Supreme Court of India
M/S. PEPSICO INDIA HOLDING PVT. LTD.versusKRISHNA KANT PANDEY
- Citation
- 2015 INSC 9
- Decided
- 6 January 2015
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- M Y EQBAL
Holding
The respondent is not a workman under Section 2(z) and the High Court erred in interfering with the Labour Court's factual findings and in directing amendment of the statute.
Summary
Krishna Kant Pandey, employed by Pepsico India Holding Pvt. Ltd., was terminated after serving in various supervisory roles, most recently as Fleet Executive. He claimed that he was a "workman" under Section 2(z) of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and that his termination violated Section 6 of the Act. The Industrial Tribunal held that his duties were managerial and supervisory, thus he did not fall within the definition of a workman. The Allahabad High Court reversed this finding, classifying him as a workman and even directing the State Government to amend Section 2(z). The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, restored the Tribunal's finding, and held that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 by re‑appreciating facts and directing legislative amendment. Consequently, the High Court order was set aside and the termination stood subject to challenge in the appropriate forum.
Issues considered
- Whether the respondent qualifies as a "workman" under Section 2(z) of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
- Whether a High Court, exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution, can interfere with factual findings of a Labour Court and direct amendment of a statutory provision.
Legislation cited
- Constitution of Indias. Article 226, s. Article 227
- Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947s. 2(z), s. 6
Subjects
workman definitionindustrial disputestermination of servicejurisdiction of High CourtArticle 226Article 227supervisory employeestatutory amendment
Judgment
[2015] 1 S.C.R. 288
A M/S. PEPSICO INDIA HOLDING PVT. LTD.
v.
KRISHNA KANT PANDEY
(Civil Appeal No.28 of 2015)
JANUARY 06, 2015
B
[M.Y. EQBAL AND SHIVA KIRTI SINGH, JJ.]
Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-:- s.2(z) and
s. 6 - Termination of service - Disputed before Labour court
C - Reference dismissed as not maintainable holding that the
employee was not a workman as defined uls 2(z) - Writ
petition - High Court allowed the petition holding that though
the employee was not covered under the definition of
workman, he shall be classified as workman - High Court alsc
D directed the Government to make an amendment in s.2(z) -
On appeal, held: Labour court rightly held that the employee
was not a workman within the meaning of s. 2(z} - High Court
exceeded its jurisdiction u!Art.2261227 of the Constitution by
interfering with finding of facts and by directing the
E Government to make amendments in s.2(z) - Constitution of
India, 1950 - Articles 226 and 227.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.The order of the Tribunal would show that
F the respondent-workman accepted different works
assigned to him which were purely of supervisory and
managerial nature. The details of 15 managerial/
supervisory works assigned to the respondent have been
analyzed by the Tribunal which finally came to the
G conclusion that the respondent is not a workman within
the meaning ofSection 2(z) of the Act. [para 16] [303-E-F]
Bir/a Corpn. Ltd.. vs. Rajeshwar Mahato and Others,
(2001) 10 sec 611 - relied on.
H
288
PEPSICO INDIA HOLDING PVT. LTD. v. KRISHNA 289
KANT PANDEY
2. The High Court has exceeded in exercise of its A
jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution
in interfering with the finding of facts recorded by the
Labour Court. The High Court in the guise of exercising
its jurisdiction, normally should not interfere under Article
227 of the Constitution and convert itself into a court of B
appeal. [para 12] [299-A"B]
Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao vs. Ashalata S.
Guram 1986 (3) SCR 866 = (1986) 4 SCC 447; Indian
Overseas Bank vs. 1.0.B. Staff Canteen Workers' Union and C
Another2000 (2) SCR 1212 = (2000) 4 SCC 245 - relied on.
3. The High Court committed grave error in holding
that although the respondent is not covered under the
definition of workman as defined under Section 2(z) of the
Act he shall be classified as a workman. The High Court D
further exceeded its jurisdiction in advising the
Government to make an amendment in Section 2(z) of the
Act and to exclude some clauses. The order passed by
the High Court cannot be sustained in law. [para 17] [303-
G-H; 304-A] E
S.K. Mani vs. Mis. Carona Sahu Company Limited and
Ors.1994 (2) SCR 333 = (1994) 3 SCC 51 O; Mis. UP. Electric
Supply Co., Ltd. vs. The Workmen of Mis. S.N. Choudhary
I
Contractors and Anr., (1960) 3 SCR 189; TISCO Ltd. v. State F
of Jharkhand, 2013 (9) SCR 437 = (2014) 1 SCC 536, and
Bhogpur Coop Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. Harmesh Kumar 2006
(8) Suppl. SCR 1021 = (2006) 13 SCC 28 - referred to.
Case Law Reference:
G
(2001) 10 sec 611 referred to para 7
1994 (2) SCR 333 referred to para 7
.
(1960) 3 SCR 189 referred to para 8
2013 (9) SCR 437 referred to para 8 H
290 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 1 S.C.R.
A 2006 (8) Suppl. SCR 1021 referred to para 8
1986 (3) SCR 866 relied on para 13
2001 (1 O) sec 611 relied on para 14
B 2000 (2) SCR 1212 relied on para 15
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 28
of 2015.
From the Judgment and Order dated 23-05-2013 of the
C High Court of Uttar Pradesh at Lucknow Bench in Writ Petition
No. 102 (MS) of 2008.
C.U. Singh, Ashlesha Srivastava, Dheeraj Nair for the
appellant.
D Kavin Gulati, Avi Tandon, Rohit Sthalekar (For T. Mahipal)
for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
M.Y.EQBAL, J. 1. Leave granted.
E
2. This appeal by special leave is directed against
judgment and order dated 23.5.2013 of the High Court of
Allahabad at Lucknow Bench whereby learned Single Judge
classifying the respondent as 'workman' allowed the writ
F petition preferred by him, quashed the order dated August 24,
2007 passed by the Industrial Tribunal 11, State of Uttar Pradesh,
Lucknow (in short, 'the Tribunal') and directed the Tribunal to
decide respondent's Case No.84/2004 on merit.
G 3. The factual matrix of the case is that the respondent was
appointed on the post of Operator/Technician Grade Ill for six
months on probation basis w.e.f. 13th of March, 1995 against
the salary of Rs. 2600/- per month. Having been found his
services satisfactory, he was confirmed w.e.f. 13th September,
1995 and was also awarded one increment w.e.f. 1st of
H
PEPSICO INDIA HOLDING PVT. LTD. v. KRISHNA 291
KANT PANDEY [M.Y. EQBAL, J.]
February, 1996. Earlier, he was appointed in the Plant of A
Jainpur (Kanpur Dehat) from where he was transferred to
Sathariya Plant, District Jaunpur, U.P. on 30th of August, 1996
on the revised pay scale i.e. Rs. 5450/-. Pursuant to the
subsequent transfer order, he was posted at Lucknow in the
month of June, 1997 and till 2000 he was awarded annual B
increments at the rate of Rs.490/-. Subsequently, he was
promoted to the post of Line Supervisor in the pay scale of
Rs. 7716/- and thereafter to the post of Fleet Executive.
4. It is the case of the respondent that being posted as a
Fleet Executive, he was to discharge the mechanical work and C
that being so, he was called as skilled workman. It is stated
that no other staff was posted in his subordination. The
respondent also pointed out the conduct of the employer
transferring him from one place to another and also compelling
him to resign from the post or to be on long leave. On being D
asked to proceed on leave, respondent remained on leave
w.e.f. 9th October, 2003 to 17th October, 2003. When he
turned up, he was not permitted to join for want of instructions
of the superior authorities. Thereafter, respondent wrote a letter
on 8th November, 2003 to the Vice President seeking guidance E
for further action, upon which the employer became unhappy
and terminated his services on 14th of November, 2003 by
giving one month's salary in lieu of notice prior to termination.
5. Aggrieved by the said termination, respondent preferred F
a reference before the Conciliation Officer, Lucknow alleging
that he is a 'workman' within the meaning of the Uttar Pradesh
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the
'Act') and termination of his services by the Company is
contrary to Section 6 of the Act. The appellant Company G
pleaded that the respondent did not satisfy the criteria of a
workman as defined under Section 2(z) of the Act. The Industrial
Tribunal dismissed the reference stating that the respondent is
not a workman under Section 2(z) of the Act and, therefore, no
challenge to the termination is maintainable before the Tribunal.
H
292 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 1 S.C.R.
A 6. Respondent, being aggrieved, moved the High Court by
way of a writ petition challenging the order of the Tribunal and
also for his re-instatement to the post of Fleet Executive with
continuity of service and for payment of full back wages. In reply,
the appellant pleaded that the order of termination is in
B accordance with the provisions of the Act. After hearing learned
counsel on either side, learned Single Judge of the High Court
allowed writ petition of the respondent, quashed order of the
Tribunal and directed it to proceed with the adjudication of the
respondent's case on merit. Hence, the present appeal by
c special leave by the appellant-Company.
7. Mr. C.U. Singh, learned counsel appearing for the
appellant, assailed the order passed by the High Court on
various grounds inter a/ia, the High Court has exceeded its
jurisdiction conferred upon it under Article 226 of the
D Constitution of India by reversing the finding recorded by the
Tribunal. Learned counsel submitted that the High Court has
committed grave error. in issuing suo motu directions to the
executive to amend a relevant provision of Section 2(z) of the
U.P. Industrial Disputes Act (in short, 'State Act'). According
E to the learned counsel, issuing such direction by the High Court
amounts to issue a direction to the legislature to enact a law in
a particular manner. Learned counsel submitted that the High
Court cannot mandate the executive to introduce or enact a
legislation, howsoever necessary or desirable. Learned
F counsel drew our attention to the provisions of Section 2(z) of
the said Act which defines 'workman' and submitted that the
High Court has failed to appreciate that the nature of duties and
responsibilities entrusted upon the respondent are not manual,
skilled or unskilled or technical services, but manual, managerial
G and supervisory. In the capacity of Fleet Executive, respondent
was required to monitor each and every vehicle of the Fleet and
ensure that the necessary repair proceedings were carried out.
Learned counsel further submitted that the High Court has
misdirected itself in considering the relevant facts and
H pleadings which were not even placed before the Industrial
PEPSICO INDIA HOLDING PVT. LTD. v. KRISHNA 293
KANT PANDEY [M.Y. EQBAL, J.]
Tribunal. Lastly, it was contended that the High Court in exercise A
of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution ought not
re-appreciate or re-weigh evidence and disturb the finding of
facts recorded by the Tribunal based on appreciation of
evidence. Learned counsel relied upon the judgment of this
Court in the case of Chandavarkar Sita R9tna ,Rao vs. B
Ashalata S. Guram, (1986) 4.ScC.447·, Bk/a Corpn. Ltd.. vs.
Rajeshwar Mahat6·and Others, (2001) 10 sec 611 and S.K.
Mani vs. Mis. Carona Sahu Company Limited and Ors.,
(1994) 3 sec 510.
8. Mr. Kavin Gulati, learned senior counsel appearing for C
the respondent firstly contended that before conciliation, the
appellant raised an objection with regard to the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal and the matter was finally referred to the Labour
Court for adjudication on a limited question as to whether the
termination of services of the respondent was justified. D
According to the learned counsel, the appellant-management
cannot raise the question of jurisdiction of the Labour Court.
Learned counsel referred to Rule 12 of the Industrial Disputes
Rules in support of his contention and relied upon the decision
of this Court in the case of Mis. UP. Electric Supply Co., Ltd. E
vs. The Workmen of Mis. S.N. Choudhary Contractors and
Anr., (1960) 3 SCR page 189. Mr. Gulati, learned senior
counsel also relied upon the decision of this Court in the case
of T/SCO Ltd. V. State of Jharkhand, (2014) 1 sec 536, and
Bhogpur Coop Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. Harmesh Kumar, (2006) F
13 SCC 28, for the proposition that the Labour Court has
limited jurisdiction to adjudicate the disputes referred to it and
not to enter into any other question that may be raised in the
reference.
G
9. We have heard learned counsel for both the parties and
considered the relevant facts and the law applicable thereto.
The admitted facts are that at the relevant time, the respondent
was working as a Fleet Supervisor and drawing a salary of Rs.
7716/-. Initially, he was appointed as a technician Grade-Ill in
H
294 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 1 S.C.R.
A 1995 on the salary of Rs. 2600/- per month and after getting
increment his salary was increased. By giving one month's
salary, in lieu of the notice, his services were terminated.
10. It appears that the appellant raised a preliminary
objection before the Labour .Court that the respondent was not
8
a Labour as defined under Section 2(z) of the said Act and the
Deputy Labour Commissioner, Lucknow, who had referred·the
present case, was not competent for this purpose. The Labour
Court recorded the evidence adduced by both the appellant and
C the respondent and discussed the evidence, and elaborately
considered the case of the parties. The Labour Court finally
recorded finding that the respondent is not a workman within
the meaning of Section 2(z) of the Act. Paras 13 to 15 of the
order are reproduced hereinbelow:-
D "13. The statement of the Applicant is that although he was
given the post in the name of Fleet Executive and he was
posted at the warehouse at Lucknow, however practically
he was doing the work of skilled manual and as such he
fall within the definition as given in Section 2(z) of the
E Industrial Disputes Act, 194 7. According to him his main
work was to remove the technical defects at 100% from
the fleet. His other works which have been mentioned by
the management in their written statement, were
secondary. It has also been stated that the written
F statement of the management is not on affidavit, therefore
the same cannot be relied upon. He was executing all his
work in accordance with the directions of the higher
officials. He was not having any right of doing the work as
per his own wishes. He has stated in his statement that
no staff was working under him. He used to do the work
• G
himself for keeping the vehicles 100% free/available from
technical deformities and removed the difficulties of the
vehicles. It has also been stated that there is a difference
in the statement of witnesses of the management EW-1
H
PEPSICO INDIA HOLDING PVT. LTD. v. KRISHNA 295
KANT PANDEY [M.Y. EQBAL, J.]
and EW-2 regarding the repair of the work of the company A
and the same cannot be relied upon. It has been stated
while relying upon• the legal arrangement given by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.K. Verma Vs. Mahesh
Chander (AIR- SC-1462) and Shri Verma Role Offer
Storage and Distribution Co. of India Ltd. Vs. Vermashel B
Management Staff Association and others (1970) 3 SCC
378 that any personnel fall within the definition of labour
or not, it depends upon the fact that what is the nature of
the main works being done by him. The same cannot be
assessed with the name of the post. If the concerned c
person is doing the work of manual skilled unskilled work,
then he is in the definition of labour, as the main work of
the Applicant was to repair the vehicles, which he used to
do from his own h,ands. No other person was working
under him and he was not having the right to take decision D
by himself. Therefore, he falls within the definition of
·labour. It has been stated while referring the S.K. Verma
Vs. Mahesh Chander and Vermashel Air Storage and
Distribution Co. of India Ltd., Vs. Vermashel Management
Staff Association (supra) that the work of the Applicant
was similar to fupelling superintendeni, which has been E
considered by the Hon'ble Apex Court as labour, because
his work was manual and not supervisory. Therefore he falls
within the definition of labour and the termination of service
made by the management is retrenchment, which has
been done in violation of the provisions of Section 60N of F
the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Therefore his
termination of service is improper and illegal. On this basis
he may be reinstated in service alongwith salary for leave
period.
G
14. It has been argued on behalf of Management that out
of the works executed by the Applicant on the post of Fleet
Executive, the details of the paid work are mentioned in
their written statement. The same has been admitted by
H
296 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 1 S.C.R.
A the Applicant in his arguments. In this manner, the details
regarding the main work out of the works on the post of
Fleet Executive being done by him is proved. All these
works are supervisory in nature. The major work of repair
of the vehicle used to be done fro,m outside. The work of
B washing.and cleaning of the vehicles was done by driver.
The Applicant has never done any type of repairing work
and neither anybody has seen the Applicant while doing
such work. In this manner mainly the Applicant was doing
the work of supervisory nature. Therefore does not fall
c within the definition of labour. His services have been
terminated under the terms. In this manner the order of
termination of his service is proper and legal. He is not
entitled to get any relief.
15. The main question in this industrial dispute is whether
D the Applicant K.K. Pandey is a labour, as claimed by him,
as this claim has been made by him and as such onus to
prove the same lies on him. Accor.ding to para 11 and 12
of his written statement he was having only one
responsibility on the post of fleet executive that he was to
E ensure the availability of the vehicles free from technical
deformities. According to the written statement for this
work nobody was working under him and he used to do
the work of repair with his own hands. He has reiterated
this fact in his statement also. In this regard except his
F statement has not produced any evidence to confirm the
same. On the other hand he has admitted in his arguments
as regards the details of different works mentioned by the
management in para No.1 of their written statement.
According to it out of his works, there is a detail of 15 main
G works. In this manner the statement made by the Applicant
regarding his main work remained rebutted. The statement
of the Applicant regarding the post of Fleet Executive on
the basis of which he is claiming himself as labour is not
liable to be believed."
H
PEPSICO INDIA HOLDING PVT. LTD. v. KRISHNA 297
KANT PANDEY [M.Y. EQBAL, J.]
11. On the basis of the findings based on elaborate A
discussions and analyzing the evidence, the Labour Court came
to the conclusion that at the relevant time the respondent was
working as a Fleet Executive which is supervisory in nature and
does not fall within the definition of 'labour' as defined under
Section 2(z) of the Act. Hence, he is not entitled to any relief. B
The respondent challenged the aforesaid'award passed by the
Labour Court in a writ petition before the High Court. After
considering the definition contained in Section 2(z) of the Act
and the nature of work assigned to the respondent, the High
Court arrived at a conclusion that the nature of work prevalent c
on the date of termination was as that of a workman. Curiously
enough, though the respondent did not come under the
definition of workman under Section 2(z) of the Act, the High
Court proceeded on the basis that the U.P. Industrial Disputes
Act was enacted in 1947 and although the respondent cannot D
be held to be a workman under the said definition, held that he
shall have to be classified as a workman and directed the
Government to make amendment in Section 2(z) of the Act
excluding some of the clauses. For better appreciation, relevant
portion of the order is quoted hereinbelow:-
E
"There is one more exclusion clause in section 2(z) of the
Act i.e. Clause (iv) which excludes the employee who being
employed in supervisory capacity draws wages exceeding
Rs. 500/- per mensem or exercise, either by the nature of
the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers F
vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial in nature.
It is very much obvious that by nature of duties assigned
to the petitioner, it cannot be said that he was attached to
the office or mainly managerial function was vested with
him. G
So far as another condition for exclusion from the
definition of "workman" viz drawing wages exceeding Rs.
500/- per mensem is concerned, it is not in dispute that
the petitioner on the date of retrenchment had been getting
H
298 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 1 S.C.R.
A more Rs. 500/- mensem. This clause is a part of original
form of the definition of "workman" as is provided under
section 2 (z) of the Act. The U. P. Industrial Disputes Act
was enacted in 1947. The petitioner was retrenched from
service in 2003. The date of his initial appointment is on
B 13th of March, 1995. By passage of time the GDP growth
had been increased in number of times from 1947 to 2003.
Therefore, the enhancement in income was a natural
corollary, in the light of which, I am of the view that this
clause has become unworkable and redundant. Now every
c workman working in the Industry definitely would have been
getting more than Rs. 500/- per mensem and if this clause
is permitted to be prevailed no workman shall be governed
under the definition of "workman". Therefore, I am of the
view that this clause has lost its significance and if the
employee is covered under the definition of "workman" as
D
is defined under Section 2 (z) of the U. P. Industrial
Disputes Act and further is not covered under the exclusion
clause except clause (iv), he shall be classified as
"workman". The clause (iv) of section 2 (z) shall not come
in the way-of his categorization as "workman".
E
It is advisable to the State Government to consider to
make an amendment in section 2 (z) of the U. P. Industrial
Disputes Act, 194 7 in general and to exclude the class (iv)
from the exclusion in particular.
F
Since the present petitioner has been classified by this
court, as above, under the definition of "workman" the
order impugned dated 24th of August, 2007 passed by the
Industrial Tribunal II, State of U. P., Lucknow is hereby
quashed with the direction to the Tribunal to proceed with
G
the adjudication case No. 82/2004 to adjudicate upon it
on merit."
12. Considering the entire facts of the case and the
findings recorded by the Labour Court, prima facie we are of
H the view that the High Court has exceeded in exercise of its
PEPSICO INDIA HOLDING PVT. LTD. v. KRISHNA 299
KANT PANDEY [M.Y. EQBAL, J.]
jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of A
India in interfering with the finding of facts recorded by the
Labour Court. It is well settled that the High Court in the guise
of exercising its jurisdiction normally should not interfere under
Article 227 of the Constitution and convert itself into a court of
appeal. B
13. While discussing the power of the High Court under
Articles 22p and 227 of the Constitution interfering with the facts
recorded by the courts or the tribunal, this Court in the case of
Chandavarkar S.R. Rao vs. Asha!ata S. Guram, (supra) held
as under:- C
"17. In case of finding of facts, the co'urt should not interfere
in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
Constitution. Reference may be made to the observations
of this Court in Bathutmal Raichand Oswa/ v. Laxmibai D
R. Tarla where this Court observed that the High Court
could not in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under
Article 227 convert itself into a court of appeal when the
legislature has not conferred a right of appeal. The High
Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by E
examining the evidence and reappreciating. Speaking for
the Court, Bhagwati, J. as the learned Chief Justice then
was, observed at p. 1301 of the report as follows: (SCC
p. 864, para 7)
"The special civil application preferred by the appellant F
was admittedly an application under Article 227 and it is,
therefore, material only to consider the scope and ambit
of the jurisdiction of the High Court under that article. Did
the High Court have jurisdiction in an application under
Article 227 to disturb the findings of fact reached by the G
District Court? lt'is well settled by the decision of this Court
in Watyam Singh v. Amarnath that the
... power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is,
H
300 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 1 S.C.R.
A as pointed out by Harries, C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airways v.
Sukumar Mukherjee to be exercised most sparingly and
only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate
courts within the bounds of their authority and not for
correcting mere errors.
B
This statement of law was quoted with approval in the
subsequent decision of this Court in Nagendra Nath Bose
v. Commr. of Hills Division and it was pointed out by
Sinha, J., as he then was, speaking on behalf of the court
in that case:
c
It is thus, clear that the powers of judicial interference under
Article 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or
quasi-judicial nature, are not greater than the power under
Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226 the power
D of interference may extend to quashing an impugned order
on the ground of a mistake apparent on the face of the
record: But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power
of interference is limited to seeing that the tribunal functions
within the limits of its authority."
E
14. In the case of Bir/a Corpn. Ltd.. vs. Rajeshwar Mahato
and Others, (2001) 1O sec, the question of validity of
termination of services of the respondent by the appellant-
Corporation was referred to the Industrial Tribunal. On
evidence, the Industrial Tribunal found that the duties of the
F respondent were mainly managerial or administrative. The
Tribunal held that the respondent was not a workman and the
reference was therefore not maintainable against the decision
of the Tribunal. The Tribunal relying on Section 2(s)(iv) (as
amended in West Bengal W.B.) held that as the respondent was
G drawing salary less than Rs.1600/- per month, he had to be
regarded as a workman. The Corporation moved this Court
against the order of the High Court. This Court while setting
aside the decision of the High Court held as under :-
H "4. It was not in dispute that at the time of the termination
PEPSICO INDIA HOLDING PVT. LTD. v. KRISHNA 301
KANT PANDEY [M:Y. EQBAL, J.]
of services of Respondent 1, he was receiving Rs 1185 A
per month by way of salary. The Tribunal recorded the
evidence as well as took into consideration documentary
evidence which was produced by the parties. On the basis
of the evidence which was adduced before it, the Tribunal
observed that: B
''The main duties of Shri Rajeshwar Mahato
were both supervisory and administrative in
nature.
In the instant case, Shri Mahato's functions C
were mainly of a managerial nature. He had
control as well as supervision over the work
of the jute mill workers working under him."
11. As we have also noticed hereinabove, the Tribunal had D
given a categorical finding to the effect that Respondent
1's function was mainly of managerial nature. His duties
were both supervisory and administrative and therefore he
was regarded as not being a workman. Though the
Tribunal did not specifically state so, it is evident that it is
E
because of Section 2(s)(iii) that Respondent 1 was
regarded as not being a workman.
12. Neither the Single Judge nor the Division Bench of the
High Court, as we have already noticed, referred to this
aspect of the matter. Even assuming that the West Bengal F
amendment was applicable, that would still not help to hold
Respondent 1 as a workman if the finding of the Tribunal
with 'egard to the nature of the duties performed by him,
as arrived at by the Tribunal, is not set aside as being
frivolous or without any evidence. As long as the finding G
of the Tribunal stands, namely, that the respondent was an
employee mainly in a managerial or administrative
capacity, the award of the Tribunal could not have been set
aside. As we have already observed the Single Judge or
even the Division Bench could have come to the H
302 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 1 S.C.R.
A conclusion that the finding so arrived at by the Tribunal was
either frivolous or not based on any evidence. But this
aspect of the case was completely overlooked by the High
Court. The emphasis of the Single Judge as well as the
Division Bench was only with regard to applicability of the
B amendment of the State of West Bengal to Section 2(s)
of the Industrial Disputes Act. In our opinion, therefore, the
High Court erred in allowing on this ground the writ petition
filed by Respondent 1. The decision of the High Court is
set aside and the writ petition filed therein by the
respondent stands dismissed."
c
15. In the case of Indian Overseas Bank vs. /. O.B. Staff
Canteen Workers' Union and Another, (2000) 4 SCC 245, this
Court considered a similar question with regard to the power
of the High Court under Article 226 against the findings
D recorded by the Industrial Tribunal. Reversing the decision of
the Single Judge and restoring the fact finding decision of the
Tribunal this, Court held :-
"17. The learned Single Judge seems to have undertaken
E an exercise, impermissible for him in exercising writ
jurisdiction, by liberally reappreciating the evidence and
drawing conclusions of his own on pure questions of fact,
unmindful, though aware fully, that he is not exercising any
appellate jurisdiction over the awards passed by a tribunal,
presided over by a judicial officer. The findings of fact
F
recorded by a fact-finding authority duly constituted for the
purpose and which ordinarily should be considered to have
become final, cannot be disturbed for the mere ceason of
having been based on materials or evidence not sufficient
or credible in the opinion of the writ court to warrant those
G findings, at any rate, as long as they are based upon some
material which are relevant for the purpose or even on the
ground that. there is yet another view which can reasonably
and possibly be taken. The Division Bench was not only
justified but well merited in its criticism of the order of the
H
PEPSICO INDIA HOLDING PVT. LTD. v. KRISHNA 303
KANT PANDEY [M.Y. EQBAL, J.]
learned Single Judge and in ordering restoration of the A
award of the Tribunal. On being taken through the findings
of the Industrial Tribunal as well as the order of the learned
Single Judge and the judgment of the Division Bench, we
are of the view that the Industrial Tribunal had overwhelming
materials which constituted ample and sufficient basis for B
recording its findings, as it did, and the manner of
consideration undertaken, the objectivity of approach
adopted and reasonableness of findings recorded seem
to be unexceptionable. The only course, therefore, open
to the writ Judge was to find out the satisfaction or c
otherwise of the relevant criteria laid down by this Court,
before sustaining the claim of the canteen workmen, on the
facts found and recorded by the fact-finding authority and
not embark upon an exercise of reassessing the evidence
and arriving at findings of one's own, altogether giving a
D
complete go-by even to the facts specifically found by the
Tribunal below."
16. The order of the Tribunal would show that the
respondent-workman accepted different works assigned to him
which were purely of supervisory and managerial nature. The E
details of 15 managerial/supervisory works assigned to the
respondent have been analyzed by the Tribunal which finally
came to the conclusion that the respondent is not a workman
within the meaning of Section 2(z) of the Act.
F
17. In exercise of its writ jurisdiction, the High Court
proceeded initially on the basis that the appellant had entered
into service on the post of Operator/Technician Grade-Ill, which
is a technical post and from there he was promoted to different
posts including Fleet Executive. The High Court committed
G
grave error in holding that although he is not covered under the
definition of workman as defined under Section 2(z) of the Act
he shall be classified as a workman. The High Court further
exceeded its jurisdiction in advising the Government to make
an amendment in Section 2(z) of the Act and to exclude some
H
304 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 1 S.C.R.
A clauses. The order passed by the High Court cannot be
sustained in law.
18. We, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the order
of the High Court and restore the order passed by the Tribunal.
However, we give liberty to the respondent to move the
8
appropriate forum to challenge, in accordance with law, the
order of termination passed by the appellant.
Kalpana K. Tripathy Appeal allowed.
Search Indian case law
Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.
Try "workman definition"Sign in to search