Supreme Court of India
M/S MOTILAL AGARWALAversusSTATE OF WEST BENGAL & ANR.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 1062
- Decided
- 28 August 2025
- Disposal
- Dismissed
Holding
Delivery of a signed copy of an arbitral award to an authorised representative who is not a party to the arbitration does not satisfy the statutory requirement of service under Section 31(5), and therefore the limitation period for a Section 34 application does not commence.
Summary
The dispute concerned an arbitral award dated 12 November 2013 in favour of M/s Motilal Agarwala against the State of West Bengal. The State sought to set aside the award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, filing the application on 20 March 2014, arguing that it had only become aware of the award when execution proceedings were initiated. The key issue was whether delivery of a xerox copy of the award, signed by the arbitrator, to an assistant engineer – an authorised representative of the State – satisfied the statutory requirement of delivery to “each party” under Section 31(5) and thus started the three‑month limitation period. The Supreme Court held that an authorised representative who is not a party to the arbitration agreement cannot be deemed to have received the award for the purpose of limitation, and delivery must be to the department head or other person with decision‑making authority. Consequently, the limitation period had not begun, and the State’s Section 34 application was not time‑barred. The Court affirmed the High Court’s order and dismissed the appeal.
Issues considered
- Whether delivery of a signed xerox copy of the arbitral award to an authorised representative of the State constitutes service upon the State under Section 31(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
- Whether the three‑month limitation period for filing a Section 34 application commences from such delivery.
Legislation cited
- Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996s. 2(1)(h), s. 31(1), s. 31(5), s. 33, s. 34(3)
Headnote
Issue for Consideration Issue arose whether the delivery of the true/xerox copy of the Arbitral Award duly signed by the Arbitrator to an authorised representative of the State would constitute delivery upon the respondent in accordance with s.31(5) of the 1996 Act. Headnotes† Arbitration – ss.31(5), 2(1) (h) – Form and contents of arbitral award – Delivery of signed copy to each party – Delivery of the true/xerox copy of the Arbitral Award duly signed by the Arbitrator to Assistant Engineer-authorised representative of the State on 12.11.2013 –
Subjects
Delivery of signed copy of award to each partyArbitral AwardPeriod of limitationCertified copy of the arbitral awardAuthorised representativeExpression “party”Section 31(5)Section 34
Judgment
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2400 : 2025 INSC 1062
M/s Motilal Agarwala
v.
State of West Bengal & Anr.
(Civil Appeal No. 4480 of 2016)
28 August 2025
[J.B. Pardiwala and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Issue arose whether the delivery of the true/xerox copy of the
Arbitral Award duly signed by the Arbitrator to an authorised
representative of the State would constitute delivery upon the
respondent in accordance with s.31(5) of the 1996 Act.
Headnotes†
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – ss.31(5), 2(1) (h) – Form
and contents of arbitral award – Delivery of signed copy to each
party – Delivery of the true/xerox copy of the Arbitral Award
duly signed by the Arbitrator to Assistant Engineer-authorised
representative of the State on 12.11.2013 – Period of limitation
to challenge the award could be said to have expired on
12.02. 2014 – State filed application u/s.34 on 20.03.2014, and
addressed a letter to the Arbitrator to provide a certified copy
of the arbitral award – Case of the State that till 12.02.2014,
it had no idea about the passing of the arbitral award, it was
only when the appellant initiated execution proceedings that
they came to know about the same – s.34 application, being
time-barred, dismissed by the trial court, however, allowed
by the High Court – Correctness:
Held: Authorised representative would not fall within the ambit of
“party” as defined by Clause (h) of Sub-Section (1) of s.2 to an
arbitration agreement – Delivery to the Assistant Engineer who
was not “a party to the arbitration” and who was not in a decision-
making capacity to take further recourses on the award would not
be a valid service of the award – Application for setting aside an
arbitral award in accordance with the provisions of the Act 1996
has to be preferred by such party within three months from the
date of the receipt of the arbitral award – In order to constitute
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2401
M/s Motilal Agarwala v. State of West Bengal & Anr.
an effective service, a copy of an award, where such party is the
Ministry of a particular Department, is to be delivered to a person
who has the knowledge and is the best person to understand
and appreciate an award and more particularly, to take decision
for its challenge – Authorised representative of the State could
not have taken the final decision to challenge the award – It is
only the Secretary of the concerned Department or the Executive
Engineer, who could be said to be the competent authority to take
a decision as to whether the award could be challenged or not –
Order passed by the High Court upheld. [Paras 20-26]
Case Law Cited
Union of India v. Tecco Trichy Engineers & Contractors [2005] 2
SCR 983 : (2005) 4 SCC 239 – relied on.
Benarsi Krishna Committee and Others v. Karmyogi Shelters Private
Limited [2012] 7 SCR 1175 : (2012) 9 SCC 496 – referred to.
List of Acts
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
List of Keywords
Delivery of signed copy of award to each party; Arbitral Award;
Period of limitation; Certified copy of the arbitral award; Authorised
representative; Expression “party”.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4480 of 2016
From the Judgment and Order dated 01.03.2016 of the High Court
of West Bengal at Calcutta in FMA No. 4576 of 2015
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Ajit Kumar Sinha, Pijush K. Roy, Sr. Advs., Pritthish Roy, Ms. Kakali
Roy, Ms. Khushboo Sharma, Rajan K. Chourasia, Anand Kumar
Chaurasia, Naveen Soni.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Ms. Madhumita Bhattacharjee, Ms. Debarati Sadhu.
2402 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
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Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Order
1. This appeal arises from the judgment and order passed by the High
Court at Calcutta (Civil Appellate Jurisdiction), dated 01.03.2016,
in F.M.A. No. 4576/2015, by which the order passed by the District
Court in Miscellaneous Case No.12/2014, came to be set aside
thereby holding that the Section 34 application, preferred by the
State against the arbitral award, was time-barred.
2. We need not delve much into the facts of this litigation as we are
in a position to affirm the impugned judgment and order passed by
the High Court on a neat question of law.
3. Here is a case in which an arbitral award came to be passed in
favour of the appellant herein dated 12.11.2013. The State having
suffered an award challenged the same invoking Section 34 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short, `the Act 1996’). The
period of limitation prescribed for the purpose of preferring Section 34
application is 90 days. Going by the date of the award and the receipt
of the xerox copy of the award by the authorised representative of
the State, the period of limitation could be said to have expired on
12.02.2014. It is the case of the State that till 12.02.2014, it had no
idea at all about the passing of the arbitral award. It is only when
the appellant herein initiated execution proceedings that they came
to know about the same. In such circumstances, they immediately
preferred Section 34 application on 20.03.2014. On 03.04.2014, the
State addressed a letter to the learned Arbitrator to provide for a
certified copy of the arbitral award dated 12.11.2013. The letter upon
which reliance has been placed by the State reads thus:
“GOVERNMENT OF WEST BENGAL
IRRIGATION & WATERWAYS DIRECTORATE
OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER
TEESTA CANAL DIVISION NO.1
ISLAMPUR, UTTAR DINAJPUR
From
The Executive Engineer
Teesta Canal Division No.1
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2403
M/s Motilal Agarwala v. State of West Bengal & Anr.
Teesta Pally, Islampur
Uttar Dinajpur
To
Justice Kalyanmoy Ganguli
High Court (Retd.)
51/4, Biren Roy Road (West)
Kolkata – 700008
Sub: Prayer for certified copy of the arbitral award passed
on 12/11/2013
Ref. A.P. No. - 200 of 2002 in the matter of Arbitration
between M/s Motilal Agrawal – vs – The State of West
Bengal & Others
Sir,
You are requested to provide a certified copy of the
arbitral award passed by your kind self on 12/11/2013 as
sole arbitrator in the above cited reference at the earliest
possible. It is urgently required for filing the same before
the Ld. District Judge, District Court, Uttar Dinajpur
before 29.04.2014 which is the next date fixed for filing
the certified copy of Arbitration award in the matter of
Misc.12/2014 (Arbitration) – State of West Bengal Vs.
M/S Motilal Agarwal.
In this context, I would like to inform you that certified copy
of the said award was not delivered to the undersigned
or the department from your end on 12/11/2013. Charges
for certified copy, if any, will be paid to you.
Thanking you,
Yours sincerely,
(NRAJ KUMAR SINGH)
Executive Engineer
Teesta Canal Division No.1
Islampur, Uttar Dinajpur”
4. The Section 34 application being time-barred, according to the
District Court, was not entertained and in such circumstances, the
Miscellaneous Case No.12/2014 came to be dismissed.
2404 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
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5. The State being dissatisfied with the order passed by the District Court
dismissing the application being Miscellaneous Case No.12/2014
went before the High Court by way of F.M.A. No.4576/2015. The
High Court, by its impugned judgment and order, allowed the FMA,
preferred by the State, and thereby set aside the order passed by
the District Court, referred to above. The High Court while allowing
the FMA, preferred by the State, observed as under:
“In our view, limitation under Section 34(3) would start
running from the date on which the party applying for
setting aside of the arbitral award received a signed copy
of the award from the Arbitral Tribunal. Such copy need not
necessarily be signed in original by the Arbitrator/majority of
the Arbitrators. An authentic photo copy along with signatures
would suffice. This issue is covered by a judgment dated
28th August, 2015 of this Bench in APOT 337 of 2015
(National Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Federation of
India Ltd. vs. M/s R. Piyarelal Import & Export Ltd.).
The award made over by the learned Arbitrator to Sri Pradip
Saha, Assistant Engineer was a signed copy. However,
the question is whether the period of limitation for making
an application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act, would
start running from the date on which the signed copy was
received by Mr. Pradip Saha, Assistant Engineer.
In State of Maharashtra Vs. ARK Builders reported in (2011)
4 SCC 616, cited by Mr. Sen, the issue was, whether the
period of limitation for making an application under Section
34 of the 1996 Act, for setting aside an arbitral award,
was to be reckoned from the date on which a copy of the
award was received by the applicant by any means or
source, or whether it was to start running from the date a
signed copy of the award was delivered to the applicant
by the Arbitrator.
The Supreme Court held that the period of limitation
prescribed under Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act, could only
commence from the date on which the award was received
by the applicant in the manner prescribed by law and/or
in other words, in the manner for service of the award
prescribed in Section 31(5) of the 1996 Act.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2405
M/s Motilal Agarwala v. State of West Bengal & Anr.
In ARK Builders (supra) the Arbitrators had not supplied
a copy of the award to the appellants. The award holder
had, however, forwarded a photocopy of the award to the
appellant and claimed payment in terms of the award. The
Supreme Court held that limitation would run from the time
the award duly signed, was received by the appellant,
from the Arbitrator.
In ARK Builders (supra) the Supreme Court did not
consider the question of whether the copies served by
the Arbitrators to the parties concerned, would all have
to actually and separately be signed by the Arbitrators
themselves. However, the Supreme Court clearly held
that limitation would start running from the date on which
a copy of the award was received by the applicant from
the Arbitral Tribunal.
In Benarsi Krishna Committee & Ors. Vs. Karmyogi
Shelters Private Limited reported in (2012) 9 SCC 496
the Supreme Court held that the expression ‘party’ as
defined in Section 2(i)(h) of the 1996 Act clearly indicates
a person who is a party to an arbitration agreement. The
said definition is not clarified in any way so as to include
the agent of the party to such agreement. Any reference,
therefore, made in Section 31(5) and Section 34(2) of the
1996 Act could only mean the party himself and not his
or her agent or advocate empowered to act on the basis
of a vakalatnama. In the aforesaid case, the award had
been served on the advocate.
In this case, Sri Pradip Saha, Assistant Engineer was
not a party to the arbitration. The State of West Bengal,
represented through the Secretary, Irrigation and
Waterways Department and the Executive Engineer were
parties. Copies of the award should have been served on
the Secretary, Irrigation and Waterways Department, and
the Executive Engineer.
The award not having been served on the Secretary,
Irrigation and Waterways Department, or the Executive
Engineer, it cannot be said that limitation had started
running. The application under Section 34(2) for setting
2406 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
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aside of the arbitral award cannot be held to have been
barred by limitation.
The appeal is therefore, allowed.
The order under appeal is set aside. The learned Court
is directed to hear and dispose of the application under
Section 34 of the 1996 Act on merits, at the earliest
preferably within 6 months from the date of communication
of this order.”
6. Thus, it appears on a plain reading of the impugned order passed
by the High Court that what weighed with the High Court was the
fact that the award was not served on the Secretary, Irrigation and
Waterways Department or the Executive Engineer. According to
the High Court, it is only the Secretary, Irrigation and Waterways
Department or the Executive Engineer, who could be termed as
“party”, as defined in Section 2(1)(h) of the Act 1996. An authorised
representative of the State, who might have participated in the
proceedings before the Arbitrator and who might have also received
a xerox copy of the award cannot be said to be falling within the
expression “party”.
7. Mr. Ajit Kumar Sinha, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
appellant would vehemently submit that the High Court committed
an error in passing the impugned order. The principal argument of
the learned Senior Counsel is that the authorised representative,
who actually participated in the arbitral proceedings and was in
complete knowledge of every fact of the proceedings, had collected
the xerox copy of the award duly signed by the Arbitrator and in such
circumstances, it could be said that the State had the knowledge
of passing of such award on 12.11.2013. He would argue that this
Court may take the view that the authorised representative in full
knowledge of the entire litigation would fall within the expression
“party”, as defined under the Act 1996.
8. In such circumstances, referred to above, the learned Senior Counsel
prayed that there being merit in his appeal, the same may be allowed
and the Section 34 application be declared to be time-barred.
9. On the other hand, Ms. Madhumita Bhattacharjee, the learned
counsel appearing for the State, would submit that no error, not to
speak of any error in law, could be said to have been committed by
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2407
M/s Motilal Agarwala v. State of West Bengal & Anr.
the High Court in passing the impugned order. She fairly submitted
that the State is unable to run away from the fact that the authorised
representative had collected the xerox copy of the arbitral award,
duly signed by the Arbitrator, on 12.11.2013 but unfortunately the
authorised representative never brought it to the notice of the State
that such award had been passed. According to her, it is only when
the execution proceedings were initiated by the award-holder, i.e.,
the appellant herein and a notice was issued to the State that for
the first time, the State came to learn about the passing of such
award. Having learnt about the passing of such award, immediately
on 20.03.2014, Section 34 application was filed. Since there was
delay, an application was filed before the District Court. According to
her, the District Court was in error in taking the view that the Section
34 application was time-barred.
10. In the last, she submitted that the authorised representative of the
State would not fall within the ambit of “party”, as defined under the
Act 1996.
11. In such circumstances, referred to above, she prayed that there being
no merit in this appeal, the same may be dismissed.
ANALYSIS
12. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having
gone through the materials on record, the only question that falls
for our consideration is whether the delivery of the true/xerox copy
of the Arbitral Award duly signed by the Arbitrator to an authorised
representative of the State on 12.11.2013 would constitute delivery
upon the respondent herein in accordance with Section 31(5) of the
Act 1996?
13. The limitation period under the Act 1996 for the Section 34 application
is three months from the date of “receipt” of an Arbitral Award or from
the date on which request under Section 33 of the Act is disposed.
14. The proviso to sub-section (3) gives an additional 30 days to a party
provided it can satisfy the Court that it was prevented in filing on
time for sufficient reasons. Sub-section (1) and Sub-section (3) of
Section 34 of the Act 1996 are reproduced below:
“34. Application for setting aside arbitral award- (1)
Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be
2408 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
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made only by an application for setting aside such award
in accordance with subsection (2) and sub-section (3)
……..
(3) An application for setting aside may not be made after
three months have elapsed from the date on which the
party making that application had received the arbitral
award or, if a request had been made under section 33,
from the date on which that request had been disposed
of by the arbitral tribunal:
Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was
prevented by sufficient cause from making the application
within the said period of three months it may entertain the
application within a further period of thirty days, but not
thereafter.”
(emphasis supplied)
15. Section 31(1) and (5) of the Act 1996 respectively read as under:
“31. Form and contents of arbitral award.—(1) An arbitral
award shall be made in writing and shall be signed by the
members of the arbitral tribunal.
xxx xxx xxx
(5) After the arbitral award is made, a signed copy shall
be delivered to each party.”
16. Thus, Section 31 of the Act 1996 sets forth the form and content
of an Arbitral Award. Sub-section (1) of Section 31 states that an
arbitral Award shall be drawn out in the manner as prescribed by the
Section and is to be signed by all members of the Arbitral Tribunal.
17. Sub-section (5) of Section 31 of the Act 1996 provides that once
an Award is made, a signed copy shall be delivered to each ‘party’.
18. A “party” is defined by Clause (h) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 of
the Act 1996 as a party to an Arbitration Agreement.
19. The analysis of the provisions above shows that an Application for
setting aside an Arbitral Award may be made by such party within
three months from the date of its receipt unless the proviso is
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2409
M/s Motilal Agarwala v. State of West Bengal & Anr.
applicable and that limitation under Sub-section (3) of Section 34 of
the Act 1996 commences on the date when the party has received
the Arbitral Award.
20. The facts are not in dispute. At the cost of repetition, we state that
the authorised representative, in fact, had collected a xerox copy of
the award on 12.11.2013 and that too, duly signed by the Arbitrator.
But the fact remains that the authorised representative in this case
would not fall within the ambit of “party” as defined by Clause (h)
of Sub-Section (1) of Section 2 of the Act 1996 to an arbitration
agreement. The application for setting aside an arbitral award in
accordance with the provisions of the Act 1996 has to be preferred
by such party within three months from the date of its receipt unless
the proviso is applicable and that limitation, under Sub-section 3 of
Section 34 of the Act 1996 commences from the date when the party
has received the arbitral award.
21. What exactly constitutes a “party”, in the context of Government,
has been interpreted by this Court in Union of India vs. Tecco Trichy
Engineers & Contractors, reported in (2005) 4 SCC 239. In the
said decision, this Court held that in order to constitute an effective
service, a copy of an award, where such party is the Ministry of a
particular Department, is to be delivered to a person who has the
knowledge and is the best person to understand and appreciate an
award and more particularly, to take decision for its challenge. We
are of the view that the authorised representative of the State could
not have taken the final decision to challenge the award. It is only the
Secretary of the concerned Department or the Executive Engineer,
who could be said to be the competent authority to take a decision
as to whether the award could be challenged or not.
22. As held by this Court, the delivery of an arbitral award under sub-
section (5) of Section 31 is not a matter of mere formality. It is a
matter of substance. The delivery by the Arbitral Tribunal and receipt
by the party sets in motion several periods of limitation such as an
application for correction and interpretation of an award within 30
days under Section 33(1), an application for making an additional
award under Section 33(4) and an application for setting aside an
award under Section 34(3) and so on. The delivery of the copy of
the award has the effect of conferring certain rights on the party
bringing to an end the right to exercise those rights on expiry of
2410 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
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the prescribed period of limitation which would be calculated from
that date, the delivery of the copy of the award by the Tribunal the
receipt thereof by each party constitutes an important stage in the
arbitral proceedings.
23. This Court has held that the award should be received in the context
of huge organisations by the person who has knowledge of the
proceedings and who would be the best person to understand and
appreciate the arbitral award as also to take a decision in the matter
of moving appropriate applications. In this context, the following
paragraphs from Tecco Trichy Engineers & Contractors (supra) are
relevant and repays close study:-
“6. Form and contents of the arbitral award are provided
by Section 31 of the Act. The arbitral award drawn up in
the manner prescribed by Section 31 of the Act has to be
signed and dated. According to sub-section (5), “after the
arbitral award is made, a signed copy shall be delivered
to each party”. The term “party” is defined by clause (h) of
Section 2 of the Act as meaning “a party to an arbitration
agreement”. The definition is to be read as given unless
the context otherwise requires. Under sub-section (3) of
Section 34 the limitation of 3 months commences from
the date on which “the party making that application” had
received the arbitral award. We have to see what is the
meaning to be assigned to the term “party” and “party
making the application” for setting aside the award in the
context of the State or a department of the Government,
more so a large organisation like the Railways.
7. It is well known that the Ministry of Railways has a
very large area of operation covering several divisions,
having different divisional heads and various departments
within the division, having their own departmental heads.
The General Manager of the Railways is at the very apex
of the division with the responsibility of taking strategic
decisions, laying down policies of the organisation, giving
administrative instructions and issuing guidelines in the
organisation. He is from elite managerial cadre which
runs the entire organisation of his division with different
departments, having different departmental heads. The
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2411
M/s Motilal Agarwala v. State of West Bengal & Anr.
day-to-day management and operations of different
departments rests with different departmental heads. The
departmental head is directly connected and concerned
with the departmental functioning and is alone expected to
know the progress of the matter pending before the Arbitral
Tribunal concerning his department. He is the person
who knows exactly where the shoe pinches, whether the
arbitral award is adverse to the department’s interest.
The departmental head would naturally be in a position to
know whether the arbitrator has committed a mistake in
understanding the department’s line of submissions and
the grounds available to challenge the award. He is aware
of the factual aspect of the case and also the factual and
legal aspects of the questions involved in the arbitration
proceedings. It is also a known fact and the Court can
take judicial notice of it that there are several arbitration
proceedings pending consideration concerning affairs of
the Railways before arbitration. The General Manager,
with executive workload of the entire division cannot be
expected to know all the niceties of the case pending
before the Arbitral Tribunal or for that matter the arbitral
award itself and to take a decision as to whether the arbitral
award deserves challenge, without proper assistance of
the departmental head. The General Manager, being the
head of the division, at best is only expected to take final
decision whether the arbitral award is to be challenged or
not on the basis of the advice and the material placed before
him by the person concerned with arbitration proceedings.
Taking a final decision would be possible only if the subject-
matter of challenge, namely, the arbitral award is known
to the departmental head, who is directly concerned with
the subject-matter as well as arbitral proceedings. In large
organisations like the Railways, “party” as referred to in
Section 2(h) read with Section 34(3) of the Act has to
be construed to be a person directly connected with and
involved in the proceedings and who is in control of the
proceedings before the arbitrator.
8. The delivery of an arbitral award under sub-section
(5) of Section 31 is not a matter of mere formality. It is a
2412 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
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matter of substance. It is only after the stage under Section
31 has passed that the stage of termination of arbitral
proceedings within the meaning of Section 32 of the Act
arises. The delivery of arbitral award to the party, to be
effective, has to be “received” by the party. This delivery
by the Arbitral Tribunal and receipt by the party of the
award sets in motion several periods of limitation such
as an application for correction and interpretation of an
award within 30 days under Section 33(1), an application
for making an additional award under Section 33(4) and
an application for setting aside an award under Section
34(3) and so on. As this delivery of the copy of award has
the effect of conferring certain rights on the party as also
bringing to an end the right to exercise those rights on
expiry of the prescribed period of limitation which would
be calculated from that date, the delivery of the copy of
award by the Tribunal and the receipt thereof by each party
constitutes an important stage in the arbitral proceedings.
9. In the context of a huge organisation like the Railways,
the copy of the award has to be received by the person
who has knowledge of the proceedings and who would be
the best person to understand and appreciate the arbitral
award and also to take a decision in the matter of moving
an application under sub-section (1) or (5) of Section 33
or under sub-section (1) of Section 34.
10. In the present case, the Chief Engineer had signed
the agreement on behalf of the Union of India entered into
with the respondent. In the arbitral proceedings the Chief
Engineer represented the Union of India and the notices,
during proceedings of the arbitration, were served on the
Chief Engineer. Even the arbitral award clearly mentions
that the Union of India is represented by the Deputy
Chief Engineer/Gauge Conversion, Chennai. The Chief
Engineer is directly concerned with the arbitration, as the
subject-matter of arbitration relates to the department of
the Chief Engineer and he has direct knowledge of the
arbitral proceedings and the question involved before the
arbitrator. The General Manager of the Railways has only
referred the matter for arbitration as required under the
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2413
M/s Motilal Agarwala v. State of West Bengal & Anr.
contract. He cannot be said to be aware of the question
involved in the arbitration nor the factual aspect in detail,
on the basis of which the Arbitral Tribunal had decided the
issue before it, unless they are all brought to his notice
by the officer dealing with that arbitration and who is in
charge of those proceedings. Therefore, in our opinion,
service of the arbitral award on the General Manager by
way of receipt in his inwards office cannot be taken to be
sufficient notice so as to activate the department to take
appropriate steps in respect of and in regard to the award
passed by the arbitrators to constitute the starting point
of limitation for the purposes of Section 34(3) of the Act.
The service of notice on the Chief Engineer on 19-3-2001
would be the starting point of limitation to challenge the
award in the Court.
11. We cannot be oblivious of the fact of impersonal
approach in the government departments and organisations
like Railways. In the very nature of the working of
government departments a decision is not taken unless
the papers have reached the person concerned and then
an approval, if required, of the competent authority or
official above has been obtained. All this could not have
taken place unless the Chief Engineer had received the
copy of the award when only the delivery of the award
within the meaning of sub-section (5) of Section 31 shall
be deemed to have taken place.”
24. In the present case, it is averred in the counter affidavit and is not
disputed by the appellant that the contract was executed between the
Superintending Engineer, Mahananda Baraj Circle (I&W) DTE and
M/s Motilal Agarwala, the appellant. The Executive Engineer, Teesta
Canal Division No.1, Islampur was also a party to the arbitration.
Admittedly and as is clear from the letter dated 08.08.2014 of the
Arbitrator, Annexure P-11 to the Civil Appeal the signed copy of
the award was delivered to SDO/AE – TCS D-2 Islampur who was
present at the meeting on behalf of the respondent. Applying the
dictum in Tecco Trichy Engineers & Contractors (supra) a delivery to
the Assistant Engineer who was not “a party to the arbitration” and
who was not in a decision-making capacity to take further recourses
on the award would not be a valid service of the award.
2414 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
25. We take notice of the fact that Tecco Trichy (supra) has been relied
upon by this Court in Benarsi Krishna Committee and others v.
Karmyogi Shelters Private Limited, reported in (2012) 9 SCC 496,
wherein this Court held that the expression “party”, as defined in
Section 2(1)(h) of the 1996 Act would be a person who is a “party”
to an arbitration agreement. The relevant extract from the decision in
Benarsi Krishna Committee (supra), more particularly the observations
made in para 15 therein reads thus:
“15. Having taken note of the submissions advanced
on behalf of the respective parties and having particular
regard to the expression “party” as defined in Section 2(1)
(h) of the 1996 Act read with the provisions of Sections
31(5) and 34(3) of the 1996 Act, we are not inclined to
interfere with the decision of the Division Bench of the
Delhi High Court impugned in these proceedings. The
expression “party” has been amply dealt with in Tecco
Trechy Engineers’s case (supra) and also in ARK Builders
(P) Ltd. case (supra), referred to hereinabove. It is one
thing for an advocate to act and plead on behalf of a party
in a proceeding and it is another for an Advocate to act
as the party himself. The expression “party”, as defined
in Section 2 (1)(h) of the 1996 Act, clearly indicates a
person who is a party to an arbitration agreement. The
said definition is not qualified in any way so as to include
the agent of the party to such agreement. Any reference,
therefore, made in Section 31(5) and Section 34(2) of the
1996 Act can only mean the party himself and not his or
her agent, or advocate empowered to act on the basis of
a Vakalatnama. In such circumstances, proper compliance
with Section 31 (5) would mean delivery of a signed copy
of the Arbitral Award on the party himself and not on his
advocate, which gives the party concerned the right to
proceed under Section 34(3) of the aforesaid Act.”
(emphasis supplied)
26. In the overall view of the matter, we have reached the conclusion
that we should not disturb the impugned judgment and order passed
by the High Court.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2415
M/s Motilal Agarwala v. State of West Bengal & Anr.
27. In the result, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.
28. This litigation is now almost 12 years old. In such circumstances,
there should not be any further delay in hearing the Section 34
application filed by the State. We request the District Court to take
up the appeal of the State and see to it that the same is decided on
its own merit within a period of six months from the date of receipt
of a copy of this order.
Result of the case: Appeal dismissed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain
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