Holding

The Delhi High Court application under section 33 in 1998 is deemed the first application under the Arbitration Act, 1940, thereby granting Delhi High Court exclusive jurisdiction over all subsequent arbitration applications, including the section 14(2) application.

Summary

The parties entered into a manufacturing agreement that contained an arbitration clause specifying Delhi as the venue and jurisdiction. The respondent sued the appellant in the Munsif Court, Gaya, and the appellant sought a stay of the suit under section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. Subsequent applications were filed in various courts, including a section 33 application in the Delhi High Court in 1998 seeking clarification on the applicable arbitration law. The Supreme Court examined whether the section 14(2) application to enforce the award could be filed only in Delhi High Court under section 31(4) of the 1940 Act. It held that the Delhi High Court application was the first proper application under the Act, making Delhi High Court the exclusive forum for all later arbitration applications, and set aside the orders of the Patna High Court and the Sub‑Judge, Gaya. The appeal was allowed and the respondent was directed to re‑file the section 14(2) application in Delhi High Court.

Issues considered

Whether the section 14(2) application to enforce the arbitral award could be filed only in the Delhi High Court under s.31(4) of the Arbitration Act, 1940.
Whether the application under s.34 of the 1940 Act filed in Gaya constitutes the first application in the arbitration reference.
Whether the Patna High Court order appointing arbitrators is an application under s.8 of the 1940 Act.
Whether the Delhi High Court application under s.33 in 1998 is the first application under the Act.

Legislation cited

Arbitration Act, 1940s. 14(2), s. 20, s. 30, s. 31(4), s. 33, s. 34, s. 8
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996s. 27, s. 43
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 115

Subjects

arbitrationjurisdictionsection 31(4)venue clauseexclusive jurisdictionaward enforcementstay of suit

Judgment

[2011] 9 S.C.R. 801

JI. M/S. MILKFOOD PVT. LTD. A
v.
M/S. GMC ICE CREAM (P) LTD.
(Civil Appeal No.6316 of 2011)
AUGUST 4, 2011
..I, B
1 [R.V. RAVEENDRAN AND A.K. PATNAIK, JJ.]

ARBITRATION ACT, 1940:
-:;
s.31 (4) - Territorial jurisdiction - Arbitration clause c
stipulating that venue of arbitr~tion would be Delhi and the
'•
~ contract subject to Delhi jurisdiction - Suit filed in Gaya - In
revision before Patna High Court against order on appellants'
-.. application uls 34 for stay of suit, arbitral tribunal appointed
which gave its award - Application u/s 14(2) filed in Gaya court D
to make the award the rule of the court - Patna High Court
" upholding the order of the Gaya court that it had jurisdiction
- HELD: Application u/s 33 filed by appellant in Delhi High
Court praying for a clarification as to whether arbitration
proceedings would be governed by the 1940 Act or the 1996
E
Act will have to be treated as the first application in terms
under the 1940 Act in the reference and all subsequent
applications will have to be made in Delhi High Court, which
alone will have jurisdiction in the matter and not th~ Gaya
I " court - Order appointing arbitrators by Patna High Court was
not in an application under the Act, but in a revision u/s 115 F
CPC arising out of an order in an application uls 34 to stay
the proceedings in a civil suit - Therefore, it cannot be said
that the first application in a reference was made before Patna
High Coult - Orders of Patna High Court and of Sub-Judge,
Gaya, set aside - Respondent shall obtain return of G
... application uls 14(2) from Gaya court and file it before Delhi
" High Court.

Under an agreement, the respondent was to
801 H

..... "--..
802 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [20111 9 S.C.R.

A manufacture and pack appellant's product (ice cream). JI

The agreement contained an arbitration clause stipulating
that the venue of arbitration would be Delhi and the
contract was subject to Delhi jurisdiction. The respondent
filed a suit in the Court of Munsif, Ga ya (Bihar) for
B injunction to restrain the appellant from interfering with .
the manufacture and supply of ice cream by it. The
appellant's application u/s 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940
(the Act) filed on 19.6.1995 for stay of the proceedings in
the suit stating that the contract between the parties
c provided for arbitration was allowed. The revision filed by
the respondent was disposed of by the High Court by its
order dated 6.5.1997, as the parties had appointed their
arbitrators and the matter stood referred to the arbitral
tribunal, which gave the award on 17.8.2004. The
0 respondent filed a suit u/s 14 (2) of the Act in the Court
of Sub.Judge, Gaya on 28.8.2004 praying that the award
be made a rule of the Court. The appellant contended
that only the Delhi High Court had the jurisdiction to
entertain the application and not the court at Gaya. The
E appellant also challenged the award by filing a petition
u/ss 30 and 33 of the Act on 16.10.2004 before the Delhi
High Court, which held that it was for the Gaya court to
decide the issue of jurisdiction. The Court of Sub.Judge,
Gaya held that it had jurisdiction to decide the application )

u/s 14 (2) of the Act. The said order was upheld by the •
F Patna High Court.
In the instant appeal, the question for consideration
before the Court was: whether the proceedings u/s 14 (2)
of the Act could have been initiated only in the Delhi High
G Court and not before the Court of Sub-Judge, Gaya,
having regard to s. 31 (4) of the Act.
•
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1Sub-s. (4) of s. 31 of the Arbitration Act,
H 1940 provides that where any application under the Act,

I -
MILKFOOD PVT. LTD. v. GMC ICE CREAM (P) LTD. 803
Ii

in any reference, had been made in a court competent to A
entertain it, then notwithstanding anything contained in
the Act (or in any other law for the time being in force),
that court alon~ shall have jurisdiction over the
,
_.._
arbitration proceedings and all subsequent applications
arising out of that reference and therefore all arbitration 8
proceedings shall be made in that court alone and not in
any other court. [para 9) [809-B-C]

1.2 The application u/s 34 of the Act filed by the
appellant on 19.6.1995 cannot be considered to be the
•. first application to a court in the reference to arbitration . c
•
[para 11) [810-E-F]
" Kumbha Mawji vs. Union of India 1953 SCR 878 ; UOI
... vs Surjeet Singh Atwa/ 1970 (1) SCR 351 =1969(2) SCC 211
- relied on. D
1.3 The order dated 6.4.1997 appointing the
arbitrators made by Patna High Court, was not in an
application under the Act, but in a revision petition u/s 115
of the Code. Further the said revision did not arise out E
of arbitration proceedings, but against the order in an
1 application u/s 34 of the Act to stay the proceedings in a
) civil suit. Therefore, it cannot be held that the first
application under the Act in a reference was made before
the Patna High Court. The order dated 6.5.1997 of the F
Patna High Court can also not be considered to be an
order u/s 8 of the Act, as neither an application was filed
u/s 8 of the Act nor the conditions for making an
application thereunder existed in the instant case.
--. Consequently, the question of making all subsequent
,, ~ applications arising out of the reference under the Act, G
to that court does not arise. [para 11·13] [810-G-H; 811-
A-B-H; 812-A-B-F]
1.4 The appellant filed an application (OMP No.94/
1998) in the Delhi High Court u/s 33 of the Act in April 1998 H
804 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R.

6- praying for a clarification as to whether the arbitration
•
proceedings between the parties would be governed by
the provisions of Arbitration Act, 1940 or by the
provisions of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
Thereafter the respondent made an application (OMP
B No.217/2000) to Delhi High Court for summoning and
examining one 'OP' as a witness in respect of the pending
arbitration, to produce certain documents. Therefore, the
application (OMP No.94/1998) made by the appellant u/s
33 of the Act will have to be treated as the first application
c under the Act in the reference and all subsequent
applications will have to be made in the High Court of
Delhi. Consequently, Delhi High Court alone will have
jurisdiction to entertain any subsequent applications and,
therefore, the court at Gaya will not have jurisdiction. It
. is also relevant to note that the arbitration clause
0
provides that the venue of arbitration shall be Delhi and
Delhi courts will have jurisdiction. The impugned order
· of the Patna High Court as also the order of Sub-Judge,
Gaya are set aide and it is held that all applications
E should be filed in Delhi High Court. [para 14-16) [812-G-
H; 813-G-H; 814-A-B]
Milkfood Ltd. Vs. GMC Ice Cream (P) Ltd. 2004 (3)
SCR 854 =2004 (7) SCC 288 - referred to.
1.5 The respondent shall, therefore, obtain return of
F the application u/s 14(2) of the Act from the Gaya court
and file it before Delhi High Court. [para 17) [814-C]
Case Law Reference:
1953 SCR 878 relied on para 11
G
1970 (1) SCR 351 relied on para 11
2004 (3) SCR 854 referred to para 15
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
H 6316 of 2011.
MILKFOOD PVT. LTD. v. GMC ICE CREAM (P) LTD. 805

From the Judgment & Order dated 25.04.2008 of the High A
Court of Patna in C.R. No. 690 of 2006.

Jayant Bhushan, Ramji Srinivasan, Kamal Budhiraja,
Sidharth Bawa, Simar Narula, Aman Gupta (for Dua
Associates) for the Appellant.
B
Soli J. Sorabjee, Neeraj Shekhar, Ashutosh Thakur,
Priyaranjan Roi for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

R.V. RAVEENDRAN,J. 1. Leave granted. c
2. Under an agreement dated 7.4.1992, respondent
agreed to manufacture and pack appellant's product (ice
cream) as per the specifications and standards of the appellant.
Clause 20 of the said agreement provided for settlement of
disputes by arbitration. The said clause provided that the venue D
of arbitration should be Delhi and contract was subject to Delhi
jurisdiction.
3. Respondent filed a suit (T.S.No.40/1995) in the court of
learned Munsif, Gaya (Bihar) for an injunction to restrain the E
appellant from interfering with the manufacture and supply of
ice cream by the respondent. On being served with the notice
of the said suit, the appellant filed an application under section
) 34 of Arbitration Act, 1940 ('Act' for short) for stay of
proceedings in the suit on the ground that the contract between F
the parties provided for arbitration. The learned Munsif by order
dated 3.8.1995 allowed the appellant's application under
section 34 of the Act and stayed further proceedings in the suit.
4. The respondent filed a revision under section 115 of the
Code of Civil Procedure ('Code' for short) before the Patna G
High Court against the order dated 3.8.1995. The High Court
disposed of the said revision petition by the following order
dated 6.5.1997 :
"Before this court parties have agreed that the dispute H
806 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R.

A between them may be referred, as per the agreement to
Arbitrators chosen by the parties. The plaintiff has chosen
Shri Uday Sinha a retired judge of this court and Senior
Advocate of the Supreme Court, while the defendants have
chosen Shri Hari Lal Agrawal, Senior Advocate of the
J.
B Supreme Court, a former judge of this court and Chief
Justice of Orissa High Court as Arbitrators. The dispute
between the parties is referred to arbitrator.

I hope that the learned Arbitrators will dispose of the
arbitration proceedings within three months of the entering
c the reference.

Let a copy of this order be sent to both Shri Hari Lal
Agarwal at his address Nageshwar Colony, Boring Road, +
Patna-1 and Shri Uday Sinha at his Patna address 308
....
D Patliputra Colony, Patna.
Parties are directed to appear before the Arbitrators within
a month from today.
Let all necessary documents be filed before the Arbitrators
E within four weeks thereafter.

This application is disposed of."

It may be mentioned that long before the disposal of the
F revision petition, by notice dated 14.9.1995 the appellant had
appointed its arbitrator and called upon the respondent to
concur in that appointment or alternatively nominate its
arbitrator. When respondent also appointed its arbitrator, the
two arbitrators appointed an umpire. The arbitral tribunal made
G an award dated 17.8.2004 in favour of the respondent.
5. The respondent filed a suit under section 14 (2) of the
Act in the court of Sub-Judge, Gaya on 28.8.2004 praying that
the award be made a rule of the court. The appellant entered
appearance on 28.10. 2004 and made an application under
H Order 7 Rule 10 of the Code read with section 31(4) of the Act
MILKFOOD PVT. LTD. v. GMC ICE CREAM (P) LTD. 807
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
• contending that only the Delhi High Court had jurisdiction to A
entertain the application and Gaya court did not have
jurisdiction.

13. The appellant also challenged the award by filing a
,.._
petition under sections 30 and 33 of the Act before Delhi High
Court on 16.10.2004. On 25.10.2005 the appellant's petition
B
under sections 30 and 33 of the Act was disposed of by Delhi
High Court on the ground that the award had been filed before
the learned Sub-Judge, Gaya, prior to filing of the petition by
the appellant under sections 30 & 33 of the Act and since the
matter was pending in the Gaya court and the appellant had
c
challenged the jurisdiction of that court, the Gaya court would
decide whether it had jurisdiction; and if it came to the
~
conclusion that it had no jurisdiction, that court could forward
,;J the record to Delhi High Court, in which event the appellant
could seek revival of the petition under sections 30 and 33 of D
the Act.

7. The Sub-Court Gaya heard and dismissed the
application filed by the appellant (for return of the plaint to the
respondent) by order dated 23.3.2006 holding that it had E
jurisdiction to entertain and decide the application under
section 14(2) of the Act. The said order was challenged by the
• appellant by filing a revision petition before the Patna High
)
Court. A learned single Judge of the Patna High Court
dismissed the revision petition, by the impugned order dated F
25.5.2008. He noted that the parties had earlier consented
before the Patna High Court for referring the disputes to
arbitration and that Patna High Court had recorded the said

... ,
agreement and referred the disputes to arbitration by order
dated 6.5.1997. He held that the said order dated 6.5.1997
should be considered to be an order under section 8 of the Act;
and if so, the order dated 6.5.1997 would be the order in the
G

first application under the Act in the reference; and as Patna
High Court did not have original jurisdiction, the Sub-Judge,
Gaya which was the corresponding civil court having original
jurisdiction would have jurisdiction to entertain the application H
808 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R.
)

A under section 14(2) of the Act, having regard to section 31(4)
of the Act. The said order is challenged in this appeal by special
leave.

8. On the contentions urged, the only question that arises j.
for consideration is whether the proceedings under section
B
14(2) of the Act could have been initiated only in the Delhi High
Court and not before the Sub-court, Gaya, having regard to
section 31 (4) of the Act.

9. Section 31 of the Act deals with jurisdiction and the
c same is extracted below :

"31. Jurisdiction.-(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act,
an award may be filed in any Court having jurisdiction in ..
the matter to which the reference relates.
'-
D (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other
law for the time being in force and save as otherwise
provided in this Act, all questions regarding the validity,
effect or existence of an award or an arbitration agreement
between the parties to the agreement or persons claiming
E under them shall be decided by the Court in which the
award under the agreement has been, or may be, filed, and
by no other Court. •
(3) All applications regarding the conduct of
F arbitration proceedings or otherwise arising out of such
proceedings shall be made to the Court where the award
has been, or may be, filed, and to no other Court.

G
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere
in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force,
where in any reference any application under this Act has
been made in a Court competent to entertain it, that Court
., ...
alone shall have jurisdiction over the arbitration
proceedings-, and all subsequent applications arising,
out of that reference, and the arbitration proceedings
H
MILKFOOD PVT. LTD. v. GMC ICE CREAM (P) LTD. 809
- Yi
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]

A
shall be made in that Court and in no other Court."

(emphasis supplied)

Sub-section (4) of section 31 provides where any application
~ under the Act, in any reference, had been made in a court
;' B
competent to entertain it, then notwithstanding anything
contained in the Act (or in any other law for the time being in
force), that court alone shall have jurisdiction over the arbitration
proceedings and all subsequent applications arising out of that
reference and therefore all arbitration proceedings shall be
made in that court alone and not in any other court. Sub-section c
(4) of section 31 of the old Act corresponds to section 42 of
the new Act.
•
10. As the court where the first application was made is
.>J
the court competent to entertain all subsequent applications D
under the Act, it is necessary to decide where the first
application in the reference was made under the Act. .In
chronological order, the four applications in the reckoning for
being considered as the first application in the reference under
the Act, in a competent court are : E
(i) . The application dated 19.6.1995 filed by the

j
• appellant under section 34 of the Act, in the court
of Munsif, Gaya (resulting in the order dated
3.8.1995).
F
(ii) The revision petition dated 2.7.1996 filed by the
respondent against the order dated 3.8.1995, under
section 115 of the Code, in the Patna High Court
(resulting in the order dated 6.5.1997).
G
(iii) The application made in April 1998 by the appellant
under Section 33 of the Act, in the Delhi High Court
(resulting in the order dated 13.10.1998).

(iv) The application dated 16.8.2000 by the respondent
under section 27 of Arbitration & Conciliation Act, H
810 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R.

A 1996 in the Delhi High Court (resulting in the order
dated 1.10.2000).
) -
The appellant contends that the first application in the reference
was filed under the Act in Delhi High Court in April, 1998 and
therefore all subsequent proceedings including the application
B
under section 14(2) should be filed in Delhi High Court. The "•
respondent contends that the application made either in the
Gaya Court on 19.6.1995 or in the Patna High Court on
2. 7.1996 should be considered to be the first application in the
reference in a competent court; and as that Patna High Court
c did not have original civil jurisdiction, the corresponding civil
court namely the Sub-Judge, Gaya was the court where all
applications, including an application under section 14(2) of the
Act should be filed. .
D 11. In Kumbha Mawji vs. Union of India -1953 SCR 878,
this Court explained that the words 'in any reference' would "'
mean 'in the matter of a reference to arbitration'. In Union of
India vs. Surjeet Singh AflNal - 1969 (2) SCC 211, this Court
held that an application under section 34 of the Act is not to
E be considered as an application under the Act in a reference.
Therefore, the application under section 34 of the Act filed by
the appellant on 19.6.1995 cannot be considered to be the first
application to a court in the reference to arbitration. Let us next
examine whether the first application under the Act in the •I
F reference was first made to the Patna High Court. A Revision
Petition (C.R.No.1020/1996) was filed in the Patna High Court
under section 115 of the Code, aggrieved by the order dated
3.8.1995 passed in an original suit filed by the respondent. The
order dated 3.8.1995 was made allowing an application filed
by respondent for stay of proceedings under section 34 of the
G
Act. Therefore, the order dated 6.4.1997 appointing the
arbitrators was made by Patna High Court, not in an application
under the Act, but in a revision petition under section 115 of
the Code. Further the said revision did not arise out of
arbitration proceedings, but against the rejection of an
H
MILKFOOD PVT. LTD. v. GMC ICE CREAM (P) LTD. 811
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]

" application under section 34 of the Act to stay the proceedings A
in a civil suit. If the proceedings in which the order dated
6.5.1997 was made by the Patna High Court did .not relate to
an application under the Act in a reference, nor is it a revision
arising from an application under the Act in a reference, it is
,_. not possible to hold that the first application under the Act in a B
reference was made before the Patna High Court.

12. At this juncture, it is necessary to notice the argument
put forth by the respondent. The respondent contends that even
though the revision petition did not arise from an application
under the Act, the order dated 6.5; 1997 made therein by the c
Patna High Court, recorded the consent of the parties that the
disputes may be referred.to arbitrators chosen by the parties,
recorded the names of the arbitrators appointed by them, and
" referred the disputes between the parties to arbitration.
-I According to the respondent, a court can appoint an arbitrator 0
either under section 20 or section 8 of the Act; as there was
no application for filing the agreement under section 20 of the
Act, the order dated 6.5.1997 should be deemed to have been
made in an application under section 8 of the Act to the High
Court. The respondent therefore contends that the Patna High E
Court should be treated as a court where first application under
the Act was filed and therefore all subsequent applications
. should be filed in that court. There is no merit in this contention .
) Section 8 relates to the power of civil court to appoint an
Arbitrator or umpire. With reference to the facts of this case the F
power under section 8 of the Act can be exercised only if the
following conditions mentioned in the section are fulfilled : (i)
the parties did not concur in the appointments of arbitrators,
when differences arose; (ii) one of the parties to the arbitration
agreement served on the other party a written notice nominating G
,j its arbitrator and calling upon the other party to make its
nomination; (iii) the other party did not appoint its arbitrator
within 15 clear days after the service of such notice; and (iv)
an application was made by the party who gave the notice
under section 8 of the Act for appointment of the arbitrator. The H
812 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011j 9 S.C.R.

A order dated 6.5.1997 of the Patna High Court cannot be
"'
considered to be an order under section 8 of the Act, as neither
an application was filed under section 8 of the Act nor the
conditions for making an application under section 8 of the Act
existed in this case. ~

B '
13. As noticed above the said order was made in a
revision petition against the grant of an application under I
section 34 in a suit filed by the respondent. All that the High
Court did was to record the submission that both parties had
appointed their respective arbitrators and therefore the
c disputes stood referred to them. Such an order recording the
nomination of arbitrators by consent and referring the disputes
to arbitration, can be made in any suit or other proceedings,
even if they do not arise under the arbitration agreement or
,,
under the Act. If for example a civil suit is filed by a party ~
D against the other and there is no arbitration agreement
between them, but during the course of the said suit both
parties agree that the matter should be referred to a named
arbitrator for arbitration and the court accordingly refers it to
arbitration, is not an appointment of an arbitrator under section
E 8 of the Act, but a consent order referring the disputes to the
arbitrators already appointed by the parties. Therefore we can
not accept the contention that the order dated 6.5.1997 of the
Patna High Court should be treated as an order in a proceeding
•
under section 8 of the Act. If the order dated 6.5.1997 is not
'
F an order made in an application under the Act in a reference,
it follows that the question of making all subsequent applications
arising out of the reference under the Act, to that court does
not arise.
14. In this case the appellant filed an application (OMP
G 1..,-<--
No.94/1998) in the Delhi High Court under section 33 of the
Act in April 1998 praying for a clarification as to whether the
arbitration proceedings between the parties would be governed
by the provisions of Arbitration Act, 1940 or by the provisions
of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Thereafter the
H
MILKFOOD PVT. LTD. v. GMC ICE CREAM (P) LTD. 813
~ [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
"
respondent made an application (OMP No.217/2000) to Delhi A
High Court for summoning and examining one O.P.Singh as a
witness in respect of the pending arbitration, to produce certain
documents. Therefore the application (OMP No.94/1998) made
.
;I
by the appellant under section 33 of the Act will have to be
treated as the first application under the Act in the reference. If B
that is so all subsequent applications will have to be made in
the High Court of Delhi.
15. Learned counsel for respondent submitted that the
application filed by it in OMP No.217/2000 for _issue of
summons to a witness to produce documents, cannot be c
treated as an application under the Act as. it was filed under
section 27 of th~ Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and not
- • under the provisions of section 43 of Arbitration Act, 1940~
;,j OMP No.217/2000 was made for issue of processes for
appearance of witness and production of documents, in a D
pending arbitration proceedings. When the application was
filed in the year 2000, there was some confusion as to whether
the new Act applied or the old Act applied. In fact that question
was pending before the Delhi High Court in OMP N0.94/1998
filed by the appellant. That issue was decided by Delhi High E
Court on 13.10.1998 holding that the matter was governed by
~
1996 Act, but that order was reversed by the order dated
! 5.4.2004 of this court in Milkfood Ltd. Vs. GMC Ice Cream (P)
Ltd. (2004 (7) SCC 288) holding that the old Act applied with
the following observations : "For the reasons aforementioned, F
we are of the view that in this case, the 1940 Act shall apply
and not the 1996 Act. .... The award shall be filed in the court
having jurisdiction whereafter the parties may proceed in terms
of the old Act." Therefore OMP No.217/2000 could be deemed
to have been made under section 43 of the Act. At all events G
..I
as OMP No.94/1998 has to be treated as the first application
under the Act, Delhi High Court alone will have jurisdiction to
entertain any subsequent applications and therefore the court
at Gaya will not have jurisdiction. It is also relevant to note that
the Arbitration clause provides that the venue of arbitration shall
H
be Delhi and Delhi courts will have jurisdiction.
814 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R.
...
A 16. In view of the above we allow this appeal, set aside
the impugned order of the Patna High Court as also the order
of Sub-Court, Gaya and hold that all applications should be filed
in Delhi High Court.

17. The respondent shall therefore obtain return of the
8
application under section 14(2) of the Act from the Gaya court
and file it before Delhi High Court within two months from today.
If it is so filed, Delhi High Court shall entertain the same and
dispose it of in accordance with law. We may note that when
C the matter had come up before this court in the first round, in
the order dated 5.4.2004, this court had expressed the hope
that the award will be made and all legal proceedings should
come to an end within four months from the date of
communication of that order. More than seven years have
elapsed thereafter and the proceedings have not ended. We
D therefore request the High Court to dispose of the matter
expeditiously.

R.P. Appeal allowed.

•