Holding

The notification under Section 4 was valid and the acquisition for planned development of Delhi, as per the zonal plan, constitutes a public purpose, so the appeal is dismissed.

Summary

M/s Meena Devi Jindal Medical Institute & Research Centre challenged a land acquisition made under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, on the ground that the notification merely stated "planned development of Delhi" without specifying the purpose, rendering it vague. The High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that the acquisition was permissible. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the phrase "planned development of Delhi" satisfied the definition of public purpose under Section 3(f)(iii) of the Act and whether the zonal plan, which reserved the land for institutional purposes, validated the notification. Relying on the inclusive definition of public purpose and on precedents such as Ajlatoon and Munshi Singh, the Court held that the notification was not vague and the acquisition was for a legitimate public purpose. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the acquisition upheld.

Issues considered

The validity of a Section 4 notification that mentions only "planned development of Delhi" without specifying the exact purpose.
Whether acquisition for institutional purposes under a zonal plan qualifies as a public purpose under Section 3(f) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
Whether the authority issuing the notification (Chief Commissioner of Delhi) had the requisite power under the Delhi Development Act, 1957.
The effect of acquiescence and lapse of time on the petitioners' right to challenge the acquisition.

Legislation cited

Delhi Development Act, 1957
Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 3(f), s. 4, s. 5, s. 6
Societies Registration Act, 1860

Subjects

land acquisitionpublic purposeSection 4 notificationplanned developmentDelhi Development Actvaguenesszonal planinstitutional purpose

Judgment

[2017] 5 S.C.R. 379

M/S. MEENA DEVI JINDAL MEDICAL INSTITUTE A
& RESEARCH CENTRE
v.
LT. GOVERNOR, DELHI & ORS.
(Civi!AppealNo: 1431 of2008) B
MARCH 29, 2017
[ARUN MISHRA AND S. ABDUL NAZEER, JJ.)
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - ss. 4 and 6 - Notifications under
- Challenge to - Appellant challenged notification uls. 4 contending C
that the purpose of acquisition in the notification was vague stating
to be planned development nf Delhi but not specifying for what
specific purpose of planned development of Delhi - High Court
dismissed the writ petition - On appeal, held: Section 3(/) of the Act
defines public purpose for which acquisition can be made under D
the Act - The definition of public purpose is inclusive of s.3f (iii)
which states that acquisition for planned development of land in
pursuance of any scheme or policy would befor public purpose -
The scheme contained in the zonal plan for Delhi indicated the
planned development of Delhi wherein the area was reserved for
institutional purposes - Thus, once planned development of Delhi E
was specified that had to be read with the zonal plan applicable in
the area in question - Thus, it could not be said thqt the notification
was vague or suffered with any legal vice - The acquisition was for
public purpose as the planned development of Delhi is by itself"a.
public purpose - Notification issued was as per zonal plan which
F
was binding upon all concerned and could not be departed - Delhi
Development Act, 1957.
Words and phrases - "Institution" - Meaning of. in context
of Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
Munshi Singh & Ors. v. Union of India [1973) 1 SeR G
973 : (1973) 2 sec 337 - distinguished.
Ajlatoon & Ors. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi & Ors. [1975)
1 SCR 802 : (1975) 4 SCC 285; Nand Kishore Gupta
& Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors. [2010) 11 SCR 356 :
(2010) 10 Sec 282 - relied on. H
379
380 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 5 S.C.R.

A Union of India & Ors. v. Krishan Lal Arne/a & Ors.
[2004] 1 Suppl. SCR 801 : (2004) 8 sec 453;
Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombar v. Industrial
Development Investment Co. P] Ltd. (1996] 5 Suppl.
SCR 551 : (1996) 11 SCC 501; Bhagat Singh v. State
of UP & Ors. (1998] 3 Suppl. SCR 404 : (1999) 2 SCC
B
384 - referred to.
Case Law Reference
[2004] 1 Suppl. SCR 801 referred to Para6
[1996] 5 Suppl. SCR 551 referred to Para 6
c
[1998] 3 Suppl. SCR 404 referred to Para8
[1975] 1 SCR 802 relied on Para 10
[1973] 1 SCR 973 distinguished Para 12
[2010] 11 SCR 356 relied on Para 13
D
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1431
of2008.
From the Judgment and Order dated 03 .03.2005 of the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi in Writ Petition (C) No.1479of1982.
E Parag P. Tripathi, Sr. Adv., Ramesh Singh, A. T. Patra, Ms. Bina
Gupta, Ad vs. for the Appellant.
Ms. Rachana Srivastava, Nitya Madhusoodhnan, Vishnu B.
Saharya, Yiresh B. Saharya, M/s. Saharya & Co., Mukesh Kumar
Sharma, Ad vs. for the Respondents.
F
The following Order of the Court was delivered:
ORDER
J. The appeal has been preferred by the Mis. Meena Devi Jindal
Medical Institute and Research Centre questioning the judgment and
G order passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi on March 03,
2005 in W.P. (C) No. 1479 of 1982 repelling the challenge to the land
acquisition proceedings initiated under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 (in short 'the Act') as per the Notification issued on 19.3 .1981.
Enquiry under Section SA of the Act was held. The objections preferred

H
MIS. MEENA DEVI JINDAL MEDICAL INSTITUTE & 381
RESEARCH CENTRE v. LT. GOVERNOR, DELHI & ORS.

by the appellant were duly considered and rejected. Thereafter A
declaration under Section 6 of the Act was issued on 21" September,
1981. Appellant/Petitioner filed writ petition before the High Court of
Delhi questioning the land acquisition proceedings in the year I 982.
2. The facts unfold that one Smt. Kanso Devi (since deceased)
was owner of the property. She had entered into an agreement dated B
21.04.1979 with Rank Television Pvt. Ltd. for construction of group
housing society. Appellant No.1 herein claims to be registered society
under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and it was formed with the
object to establish and maintain hospitals for philanthropic purpose and it
entered into a lease agreement with owner Kan so Devi on 3. 1. I 98 L,
The lease agreement has been concurred by Rank Television Pvt. Ltd.. , C
as confirming party. It was tri-partite agreement. Later on 17 .2.198 I the
appellant No.1 herein entered into an agreement to sell with respect to
said property with Kanso Devi. It was confirmed by Mis Rank Television
Pvt. Ltd. Power of Attorney has been obtained by the appellant No. I
from Kanso Devi and the appellant had been placed in possession ofthe D
property.
3. Kan so Devi purportedly executed a wi II in favour of the appellant
No. l on 4.4.1982. She ultimately died on 27.11.1989 during the pendency
of the writ petition. It is submitted that property had been mutated in the
name of the appellant No. l- charitable institution. The acquisition had E
been questioned in the High Court on the ground that in the Notification
issued under Section 4 of the Act, purpose was shown to be planned
development of Delhi. Only 10,000 Sq. Yard land comprised in Khasra
No. 394 (plot no.20), Alipur Road, Delhi was proposed to be acquired.
It was not specified in the Notification for what specific purpose of
planned development of Delhi, Notification had been issued. Thus the F
objection raised by the Appellant No. I herein, in the course of enquiry,
held under Section SA of the Act, had been illegally rejected. The
acquisition for the purpose of School was not mentioned in the Notification
issued under Section 4 of the Act as such the Notification was vague
and no useful purpose would be served by acquisition of a small plot of G
land.
4. It was not disputed that in the zonal plan prepared for
development of Delhi, the area in question had been shown as reserved
for the institutional purposes.
H
382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] S S.C.R.

A S. The writ application was resisted on behalf of the respondents
on the ground that acquisition had been made in accordance with law
for the planned development ofDelhi. Ultimately it was for the purpose
of the school the acquisition had been made and it would be open after
acquisition to change the purpose related to the planned development of
Delhi as such there was no illegality in the acquisition of the land and no
B
malafide has been attributed.
6. The High Court by the impugned order has dismissed the writ
application on various grounds; firstly that acquisition is permissible for
planned development of the city. Apart from that, it has been found that
in that zonal development plan of Delhi the area in question had been
c shown for the institutional purposes th us, it was open to acquire the area
in accordance therewith forthe purpose of planned development of Delhi.
The petitioner No. l, at the relevant point of time, was having only
agreement to sell in its favour. The enqui1y was properly held under
Section SA of the Act. Thus the writ petition has been ultimately
D dismissed holding that running of educational institution by the
Government for the benefit of public at large can hardly be equated to
running of the charitable hospital. Thus acquisition cannot be said to be
suffering with any illegality. Thus the same has been upheld. Aggrieved
thereby the appeal has been preferred.

E 7. It was submitted by the learned senior counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellants that there was .no public purpose behind the
acquisition. The mention that it was for planned development of Delhi
was absolutely vague, mention of public purpose, if any. The enqui1y
under Section SA of the Act was not properly conducted. The objection
raised by the appellant had been illegally rejected. Reliance has been
F placed on the decisions with respect to the vagueness on Munshi Singh
& Ors. vs. Union of!ndia [( 1973)2 SCC 337] and with respect to the
entitlement of tenants to question the acquisition, reliance has been placed
on the decision of this court in Union of/ndiu & Ors. vs. Krishun Lal
Arneja & Ors. [(2004)8 SCC 4S3] in which reliance was placed upon
G the decision in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay vs.
Industrial Development Investment Co. (P) Ltd. [(1996) 11 SCC
501} in which it has been held that it cannot be said that in no case of
the land acquisition under the provisions of the Act tenant cannot challenge
the proceedings.

H 8. On the other hand learned counsel on behalf of the respondents
MIS. MEENA DEVI JINDAL MEDICAL lNSTrTUTE & 383
RESEARCH CENTRE v. LT. GOVERNOR, DELHI & ORS.

has submitted that land as has been acquired in accordance with zonal A
plan for "planned development of Delhi" for institutional purposes land
could be acquired by specifying that it is being acquired for planned
development ofDelhi. Learned counsel has relied upon the decision of
the Constitution Bench of this Court in Af/atoon & Ors. vs. Lt. Governor
o(Delhi & Ors. [(1975) 4 SCC 285]. She has also referred to the
B
decision of this Court in Bhagat Singh vs. State of UP & Ors. [(I 999)
(2) sec 384] to submit that once the land has been acquired for planned
development its purpose can be changed at any point of time for
appropriately for planned development of the city.
9. Section J(f) of the Act defines public purpose for which
acquisition can be made under the Act. The definition of public purpose
c
is inclusive of Section 3f(iii) contains the provisions regarding acquisition
for planned development of land from public fund in pursuance of any
scheme or policy would be for public purpose. Section 3(f) of the Act is
extracted hereunder:
"3(f) The expression "public purpose" includes -(i) the provision D
of village-sites, or the extension, planned development or
improvement of existing village-sites;(ii) the provision ofland for
town or rural planning;(iii) the provision of land for. planned
development of land from public funds in pursuance of any scheme
or policy of Government and subsequent disposal thereof in whole E
or in part by lease, assignment or outright sale with the object of
securing further development as planned;( iv) the provision ofland
for a corporation owned or controlled by the State;(v) the provision
ofland for residential purposes to the poor or landless or to persons
residing in areas affected by natural calamities, or to persons
displaced or affected by reason of the implementation of any F
scheme undertaken by Goverriment, any local authority or a
corporation owned or controlled by the State;( vi) the provision of
land for carrying out any educational, housing, health or slum
../· clearance scheme sponsored by Government, or by any authority
es ta bl ished by Government for carrying out any such scheme, or, G
with the prior approval of the appropriate Government, by a local
authority, or a society registered under the Societies Registration
Act, 1860 (21 of 1860), or under any corresponding law for the
time being in force in a State, or a co-operative society within the
meaning of any law relating to co-operative societies for the time
H
384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 5 S.C.R.

A being in force in any State;( vii) the provision of land for any other
scheme of development sponsored by Government or, with the
prior approval of the appropriate Government, by a local
authority;( viii) the provision ofany premises or building for locating
a public office,
B but does not include acquisition ofland for companies."
10. The scheme contained in the zonal plan for Delhi city indicated
the planned development of Delhi and the area was reserved for
institutional purposes. The word "institution" includes educational institute
as defined in Oxford Dictionary is to the following effect:
c "a large organization founded for a particular purpose, such as a
college, bank, etc.- an organization providing residential care for
people with special needs. - an official organization with an
important role in a country. 2. an established law or custom. -a
well established and familiar person or thing; he became a national
D institution. 3. the action of instituting."
11. It is apparent that there can be acquisition for planned
development as per zonal plan prepared under Delhi Development Act,
1957 (in short 'the Act') for institutional area, it was not necessary to
mention particular purpose, once planned development of Delhi has been
E specified that to be read with the zonal plan applicable in the area in
question. Thus, it Could not be said that the Notification suffered with
any legal vice. The constitution Bench of this court in the case ofAflatoon
(supra) has considered the question where the Notification was issued ·
under section 4 of the act with respect to planned development of Delhi
though no doubt it was with respect to larger area, but area would not
F make a difference, ultimately this court has upheld similar Notification
under Section 4, while discussing the matter, this Court held as under:
"23.The planned development of Delhi had been decided upon by
the Government before 1959, viz., even before the Delhi
Development Act came into force. It is true that there could be
G no planned development of Delhi except in accordance with the
provisions of Delhi Development Act after that Act came into
force but there was no inhibition in acquiring land for planned
development of Delhi under the Act before the Master Plan was
ready. [see the decision in Patna Improvement Trust v. Smt.
Lakshmi Devi).
H
MIS. MEENA DEVI JINDAL MEDICAL INSTITUTE & 385
RESEARCH CENTRE v. LT. GOVERNOR, DELHI & ORS.

In other words, the fact that actual development is permissible A
in an area other than a development area with the approval or
sanction of the local authority did not preclude the Central
Government from acquiring the land for planned development under
the Acts. Section 12 is concerned only with the planned
development. It has nothing to do with acquisition of property;
B
acquisition generally precedes development. For planned
development in an area other than a development area, it is only
necessary to obtain the sanction or approval of the local authority
as provided in section 12(3). The Central Government could
acquire any property under the Act and develop it after obtaining
the approval of the local authority. We do not think it necessary to c
go into the question whether the power to acquire the land under
Section 15 was delegated by the Central Government to the Chief
Commissioner of Delhi. We have already held the appellants and
the writ petitioners cannot be allowed to challenge the validity of
the notification under section 4 on the ground of !aches and
acquiescence. The plea that the Chief Commissioner of Delhi
D
had no authority to initiate the proceeding for acquisition by issuing
the notification under section 4 of the Act as section 15 of the
Delhi Development Act gives that power only to the Central
Government relates primarily to the validity of the notification.
Even assuming that the Chief Commissioner of Delhi was not E
authorized by the central Government to issue the notification under
Section 4 ofthe land acquisition Act, since the appellants and the
writ petitioners are precluded by their !aches and acquiescence
from questioning the notification, the contention must, in any event,
be negatived and we do so."
F
12. The reliance has been placed by learned counsel appearing
on behalf of the appellant on Munshi Singh s case (supra) which
reads as follows:
'"8. As already noticed, in the notifications under section 4 all that
was stated was that the land was required for '"planned G
development of the area". There was no indication whatsoever
whether the development was to be of residential and building
cites or of commercial and industrial plots nor was it possible for
any one interested in the land sought to be acquired to find out
what kind of planned development was under contemplation i.e.
H
386 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 5 S.C.R.

A whether the land would be acquired and the development made
by the government or whether the owners of properties would
be required to develop a particular area in a specified way.
If the master plan which came to be sanctioned on September
4, 1962 had been available for inspection by the persons interested
in filing objections or even ifthe knowledge of its existence on
B
the part of the appellants had been satisfactorily proved the position
may have been different. In that situation the appellants could not
claim that they were unable to tile objections owing to the lack of
any indication in the notification under section 4 of the nature of
development for which the area was being requisitioned. On behalf
c of the state it has been pointed out that the appel Iants had
themselves tiled a copy of the master plan which was sanctioned
on September 4, 1962 and that it was a matter of common
knowledge that the master plan was under preparation. The details
relating tothe master plan and the plan itself had been published in
the local newspapers and the appellants could have easily
D
discovered what the proposed scheme was with regard to the
development of the area in which they were interested. In view
of the peculiar circumstances of these cases we gave an
opportunity to the state to apply for amendment of its return since
nothing had been said about these matters therein and to produce
E additional evidence in support of its allegations. Such a petition
was tiled and certain documents were sought to be placed on the
record. after a careful consideration of the petition for amendment
and the evidence sought to be adduced we dismissed the prayer
for amendment as we! I as for production of additional evidence
as we were not satisfied that the documents sought to be produced
F
were either relevant or were required to enable this court to
,,- ·- pronounce judgment."
13. It is apparent from the aforesaid discussion made in Munshi
Singh 's case (supra) that there was no master plan/zonal plan in
vogue in the area. Thus when there was no plan for the area, in that
G context, this court has observed that mention in the Notification issued
under Section 4 of the act that it was acquisition for the purpose of
planned development of the area was vague as such purpose should
have been mentioned. In the Munshi Singh s case (supra) the facts
were totally different and the decision in Munshi Singh s case (supra)
H
M/S. MEENA DEVI JINDAL MEDICAL INSTITUTE & 387
RESEARCH CENTRE v. LT. GOVERNOR, DELHI & ORS.

had been taken consideration in the latter decision of Constitution Bench A
s
in Atlatoon case (supra) and the similar submission raised with respect
to the vagueness of the Notification issued under Section 4 of the Act
was not accepted.
14. This court in Nand Kishore Gupta & Ors. vs. State of U.P.
& Ors. [(20 I 0) 10 SCC 282] has also considered the concept of public B
purpose under Section 3(f) of the Act and it has been discussed that a
purpose complementary to public purpose is also a public purpose. When
the land had been acquired for construction of Yamuna Expressway
which itself was of public importance the acquisition of the land for
Yamuna Expressway for development of the same for commercial,
amusement, industrial, institutional and residential purposes was held to
c
be complementary to the creation of expressway hence amounted to
acquisition for public purpose. The planned development of Delhi is by
itself a public purpose. The submission raised by the appellant is thus
liable to be rejected.
15. In view of the decision on merits, we need not go into the D
question as to whether the petition was maintainable at the instance of
the petitioners on the strength of the lease deed. The fact remains that
owner has not chosen at any point of time to question it.
16. The acquisition is for public purpose. In our opinion, there
was no vagueness in the Notification. It could not be said that particular E
property has been plucked out as there is no allegation of any malafide
attributed in the matter of acquisition. it was as per zonal plan which is
binding upon all concerned and could not be departed to having been
issued under the provisions of the Delhi Development Act, 1957.
17. Thus we find no force in the appeal. The same is liable to be F
and is hereby dismissed. No costs.

Divya Pandey Appeal dismissed.