Holding

The Supreme Court retained jurisdiction as the forum for objections, and the objections filed on 20 November 1994 were barred by the limitation period, so the award stands.

Summary

The Supreme Court had earlier referred the disputes between M/s Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. and M/s C.K. Ahuja to arbitration by consent, appointing an arbitrator who rendered an award on 14 February 1994. The award was filed before the Court and notice of filing was given on 29 April 1994. The respondents filed applications under Sections 14(2), 17 and 29 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 seeking to have the award made a rule of court and to claim interest, but raised their objections to the award only on 20 November 1994, well beyond the 30‑day limitation period from either the notice or the inspection date. The Court examined whether the Supreme Court remained the appropriate forum for such objections and held that, since it had appointed the arbitrator and gave no further directions, it retained jurisdiction. It further held that the limitation period had expired, so the objections were barred, and there was no merit to interfere with the award. Consequently, the interlocutory applications were dismissed, the award was made a rule of court, and interest at 12% was awarded to the respondents.

Issues considered

What is the appropriate forum for filing objections to an arbitral award when the arbitrator is appointed by the Supreme Court?
From what date does the limitation period for filing objections to the award commence?
Is the award properly filed before the Supreme Court?
Are the objections filed on 20 November 1994 barred by limitation?
Is any interference with the award warranted on merits?

Legislation cited

Arbitration Act, 1940s. 14(2), s. 17, s. 29

Subjects

ArbitrationArbitral awardLimitation periodForum jurisdictionSupreme CourtSection 14(2) Arbitration ActSection 17 Arbitration ActSection 29 Arbitration ActAward filing

Judgment

\

M/S BHARAT COKING COAL LTD. A
v.
M/S C.K. AHUJA AND ANR.

FEBRUARY 14, 1995

[P.B. SAWANT AND G.N. RAY, JJ.] B

Arbitation Act 194(}-Ss. 14(2), 17 and 29-Award-Delay in filing ob-
jection~orum for dealing with award where arbitrator appointed by
Supreme Court-Held, objection as to award, including objection as to forum,
should be dismissed being filed long after period of iimitation, as also on C
merits-Held further, where arbitrator appointed by Supreme Court and no
further directions given, forum for taking further action is Supreme
-.( Court-Limitation.

This Court by order dated Novemeber 12, 1991 referred the disputes
and differences to arbitration by consent of parties. The award of the D
arbitrator made on February 14 1994 was filed before this Court. The
Registry gave notice on April 29, 1994 of filing of the award to counsel for
both parties. The respondents made an application under the Arbitration
Act 1940 that the award· be made rule of the court and interest at the rate
of 24% be awarded to them from the date of filing of the award. When the E
interlocutory applications came up for hearing, the appellant prayed for
fresh notice which was issued without prejudice to the contentions of the
respondents that the period for filing objections were already barred by
limitation. Even thereafter, while inspection of the award was taken on
October 3, 1994, the objections to the award w~re filed on November 20,
1994, i.e. not within 30 days from such inspection. The appellant, besides F
contending that the award was not filed and signed in the proper manner
and that they had not been supplied a copy as is required, further sub-
mitted that the award was not filed in the proper court. Accordingly, it was
urged that there was no question of limitation running from the date of
filing the award~ G
Disposing of the applications, this Court

HELD : 1. Where the arbitrator was appointed by this Court by
consent of parties and no further directions were given in the said order
which would indicate that this Court bad not divested itself of its jurisdic- H
65
)
66 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) 2 S.C.R.

A tion to deal with the award or matters arising out of the award, the forum
for taking further action is this Court. In· the absence of any other court
having been invested with such jurisdiction, the only conclusion that is
possible is that further orders must be passed only by the court that
passed the order, namely, the Supreme Court. [69-G-H]

B State of M.P. v; Mis Saith and Skelton (P) Ltd., [1972) 1 SCC 702,
followed.

Punjab State Electricity Board v. Ludhiana Steels Pvt. Ltd., [1993) 1
sec 205, distinguished.
C Food Corporation of India v. E. Kuttappan, JT (1993) 4 SC 90;
Nilkantha Shidramappa Nindushetti v. Kashinath Somanna Ningashetti,
[1962) 3 SCR 551 and Indian Rayon Corporation Ltd. v. Raunaq and Co.
Pvt. Ltd., [1988) 4 SCC 31, referred to.

2. In any event, even if it is assumed that the award should be filed
D in other court when the notice oniling of the award was given by the
Registry of this Court, objection as to the award including objection as to
· forum ought to have been raised before this Court and it will not be open
to the parties to altogether ignore the notice of filing the award given by
the Registry. Accordingly, such objection should not be permitted to be
E raised at this stage as the objection to the award has been filed long after
the period of limitation. Even on merits, no interference is called for
against the award. [70·C·D]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:. Interlocutory Application
No. 9 to 12 of 1994.
F
IN

Civil Appeal Nos. 3882-85 of 1990.

From the Judgment and Order dated 11.5.89 of the Patna High Court
G in C.R. Nos. 199-202of1989 (R).
G.L. Sanghi and G.S. Chatterjee for the Appellant.

M.C. Bhandare and R.P. Gupta for the Respondents.
,_
.

Ji The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
JJHARATCOKING COAL LTD. \1. C.K. AHUJA [G.N. RAY, J.] 67

G.N. RAY, J. In Civil Appeal Nos. 3882-85 of 1990 and SLP (Civil). A·
Nos. 10832-33 of 1989 this court by order ·dated November 18, 1991,
-
I referred the disputes and differences in the said Civil Appeals and leave
applications to arbitration by consent of parties. The order passed on
November 18, 1991 is to the following effect :-

"The disputes and differences referred to in the aforesaid B
matter are by consent referred to the arbitration of Mr. J.P.
Thakur, Dy. Chief Engineer (Civil) Koylanagar P.O., Koylanagar
District, Dhanbad, Bihar. Both the parties undertake to file a
regular reference agreement before the said arbitrator within two
weeks. Award to be made within four months thereafter." C
The sole arbitrator thereafter entered the reference and parties to
the arbitration appeared before the arbitrator and made submissions. The
-(
arbitrator thereafter made an award on February 14, 1994 and such award
was filed before this Court by the arbitrator. The Registry of this Court
gave notice of filing of the award on April 29, 1994 to the learned counsel D
for both the parties. the respondents namely M/s C.K. Ahuja and another
made an application under Sections 14(2), 17 and 29 of the Indian Arbitra·
tion Act, 1940 on July 11, 1994 before this Court inter alia praying that the
award dated February 14, 1994 delivered by the sole arbitrator, Shri J.P.
Thakur, be made rule of Court and interest @ 24% be also given to the. E
appellants on the awarded sum from the date of the award. It appears that
Civil Appeal Nos. 3882-85 of 1990 were listed on March 22, 1993 for
hearing but in view of the fact that the disputes relating to the appeals had
been referred to arbitration by consent of parties this Court by order dated
March 22, 1993 d~sed the said apeals.
F
The applications under Sections 14(2), 17 and 29 of the Indian
Arbitration Act came up for hearing but on the prayer of Mr. G.S.
Chatterjee, the learned counsel for M/s Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., a direc-
tion was given to issue fresh notice on M/s Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. about
the filing of the award. Such notice, however, was issued without prejudice G
to the contentions of learned counsel for M/s C.K. Ahuja and another that
the period for filing objections was already barred by limitation. The
objections to the award have, however, been filed on November 20, 1994.

The said applications under Sections 14(2), 17 and 29 of the Indian
Arbitration Act have been numbered as I.A. Nos. 9-12 of 1994 in Civil H
)
68 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995) 2 S.C.R.

A Appeal Nos. 3882-85 of 1990. At the hearing of the said applications,
learned counsel appearing for M/s Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. has contendeg _
that as the award was not filed and signed in proper manner, the same
should not be taken into consideration. It was· also contended that the copy
of the award was required to be supplied to the parties and since copy of
B the award was not given to M/s Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., the question of
filing objections did not arise. It was also contended that the said award
was not filed in proper court. Accordingly, there was no question of
limitation running from the date of filing the award. In support of the
contention that there will be no question of limitation if the award is not
filed in proper court reliance is made to a decision of this Court in State
C of Madhya Pradesh v. Mis Saith and Skelton (P) Ltd., (1972] 1 SCC 702. It
may be stated here that the learned counsel for M/s Bharat Coking Coal
Ltd. took inspection of the award on October 3, 1994 but the objection to
the award was not filed within thirty days from such inspection. Disputing
"')..-
the said contentions, Mr. Bhandare, the learned counsel appearing for M.s
D C.K. Ahuja and another, has contended that the reference to arbitration
has been made by this Court on the prayer of the parties. Accordingly, the
arbitration proceedings have originated in this Court Therefore the award -
is required to be filed before this Court. Consequently, the objection if any
to the award is also required to be filed before this Court. He has also
E submitted that at no point of time, any objection was raised by M/s Bharat
Coking Coal Ltd. about the alleged impropriety in filing the award before
this Court even though the notice of the counsel was drawn about filing of
the award in April, 1994. Even in the petition of objection filed before this
Court, no objection has been taken by Mis Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. that
F the award should not have been filed before this Court. Accordingly, such
contention should not be allowed to be raised at the hearing of these
applications. Mr. Bhandare has also contended that when the, award has
been filed in the Court and the attention of the learned counsel of the
parties drawn by the Registry of this Court about the filing of the award,
the period of limitation for filing objection to such award will run from the
G date of the n:otice. Although on the prayer of the learned counsel for the
objector, a fresh notice was issued later on, ~he limitation for filing objec-
tion to the award cannot be counted from the date of such notice isued
subsequently by this Court at the instance of the learned counsel for M/s
Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. In support of this contention Mr. Bhandare has
H referred to a decision of this Court in·Food Corporation of India and others·
BHARAT COKING COAL LTD. v. C.K. AHUJA (G.N. RAY, J.) 69

v. S. Kuttappan, JT (1993) 4 SC 90. In the said decision reference was made A
to an earlier decision of this Court in Nilkantha Bhidramappa Ninoashetti
v. Kashinath Somanna Ninoashetti and others, [1962) 2 SCR 551 and Indian
Rayon Corporation Ltd. v. Raunaq and Company Pvt. Ltd., [1988) 4 SCC
31. It has been held in the decision in Food Corporation of India's case
(supra) that the obligation of filing the award in court is a legal imperative B
on the arbitrator and when the award was filed in Court and the parties
were aware of such filing of the award in Court, the limitation to file
objection would run from the date of filing the award being made known
to the parties, and not from any subsequent date when a notice of filing of
such award was subsequently issued to the parties concerned.
c
Mr. Bhandare has contended that in the instant case the Registry of
this Court specifically drew the attention of the counsel in April. 1994
1 about the filing of the award but despite such knowledge, the appellant,
Mis Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. did not choose to file any objection to the
said award. Even after taking inspection of the award on October 3, 1994, D
the objection has not been filed within a period of thirty days from such
inspection but the objection has been filed only on November 20, 1994.
' Accordingly, the objection to the award should not be considered as the
same is hopelessly barred by limitation.

In our view, the contention raised by Mr. Bhandare is wholly jus- E
tified. The Registry of this Court gave notice to the learned counsel for the
parties about the filing of the award in April, 1994. It is nobody's case that
counsel had an authority to take such notice on behalf of either of the party.
It was also open to the counsel to take inspection of the award. As a matter
of fact, such inspection was also taken on October 3, 1994 but no objection F
was filed within thirty days either from the notice given by the Registry in
April, 1994 or from the date of inspection of the award on October 3, 1994.
.It has been held by this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Mis Saith and
Skelton (P) Ltd., [1972] 1 sec 702 that where the Arbitrator was appointed I

by the Supreme Court by consent of parties and no further directions were
given in the said order which indicate that the Supreme Court had not G
divested itself of its jurisdiction to deal with the award or matters arising
out of award, the forum for talcing further action is the Supreme Court. It
has also been held in the said decision that in the absence of any other
court having been invested with such jurisdiction, the only conclusion that
·is posst"ble is that further orders must be passed only by the Court that H
)
70. SUPREME COURT REPORTS · ·[1995) 2 S.C.R.

A pased the order, namely, the Supreme Court. Mr. Bhandare bas relied on
a later decision of this Court in l'unjab State Electicity Board v. Ludluana
Steels Private Ltd.; [1993) 1 SCC 205 in support of his contention that when
reference to arbitration was made by this Court, the award is to be filed in
this Court only. We may only indicate that the said decision has a distin-
guishing feat':!Ie inasmuch as in that case after making reference to arbitra-
B · . tion, this Court specifically directed that the award would be sent to
Registry of this Court. In any event, even if it is assumed that the award
should be filed in other Court when the notice of filing of the award was
·given by the Registry of this Court, objection as to the award including
objection as to forum ought to have been raised before this Court and it
c. will not be open to the parties to altogether ignore the notice of filing the
· award given by the Registry of this Court. We may also indicate here that
: in the petition of objection it has not been urged that there has been any
impropriety in filing the award in this Court. Accordingly, such objection
1
should not be permitted to be raised at this stage as the objection to tlie
D .award has been filed long after the period of limitation, the same should
,be dismissed. We may also indicate here that even on merit, we do not
think that any interference is called for. against the award. We, therefore,
_·allow the Interlocutory Application Nos. 9 to 12 of 1994 and direct the '·
JilWard to be made rule of Court.· It also appears to us that in the facts of
the case, the applicants Mis C.K. Ahuja and another, are entitled to get an
E award of interest @ 12% from the date of the award till realisation. The
Interlocutory applications are accordingly disposed of. There will be no
order as to cost.

U.R. Petitions disposed of.