fails to comply with
an order under sub-section (5) within a period of thirty days of the
service of notice, that the competent authority is required to take
over possession of the vacant land and for that purpose may use
force, if necessary. Therefore, the provisions of sub-section (6) are
to be resorted to only when there is refusal or non-compliance of
an order under sub-section (5) of Section 10 of the Act, 1976 within
the prescribed period.
23. In State of Maharashtra v. B.E. Billimoria, (2003) 7 SCC 336, this
Court in the context of the Act, 1976 held that the said Act being an
expropriatory legislation should be construed strictly.
24. This Court in the case of Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar
Mill (P) Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 111, in the context of the Gujarat Town
Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976 held thus:-
“The statutory interdict of use and enjoyment of the property
must be strictly construed. It is well settled that when a
statutory authority is required to do a thing in a particular
manner, the same must be done in that manner or not at
all. The state and other authorities while acting under the
said Act are only creature of statute. They must act within
the four corners thereof”.
(Emphasis supplied)
25. Thus, applying the principle of strict construction as explained in the
aforesaid two decisions, the authorities are required to act strictly in
accordance with the statutory provisions. Thus, when sub-section (5)
of Section 10 mandates giving notice of an order under the said
sub-section to the person in possession, the same is required to be
complied with in its true letter and spirit. Considering the nature of rights
involved, mere issuance of notice without service thereof, cannot be
said to be due compliance with the provisions of the statute. Besides,
the provisions of sub-section (6) of Section 10 can be resorted to
1676 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
only if the person fails to comply with an order under sub-section
(5) thereof, within a period of thirty days of service of notice. Hence,
possession cannot be taken over under Section 10(6) of the Act,
1976 unless a period of thirty days from the date of service of notice
has elapsed. In absence of service of notice under sub-section (5) of
Section 10, there will be no starting point for calculating the period
of thirty days. In other words, time will not start running, hence the
question of taking over possession under sub-section (6) of Section
10 of the Act, 1976 will not arise at all. In this view of the matter, in
the case on hand, it was not open to the respondent authorities to
resort to the provisions of sub-section (6) of Section 10 of the Act,
1976 without first strictly complying with the provisions of sub-section
(5) thereof. Hence, such action being in contravention of the statutory
provisions cannot be sustained and deserves to be struck down.
26. The case of Hari Ram (supra) needs to be looked into. In the said
case, this Court dealt with the very same issue i.e. deemed vesting
of the surplus land under Section 10(3) of the Act, 1976. The matter
was from Allahabad. This Court explained the concept of voluntary
surrender, peaceful dispossession and forceful dispossession. We
may quote the relevant observations:-
“18. The legislature is competent to create a legal fiction,
for the purpose of assuming existence of a fact which does
not really exist. Sub-section (3) of Section 10 contained
two deeming provisions such as “deemed to have been
acquired” and “deemed to have been vested absolutely”.
Let us first examine the legal consequences of a “deeming
provision”. In interpreting the provision creating a legal
fiction, the court is to ascertain for what purpose the fiction
is created and after ascertaining this, the court is to assume
all those facts and consequences which are incidental or
inevitable corollaries to the giving effect to the fiction. This
Court in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. State
of Rajasthan [(1996) 2 SCC 449] held that what can be
deemed to exist under a legal fiction are facts and not legal
consequences which do not flow from the law as it stands.
19. James, L.J. in Levy, In re, ex p Walton [(1881) 17 Ch D
746 : (1881-85) All ER Rep 548 (CA)] speaks on deeming
fiction as: (Ch D p. 756) “… When a statute enacts that
something shall be deemed to have been done, which in
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1677
M/s A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc.
fact and in truth was not done, the court is entitled and
bound to ascertain for what purposes and between what
persons the statutory fiction is to be resorted to.”
20. In Szoma v. Secy. of State for Work and Pensions
[(2006) 1 AC 564 : (2005) 3 WLR 955 : (2006) 1 All ER 1
(HL)] the Court held: (AC p. 574, para 25)
“25. … it would … be quite wrong to carry this fiction
beyond its originally intended purpose so as to deem
a person in fact lawfully here not to be here at all.
‘The intention of a deeming provision, in laying down
a hypothesis, is that the hypothesis shall be carried as
far as necessary to achieve the legislative purpose,
but no further’….”
(See also DEG Deutsche Investitions und
Entwicklungsgesellschaft mbH v. Koshy [(2001) 3
All ER 878(CA)].)
21. Let us test the meaning of the expressions “deemed
to have been acquired” and “deemed to have been
vested absolutely” in the above legal settings. The
expressions “acquired” and “vested” are not defined
under the Act. Each word, phrase or sentence that we
get in a statutory provision, if not defined in the Act, then
is to be construed in the light of the general purpose
of the Act. As held by this Court in Organo Chemical
Industries v. Union of India [(1979) 4 SCC 573 : 1980
SCC (L&S) 92] that a bare mechanical interpretation of
the words and application of a legislative intent devoid
of concept of purpose will reduce most of the remedial
and beneficial legislation to futility. Reference may also
be made to the judgment of this Court in Directorate of
Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan [(1994) 3 SCC 440 :
1994 SCC (Cri) 785]. Words and phrases, therefore,
occurring in the statute are to be taken not in an isolated
or detached manner, they are associated on the context
but are read together and construed in the light of the
purpose and object of the Act.
22. This Court in S. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P. [(1996) 4
SCC 596 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 792] held: (SCC p. 607, para 12)
1678 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
“12. It is a well-known rule of interpretation of statutes
that the text and the context of the entire Act must be
looked into while interpreting any of the expressions
used in a statute. The courts must look to the object
which the statute seeks to achieve while interpreting
any of the provisions of the Act. A purposive approach
for interpreting the Act is necessary.”
23. In Jugalkishore Saraf v. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd. [AIR
1955 SC 376] , S.R. Das, J. stated: (AIR p. 381, para 6)
“6. … The cardinal rule of construction of statutes
is to read the statute literally, that is by giving to
the words used by the legislature their ordinary,
natural and grammatical meaning. If, however, such
a reading leads to absurdity and the words are
susceptible of another meaning the court may adopt
the same. But if no such alternative construction is
possible, the court must adopt the ordinary rule of
literal interpretation.”
24. The expression “deemed to have been acquired” used
as a deeming fiction under sub-section (3) of Section
10 can only mean acquisition of title or acquisition of
interests because till that time the land may be either in
the ownership of the person who held that vacant land
or to possess such land as owner or as a tenant or as
mortgagee and so on as defined under Section 2(1) of the
Act. The word “vested” has not been defined in the Act,
so also the word “absolutely”. What is vested absolutely
is only the land which is deemed to have acquired and
nothing more. The word “vest” has different meaning in
different context; especially when we examine the meaning
of “vesting” on the basis of a statutory hypothesis of a
deeming provision which Lord Hoffmann in Customs and
Excise Commissioners v. Zielinski Baker and Partners Ltd.
[(2004) 1 WLR 707 : (2004) 2 All ER 141 (HL)] , All ER at
para 11 described as “heroic piece of deeming”.
25. The word “vest” or “vesting” has different meanings.
Legal Glossary, published by the Official Language
(Legislative) Commission, 1970 Edn. at p. 302:
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1679
M/s A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc.
“Vest.—(1) To give a person a legally fixed, immediate
right or personal or future enjoyment of (an estate), to
grant, endow, clothe with a particular authority, right
of property, (2) To become legally vested; (TP Act)
Vesting order.—An order under statutory authority
whereby property is transferred to and vested, without
conveyance in some person or persons;”
26. Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Edn.), 1990 at p. 1563:
“Vested.—Fixed;accrued; settled; absolute; complete.
Having the character or given the rights of absolute
ownership; not contingent; not subject to be defeated
by a condition precedent. Rights are ‘vested’ when
right to enjoyment present or prospective, has become
property of some particular person or persons as
present interest; mere expectancy of future benefits,
or contingent interest in property founded on
anticipated continuance of existing laws, does not
continue ‘vested right’. Vaughn v. Nadel [228 Kan
469 : 618 P 2d 778 (1980)] . See also Accrue; Vest,
and specific types of vested interests, infra.”
27. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, of the
English Language unabridged, Vol. III S to Z at p. 2547
defines the word “vest” as follows: “‘vest’ vest … To place
or give into the possession or discretion of some person
or authority [the regulation of the waterways … to give
to a person a legally fixed immediate right of present or
future enjoyment of (as an estate) (a deed that vests a
title estate in the grantee and a remainder in his children)
(b) to grant, endow, or clothe with a particular authority
right or property … to put (a person) in possession of land
by the feudal ceremony of investiture … to become legally
vested (normally) title to real property vests in the holder
of a property executed deed.]”
28. “Vest”/“vested”, therefore, may or may not include
“transfer of possession”, the meaning of which depends
on the context in which it has been placed and the
interpretation of various other related provisions.
1680 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
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29. What is deemed “vesting absolutely” is that “what is
deemed to have acquired”. In our view, there must be
express words of utmost clarity to persuade a court to
hold that the legislature intended to divest possession
also, since the owners or holders of the vacant land are
pitted against a statutory hypothesis. Possession, there is
an adage is “nine points of the law”. In Beddall v. Maitland
[(1881) 17 Ch D 174 : (1881-85) All ER Rep Ext 1812]
Sir Edward Fry, while speaking of a statute which makes
a forcible entry an indictable offence, stated as follows:
(Ch D p. 188)
“… This statute creates one of the great differences
which exist in our law between the being in possession
and the being out of possession of land, and which
gave rise to the old saying that possession is nine
points of the law. The effect of the statute is this, that
when a man is in possession he may use force to
keep out a trespasser; but, if a trespasser has gained
possession, the rightful owner cannot use force to put
him out, but must appeal to the law for assistance.”
30. Vacant land, it may be noted, is not actually acquired
but deemed to have been acquired, in that deeming
things to be what they are not. Acquisition, therefore,
does not take possession unless there is an indication to
the contrary. It is trite law that in construing a deeming
provision, it is necessary to bear in mind the legislative
purpose. The purpose of the Act is to impose ceiling on
vacant land, for the acquisition of land in excess of the
ceiling limit thereby to regulate construction on such lands,
to prevent concentration of urban lands in the hands of a
few persons, so as to bring about equitable distribution.
For achieving that object, various procedures have to
be followed for acquisition and vesting. When we look
at those words in the above setting and the provisions
to follow such as sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 10,
the words “acquired” and “vested” have different meaning
and content. Under Section 10(3), what is vested is de
jure possession not de facto, for more reasons than one
because we are testing the expression on a statutory
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1681
M/s A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc.
hypothesis and such an hypothesis can be carried only
to the extent necessary to achieve the legislative intent.
31. The “vesting” in sub-section (3) of Section 10, in our view,
means vesting of title absolutely and not possession though
nothing stands in the way of a person voluntarily surrendering
or delivering possession. The Court in Maharaj Singh v.
State of U.P. [(1977) 1 SCC 155] , while interpreting Section
117(1) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms
Act, 1950 held that “vesting” is a word of slippery import
and has many meanings and the context controls the text
and the purpose and scheme project the particular semantic
shade or nuance of meaning. The Court in Rajendra Kumar
v. Kalyan [(2000) 8 SCC 99] held as follows:
(SCC p. 114, para 28)
“28.… We do find some contentious substance in
the contextual facts, since vesting shall have to be a
‘vesting’ certain. ‘To “vest”, generally means to give
a property in.’ (Per Brett, L.J. Coverdale v. Charlton
[(1878) 4 QBD 104 (CA)] : Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary,
5th Edn., Vol. VI.)Vesting in favour of the unborn
person and in the contextual facts on the basis of
a subsequent adoption after about 50 years without
any authorisation cannot however but be termed to
be a contingent event. To ‘vest’, cannot be termed
to be an executory devise. Be it noted however, that
‘vested’ does not necessarily and always mean ‘vest
in possession’ but includes ‘vest in interest’ as well.”
32. We are of the view that so far as the present case is
concerned, the word “vesting” takes in every interest in
the property including de jure possession and, not de facto
but it is always open to a person to voluntarily surrender
and deliver possession, under Section 10(3) of the Act.
33. Before we examine sub-section (5) and subsection (6)
of Section 10, let us examine the meaning of sub-
section (4) of Section 10 of the Act, which says that during
the period commencing on the date of publication under
sub-section (1), ending with the day specified in the
declaration made under sub-section (3), no person shall
1682 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
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transfer by way of sale, mortgage, gift or otherwise, any
excess vacant land, specified in the notification and any
such transfer made in contravention of the Act shall be
deemed to be null and void. Further, it also says that no
person shall alter or cause to be altered the use of such
excess vacant land. Therefore, from the date of publication
of the notification under sub-section (1) and ending with
the date specified in the declaration made in subsection
(3), there is no question of disturbing the possession of
a person, the possession, therefore, continues to be with
the holder of the land.
34. Sub-section (5) of Section 10, for the first time, speaks
of “possession” which says that where any land is vested
in the State Government under subsection (3) of Section
10, the competent authority may, by notice in writing, order
any person, who may be in possession of it to surrender
or transfer possession to the State Government or to any
other person, duly authorised by the State Government.
35. If de facto possession has already passed on to the
State Government by the two deeming provisions under
sub-section (3) of Section 10, there is no necessity of
using the expression “where any land is vested” under
sub-section (5) of Section 10. Surrendering or transfer
of possession under subsection (3) of Section 10 can be
voluntary so that the person may get the compensation
as provided under Section 11 of the Act early. Once
there is no voluntary surrender or delivery of possession,
necessarily the State Government has to issue notice in
writing under sub-section (5) of Section 10 to surrender or
deliver possession. Sub-section (5) of Section 10 visualises
a situation of surrendering and delivering possession,
peacefully while sub-section (6) of Section 10 contemplates
a situation of forceful dispossession.
36. The Act provides for forceful dispossession but only
when a person refuses or fails to comply with an order under
sub-section (5) of Section 10. Sub-section (6) of Section
10 again speaks of “possession” which says, if any person
refuses or fails to comply with the order made under sub-
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1683
M/s A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc.
section (5), the competent authority may take possession
of the vacant land to be given to the State Government
and for that purpose, force—as may be necessary—can be
used. Sub-section (6), therefore, contemplates a situation
of a person refusing or fails to comply with the order under
sub-section (5), in the event of which the competent authority
may take possession by use of force. Forcible dispossession
of the land, therefore, is being resorted to only in a situation
which falls under sub-section (6) and not under sub-section
(5) of Section 10. Sub-sections (5) and (6), therefore, take
care of both the situations i.e. taking possession by giving
notice, that is, “peaceful dispossession” and on failure to
surrender or give delivery of possession under Section 10(5),
then “forceful dispossession” under sub-section (6) of
Section 10.
37. The requirement of giving notice under subsections
(5) and (6) of Section 10 is mandatory. Though the word
“may” has been used therein, the word “may” in both the
sub-sections has to be understood as “shall” because a
court charged with the task of enforcing the statute needs
to decide the consequences that the legislature intended to
follow from failure to implement the requirement. Effect of
non-issue of notice under sub-section (5) or sub- section
(6) of Section 11 is that it might result in the landholder
being dispossessed without notice, therefore, the word
“may” has to be read as “shall”. ”
27. In the very same judgment, the effect of the Repeal Act, 1999 has also
been discussed. Paragraphs 41 and 42 respectively read as under:-
“41. Let us now examine the effect of Section 3 of Repeal
Act 15 of 1999 on sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the Act.
The Repeal Act, 1999 has expressly repealed Act 33 of
1976. The objects and reasons of the Repeal Act have
already been referred to in the earlier part of this judgment.
The Repeal Act has, however, retained a saving clause.
The question whether a right has been acquired or liability
incurred under a statute before it is repealed will in each
case depend on the construction of the statute and the
facts of the particular case.
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42. The mere vesting of the land under subsection (3)
of Section 10 would not confer any right on the State
Government to have de facto possession of the vacant
land unless there has been a voluntary surrender of vacant
land before 18-3-1999. The State has to establish that
there has been a voluntary surrender of vacant land or
surrender and delivery of peaceful possession under sub-
section (5) of Section 10 or forceful dispossession under
sub-section (6) of Section 10. On failure to establish any
of those situations, the landowner or holder can claim
the benefit of Section 4 of the Repeal Act. The State
Government in this appeal could not establish any of those
situations and hence the High Court is right in holding that
the respondent is entitled to get the benefit of Section 4
of the Repeal Act.”
(Emphasis supplied)
28. A close reading of the above judgment more particularly the dictum
laid therein lays down that though Section 10(3) of the Urban Land
(Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978 (Central Act), which is pari-
materia to Section 11(3) of the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and
Regulation) Act, 1978 (Ceiling Act), provides that the vacant land is
deemed to be acquired, yet it does not mean that the possession
of the land has been taken over. This Court has categorically stated
that the procedure contained under sub-sections (5) and (6) of the
Act, 1976 must be scrupulously followed. This Court was of the view
that Section 10(5) of the Act, 1976 which is pari-materia to Section
11(5) of the Ceiling Act stipulates that any vacant land even if vested
in the State under sub-section (3),the competent authority has to by
notice in writing order any person who may be in possession of it to
surrender or deliver possession of the land to the State Government
within thirty days of the service of notice. If the landowner fails
or refuses to do so, then the State Government has to follow the
procedure under sub-section (6) of Section 10 or Section 11 as the
case may be, and take forcible possession.
29. Thus, the dictum, as laid in Hari Ram (supra), is that where the
possession of the subject land has not been taken over by the
State Government or by any person duly authorised by the State
Government in this behalf or by the competent authority, the
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1685
M/s A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc.
proceedings under the Act would not survive and mere vesting of
the vacant land with the State Government by operation of law,
without actual possession, is not sufficient. To put it in other words,
the mere paper possession would not save the situation for the State
Government unless the State is able to establish by cogent evidence
that actual physical possession of the entire land was taken over
by evicting each and every person from the land. The onus is on
the State to establish that actual physical possession of the excess
vacant land was taken over before the repeal.
30. The proposition of law that mere paper possession is not sufficient
to vest the land in the State has been explained by this Court in
Raghbir Singh Sehrawat v. State of Haryana,,2012 AIR SCW 240. This
was a case under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. This Court, while
allowing the appeals and declaring the acquisition illegal, observed
that the taking of possession means the actual possession. Paper
possession is not sufficient to vest the land in the State. This Court
noticed various revenue entries recorded in the revenue records which
showed that the crops were grown on the different acquired land said
to have been taken over. The Court noticed that the State had not
questioned the genuineness and correctness of the entries contained
in the revenue records. This Court also took notice of the fact that
it was neither pleaded nor any evidence had been produced before
the Court to show that the occupant of the land had unauthorisedly
taken possession of the land after its acquisition.
31. The decision rendered in the case of Hari Ram (supra) has been
followed by this Court in the case of in Vipin Chandra Vadilal Bavishi
v. State of Gujarat, reported in (2016) 4 SCC 531. The relevant
paragraphs of the judgment read as under:-
“20. From these facts and the documents available on
record, it is evidently clear that neither the Notifications
under Sections 10(1), 10(2), 10(3) and 10(5) were issued
in respect of plot nos. 36 to 43 nor possession of those
plots have been taken over by the respondents. Curiously
enough even the map attached to the letter dated 26.6.1989
shows that the possession of plot nos. 1 to 16 were taken
and not of plot nos. 36 to 43.
x x x x
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23. A similar question came up for consideration before
this Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Hari Ram reported
in (2013) 4 SCC 280. In this case, a question arose as
to whether the deemed vesting of surplus land under
Section 10(3) of the Act would amount to taking de facto
possession depriving the landholders of the benefit of the
saving clause under Section 4 of the Urban Land (Ceiling
and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999. After examining in
detailed provisions of the Ceiling Act as also the Repeal
Act, the Court observed:-
“35. If de facto possession has already passed
on to the State Government by the two deeming
provisions under subsection (3) of Section 10, there
is no necessity of using the expression “where any
land is vested” under subsection (5) of Section
10. Surrendering or transfer of possession under
subsection (3) of Section 10 can be voluntary so that
the person may get the compensation as provided
under Section 11 of the Act early. Once there is
no voluntary surrender or delivery of possession,
necessarily the State Government has to issue
notice in writing under sub-section (5) of Section 10
to surrender or deliver possession. Sub-section (5)
of Section 10 visualises a situation of surrendering
and delivering possession, peacefully while sub-
section (6) of Section 10 contemplates a situation
of forceful dispossession.
36. The Act provides for forceful dispossession but
only when a person refuses or fails to comply with an
order under sub-section (5) of Section 10. Sub-section
(6) of Section 10 again speaks of “possession” which
says, if any person refuses or fails to comply with
the order made under subsection (5), the competent
authority may take possession of the vacant land
to be given to the State Government and for that
purpose, force—as may be necessary—can be used.
Sub-section (6), therefore, contemplates a situation
of a person refusing or fails to comply with the order
under sub-section (5), in the event of which the
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1687
M/s A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc.
competent authority may take possession by use of
force. Forcible dispossession of the land, therefore,
is being resorted to only in a situation which falls
under sub-section (6) and not under subsection (5) of
Section 10. Sub-sections (5) and (6), therefore, take
care of both the situations i.e. taking possession by
giving notice, that is, “peaceful dispossession” and
on failure to surrender or give delivery of possession
under Section 10(5), then “forceful dispossession”
under sub-section (6) of Section 10.
37. The requirement of giving notice under sub-
sections (5) and (6) of Section 10 is mandatory.
Though the word “may” has been used therein,
the word “may” in both the sub-sections has to be
understood as “shall” because a court charged with
the task of enforcing the statute needs to decide
the consequences that the legislature intended to
follow from failure to implement the requirement.
Effect of non-issue of notice under subsection (5) or
sub-section (6) of Section 11 is that it might result
in the landholder being dispossessed without notice,
therefore, the word “may” has to be read as “shall”.”
24. The Bench further considered the effect of Repeal Act
and held that:-
“41. Let us now examine the effect of Section 3 of
Repeal Act 15 of 1999 on sub-section (3) of Section
10 of the Act. The Repeal Act, 1999 has expressly
repealed Act 33 of 1976. The objects and reasons
of the Repeal Act have already been referred to in
the earlier part of this judgment. The Repeal Act has,
however, retained a saving clause. The question
whether a right has been acquired or liability incurred
under a statute before it is repealed will in each case
depend on the construction of the statute and the
facts of the particular case.
42. The mere vesting of the land under sub-section (3)
of Section 10 would not confer any right on the State
Government to have de facto possession of the vacant
1688 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
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land unless there has been a voluntary surrender
of vacant land before 18-3-1999. The State has to
establish that there has been a voluntary surrender
of vacant land or surrender and delivery of peaceful
possession under sub-section (5) of Section 10
or forceful dispossession under sub-section (6) of
Section 10. On failure to establish any of those
situations, the landowner or holder can claim the
benefit of Section 4 of the Repeal Act. The State
Government in this appeal could not establish any
of those situations and hence the High Court is right
in holding that the respondent is entitled to get the
benefit of Section 4 of the Repeal Act.
43. We, therefore, find no infirmity in the judgment
of the High Court and the appeal is, accordingly,
dismissed so also the other appeals. No documents
have been produced by the State to show that
the respondents had been dispossessed before
coming into force of the Repeal Act and hence, the
respondents are entitled to get the benefit of Section 4
of the Repeal Act. However, there will be no order
as to costs.”
25. The submission of Mr. Kapoor, learned counsel
appearing for the respondent-State, that mentioning of Plot
Nos. 1 to 16 in the Notification issued under Sections 10(1),
10(3) and 10(5) is a clerical mistake which can be corrected
by issuing a corrigendum, is absolutely not tenable in
law. How Plot Nos. 1 to 16 can be replaced by Plot Nos.
36 to 43 in those Notifications by issuing a hand-written
corrigendum which was not even finally approved by the
authorities after 1976 Act stood repealed.
26. An arithmetical mistake is a mistake in calculation,
while a clerical mistake is a mistake of writing or typing
error occurring due to accidental slip or omissions or error
due to careless mistake or omission. In our considered
opinion, substituting different lands in place of the lands
which have been notified by a statutory Notification under
Section 10(1), 10(3) and 10(5) cannot and shall not be
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1689
M/s A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc.
done by issuing a corrigendum unless the mandatory
requirements contained in the aforementioned sections is
complied with. A land holder cannot be divested from his
land on the plea of clerical or arithmetical mistake liable
to be corrected by issuing corrigendum.”
32. We should now look into the decision of this Court in the case of
State of Assam v. Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma, (2015) 5 SCC 321. A cursory
reading of this decision may at the first blush create an impression
that the dictum as laid in Hari Ram (supra) has been diluted.
33. We quote few relevant paras of the said judgment as under:-
“14. We say so because in the ordinary course actual
physical possession can be taken from the person in
occupation only after notice under Section 10(5) is issued to
him to surrender such possession to the State Government,
or the authorised officer or the competent authority. There
is enough good sense in that procedure inasmuch as the
need for using force to dispossess a person in possession
should ordinarily arise only if the person concerned refuses
to cooperate and surrender or deliver possession of the
lands in question. That is the rationale behind Sections
10(5) and 10(6) of the Act. But what would be the position if
for any reason the competent authority or the Government
or the authorised officer resorts to forcible dispossession of
the erstwhile owner even without exploring the possibility
of a voluntary surrender or delivery of such possession on
demand. Could such use of force vitiate the dispossession
itself or would it only amount to an irregularity that would
give rise to a cause of action for the aggrieved owner or
the person in possession to seek restoration only to be
dispossessed again after issuing a notice to him. It is this
aspect that has to an extent bothered us.
15. The High Court has held that the alleged dispossession
was not preceded by any notice under Section 10(5) of
the Act. Assuming that to be the case all that it would
mean is that on 7th December, 1991 when the erstwhile
owner was dispossessed from the land in question,
he could have made a grievance based on Section
10(5) and even sought restoration of possession to
1690 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
him no matter he would upon such restoration once
again be liable to be evicted under Sections 10(5) and
10(6) of the Act upon his failure to deliver or surrender
such possession. In reality therefore unless there was
something that was inherently wrong so as to affect the
very process of taking over such as the identity of the
land or the boundaries thereof or any other circumstance
of a similar nature going to the root of the matter hence
requiring an adjudication, a person who had lost his land
by reason of the same being declared surplus under
Section 10(3) would not consider it worthwhile to agitate
the violation of Section 10(5) for he can well understand
that even when the Court may uphold his contention
that the procedure ought to be followed as prescribed,
it may still be not enough for him to retain the land for
the authorities could the very next day dispossess him
from the same by simply serving a notice under Section
10(5). It would, in that view, be an academic exercise
for any owner or person in possession to find fault with
his dispossession on the ground that no notice under
Section 10(5) had been served upon him.
16. The issue can be viewed from another angle also.
Assuming that a person in possession could make a
grievance, no matter without much gain in the ultimate
analysis, the question is whether such grievance could
be made long after the alleged violation of Section 10(5).
If actual physical possession was taken over from the
erstwhile land owner on 7th December, 1991 as is alleged
in the present case any grievance based on Section 10(5)
ought to have been made within a reasonable time of
such dispossession. If the owner did not do so, forcible
taking over of possession would acquire legitimacy by
sheer lapse of time. In any such situation the owner or
the person in possession must be deemed to have waived
his right under Section 10(5) of the Act. Any other view
would, in our opinion, give a licence to a litigant to make a
grievance not because he has suffered any real prejudice
that needs to be redressed but only because the fortuitous
circumstance of a Repeal Act tempted him to raise the
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1691
M/s A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc.
issue regarding his dispossession being in violation of the
prescribed procedure.
17. Reliance was placed by the respondents upon the
decision of this Court in Hari Ram's case (supra). That
decision does not, in our view, lend much assistance to
the respondents. We say so, because this Court was in
Hari Ram's case (supra) considering whether the word
‘may’ appearing in Section 10(5) gave to the competent
authority the discretion to issue or not to issue a notice
before taking physical possession of the land in question
under Section 10(6). The question whether breach of
Section 10(5) and possible dispossession without notice
would vitiate the act of dispossession itself or render it
non est in the eye of law did not fall for consideration in
that case. In our opinion, what Section 10(5) prescribes
is an ordinary and logical course of action that ought to
be followed before the authorities decided to use force to
dispossess the occupant under Section 10(6). In the case
at hand if the appellant’s version regarding dispossession
of the erstwhile owner in December 1991 is correct, the
fact that such dispossession was without a notice under
Section 10(5) will be of no consequence and would not
vitiate or obliterate the act of taking possession for the
purposes of Section 3 of the Repeal Act. That is because
Bhabadeb Sarma-erstwhile owner had not made any
grievance based on breach of Section 10(5) at any stage
during his lifetime implying thereby that he had waived
his right to do so.”
(Emphasis supplied)
34. We have supplied emphasis on paras 15 and 17 of Bhaskar Jyoti
Sharma (supra) referred to above, for the purpose of highlighting
that Hari Ram (supra) has not been diluted in any manner. We are of
the firm view that Hari Ram (supra) holds the field even as on date.
The statements of law in Hari Ram (supra) are absolutely correct.
35. If two decisions of this Court appear inconsistent with each other, the
High Courts are not to follow one and overlook the other, but should
try to reconcile and respect them both and the only way to do so
1692 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
is to adopt the wise suggestion of Lord Halsbury given in Quinn v.
Leathern, 1901 AC 495 at p.506 and reiterated by the Privy Council
in Punjab Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Commr. of Income Tax, Lahore
AIR 1940 PC 230:
“…… every judgment must be read as applicable to the
particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the
generality of the expressions, which may be found there,
are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but
governed or qualified by the particular facts of the case
in which such expressions are to be found.”
and follow that decision whose facts appear more in accord with
those of the case at hand.
36. The “vesting” in sub-section (3) of section 10, in our view, means
vesting of title absolutely and not possession though nothing stands in
the way of a person voluntarily surrendering or delivering possession.
This Court in Maharaj Singh v. State of UP, reported in 1977(1) SCR
1072, while interpreting section 117(1) of U.P. Zamindari Abolition
and Land Reform Act, 1950 held that “vesting” is a word of slippery
import and has many meaning and the context controls the text and
the purpose and scheme project the particular semantic shade or
nuance of meaning. This Court in Rajendra Kumar v. Kalyan (Dead)
by L.Rs. reported in (2000) 8 SCC 99, held as follows:-
“We do find some contentious substance in the contextual
facts, since vesting shall have to be a “vesting” certain. “To
vest, generally means to give a property in.” (Per Brett,
L.J. Coverdale v. Charlton, Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary,
5th Edn. Vol. VI.) Vesting in favour of the unborn person
and in the contextual facts on the basis of a subsequent
adoption after about 50 years without any authorization
cannot however but be termed to be a contingent event.
To “vest”, cannot be termed to be an executor devise. Be
it noted however, that “vested.” does not necessarily and
always mean “vest in possession” but includes “vest in
interest” as well.”
(Emphasis supplied)
37. Sub-section (5) of Section 10 talks of “possession” which says where
any land is vested in the State Government under sub-section (3) of
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1693
M/s A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc.
Section 10, the competent authority may, by notice in writing, order
any person, who may be in possession of it to surrender or transfer
possession to the State Government or to any other person, duly
authorized by the State Government.
38. If de facto possession has already passed on to the State Government
by the two deeming provisions under sub-section (3) to Section 10,
there is no necessity of using the expression “where any land is
vested.” under sub-section (5) to Section 10. Surrendering or transfer
of possession under sub-section (3) to Section 10 can be voluntary so
that the person may get the compensation as provided under Section
11 of the Act, 1976 early. Once there is no voluntary surrender or
delivery of possession, necessarily the State Government has to issue
notice in writing under sub-section (5) to Section 10 to surrender or
deliver possession. Sub-section (5) of Section 10 visualizes a situation
of surrendering and delivering possession, peacefully while sub-section
(6) of Section 10 contemplates a situation of forceful dispossession.
39. The mere vesting of the land under sub-section (3) of Section 10
would not confer any right on the State Government to have de facto
possession of the vacant land unless there has been a voluntary
surrender of vacant land before 18.03.1999. State has to establish
that there has been a voluntary surrender of vacant land or surrender
and delivery of peaceful possession under sub-section (5) of Section
10 or forceful dispossession under sub-section (6) of Section 10. On
failure to establish any of those situations, the landowner or holder
can claim the benefit of Section 3 of the Repeal Act, 1999. In the
case on hand, the State Government has in our considered view
not been able to establish any of those situations and hence the
learned Single Judge was right in holding that the appellant herein
is entitled to get the benefit of Section 3 of the Repeal Act, 1999.
40. The effect of Repeal Act, 1999 is further clear. If the landowner
remains in physical possession, then irrespective of his land being
declared surplus and/or entry being made in favour of the State
in revenue records, he will not be divested of his rights. Even if
compensation is received that also will not dis-entitle him to claim
the benefit if compensation is refunded, provided he is in actual
physical possession. Payment of compensation has no co-relation
with the taking of actual physical possession as with the vesting land
compensation becomes payable which can be paid without taking
actual physical possession.
1694 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
41. The propositions of law governing the issue of possession in context
with Sections 10(5) and 10(6) respectively of the Act, 1976 read with
Section 3 of the Repeal Act, 1999 may be summed up thus:
[1] The Repeal Act, 1999 clearly talks about the possession being
taken under Section 10(5) or Section 10(6) of the Act, 1976,
as the case may be.
[2] It is a statutory obligation on the part of the competent authority
or the State to take possession strictly as permitted in law.
[3] In case the possession is purported to have been taken under
Section 10(6) of the Act, 1976 the Court is still obliged to look
into whether “taking of such possession” is valid or invalidated
on any of the considerations in law.
[4] The possession envisaged under Section 3 of the Repeal Act,
1999 is de facto and not de jure only.
[5] The mere vesting of “land declared surplus” under the Act without
resuming “de facto possession” is of no consequence and the
land holder is entitled to the benefit of the Repeal Act, 1999.
[6] The requirement of giving notice under sub-sections (5) and
(6) of Section 10 respectively is mandatory. Although the word
“may” has been used therein, yet the word “may” in both the
sub-sections should be understood as “shall” because a Court is
obliged to decide the consequences that the legislature intended
to follow from the failure to implement the requirement.
[7] The mere vesting of the land under sub-section (3) of Section
10 would not confer any right on the State Government to have
de facto possession of the vacant land unless there has been
a voluntary surrender of vacant land before 18th March 1999.
[8] The State has to establish by cogent evidence on record that
there has been a voluntary surrender of vacant land or surrender
and delivery of peaceful possession under sub-section (6) of
Section 10 or forceful dispossession under sub-section (6) of
Section 10.
SCOPE OF INTRA-COURT APPEAL
42. We have noticed that the Division Bench in its impugned judgment
has used the expression “shockingly the learned Single Judge” at
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1695
M/s A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc.
various places. We fail to understand what is so shocking in the
judgment of the learned Single Judge that the Division Bench had to
interfere in a writ appeal. Was the Division Bench deciding a criminal
appeal against the judgment and order of conviction passed by the
learned Single Judge? The Division Bench was quite aware that it
was deciding an intra court appeal. An intra-court appeal is really not
a statutory appeal preferred against the judgment and order of an
inferior to the superior court. The Division Bench was not deciding
a criminal appeal against the judgment rendered by learned Single
Judge. The appeal inter se in a High Court from one court to another
is really an appeal from one coordinate bench to another coordinate
bench and it is for this reason that a writ cannot be issued by one
Bench of the High Court to another Bench of the High Court nor can
even the High Court issue writ to a High Court. Thus, unlikely an
appeal, in general, an intra court appeal is an appeal on principle
and that is why, unlike an appeal, in an ordinary sense, such as a
criminal appeal, where the whole evidence on record is examined
afresh by the appellate court, what is really examined, in an intra
court appeal, is the legality and validity of a judgment and/or order
of the learned Single Judge and it can be set aside or should be set
aside only when there is a patent error on the face of the record or
the judgment is against the established or settled principles of law. If
two views are possible and a view, which is reasonable and logical
has been adopted by a Single Judge, the other view howsoever
appealing may be to the Division Bench, it is the view adopted by the
learned Single Judge, which should, normally, by allowed to prevail.
43. The learned Single Judge after a meticulous examination of the entire
record noticed so many deficiencies in the procedure adopted by
the State. The plain reading of the impugned judgement gives an
impression that all that the Division Bench kept doing was to cure
such deficiencies noted by the learned Single Judge by giving benefit
of doubt to the State at every possible stage.
44. The State has not been able to give us any satisfactory reply as to
on what basis it says that at the relevant point time the factory was
closed; there was not a soul in site and therefore, the officials were
left with no other option but to affix Section 10(5) notice outside the
premises. This is something which is absolutely unpalatable. The
State proceeds further saying that as there was no voluntary surrender
of the excess land within thirty days from the date of affixation, it
1696 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
had to invoke Section 10(6) of the Act, 1976 and accordingly took
over the possession. It is extremely hard to believe that when such
a large parcel of land is being taken over the owner would not be
present and further would not take any steps in accordance with law.
45. It was pointed out on behalf of the appellant herein that not only the
factory is still running on the subject-land but there are multi-storeyed
residential buildings also constructed therein. It was also pointed out
that entire land is encompassed by a boundary wall and the gate is
manned by security guard. It was also brought to our notice that the
so called panchnama does not contain any site map or distinctive
boundaries with special divisions whatsoever. The entire extent of
1,63679 sq.mtrs. is bound by one compound wall. It seems that the
Division Bench in its impugned judgment has observed that there is
no requirement under the statute for obtaining the signature of the
landowner in the panchnama or filing of the affidavits by the panchas.
When State Authorities try to take law in their own hands by hook
or crook and rely on bogus paper panchnamas for the purpose of
asserting that actual physical possession was taken over before
the date of the repeal, then it is imperative that the signature of the
landowner must be obtained in the panchnama so as to attach sanctity
and authenticity to such exercise of taking over of actual possession.
Affidavits of the panchas would also attach great sanctity to the same.
46. We have no hesitation in saying that the State has not placed true
and correct facts in all respect. Both of us (J.B. Pardiwala and R.
Mahadevan, J.J.) have worked as judges in our respective High
Courts. We had the occasion to decide many matters exactly of the
present type. Our experience so far has been that out of ten matters
in nine matters it was apparent that the cases were one of paper
possession. The present case is also one of paper possession. The
learned Single Judge was constrained to observe that having regard
to the materials on record few documents were found to be ante
dated coupled with fabrication of evidence to some extent. All this
has been dismissed by the Division Bench saying that they could
be clerical errors or arithmetical errors.
POWER OF WRIT COURT TO DETERMINE DISPUTED QUESTION
OF FACT
47. One stock argument available with the State in this type of cases is that
the question whether the actual physical possession of the disputed
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1697
M/s A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc.
land had been taken over or not is a seriously disputed question
of fact, which the High Court should not adjudicate or determine in
exercise of its writ jurisdiction. As a principle of law, there need not
be any debate on such a proposition, but by merely submitting that
it is a seriously disputed question of fact, the same, by itself, will not
become a question of fact. To put it in other words, having regard to the
materials on record, which falsifies the case of the State Government,
then such materials should not be overlooked or ignored by the Court
on the principle that the issue with regard to taking over of the actual
physical possession would be a disputed question of fact.
48. Normally, the disputed questions of fact are not investigated or
adjudicated by a writ court while exercising powers under Article 226
of the Constitution of India. But the mere existence of the disputed
question of fact, by itself, does not take away the jurisdiction of this
writ court in granting appropriate relief to the petitioner. In a case
where the Court is satisfied, like the one on hand, that the facts are
disputed by the State merely to create a ground for the rejection of
the writ petition on the ground of disputed questions of fact, it is the
duty of the writ court to reject such contention and to investigate
the disputed facts and record its finding if the particular facts of the
case, like the one at hand, was required in the interest of justice.
49. There is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to indicate that the
High Court in the proceedings, like the one on hand, is debarred
from holding such an inquiry. The proposition that a petition under
Article 226 must be rejected simply on the ground that it cannot
be decided without determining the disputed question of fact is not
warranted by any provisions of law nor by any decision of this Court.
A rigid application of such proposition or to treat such proposition
as an inflexible rule of law or of discretion will necessarily make
the provisions of Article 226 wholly illusory and ineffective more
particularly Section 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act, 1976 respectively.
Obviously, the High Court must avoid such consequences.
50. In the aforesaid context, we may look into the decision of this Court
in the case of State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei reported in
AIR 1967 SC 1269. In paragraph 6 at p. 1270 of the said judgment,
this Court has been pleased to hold as follows:-
“Under Art. 226 of the Constitution the High Court is not
precluded from entering upon a decision on questions
1698 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
of fact raised by the petition. Where an enquiry into
complicated questions of fact arises in a petition under Art.
226 of the Constitution before the right of an aggrieved
party to obtain relief claimed may be determined. The
High Court may in appropriate cases decline to enter
upon that enquiry and may refer the party claiming relief
to a suit. But the question is one of discretion and not of
jurisdiction of the Court.”
(Emphasis supplied)
51. This Court in the case of Gunwant Kaur v. Bhatinda Municipality
reported in AIR 1970 SC 602 observed as follows:-
“The High Court observed that they will not determine
disputed question of fact in a writ petition. But what facts
were in dispute and what were admitted could only be
determined after an affidavit in reply was filed by the State.
The High Court, however, proceeded to dismiss the petition
in limine. The High Court is not deprived of its jurisdiction
to entertain a petition under Art.226 merely because in
considering the petitioner’s right to relief questions of fact
may fall to be determined. In a petition under Art.226 the
High Court has jurisdiction to try issues both of fact and
law. Exercise of jurisdiction is, it is true, discretionary,
but the discretion must be exercised on sound judicial
principles. When the petition raises questions of fact of a
complex nature, which may for their determination require
oral evidence to be taken, and on that account the High
Court is of the view that the dispute may not appropriately
be tried in a writ petition, the High Court may decline to
try a petition. Rejection of a petition in limine will normally
be justified, where the High Court is of the view that the
petition is frivolous or because of the nature of the claim
made, dispute sought to be agitated., or that the petition
against the party against whom relief is claimed is not
maintainable or that the dispute raised thereby is such that
it would be inappropriate to try it in the writ jurisdiction, or
for analogous reasons.”
(Emphasis supplied)
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1699
M/s A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc.
52. In one of the recent pronouncements of this Court in State of U.P. &
Anr. v. Ehsan & Anr. reported in 2023 INSC 906, this Court observed
that:-
“28. We are conscious of the law that existence of an
alternative remedy is not an absolute bar on exercise of
writ jurisdiction. More so, when a writ petition has been
entertained, parties have exchanged their pleadings/
affidavits and the matter has remained pending for long.
In such a situation there must be a sincere effort to decide
the matter on merits and not relegate the writ petitioner
to the alternative remedy, unless there are compelling
reasons for doing so. One such compelling reason may
arise where there is a serious dispute between the parties
on a question of fact and materials/evidence(s) available
on record are insufficient/inconclusive to enable the Court
to come to a definite conclusion.
29. Bearing the aforesaid legal principles in mind, we would
have to consider whether, in the facts of the case, the
High Court ought to have dismissed the third writ petition
of the first respondent and relegate him to a suit as there
existed a serious dispute between the parties regarding
taking of possession. More so, when the High Court, in
the earlier round of litigation, refrained from taking up the
said issue even though it had arisen between the parties.
30. No doubt, in a writ proceeding between the State and
a landholder, the Court can, on the basis of materials/
evidence(s) placed on record, determine whether
possession has been taken or not and while doing so, it
may draw adverse inference against the State where the
statutory mode of taking possession has not been followed
[See State of UP vs. Hari Ram (supra)]. However, where
possession is stated to have been taken long ago and there
is undue delay on the part of landholder in approaching the
writ court, infraction of the prescribed procedure for taking
possession would not be a determining factor, inasmuch
as, it could be taken that the person for whose benefit the
procedure existed had waived his right thereunder [See
State of Assam vs. Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma, (supra)]. In such
1700 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
an event, the factum of actual possession would have to be
determined on the basis of materials/evidence(s) available
on record and not merely by finding fault in the procedure
adopted for taking possession from the land holder. And if
the writ court finds it difficult to determine such question,
either for insufficient/ inconclusive materials/evidence(s) on
record or because oral evidence would also be required to
form a definite opinion, it may relegate the writ petitioner
to a suit, if the suit is otherwise maintainable.”
(Emphasis supplied)
53. Thus, it would all depend on the nature of the question of fact. In other
words, what is exactly, that the writ court needs to determine so as
to arrive at the right decision. If the only issue, that revolves around
the entire debate is one relating to actual taking over of the physical
possession of the excess land under the provisions of sub-sections
(5) and (6) of Section 10 of the Act, 1976 respectively, then in such
circumstances, the writ court has no other option but to go into the
factual aspects and take an appropriate decision in that regard. The
issue of possession, by itself, will not become a disputed question
of fact. If all that has been said by the State is to be accepted as
a gospel truth and nothing shown by the landowner is to be looked
into on the ground that a writ court cannot go into disputed questions
of fact, then the same may lead to a serious miscarriage of justice.
54. We are of the considered opinion that the issue as regards taking over
of the actual physical possession of the excess land in accordance
with the provisions of sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 10 of the
Act, 1976 could be said to be a mixed question of law and fact and
not just a question of fact. Mixed question of law and fact refers to
a question which depends on both law and fact for its solution. In
resolving a mixed question of law and fact, a reviewing court must
adjudicate the facts of the case and decide relevant legal issues
at the same time. Mixed questions of law and fact are defined “as
questions in which the historical facts are admitted or established,
the rule of law is resolved and the issue is whether the facts satisfy
the statutory standard, or to put it another way, whether the rule of
law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated”. [Bausch
& Lomb v. United States C.I.T. 166, 169 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1997]
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1701
M/s A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc.
55. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to the decision of this Court
in Kolkata Municipal Corporation and Another v. Bimal Kumar Shah
and Others reported in (2024) 10 SCC 533, wherein this Court in
paras 28 and 29 respectively observed thus:-
“28. While it is true that after the 44th Constitutional
Amendment [the Constitution (44th Amendment) Act,
1978], the right to property drifted from Part III to Part XII
of the Constitution, there continues to be a potent safety
net against arbitrary acquisitions, hasty decision-making
and unfair redressal mechanisms. Despite its spatial
placement, Article 300-A [ 300-A of the Constitution:“300-A.
Persons not to be deprived of property save by authority of
law.—No person shall be deprived of his property save by
authority of law.”] which declares that “no person shall be
deprived of his property save by authority of law” has been
characterised both as a constitutional and also a human
right [Lachhman Dass v. Jagat Ram, (2007) 10 SCC 448;
Vidya Devi v. State of H.P., (2020) 2 SCC 569 : (2020) 1
SCC (Civ) 799] . To assume that constitutional protection
gets constricted to the mandate of a fair compensation
would be a disingenuous reading of the text and, shall we
say, offensive to the egalitarian spirit of the Constitution.
29. The constitutional discourse on compulsory acquisitions,
has hitherto, rooted itself within the “power of eminent
domain”. Even within that articulation, the twin conditions
of the acquisition being for a public purpose and subjecting
the divestiture to the payment of compensation in lieu of
acquisition were mandated [State of Bihar v. Kameshwar
Singh, (1952) 1 SCC 528]. Although not explicitly contained
in Article 300-A, these twin requirements have been read
in and inferred as necessary conditions for compulsory
deprivation to afford protection to the individuals who are
being divested of property [Hindustan Petroleum Corpn.
Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai, (2005) 7 SCC 627; K.T.
Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1 :
(2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 414] . A post-colonial reading of the
Constitution cannot limit itself to these components alone.
The binary reading of the constitutional right to property
1702 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
must give way to more meaningful renditions, where the
larger right to property is seen as comprising intersecting
sub-rights, each with a distinct character but interconnected
to constitute the whole. These sub-rights weave themselves
into each other, and as a consequence, State action or
the legislation that results in the deprivation of private
property must be measured against this constitutional
net as a whole, and not just one or many of its strands.”
(Emphasis supplied)
56. In the overall view of the matter, we are convinced that the Division
Bench of the High Court committed an egregious error in interfering
with a very well considered and well-reasoned judgment rendered
by the learned Single Judge of the High Court. There was no good
reason for the Division Bench to interfere with the judgment rendered
by the learned Single Judge.
57. In the result, both the appeals succeed and are hereby allowed. The
impugned judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the
High Court is hereby set aside and that of the learned Single Judge
is affirmed and restored.
58. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.
Result of the case: Appeals allowed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan
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