Holding

There is no repugnancy between the Mysore Act and the amended central Land Acquisition Act, and the Deputy Commissioner’s empowerment to issue a notification is valid; therefore the acquisition proceedings stand and the High Court’s order is set aside.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined whether the Karnataka (Mysore) Land Acquisition (Extension and Amendment) Act, 1961 was repugnant to the central Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as amended in 1984, and whether a Special Deputy Commissioner could issue a acquisition notification without prior approval of the State Government as required by Section 3(vi) of the central Act. The Court held that empowering the Deputy Commissioner does not create any repugnancy under Article 254 of the Constitution, and that the State Government had duly approved the acquisition after verification by a three‑member committee. Consequently, the acquisition proceedings were valid, the High Court’s order quashing the notification was set aside, and the Single Judge’s dismissal of the writ petitions was restored.

Issues considered

Whether the Land Acquisition (Mysore Extension and Amendment) Act, 1961 is repugnant to the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (as amended) under Article 254 of the Constitution.
Whether initiation of acquisition proceedings by a Special Deputy Commissioner without prior approval of the State Government violates Section 3(vi) and Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
Whether the Karnataka High Court was correct in quashing the acquisition notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 254
Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 3(vi), s. 4, s. 6
Land Acquisition (Mysore Extension and Amendment) Act, 1961s. 4

Subjects

Land acquisitionRepugnancyArticle 254Deputy CommissionerPublic purposeState legislation vs Central legislationAcquisition notificationMysore ActSection 3(vi)Section 4

Judgment

MIS. KANAKA GRUHA NIRMAN SAHAKARA SANGHA. A
v.
SMT. NARA YANAMMA (SINCE DECEASED) BY LRS. AND ORS.

OCTOBER J, 2002
-
....
[M.B. SHAH AND D.M. DHARMADHIKARit JJ~ ) B

Land Acquisition Act, /894/Land Acquisition (Mysore Extension and
Amendment) Act, 19~1-Sections 3(/)(vO, 4 and 61 Section 4-Land acquisition
for public purpose:
c
Initiation of proceedings for acquisition of land under Mysore Act-
Acquisition proceedings challenged on the ground that Mysore Act was'
repugnant to Central Act of/894 as amended in 1984 and proceeding initiated
with lhe approval of Depzity Commissioner instead of State Government-
Single Judge dismissing the writ petition-Division Bench holding that in view D
ofArticle 2.54 proceedings initiated under Mysore Act void, thus quashing the
notification and consequently the proceedings-On appeal held, finding ofthe
High Court illegal and erroneous-By empowering the Deputy Commissioner
with the powers which could be exercised by the appropriate Government, no
question of repugnancy between the provisions of both the Acts would aril'e
since both can co-exist withmtt any conflict-Constitution of India, 1950- E
Article 254.

Land owner challenging notification for acquisition ofland-Single Judge
dismissing the writ petition-Division Bench quashing the notification on the
ground that initiation of action by Deputy Commissioner under Section 4/or
Issuing notification illegal as under the Land Acquisition Act, the appropriate F
. Government is required to be satisfied that the land is needed for public
purpose In terms of section J(/){vV and approval not obtained from State
Government-On appeat held, there is no laps·e in observing the procedure
prescribed under Section 3(/)(vlj-Prior approval by the State Government
under Section 3(/)(vi) was granted after due verification and scrutiny. G
· Notification was Issued under Section 4(1) and Section 6(1) of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 respectively for acquisition of la~ds for
appellants Society. Respondent-land owners challen1ed the notification.
It also contended that the proceedings under the Land Acquisition (Mysore
97
H
I .

I
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2002] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
98
A Extension and Amendment) Act, 1961 was void on the ground that Mysore •'•r
i. ~

I .· ' Act was repugnant to Central Act of 1894 as amended In 1984 and
I'
proceedings were lnltiattd with the approval of Deputy Commissioner
instead of State Government. High Court dJsmtssed the .same. Respondent-
land owners then filed Writ appeals. Division Bench quashed the
notification under Section 4(1) of the Act on the ground that the initiation
B . of action by Deputy Commissioner under Section 4 for issuing notification
is Illegal as under the Land Acquisition Act, the appropriate Government
Is required to be satisfied that the land is needed for public purpose and
that prior approval in terms of Section 3(0(vi) was not obtained from the
State Government. It also held that in view of Article 254 of the
C . Constitution, proceedings initiated under the Mysore Act would be void.
However, writ appeal filed by the Society was dismissed. Hence the present
appeals and Special Leave Petitions. · ·

Appellants contended that the finding given by High Court with
D regard to the non-compliance of Section 3(0(vi) is, on the face of it, illegal. ·
. -
Respondent-land-owners contended that High Court rightly arrived
;.
:~ at the conclusion that State Government conveying its approval Cor
initiating the proceedings for acquisition of the land cannot be termed to
be the satisfaction either in terms of Section J(t)(vi) or sub-section (1) of
E Section 4 of the Act. . . . . .. . ..
II .
Disposing of the matters, the Court

! I .· HELD: 1.1. By empowering the Deputy Commissioner with the
i'. I
I I powers which could be exercised by the appropriate Government, no .
,,~~ F question of repugnancy between Sec:Uon 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, .
1894 and Section 4 of the Land Acquisition (Mysore Extension and
i Amendment) Act, 1961 would arise. (103-GJ

' 1.2. ·u would be difflcult. to hold that the a.mendm~nts made by the.
Mysorc Act' which are sup 1 ·
w' th th P ementary 1n nature, cannot stand together
G. t e amended Land Acquisition Act. It cannot be Jtated that the
amended Land AcquisJtlon A t 15 h . ·
the , . c so ex aushve and unquullfied that only
appropriate Government' has to b t' fi
Notification under Section e sa ts ted before Issuing the
to exercise such powers b Sand it e~cludes empowering of other authority
4
Issuing the Notificatl yD tate legaslatlon. The only di(ference is-before
H decide-whether the ,:~ l eputy Commissioner Is also empowered to .
n 5 needed or. is likely to be needed for public

!I ...
=- .
·~·- ~':'·. , , .;
- ·- - - > -

.
-- •

KANAKA GRUHA NIRMAN SAHAKARA SANGHA v. NARA YANAMMA 99
· purpose. From .this, it cannot be held that there is repugnancy between A·
the Mysore Act and the amended Land Acquisition Act as both can ccr
exist without any conflict. Hence the finding recorded by High Court is,
on the face _of it, illegal and erroneous. (106·E, GJ ·· · ·

't•: M. Karzm~niditi v. Union of India and Anr., f1979J3 SCC431; Deep
i•

Chand v. State of U.P., 11959) Supp. l SCR 8; Megh Raj v. Allah Rakhia, B
AIR (1942) FC 27 and T.S. Balliah v. T.S. Rangachari, 11969) 3 SCR 65,
·referredto. ···· · · ·. · · · · ..; : · :· ' : · . ··.
. . ~ '
· · ·

2.1. The findi~g of High Court that the initiation of action by Special
Deputy Commissioner under Section 4 of the Act for issuing notification
is lllegar"as under the La rid Atquisition Act, the appropriate Government C
is required to be satisfied that the land is needed for public purpose; "a nd.
that respondents have also not placed on · record any document to show
that prior approval in terms of Section 3(f)(vl) was granted by the
Government and State Government conveying its approval for initiating
the proceedings for acquisition or the land cannot be deemed to be D
substitute or the powers required to be exercised under Section 3(f)(vi)
and Section 4(1) of the Ad, is on the face of it, erroneous • .
: : _ . , ; _ 1_ : (101-C·E; 107·GJ
. . . .. . . . ·:
. 2.2. In the instant case the Society requested the State Government
to acquire the land In question with a view to provide sites to the members, E
who were site-less. At the direction of the State Government, Assistant
Registrar of Co-op. Societies verified the requirement of the members of
the Society and recommended to the Revenue Department that the extent
of land In question was required by the Society. The State Government
placed the matter before a Committee of three members for scrutiny and
the Committee approved and cleared the proposal fot the acquisition for F ·
the benefit or the Society~ The State Government conveyed its approval
for Initiating the proceedings for acquisition of the lands for the benefit
of the Society and issued Notlfication under Section 4( 1) of the Att.
Respondent-land-owners made representations and the State Government
over-ruled the objections of the writ petitioners and issued directions for- G
taking further pro~eedings in the matter· which was followed by a
Notification lssued under Section 6 of the Act acq.uirin.g the above
mentioned lands. Thus the acquisition pro~eeding5 have been initiated and
concl~ded In accordan~e ·with law. 11 07-G, H; I 08·A-DI
~ ,: .. ' . . .

A.K. Kayamma v. Stale of Karnataka SLP(C) No. 18l39-S4/96 de~idcd H
100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A on 20.9.1996; Muniyappa v. State ofKarnataka SLP(C) No.l4681/9! decld~
on 4.10.1996; Sumitramma v. State of Karnataka SLP(C) No. 10270196
decided on 4.10.1996 and RM. T House Building Cooperative Society v. Syed
Khader and Ors., (199!.1 2 SCC 611, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 5699 of
B 1998.
From the Judgment and Order dated 11'. 7.1997. of the Karnataka
High Court in W.A. No. 4630 of 1995.
WITH
c . C.A. Nos. 5700·04, 5705, 5706, 5707, 5708, 5709, 6499, 6420·21/98,
1054, 1263, 201/99, 6589/2000, 3603·04, 361312002, 6495/2002 and S.L.P.
(C) Nos. 22506, 22589/2001, 2608·2611 of 2002.
V.A. Mohta, Praveen Yashank Adhyaru and Raju Ramachandran,
M. Sreenivasa, B.K. Choudhary, Santosh Kumar, E.C Vidyasagar, A.S. \
D Bhasme, Sanjay Visen, Manoj K. Mishra, Basava Prabhu S. Patil, Rajesh
Mahale, R.C. Kohli, R.S. Hegde, G.V. Chandrashekhar, P.P. Singh, Ms.
Kiran Suri, Sanjay R. Gegde, Stya Mitra, S. Ravindra. Bhat, Naveen R.
Nath, Mrs. Lalit Mohini Bhat, Shiv Kumar Suri, S.K. Kulkarni, Ms. Gireesh
Kum~r, Ankur S. Kulkarni, Ms. Sangeta Kumar, Vijay Kumar, Kh. Nobin
Singh, P.R. Ramasesh, N. Oanapathy, (NP), Ms. Sushma Suri, (NP) and
E Ms. Manjula Gupta, (NP), for the appearing parties.
··.The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SHAH, J.
~c.A. Nos. 5699, 5705, 6420-21, 5706, 5708 of/998:
F
.::Respondents land owners·challenged the Notification dated 29~~. March,
1986 issued under sub-section ( 1) of Section 4 and the Notification dated
4.5.1987 issued under sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Land Acquisition
Act, ·1894 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') for acquisiti'on of lands for a
G Co-operative Housing Society by filing Writ Petition Nos.7837, 8113 and ~

8958 of 1987 before the High Court of Karnataka. By judgment and order
dated 14.11 .1995, the learned Single Judge dismissed the said writ petitions.
Against the said judgment and order, Writ Appeal Nos. 95 and 4630 of 1995
were preferred by the landowners and Writ Appeal No. 75 of 1995 was filed
by the Kanaka Gruha Nirmana Sahakara Sangha [the Group Housing Society]
H which was impleaded as a party • respondent in writ petitions. The Division
KANAKA GRUHA NIRMAN SAHAKARA SANOHA "· NARA YANAMMA [SHAH, J.} l 01

Bench of the High Court allowed the writ appeal Nos. 9S and 4630 of 1995 A
and quashed the notification under sub-Section ( 1) of Section 4 of the Act
and also all consequential proceedings relating to the acquisition of the land
... 'Subject to the writ petitioners• depositing the amount of compensation received
by them along with interest calculated @ 15% per annum from the date of
payment of amount. Writ Appeal No. 75 of 1995 filed by the Society was B
dismissed.

The Court also held that no writ appeal was filed by the land owners
who had filed Writ Petition no.8958/87 and they have acquiesced in the
action of the State Government and were satisfied with the compensation.
Hence, the judgment would not confer any right upon the said writ petitioners C
to re-open the case or re-agitate the matter by way of appeal or any other
proceedings.

' The Court allowed the writ appeals on the ground • (a) the initiation of
action by the Special Deputy Commissioner under Section 4 of the Act for
issuing notification is illegal as under the Land Acquisition Act, the appropriate D

- Government is required to be satisfied that the land is needed for public
purpose; (b) respondents have also not placed on record any document to
show that prior approval in terms of Section 3(0(vi) was~ granted by the
Government and Annexure R-1 cannot be deemed to be· substitute of the
powers required to be exercised under Section 3(f)(vi) and sub·secti~n (1) of E
Section 4 of the Act. Hence, these appeals.

At this stage, we may note that in Writ Appeal Nos.6804·05/1996, Full
Bench of the Karnataka High Court by judgment and order dated 27th March,
2002 held that the view taken by the Division Bench in case of Naveen
'\ Jayakumar and Kanaka Gruha Nirmana Sahakara Sangha was not a good F
law. The Full Br.nch arrived at the conclusion that initiation of proceedings
by the Deputy Commfssioner cannot be said to be illegal. There was no
inconsistency or repugnancy between the State Act and the Land Acquisition
Act as amended in 1984. For the reasons stated b.elow, we agree with the said
findings.
G
Re: Inconsistency between Mysore Act and Amended Land Acqrdsilion Act.

We would first deal with the contention that the proceedings under the
Land Acquisition (Mysore Extension and Amendment) Act 17 of 1961
(hereinafter referred to as the 'Mysore Act') are illegal, null and void because
by Act 68 of 1984, the Land Acquisition Act 1894 was substantially amended H
. ,. ' SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
102 . l l '. , . . . . I

A and was .made applicable to the whole of India except the State .of Jammu and
· Kashmir. The Mysore Act being repugnant to the Act of Parliament, would
be void. Hence, the proceedings initiated under the said Act by the approval
of the Deputy Commissioner instead of the State Government would also b(,
void.. . ·.
. . . .;

B For dealing with the said contention, we would refer to the relevant
part of the Mysore Act which requires consideration. It inter alia provides
.' thus: , ..
..:'.i ' ·· "·A·~ Act to ~xtend the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Central Act l .o f
'.
t~
I
1894); ·the. whole of the State of Mysore and further to ·amend it in its.
•
'
C · application to the State.
I·
'.
' WHEREAS it is expedient to extend the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 (Central Act J of 1894), to the whole of the State of Mysore
,.
and further to amend it in its application to the State of Mysore;
. '
I D .: :· · Be it enacted by the Mysore State Legislature in the Twelfth
Year of the Republic of India as follows: ·. ·.. · · ·
I,. • ' : •• • • ,. • · · '· .. • }> . • •
I
. . . , · . . .1. Short title, extent and commencement.~ I) This Act may ·be
.. called the Land Acquisition (Mysore Extension and Amendment) Act.
1961. .. .·
E
(2) It extends to the whole of the State of Mysore. · · J •

. ·• : ..(3) It shall come into force at once. . .
.... 2.. .·' ......•.•...•
. :, . .. ·. :. '• 1

I, .. . 1
'\
.' 1
I,
I
F. 3. E:ctension ofCentra/ Act/ of 1894 to the whole of the State .
l. · ·

ofMysore.-The land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Central Act I of 1894)
l
., ~ amended by this Act is hereby extended to and shall be in fore; I
., m the whole of the State of Mysore. · · . · · · .. · ·

4. Substltzttion of the e."tpression ,;D~puty Commissione~" for
G the expression Collector In Central Act 1 of /894.-In tbe' prin~ipal
Act, f~r ~he w,~rd "Collector.. where it occurs, the words "Deputy
Comm issioner shall be substituted.
5. ...... ' ..

6. ...•.•••• .· . . .'
H •t , r
KANAKA GRUBA NIR~AN .SAHA KA~A SANGHA ': NARAYANAMMA (SHAH, J.] (.OJ
. "· ~. -· · C 1 1A 1 of /894-In secuon A
1. Amendment of section 4 of en.tra ~ -· ·- .
' -· 4 of the pri_ncip~l Act, ~ . . ·,. ·
I • • o •

(n' . in sub·section ( 1), ' ' .
. .. ., {a) after th.e words "the ap~~opriate Government'' the words "or the '
Deputy Commissioner" shall be inserted; ._ B
(b) for the words "notification to that effect~', t~e words, ~otification
stating the purpose for which the land is needed, or llkel~ to be
needed and describing the land by _its survey number, If any,
and al;o by its-boundaries and its approximate area'' shall be
substituted: 1 ...
'(c) after the w~rds "the said locality": the follow~ng sentence and
... • explanation shall be added, namely:
"The Deputy Commissioner may also cause a copy of such
notification to be served on the owner, or where the owner is not
the occupier, on the occupier of the land. D
, . · Expla~1a1ion. The expression ,. convenient places' includes. in
the case of land situ ated in a village, the office of the panchayat
within whose jurisdiction the !an~ lies."

By the aforesaid Mysore Act, the Land Acquisition Act was made
applicable to the then State of Mysore with certain amendments. For the said
E.
amendments, assent of the President as contemplated under Article 254 was
obtained. Under the Mysore Act, if it appears to the appropriate Government
or to the Deputy Commissioner that the land is needed for any public purpose,
Notification to that effect could be issued in the official gazette. The rest of
the amendment in Section 4( 1) deals with the publication of the Notification F
and makes additional provision for the method of its publication which we
are not required to deal with in these appeals. The limited question would be
whether the supplementary provision empowering the Deputy Commissioner
to exercise the powers which could be exercised by the appropriate
Government is repugnant? By empowering the Deputy Commissioner with
the p~wers which could be exercised by the appropriate Government, no G
question of repugnancy between Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (law
made by the Parliament) and Section 4 of the Mysore Act would arise. ·

. In our ~ie~, the Division Bench of. the High Court materially erred in
holdmg that m v1ew of Articte 254 of the Constitution, proceedings initiated
H· . l
104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A under the Mysore Act would be void. Question of application of Article 254
of the Constitution would arise only in those cases where there is repugnancy
between th~ State legislation and the law made by the Parliament. This would
be apparent from clause (l) of Article 254 of the Constitution which reads
thus:

B "2!4. Inconsistency between laws made by Parliament and laws
made by the Legislatures of States.-( I) If any provision of a law
~ade by thrt Legislature of a State is repugnant to any provision of
a law made by Parliament which Parliament is competent to enact,
or 'to any provision of an existing law with respec~ to one of the
matters enumerated in the Concurre11t List. then. subject to the
c provisions ofclause(2). the law made by Parliament. whether passed
before or after the law made by the Legislature of such State. or, as
-the case may be, the existing law, shall prevail and the law made by
• th~ Legislature of the State shall, to the extent of the repugnancy. be
void."
D
The language of the aforesaid Article is crystal clear and it inter alia
provides [subject to the provisions of Clause (2)) that
(a) if any provision of law .made by the Legislature of State is
repugnant to any provision of a law made by the Parliament,
E which the Parliament is competent to enact, then the Jaw made·
by the Parliament whether passed before or after the Jaw made
by the Legislature of such State shall prevail and the law made
by Legislature of the State shall, to the extent of repugnancy, be
voi~; or

F (b) if any provision of a law made by the legislature ot' State is
repugnant to any provision of an existing Jaw with respect to one
' · of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List, then the existing
'· law shall prevail and the law made by the legislature of the State
shall, to the extent of repugnancy, be void .
.. t=

0 There cannot be any doubt that the Article gives supremacy to the law
made by the Parliament, which Parliament is competent to enact. But, for
application of this Article, firstly, there must be repugnancy between the
State law and the law made by the Parliament. Secondly, ifthere is repugnancy,
the State legislation would be void only to the extent of repugnancy. If there
Is no repugnancy between the two laws, there is no question of application
H of Article 2S4(1) and both the Acts would prevail. Similar issue was
KANAKA GRUHA NIRMAN SAHAKARA SANGHA~·. NARAYANAMMA [SHAH, 1.] } 05

exhaustively dealt with by the Constitution Bench of this Court in M A
Karunanidhi v. Union of India and Anr.~ [1979] 3 SCC 43 I. In that case,
Madras Legislature, after obtaining the assent of the President of India, made
an Act known as Tamil Nadu Public Men (Criminal Misconduct) Act, 1973
(hereinafter referred to as 'State Act'). That Act was repealed in 1977.
Meantime, against the appellant of that matter, FIR was recorded on June 16, B
1976 for prosecution under Sections 161, 468 and 471 of IPC and Section
5(2) read with Section 5(1 )(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. It \Yas
contended that by virtue of Article 254(2) of the Constitution of India, the
provisions of the Central Act stood repealed and could not revive after the
State Act was repealed. In that context, the Court considered ArticJe 25.4(2)
and held that there must be real repugnancy resulting from an irreconcilable C
inconsistency between the State Act and Central Acts. The Court held thus:
'
"24. It is well-settled that the presumption is always in favour
of the constitutionality of a statute and the onus lies on the person
assailing the Act to prove that it is unconstitutional. Prima facie, there
does not appear to us to be any inconsistency between the State Act D
and the Central Acts. Before any repugnancy can arise, the following
conditions must be satisfied:
l. That there is a clear and direct inconsistency between the Central
Act and the State Act.
2. That such an inconsistency is absolutely irreconcilable.
E
3. . That the inconsistency between the provisions of the two Acts is
of such a nature as to bring the two Acts into direct collision
with each other and a situation is reached where it is impossible
to obey the one without disobeying the other."
F
The Court also referred to the earlier decisions including Deep Chand
v. State ofU.P., [1959] Supp. 2 SCR 8, 43, wherein various tests to ascertain
the question of repugnancy between the two statutes were indicated and inter
alia it was held that repugnancy between two statute~ may be ascertained by
..
; considering- whether Parliament intended to lay down an exhaustive code in G
respect of the subject-matter replaCing the Act of the State L~gislature? The
Court also referred to Megh Raj v. Allah Rakhia, AIR (1942) FC 27, 30
wherein it was observed that the safe rule to follow was that where the
paramount legislation does not purport to be exhaustive or unqualified there
is no inconsistency and it cannot be said that any qualification or restriction
introduced by another law is repugnant to _the provision in the main or H
.\
-
0;
•I
J
• J
0'..
suPREME couRT REPORTS [iooiJ suPP. 3 s.c.R.
106 0 • •

I'
.,
'A ·paramount 1aw.· ·· Th. e c·' 0· u.rt also .referred to T.S
· ·
Bal/iah v. T.S. Rangachari,
.
[l 969J 3 SCR 65~ 68, 69, 72 wherein it was inte.r ali~ o~served that before
coming to .the conclusion that there is a repeal by tmpl~catJon, the ~ourt must
r, . be satisfied that the two enactments are so incons1stent that It becomes
I•.
impossible for them to stand together:', Fina~ly, the .court held thus: . .
' I l, . . . , • •

'·
;. B !' : .. "35. On a careful consideration, therefore, of the authorities referr~d
I,
-~ '
··. . . . ·: to above,' the following prop~~itions emerge:
·. ,. ' ' t·.· That in ord~r to decide the questio~ of repugnancy it must be
'· .
:;, · shown· that the two enactments contain inconsistent and
,;
·- · ·.· . irreconcilable provisions, so that they cannot stand together or
·.r
I
I·
C ..:;~ , ; . operate in the same field. . .
2. That there can be no repeal by implil;ation unless the inconsistency
appears on the face of the two statutes ..
· · _, ·. 3. : Th~~· where two stat~~~s occ~p; .a ~articular field, but there
the
... . ' is room ~r possibility of both the statutes operating in the same
,. .
D ' . · .· field without coming into collision with each other, no repugnancy
• ' .1

results.
4. That where there is no inconsistency but a statute occupying the
.·
. '•
·same field seeks to create distinct and separate offences, no
question of repugnancy arises and both the statutes continue to
I, E · I operate in the same field."
I:. · · Applying the propositions enunciated above, it would be difficult to
hold that the amendments made by the ' Mysore Act' which are supplementary
in nature, cannot stand together with the amended Land Acquisition Act. h
cannot be stated that the amended Land Acquisition Act is so exhaustive and
F unqualified that only the 'appropriate Government' has to be satisfied before
issuing the Notification under Section 4 and it excludes empowering of other
authority to exercise such powers by State Legislation. The only difference
is - before issuing the Notification, the Deputy Commissioner is also
empowered to decide - whether the land is needed or is likely to be needed '
G for public purpose. From this, it cannot be held that there is repugnancy
between the two provisions as both can co-exist without any conflict. Hence,
the finding recorded by the High Court is, on the face of it, illegal and
erroneous. ln the present case, we are not required to deal with other
amendments which are carried out in the Land Acquisition Act. But prima
facie it is apparent that there is no inconsistency between the Mysore Act and
H the amended Land Acquisition Act.

. ~ . . . ..
KANAKA GRtJHA .NIRMAN SAHAKARA.SANGHA "· NARA YANAMMA (SHAH, J.Jl 07

Re: Appro~al ofthe State Goverlmieiz.t as con_templ~ted unde~ Section -~(f)(~!)· A
::,· . · _: ~he, learned counsel for the appell~-nt. next .su~mitted that the finding
given by the High Court with regard to the non-compliance of Section 3(0(vi)
is; on the face of it, iHegal. As against this, the learned counsel for t~e land-
owners submitted that the High Court rightly arrived at the conclusion that B
-A~nexure R-1 cannot be termed to be the satisfaction either · in terms of
Section 3(f)(vi) or sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Act. For appreciating
this contention, we would first refer to Sec.tion 3(t)(vi), which reads thus:
! . . •

. ~3. Defini~ions.-·In this Act, u~less there is something repugnant in
• the subject or context, . • I I • • '

c
·· (f)" · the expression "public purpose' incl~des.
,. I .

(vi) the provision of Jcind for carrying out any educational, housing,
health or slum clearance scheme sponsored by Government, or by .
any authority established by Government for carrying out any such
·, scheme, or, with the prior, approval of the appropriate Government, D
by a locQ/ authority, · or a society registel·ed under the Societies
Registration Act, 1860 (21 of I 860}, or under any corresponding law
· for the time being in force in a State, or a co-operative society within
the meaning of any law relating to co-operative societies for the time
being in force in any Slate. " ·· ·. _ . :• E
On the basis of the aforesaid Section, the High Court observed that the
land in dispute has been intended to be acquired for the Housing Co-operative
Society for which the prior approval of the appropriate Government was
necessary in terms of Section 3(f)(vi) of the Act and such approval is not on
the record. Similarly, before initiation of action by the Collector under Section F
4 of the Act, it is necessary that the land intended to be acquired should
appear to the appropriate Government to be needed for any public purpose
in tenns of Section 3(t)(vi) of the Act.

In our view, aforesaid finding is, on the face ~f it, erroneous. It has
been pointed out by the State Government and also by the Housing Co- G
operative Society that with a view to provide sites to the members, who were
site-less, the Society requested the State Government to acquire the land in
Sy. Nos.l9/2, 26 and 29 of Kadirenhalli village in Bangalore South Taluk. At
the direction of the State Government, the Asstt. Registrar of Co-op. Societies,
Ban~alore-11 Circle verified the requirement of the members of the Soc_iety H
108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A and recommended to the Revenue Department that the extent of land in the
above~said survey numbers was required by the Society. The State Government
placed the above matter before the Committee of three members for scrutiny.
The three-Member Committee approved and cleared the proposal for the
acquisition of the aforesaid survey numbers for the benefit of the Society.
B The State Government conveyed its approval for initiating the proceedings
for acquisition of the aforesaid lands for the benefit of the Society by its
order date,d 14.11.1985 as per Annexure R·l. After issuance of Notification
dated 29th March, 1986 under sub·section ( 1) of Section 4 of the Act, the
land-owners made representations to the Government and the State
Government over-ruled the objections of the writ petitioners and issued
C directions for taking further proceedings in th(!\ matter vide order dated
25.4.1987 which was followed by a Notification dated 4.5.1987 issued under
Section 6 of the Act acquiring the above mentioned lands. The acquisition
proceedings are stated to have been initiated and concluded in accordance
with law.
•·
,._
D For emphasizing that prior approval of the appropriate Government in I

the present case was not just an empty formality, we would refer to Annexure: .J
•
R-1, which is as under:
"Dated: 14.11.85
The Revenue Commissioner and
E Secretary to Government, Bangalore.

The Special Deputy Commissioner,
Ban galore.

F Sir,
Sub: Acquisition of Land in Sy. Nos.19/2, 26, 29 of Kadirenahalli
village and Sy. No.29/3 of Konanakunt village Bangalore South
Taluk in favour of Kanaka Gruhaniramana Sahakara Sangha, r
Bangalore.
G I am directed to convey the approval of Government to initiate
acquisition proceedings by issuing 4{1) notification in respect of lands
measuring 8 acres 03 guntas ·as recommended by the Official
Committee in Sy. Nos.19/2, 26, 29 of Kadirenehalli village and Sy.
No.l9/3 of Kenanakunte village, Bangalore South Taluk in favour of
H :.
~
KANAKA GRUHA NIRMAN SAHAKARA SANGHA''· NARA YANAMMA [SHAH, J.} 109

Kanaka Gruba Nirmana Sahakara Sangha Bangalore. A
Yours faithfully,
Sd/-
(Mandi Hussain)
Under Secretary to Government
Revenue Department. B
Copy to the President, Kanaka Gruha Nirmana Sahakara No.435
Middle School Road, V.V. Puram, Bangalore-4."

Considering the fact that State Government directed the Assistant
Registrar of Co-operative Societies of Ban galore to verify the requirement of
the members of the Society and also the fact that the matter was placed C
before the Committee of three Members for scrutiny and thereafter the State
Government has conveyed its approval for initiating the proceedings for
acquisition of the land in question by letter dated 14.11.1985, it cannot be
said that there is lapse in observing the procedure prescribed under Section
3(f)(vi). Prior approval is granted after due verification and scrutiny. D
The learned counsel for the appellant further pointed out that three-
Member Committee consisted of the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, (II)
Secretary, Bangalore Development Authority, and (lll) Special Deputy
Commissioner, Revenue Department. It is also pointed out that State
Government had constituted State level Co-ordination Committee which E
consisted of (i) the Revenue Commissioner and Secretary to Government (ii)
Secretary, HUD Department (iii) Secretary to Cooperation Department (iv)
Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore District (v) Chairman KIABD, and (vi)
Commissioner, BOA and other special invitees. The recommendations of the
three-Member Committee were considered by the State Level Co-ordination
Committee. The constitution of the two high power committees consisting of F
highly placed officials of the Government only assisted the Government to
re-ensure itself that the land in question and other lands were required for
public purpose. lt has also been pointed out that such approval by the State
.
/
Government is considered to be proper approval by this Court and number
of petitions, namely, A.K. Kayamma v. State ofKarnataka. SLP (C) No.l8239- G
54/96 decided on 20.9.1996 (Annexure-P6), Muniyappa v. State ofKarnataka.
SLP(C) No. 14681/95 decided on 4. I0.1996 (A nnexure-P7), Sumitramma v.
State of Karnataka, SLP(C) No.1 0270/96 decided on 4.10.1996 (Annexure-
P8) etc. etc. are dismissed. In Sumitramma 's case, this Court has distinguished
the decision rendered by this Court in H.M. T. House Building Cooperative
Society v. Syed Khader and Ors., [1995] 2 sec 677, but in our view, R-1 H
11(} SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A reflects ·a specific approval by the State Government as contemplated under
Section 3(f)(vi). Hence, the decision rendered by this Court in H.M.T. House
Building Cooperative Society's case does not require any further discussion.

The High Court allowed the writ appeals on the aforesaid two grounds
and has quashed the land acquisition proceedings. For the reasons stated
B above, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court cannot
be sustained.

In the result, these appeals are allowed and the impugned judgment and
order passe~ by the High Court in Writ Appeals is quashed and set aside. The
C order passed by the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petitions is
restored.

C.A. No.5700-04/98
'
,.
These appeals are filed against the judgment and order dated 15.6.1998
passed in WP Nos.3539-42/96 and C/W No.6603/96. By the impugned order,
.'
D the High Court has set aside the Notification and the award passed in the land
acquisition proceedings. For the reasons recorded above, these appeals are
allowed, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is set
aside.

E C.A. No. 5709, 6499/98 and 201199

These appeals are filed against judgment and order dated 18.6.98 and
17.6.98 in W.P. 16783/91, 25283/90 and 1002 of 1991 respectively. For the
reasons recorded above, these appeals are allowed, the impugned judgment
and order passed by the High Court is set aside.
F
C.A. No.1263199

This appeal is filed against judgment and order dated 17.6.98 in W.P.
No.24792/90. For the reasons recorded above, this appeal is allowed, the
impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is set aside.
G
C.A. No. 6495 of 2002 @ S.L.P. (C) No. 18703198
..
L_eave granted. This appeal is filed against judgment and order dated
18.6.98 in W.P. No.13399/91. In view of the order passed above, this appeal
is allowed, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is
H quashed and set aside.
KANAKA GRUHA NIRMAN SAHAKARA SANGHA v. NARAYANAMMA [SHAH, J.] Ill

CA. No. 1054/99, 3603-0412002, 3613/2002 A
These appeals are filed against the judgment and order dated 5.6.1997,
27.3.2002 and 7.6.2000 passed in WP No. 4241/1995, WA No. 4596/95 and
WA No. 14902/2000 respectively. For the reasons recorded above, these
appeals are dismissed.
B
S.L.P. (C) No. 22589/01

This petition is filed against judgment and order dated 1.8.2001 passed
in WA No. 1462/98. For the reasons recorded above, this petition does not
call for any interference and is dism'issed.
c
S.i.P. (C) No. 2608-11102

The Division Bench of the High Court in WA Nos. 725-28/99 arrived
at the conclusion that the Deputy Commissioner in State of Kamataka had
competence to issue Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition
Act and therefore, set aside the order passed by the learned Single Judge. D
This order is challenged by filing these special leave petitions. In our view,
the order passed by the High Court does not call for any interference. Hence,
the SLP is dismissed.

S.L.P. (C) No. 22506101
E
This petition is filed against judgment and order dated 1.8.200 I passed
in WA No. 6059/98. By the impugned order, the High Court has allowed the
appeal and set aside the order passed by the learned Single Judge. For the
reasons recorded above, this petition does not call for any interference and,
is therefore, dismissed.
F
C.A. No. 658912000:

This appeal is filed against the judgment and order dated 7.6.2002 in
Writ Appeal No. 1490 of 2002. For the reasons recorded above, this appeal
does not call for any interference and, is therefore, dismissed. G
C.A. No. 5707198:

This appeal is filed against the judgment and order dated 28.7.97 of
High Court of Karnataka in Writ Petition No.l7558/89. By the said judgment
and order, the High Court dismissed the writ petition challenging the action H
112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) SUPP. 3 S.C.lt

A taken by the Government in withdrawing from the acquisition proceedings.
The Court dismissed the writ petition solely on the ground that in Writ
Appeal No.4596 of 1995 decided on 22.7.1997, the Division Bench of the
High Court has quashed the acquisition tjf the land and, therefore,
consequential action taken in withdrawing the land from acquisition has no
B significance.

In our view, as the order passed· by the Division Bench passed in Writ
Appeal No.4596/95 quashing the land a~q\ll8ltlbh proceedings is set aside in
Civil Appeal No.5708 of 1998, the writ petition requires to be decided on
merits and, therefore, the matter I~ remitted to the High Court for deciding
C it afresh in accordance with law. Appeal is allowed accordingly.
There shall be no order as to costs in all these cases.

N.J. Appeals/Petitions disposed of.

....