Holding

Section 12 of the Limitation Act applies to Section 34(3) proceedings, and because the three‑month period expired on a court holiday, Section 4 extends the time, rendering the respondent’s Section 34 application filed on the next working day timely.

Summary

The parties entered into a contract for bauxite mining, and an arbitral award dated 9 April 2022 was issued in favour of the appellant. The respondent filed an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 on 11 July 2022 to set aside the award. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to the three‑month limitation period in Section 34(3) and, if so, whether the expiry of that period on 9 July 2022 – a court holiday – invokes Section 4 of the Limitation Act. The Court held that Section 12(1) does apply, so the day of receipt (9 April 2022) is excluded and the limitation runs from 10 April 2022, expiring on 9 July 2022. Since that day was a non‑working day, Section 4 extends the period, making the filing on the next working day (11 July 2022) timely. Consequently, the High Court’s decision was affirmed and the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

Does Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 apply to the computation of the limitation period under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996?
Is an application filed on the next working day after the expiry of the three‑month period, when the expiry day is a court holiday, deemed to be within the limitation period under Section 4 of the Limitation Act?

Legislation cited

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996s. 34(3)
Limitation Act, 1963s. 12, s. 4

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Matter pertains to the applicability of s.12 of the Limitation Act to proceedings u/s.34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; and whether the application filed by the respondent u/s.34 was barred Act, 1996 – s.34 – Limitation Act, 1963 – s.12 – Limitation period for filing an application to set aside an arbitral award – Applicability of s.12 of the 1963 Act to s. 34 proceedings – On facts, arbitral award in favour of the appellant signed and

Subjects

Barred by limitationArbitral awardLimitation period as “three months”Condonable period as “thirty days”Working day of the courtRecall application3 months not 90 daysLimitation Act applicable to arbitration proceedingsExcluding day of receiving signed copy of award

Judgment

[2025] 5 S.C.R. 401 : 2025 INSC 438

M/s R. K. Transport Company
v.
M/s Bharat Aluminum Company Ltd. (BALCO)
(Civil Appeal No. 4763 of 2025)
03 April 2025
[Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha* and
Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Matter pertains to the applicability of s.12 of the Limitation Act to
proceedings u/s.34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996;
and whether the application filed by the respondent u/s.34 was
barred by limitation.

Headnotes†
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.34 – Limitation
Act, 1963 – s.12 – Limitation period for filing an application
to set aside an arbitral award – Applicability of s.12 of the
1963 Act to s. 34 proceedings – On facts, arbitral award in
favour of the appellant signed and delivered to respondent
on 09.04.2022 – Respondent filed application to set aside
the award on 11.07.2022 – Trial court held the application
to be within limitation as the 3-month period expired on
09.07.2022, which was a second Saturday and the following
day was a Sunday, and since the court was closed on these
days, the respondent filed application on the next working
day-11.07.2022 – Recall application by appellant – Trial court
allowed the same holding that s.34 application was barred by
limitation as the 3-month period expired on 08.07.2022 on which
day the court was working – Appeal u/s.37 by respondent,
allowed by the High Court – Correctness:
Held: Statutory language of s.34(3) clearly stipulates the limitation
period as “three months”, as opposed to the condonable period as
“thirty days” – Difference in language unambiguously demonstrates
the legislative intent that the limitation period is 3 calendar months
as opposed to 90 days – Thus, it cannot be said that 3 months
must be read as 90 days in the context of s.34(3) – Nothing in the

* Author
402 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

statutory language or scheme of s.34(3) that is contraindicative
that s.12(1) does not apply – On facts, since s.12(1) applies, date
of receiving signed copy of award must be excluded and 3-month
limitation period must be reckoned from 10.04.2022 which expires
on 09.07.2022, which was a second Saturday when the court was
not working – Benefit of s.4 of the Limitation Act will inure to the
benefit of the respondent – Thus, the respondent’s application filed
on 11.07.2022-next working day of the court, must be considered
as being filed within the limitation period – No delay in filing the
application and sufficient cause need not be shown for condonation
of delay – High Court rightly allowed the appeal u/s.37 and held that
the respondent’s application u/s.34 was filed within the limitation
period. [Paras 8, 12-15]

Case Law Cited
My Preferred Transformation & Hospitality Pvt Ltd v. Faridabad
Implements Pvt Ltd., 2025 INSC 56 – relied on.
State of Himachal Pradesh v. Himachal Techno Engineers [2010] 8
SCR 1025 : (2010) 12 SCC 210; Bhimashankar Sahakari Sakkare
Karkhane Niyamita v. Walchandnagar Industries Limited [2023] 4
SCR 361 : (2023) 8 SCC 453; State of West Bengal v. Rajpath
Contractors and Engineers Ltd. [2024] 7 SCR 1 : (2024) 7 SCC
257 – referred to.

List of Acts
Limitation Act, 1963; Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

List of Keywords
Barred by limitation; Arbitral award; Limitation period as “three
months”; Condonable period as “thirty days”; Working day of the
court; Recall application; 3 months not 90 days; Condonable period;
Limitation Act applicable to arbitration proceedings; Excluding day
of receiving signed copy of award.

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4763 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 27.09.2024 of the High Court
of Chhatisgarh at Bilaspur in ARBA No. 17 of 2023
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 403

M/s R. K. Transport Company v.
M/s Bharat Aluminum Company Ltd. (BALCO)

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Mukul Rohatgi, Sr. Adv., Arshdeep Singh Khurana, Sanjay Abbot,
Ms. Devanshi Singh, Manohar Pratap, Peeyush Bhatia, Sulakshan
V.S., Harsh Srivastava.
Advs. for the Respondent:
Ranjit Kumar, Sr. Adv., Rishabh Garg, Ravi Raghunath.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J.

1. Leave granted.
2. It is just as necessary to follow a precedent as it is to make a
precedent.
3. The present appeal arises out of an order of the Chhattisgarh High
Court dated 27.09.2024 by which it allowed the respondent’s appeal
under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 19961 and
held the respondent’s application under Section 34 as being filed
within the limitation period.
4. The short facts necessary for adjudication are as follows. The parties
entered into a contract on 01.04.2002 for bauxite mining and delivery.
Pursuant to disputes arising on payments under the contract, the
matter was referred to arbitration, resulting in an arbitral award of
Rs. 51,33,40,100 dated 09.04.2022 in favour of the appellant. It is
undisputed that the award was signed and delivered to the respondent
on this very day. The respondent filed an application to set aside the
award under Section 34 on 11.07.2022, along with an application
for stay of the award. The Trial Court, on 13.07.2022, passed an
ex-parte order that the Section 34 application was within limitation
as the 3-month period expired on 09.07.2022, which was a second
Saturday and the following day was a Sunday. Since the court was
closed on both these days, the respondent filed the application on

1 Hereinafter “ACA”.
404 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

the next working day. It also directed the respondent to deposit
50% of the arbitral sum. It is relevant to note that such amount was
deposited by the respondent, and the same has been withdrawn by
the appellant after furnishing a bank guarantee.
5. The appellant challenged the order dated 13.07.2022 by filing a writ
petition under Article 227 of the Constitution, wherein the High Court
gave the appellant liberty to file a recall application as the Trial Court
order had been passed ex-parte. The appellant filed such recall
application before the Trial Court, which was allowed on 25.04.2023
and it was held that the Section 34 application is barred by limitation
as the 3-month period expired on 08.07.2022 on which day the court
was working. The respondent filed a Section 37 appeal against this
order, which was allowed by the High Court by the order impugned
herein. The High Court relied on Section 12 of the Limitation Act,
19632 and this Court’s decision in State of Himachal Pradesh v.
Himachal Techno Engineers3 to hold that the limitation period expired
on 09.07.2022, which was a court holiday. Therefore, Section 4 of
the Limitation Act becomes applicable as per Bhimashankar Sahakari
Sakkare Karkhane Niyamita v. Walchandnagar Industries Limited,4
and the Section 34 application must be considered as being within
the limitation period as it was filed on the next working day. The High
Court remanded the parties to appear before the Trial Court, and
also directed that the interim order in respect of execution of pending
recovery shall continue till the application is decided on merits.
6. We have heard learned senior counsel, Mr. Mukul Rohatgi for the
appellant and learned senior counsel, Mr. Ranjit Kumar for the
respondent and have also perused the written submissions.
7. Mr. Rohatgi submitted that the limitation period must be calculated
from the date on which the award was received by the respondent,
i.e., 09.04.2022 and therefore, the 3-month limitation period expired
on 08.07.2022. He submitted that the Limitation Act, including Section
12, does not apply to proceedings under Section 34 of the ACA.
Since the court was working on the date on which limitation expired,
Section 4 of the Limitation Act will not apply to hold the application

2 Hereinafter “the Limitation Act”.
3 (2010) 12 SCC 210
4 (2023) 8 SCC 453
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 405

M/s R. K. Transport Company v.
M/s Bharat Aluminum Company Ltd. (BALCO)

filed on 11.07.2022 as being within the limitation period. There was a
3-day delay in filing the Section 34 application but the respondent did
not file an application for condonation that showed sufficient cause
to condone the delay. Finally, he also submitted that the respondent
must be required to deposit 100% of the arbitral sum, and the High
Court has not offered any reasons for restricting the deposit to 50%.
7.1 On the other hand, Mr. Ranjit Kumar has relied on Section
12 of the Limitation Act and the judgment in Himachal Techno
Engineers (supra) to submit that the date on which the arbitral
award was received, i.e. 09.04.2022, must be excluded while
calculating the limitation period. Hence, the High Court rightly
concluded that the 3-month period commencing on 10.04.2022
expired on 09.07.2022, which was a court holiday and therefore
Section 4 of the Limitation Act is attracted and the application
was filed in time. He also took us through the prayer in the
Article 227 writ petition to show us that the appellant only sought
deposit of 60% of the amount before the High Court and a bank
guarantee for the remaining 40%, and hence cannot demand
deposit of the entire amount at this stage.
8. Section 34(3) of the ACA stipulates the limitation period for filing
an application to set aside an arbitral award as 3 months from the
date on which the party receives the arbitral award, which can be
further extended by 30 days on sufficient cause being shown.5 At
this stage, it is necessary to reiterate that the statutory language
of Section 34(3) clearly stipulates the limitation period as “three
months”, as opposed to the condonable period as “thirty days”. This
difference in language unambiguously demonstrates the legislative
intent that the limitation period is 3 calendar months as opposed to
90 days.6 Therefore, we reject the argument taken by the appellant
in its written submissions that 3 months must be read as 90 days
in the context of Section 34(3).

5 Section 34(3) of the ACA reads:
“34. Application for setting aside arbitral award.— (3) An application for setting aside may not
be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application
had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under section 33, from the date on
which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal:
Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from
making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within
a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter.”
6 Himachal Techno Engineers (supra), paras 14 and 15.
406 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

9. We will now deal with how limitation must be calculated in the present
case. The law on the applicability of the Limitation Act to Section
34 proceedings has been summarised by us in a recent decision
in My Preferred Transformation & Hospitality Pvt Ltd v. Faridabad
Implements Pvt Ltd 7 as follows:
“23. …Through the above discussion, it is amply clear
that there is no wholesale exclusion of the provisions of
the Limitation Act in calculating the period of limitation
under Section 34(3). Rather, each provision’s applicability/
exclusion has been individually tested by this Court, on a
case-to-case basis, based on the language and purpose
of the specific provision in the Limitation Act, the language
of Section 34(3) of the ACA, and the scheme and object
of the ACA…”
10. The applicability of Section 12 of the Limitation Act is in issue in the
present case. The relevant portion of Section 12 reads:
“12. Exclusion of time in legal proceedings.— (1) In
computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal
or application, the day from which such period is to be
reckoned, shall be excluded…”
11. This Court in Himachal Techno Engineers (supra) held that Section
12(1) of the Limitation Act applies while calculating the limitation period
under Section 34(3) such that the day from which such period is to be
reckoned must be excluded.8 The relevant portion reads as follows:
“12. Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides for
exclusion of time in legal proceedings. Sub-section (1)
thereof provides that in computing the period of limitation
for any application, the day from which such period is to
be reckoned, shall be excluded. The applicability of Section
12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to petitions under Section
34 of the Act is not excluded by the provisions of the Act.”
12. In the recent decision in State of West Bengal v. Rajpath Contractors
and Engineers Ltd 9 also, this Court applied Section 12(1) while

7 2025 INSC 56
8 Himachal Techno Engineers (supra), para 12.
9 (2024) 7 SCC 257
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 407

M/s R. K. Transport Company v.
M/s Bharat Aluminum Company Ltd. (BALCO)

calculating the limitation period of 3 months under Section 34(3).10
There is nothing in the statutory language or scheme of Section 34(3)
that is contraindicative that Section 12(1) does not apply.
13. In the present case, the respondent received a signed copy of the
award on 09.04.2022. Since Section 12(1) applies, this date must
be excluded and the 3-month limitation period must be reckoned
from 10.04.2022. This expires on 09.07.2022, which happened to
be a second Saturday when the court was not working. Hence, the
benefit of Section 4 of the Limitation Act will inure to the benefit of the
respondent. This position of law is well-settled and has been reiterated
by us in My Preferred Transformation & Hospitality (supra) as follows:
“35. Summarising the Current Position of Law: From the
reasoning and decisions in the above cases, the following
conclusions evidently follow:
35.1 First, Section 4 of the Limitation Act applies to Section
34(3) of the ACA.
35.2 Second, Section 4 of the Limitation Act benefits a
party only when the “prescribed period’’, i.e. the 3-month
limitation period under Section 34(3) expires on a court
holiday. In such a situation, the application under Section 34
will be considered as having been filed within the limitation
period if it is filed on the next working day of the court.
35.3 Third, Section 4 of the Limitation Act does not come
to the aid of the party when the 3-month limitation period
expires on a day when the court was working. The 30-day
condonable period expiring during the court holidays will
not survive and neither Section 4, nor any other provision
of the Limitation Act, will inure to the benefit of the party
to enable filing of the Section 34 application immediately
after reopening.

10 ibid, para 8. The relevant portion of this decision reads as follows:
“8. As per Section 12(1) of the Limitation Act, the day from which the limitation period is
to be reckoned must be excluded. In this case, the period of limitation for filing a petition
under Section 34 will have to be reckoned from 30-6-2022, when the appellants received
the award. In view of Section 12(1) of the Limitation Act, 30-6-2022 will have to be excluded
while computing the limitation period. Thus, in effect, the period of limitation, in the facts of
the case, started running on 1-7-2022. The period of limitation is of three months and not
ninety days. Therefore, from the starting point of 1-7-2022, the last day of the period of three
months would be 30-9-2022. As noted earlier, the pooja vacation started on 1-10-2022.”
408 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

35.4 Fourth, since Section 4 of the Limitation Act applies to
proceedings under Section 34 of the ACA, the applicability
of Section 10 of the GCA stands excluded in view of the
express wording of its proviso that excludes the applicability
of the provision when the Limitation Act applies.”
14. Therefore, the respondent’s application under Section 34, which was
filed on 11.07.2022, i.e., the next working day of the court, must be
considered as being filed within the limitation period. Consequently,
there was no delay in filing the application and sufficient cause need
not be shown for condonation of delay. The High Court therefore
rightly allowed the Section 37 appeal and held that the respondent’s
Section 34 application was filed within the limitation period.
15. Further, we do not wish to interfere with the High Court’s direction to
stay the execution of pending recovery till the matter is adjudicated
on merits, since the same is interim in nature and the appellant
has already withdrawn 50% of the arbitral sum that was deposited
by the respondent. In this view of the matter, the present appeal is
dismissed.
16. No order as to costs.
17. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.

Result of the case: Appeal dismissed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain