Holding

Section 406 CrPC cannot be invoked merely for lack of territorial jurisdiction; transfer is permissible only when there is a reasonable apprehension of miscarriage of justice, and the complaint filed in Chandigarh is within jurisdiction under Section 142(2) of the NI Act, so no transfer is warranted.

Summary

Shri Sendhur Agro & Oil Industries, a proprietorship based in Coimbatore, defaulted on an overdraft facility and Kotak Mahindra Bank filed a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act in the Judicial Magistrate Court at Chandigarh. The petitioner sought transfer of the criminal case to a court in Tamil Nadu, arguing that the complaint lacked territorial jurisdiction and that the proceedings were intended to harass them. The Supreme Court examined whether Section 406 of the Code of Criminal Procedure could be invoked to transfer a case solely on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and what the phrase "expedient for the ends of justice" entails. It held that transfer under Section 406 is discretionary and requires a reasonable apprehension of miscarriage of justice, not mere inconvenience, and that the complaint filed in Chandigarh is within jurisdiction under Section 142(2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Consequently, the Court dismissed the transfer petitions, finding no basis for relocation of the trial.

Issues considered

Whether a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act can be transferred from one court to another on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction using the power under Section 406 CrPC.
If the court where the complaint is filed lacks territorial jurisdiction, can Section 406 CrPC be exercised to transfer the case to a court having proper jurisdiction.
Whether the expression "for the ends of justice" in Section 406 CrPC includes the mere absence of territorial jurisdiction of the court.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 406
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881s. 138, s. 142, s. 142A
Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Issue arose whether a complaint filed u/s.138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, can be ordered to be transferred from one court to the other having territorial jurisdiction to try the offence in exercise of powers u/s.406 CrPC on the ground of lack of the court in which the complaint is filed; and whether the expression “that for the ends of justice, this Court can transfer any criminal case or appeal to any place” in s.406 CrPC embraces in itself the lack of territorial jurisdiction of the court to try the offence u/s.138

Subjects

Transfer of proceedingsTransfer of criminal cases by Supreme CourtTransfer of civil casesDishonour of chequeOverdraft facilityInconvenience to petitionerLanguage barrierDebt Recovery TribunalExpedient for the ends of justiceTransfer from one court to the other having territorial jurisdiction to try the offenceLack of territorial jurisdictionTransfer any criminal case or appeal to any placeTransfer of trialPlace where cheque was presented for collectionWord delivered used in s.142(2)(a) NI ActExpression ‘for collection through an account’Cause of action

Judgment

[2025] 3 S.C.R. 714 : 2025 INSC 328

M/s Shri Sendhur Agro & Oil Industries
v.
Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd.
(Transfer Petition (Crl.) No. 608 of 2024)
06 March 2025
[J.B. Pardiwala* and R. Mahadevan, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Issue arose whether a complaint filed u/s.138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, can be ordered to be transferred from one court
to the other having territorial jurisdiction to try the offence in
exercise of powers u/s.406 CrPC on the ground of lack of territorial
jurisdiction of the court in which the complaint is filed; and whether
the expression “that for the ends of justice, this Court can transfer
any criminal case or appeal to any place” in s.406 CrPC embraces
in itself the lack of territorial jurisdiction of the court to try the
offence u/s.138 Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Headnotes†
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.406 – Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881 – ss.138, 142, 142A – Transfer of
criminal case by Supreme Court – Petitioner-proprietorship
concern defaulted on payment of its EMI’s of overdraft availed
from respondent bank – Respondent instituted proceedings
in Chandigarh, where it had presented the cheque that was
dishonoured – Case of the petitioner that court in Chandigarh
has no jurisdiction as the entire transaction took place in
Tamil Nadu, and proceedings are initiated solely with an intent
to harass the petitioner to travel all the way to Chandigarh
only to attend the court proceedings – Petitioner initiated
transfer proceedings u/s.406 to transfer the proceedings from
Chandigarh to Chennai:
Held: No case made out for transfer of the proceedings u/s.406 –
For the purpose of transfer of any case or proceedings u/s.406, the
case must fall within the ambit of the expression “expedient for the
ends of justice” – Mere inconvenience or hardship that the accused
may have to face in travelling from Coimbatore to Chandigarh
would not fall within the expression “expedient for the ends of
justice” – Transfer of cases u/s.406 Cr.P.C. may be allowed when
* Author
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 715

M/s Shri Sendhur Agro & Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd.

there is a reasonable apprehension backed by evidence that justice
may not be done and mere convenience or inconvenience of the
parties may not by itself be sufficient enough to pray for transfer –
Court has to appropriately balance the grounds raised in the facts
and circumstances of each case and exercise its discretion in a
circumspect manner while ordering a transfer u/s.406 – No rigid
and inflexible rule or test could be laid down to decide whether or
not the power u/s.406 should be exercised – An order of transfer of
trial is not to be passed as a matter of routine and more particularly
on the plea of lack of territorial jurisdiction of the court to try the
offence u/s.138 NI Act – This power has to be exercised cautiously
and in exceptional situations, where it becomes necessary to do so
to provide credibility to the trial – When a complainant institutes a
case in a court of his choosing and such a court has the territorial
jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter then the transfer of such case
has to be guided by principles that would achieve the ends of
justice – Meaning of “ends of justice” essentially refers to justice
for all the parties involved in the litigation – It is clear on a reading
of s.142(2)(a) and the Explanation thereto that the court of the
place where such cheque was presented for collection, will have
the jurisdiction to entertain the complaint alleging the commission
of offence punishable u/s.138 – Word ‘delivered’ used in s.142(2)(a)
NI Act has no significance, whereas the expression ‘for collection
through an account’ is significant – Delivery of the cheque takes
place where the cheque was issued and presentation of the
cheque will be through the account of the payee or holder in due
course, and the said place is decisive to determine the question
of jurisdiction. [Paras 47, 49, 54, 55, 62, 65, 66]
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – ss.138, 142, 142A – Cause
of action – Meaning. [Para 56]

Case Law Cited
Yogesh Upadhaya and Another v. Atlanta Limited [2023] 2 SCR 511 :
2023 SCC OnLine SC 170; K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan
Balan [1999] Supp. 3 SCR 271 : (1999) 7 SCC 510; Dashrath
Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra [2014] 11 SCR 921 :
(2014) 9 SCC 129; Bridgestone India Private Limited v. Inderpal
Singh [2015] 14 SCR 153 : (2016) 2 SCC 75; A.E. Premanand v.
Escorts Finance Ltd. (2004) 13 SCC 52; Kaushik Chatterjee v.
State of Haryana and Ors. [2020] 9 SCR 311 : (2020) 10 SCC 92;
Bhiaru Ram & Ors. v. Central Bureau of Investigation& Ors. [2010]
9 SCR 554 : (2010) 7 SCC 799; Rajkumar Sabu v. Sabu Trade
716 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

Private Limited [2021] 7 SCR 1 : 2021 SCC OnLine SC 378;
Nahar Singh Yadav & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. [2010] 13 SCR
851 : (2011) 1 SCC 307; Amarinder Singh v. Parkash Singh Badal
[2009] 9 SCR 194 : (2009) 6 SCC 260; Maneka Sanjay Gandhi
v. Rani Jethmalani [1979] 2 SCR 378 : (1979) 4 SCC 167; Yakub
Abdul Razak Memon v. State of Maharashtra [2013] 15 SCR 1 :
(2013) 13 SCC 1; Mahadev Govind Gharge v. LAO [2011] 8 SCR
829 : (2011) 6 SCC 321; State of Madras v. C.P. Agencies, AIR
1960 SC 1309 – referred to.
Mst. Chand Kour v. Pratab Singh, 15 Indian Appeals 156; State
of Madhya Pradesh v. K.P. Ghiara, 1956 SCC OnLine SC 85;
Refex Energy Ltd. v. Union of India 2019 SCC Online Mad
9941 – referred to.
United States v. National City Lines, 337 U.S. 78 – referred to.

List of Acts
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Negotiable Instruments Act,
1881; Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and
Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002.

List of Keywords
Transfer of proceedings; Transfer of criminal cases by Supreme
Court; Transfer of civil cases; Dishonour of cheque; Overdraft facility;
Inconvenience to petitioner; Language barrier; Debt Recovery
Tribunal; Expedient for the ends of justice; Transfer from one court
to the other having territorial jurisdiction to try the offence; Lack of
territorial jurisdiction; Transfer any criminal case or appeal to any
place; Transfer of trial; Place where cheque was presented for
collection; Word delivered used in s.142(2)(a) NI Act; Expression
‘for collection through an account’; Cause of action.

Case Arising From
CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Transfer Petition (Crl.) No.
608 of 2024
Petition Filed Under Section 406 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973
With
T.P. (Crl.) No(s). 670, 761, 662, 977 And 850 of 2024
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 717

M/s Shri Sendhur Agro & Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd.

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Petitioner:
Nikhil Goel, Sr. Adv., Kaushal Kishore, C. Solomon, Bikash Chandra,
Amit Pratap Shaunak, Jitendra Kumar Sah, Zulfiqar Ali Khan,
Chetan Bairwa, Mohd Israr Khan, Ms. D Durga Devi, Ms. Siddhi
Gupta, Pranab Prakash.
Advs. for the Respondent:
Jayant Mehta, Sr. Adv., Ms. Sonia Dube, Ms. Kanchan Yadav,
Tanishq Sharma, Ms. Chetna Bisht, Ms. Saumya Sharma,
Ms. Jasleen Virk, For M/s. Legal Options.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

J.B. Pardiwala, J.

1. Since the issues raised in all the captioned transfer petitions are the
same, those were taken up for hearing analogously and are being
disposed of by this common judgment and order.
2. For the sake of convenience, the Transfer Petition (Criminal) No.
608 of 2024 is treated as the lead matter.
3. This transfer petition filed under Section 406 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (for short, “the Cr.P.C.”) is at the instance of a
proprietary concern through its proprietor with a prayer to transfer
Criminal Case No. 4016 of 2021 titled as Kotak Mahindra Bank
Limited v. M/s Shri Sendhur Agro and Oil Industries pending in the
court of Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Chandigarh (UT) to the court
of Metropolitan Magistrate, Coimbatore, Tamil Nadu, essentially on
the ground that no cause of action could be said to have arose for
the bank to lodge the complaint for the offence punishable under
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short, the
N.I. Act) in Chandigarh.
4. In the memorandum of the transfer petition the following has been
pleaded:
“That the Petitioner herein seeks the transfer to Metropolitan
Magistrate Court, Chennai, Tamil Nadu on the following
grounds:
718 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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(a) Because in the facts and circumstance of the present
case, the transaction between the Petitioner and the
Respondent wholly happened in Coimbatore and the Courts
in Coimbatore alone will have the jurisdiction to entertain
the present criminal complaint. The Petitioner holds a
savings Account in the Respondent’s Coimbatore Branch
and the loan was also processed in the same branch.
All the previous EMI were also deducted from her Bank
Account in Coimbatore and credited to the loan account
maintained in the Coimbatore Branch. Therefore, the
Court in Chandigarh will have no jurisdiction to entertain
the present Criminal Complaint.
(b) Because in the facts and circumstances of the Instant/
case, under Sec. 142 of the Act the Court within whose
jurisdiction the Bank where the Cheque, is presented for
collection or where the Cheque is presented for payment
alone has the Jurisdiction to entertain the complaint under
Sec.138 of the Act. Whereas the present Complaint does
not satisfy any of the conditions under the Sec.142.
(c) Because in the facts and circumstances of the present
case, there are already pending proceedings between
the Petitioner and the Respondent in Coimbatore and the
Respondent has purposefully filed the present proceedings
in Ahmedabad only to harass the Petitioner with multiple
proceedings in different States.
(d) Because in the facts and circumstances of the instant
case the Court in Chandigarh had no jurisdiction to entertain
the criminal complaint as the Respondent’s headquarters in
Mumbai and it’s the branch office in Coimbatore had solely
processed the loan of the Petitioner. Hence the Court in
Chandigarh where no cause of action arose will not have
the jurisdiction to entertain the present proceedings.
(e) Because in the facts and circumstances of the instant
case, the Petitioner had opted to repay the EMI through
automatic deduction facility and the same gets credited
automatically into the loan account maintained by the
Branch office in Chennai. The automatic deduction for the
EMI is not branch specific. Therefore, the same does not
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 719

M/s Shri Sendhur Agro & Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd.

satisfy the conditions under Sec. 142 for filing the complaint
under Sec. 138 of the Act in Ahmedabad.
(f) Because in the present circumstances the present
proceedings are initiated solely with an intent to harass
the Petitioner to travel all the way to Chandigarh from
Kangeyum only to attend the court proceedings. The
Petitioner has been harassed by the Respondent for
over 5 years by using anti-social elements therefore the
Petitioner fears his safety to travel alone to Chandigarh
to attend the proceedings.
(g) Because in the facts and circumstances of the instant
case, the Petitioner doesn’t Know anyone in Chandigarh
and does not even know the local language to effectively
defend himself in the criminal proceedings initiated by the
Respondent.
(h) Because in the facts and circumstances of the instant
case, the Respondent Bank has already initiated Sarfaesi
proceedings for the recovery of entire loan amount. The
Respondent and its employees have colluded and sold the
properties of the Petitioner without any information. The
Petitioner has already filed appropriate proceedings against
the Respondent in Coimbatore. In the said circumstances,
the Criminal Complaint under Section 138 of Negotiable
Instruments Act is abuse of process of law.”

ORDER PASSED BY THIS COURT
5. On 22nd July 2024, this Court passed the following order:
“Mr. Nikhil Goel, learned senior counsel appearing for the
petitioner submits that the petitioner concern is engaged
in the business of producing coconut oil, selling coconut
oil and its byproducts and is situated at Coimbatore; that
the petitioner availed over-draft limits and terms from the
respondent-Bank at its R.S. Puram branch at Coimbatore;
that a loan was granted against the equitable mortgage
of properties located at Coimbatore and the money was
also disbursed at Coimbatore. The learned senior counsel
submits that only for the presentation of the cheque
720 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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the Bank has proceeded to Chandigarh. Issue notice,
returnable in four weeks. In the meantime, there shall be
stay of further proceedings in Complaint Case No.4016
of 2021 titled as “Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. Vs. M/s. Shri
Sendhur Agro and Oil Industries”, pending in the Court of
Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, UT, Chandigarh.”
6. Thereafter, on 29th November 2024, the following order was passed:
“1. The learned counsel appearing for the Respondent -
Bank prays for a short adjournment to seek appropriate
instructions in the matters.
2. Prima facie, it appears that the entire transaction had
taken place in Coimbatore, State of Tamil Nadu. However,
the Bank seems to have filed complaints under Section
138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 in Chandigarh.
3. The bank owes an explanation why it thought fit to file
complaints in Chandigarh and not in Coimbatore, Tamil
Nadu.
4. Post these matters on 6-12-2024.”

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:
7. The written submissions of the petitioner read as under:
"A. The scope of powers under Section 406 CrPC, 1973
(akin to Section 527 of CrPC, 1898 and Section 447
of BNSS, 2024) is the question which concerns this
Hon’ble Court.
B. One aspect of exercise of power of transfer is
the introduction of Section 142A in the Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881 by Amending Act 26 of 2015,
which has retrospective effect. Clause (2) of Section
142A contemplates a situation where cases against
the same drawer ought to be filed in the same Court
where the first case pertaining to dishonor of cheque
is filed or “transferred”. Independent of the fact that
the interpretation of this provision is being considered
by this Hon’ble Court in Kedar Bhausaheb Malhari vs.
Axis Bank Ltd. [TP (Crl.) 33 of 2018] where the Court
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 721

M/s Shri Sendhur Agro & Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd.

has impleaded the Union of India, taken assistance of
an amicus curie and also requested the Ld. Attorney
General to appear, the Petitioner submits that in
certain scenarios, power of transfer under Section
406 CrPC should be exercised to transfer Section
138 Negotiable Instruments Act cases.
C. The Petitioner submits that the invocation of power of
transfer presupposes the existence of jurisdiction. A
case which is filed in a court without jurisdiction should
be subjected to a quashing petition and therefore
as a matter of principle, the power of transfer under
Section 406 CrPC is not sought on the ground that
the court from which transfer is sought does not have
jurisdiction. The expression which is used in all the
three codes is “expedient for the ends of justice”
and it is this expression alone which is sought to be
invoked by the Petitioner.
D. The undisputed facts from Transfer Petition (Crl.) No.
608 of 2024 may kindly be noticed. Some of these
facts are recorded in the order issuing notice dated
22.07.2024 –
(a) The Petitioner is a proprietorship concern which
deals with production and distribution of coconut oil
and its by-products.
(b) The Petitioner firm had taken overdraft facility
from the Respondent Bank vide sanction letter dated
19.03.2015 (pg. 6 of Crl. MP No. 155078 of 2024). This
was extended till 2078. The Bank’s correspondence
address was recorded therein as Egmore, Chennai
branch and had nothing to do with Chandigarh.
(c) For this overdraft facility, several collaterals in
the form of land were taken apart from a lien which
was created on a Fixed Deposit of Rs. 25 lakhs. The
11 properties which were taken as collateral are all
lands located in the area of Kangeyam in Tiruppur
district (bifurcated from the erstwhile Coimbatore
district) of Tamil Nadu.
722 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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(d) The sanction letter also required the Petitioner
borrower to repay from his HDFC Bank account
situated in the Kangeyam branch.
(e) It is pleaded by the Petitioner at pg 3 that all
procedures for availing the overdraft facility were
done in the Coimbatore branch.
(f) It is further pleaded that the blank cheques of Kotak
Mahindra Bank, Tiruppur were given as surety and
all the EMI’s were to be made through ECS facility.
(g) The Petitioner has also pleaded that there are no
other transactions that the Petitioner has with any
other branch of the Respondent Bank.
(h) The Petitioner defaulted on payments of its EMIs
in the year 2018 which resulted in a demand notice
under the SARFAESI Act for a sum of Rs. 2.74 crores.
The consequential sale notices and the sale of the
Petitioner’s assets also took place in Coimbatore.
(i) The Respondent vide. Its letter dated 05.10.2018
had also informed the Petitioner that his Account
would be declared as NPA in next two days.
(j) The Petitioner challenged the SARFAESI
proceedings before the Debt Recovery Tribunal at
Coimbatore (Annexure P-2, pg. 28 onwards).
E. Despite all these aforesaid transactions taking place
within the jurisdiction of Tamil Nadu, the Respondent
Bank chose to present the cheque for Rs. 21 lakhs at
Chandigarh. The complaint is annexed at Annexure
P-1 (pg. 13 onwards) and shows the address of the
Petitioner to be in Tamil Nadu. The complaint does
not refer to several of the aforementioned undisputed
facts. This complaint is dated 21.04.2021 and is
numbered as CIS No. NACT/4016/2021, while the
summons on this have been issued by the Court
of Ld. CJM, Chandigarh only on 30.04.2024. This
factor of issuance of summons after 3 years of delay
also indicates that the complaint was filed and kept
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 723

M/s Shri Sendhur Agro & Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd.

in the Registry only to be used at the whim of the
Respondent Bank.
F. In the aforesaid background, the Petitioner is
requesting this Court to exercise its power of transfer
on the anvil of “expedient for the ends of justice”.
The following parameters and precedents may be
considered –
i. This Hon’ble Court on 29.11.2024 had called upon
the Respondent Bank to explain the reason for
choosing the jurisdiction of Chandigarh even though
the entire transaction had taken place in Coimbatore.
There is, however, no explanation that has been given
till date. The only response in the Counter Affidavit
filed is in paragraph 5 which records that the Bank’s
collection account is located in Chandigarh. This stand
of the Bank might justify the existence of jurisdiction
at Chandigarh but does not answer/explain the reason
for filing a complaint there, especially when one set
of legal proceedings viz. under SARFAESI Act were
undertaken within the jurisdiction of Tamil Nadu.
ii. As submitted earlier, this is not an issue pertaining to
territorial jurisdiction or an issue of convenience of the
accused, but having undertaken all the proceedings
including initiation of one set of litigation within Tamil
Nadu, it is unjust for the Respondent Bank to choose
an unrelated jurisdiction merely because it has an
option of more than one places where a complaint
can be lodged.
iii. The parameters of ‘expedient for the ends of
justice’ should take into account a situation where
availability of more than one jurisdiction is misused
for no extra benefit to the Complainant.
iv. The legislative intent of Section 142A also
contemplates that holder in due course is not allowed
to misuse the availability of multiple jurisdictions and
therefore have consciously used the expression
‘transfer’ along with ‘filed’ in Section 142A(2).
724 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

v. This Hon’ble Court recently in Navapavithra G &
Ors. vs. M/s Cholamandalam Investment & Finance
Co. Ltd. [TP (Crl] No.441 of 2024] in its order dated
24.10.2024 had held that financial institutions should
avoid filing proceedings in various states merely
because they have offices there, and should file
proceedings in courts having jurisdiction where the
actual transaction has taken place and where the
cause of action has arisen
vi. Further, this Hon’ble Court in M/s Oasis Marine
Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. vs. M/s Godrej Agrovet Ltd. [TP (Crl.)
No. 323-325 of 2023] in order dated 08.11.2024 and
in Blue Line Entertainment Media Ltd. vs. Kotak
Mahindra Bank Ltd. [TP (Crl.) No. 224 of 2020] in
order dated 31.10.2022 has allowed similar petitions
where the Respondent had instituted other recovery
proceedings in a different jurisdiction. The Petitioner
submits that they are identically situated.
vii. Moreover, this Hon’ble Court in several cases
has allowed transfer petitions when multiple Section
138 NI Act complaint cases are pending against
a drawer in different locations. For instance, in Sri
Lakshmi Agencies v. Rallis India Ltd., (2006) 13
SCC 312, transfer petition was allowed considering
the convenience of the parties and the fact that the
Respondent company was a multinational company
with offices all over India. Some other similar cases
are A.E. Premanand v. Escorts Finance Ltd., (2004) 13
SCC 527; Global Infrastructure & Technologies Ltd. v.
G.K. Builders, (2005) 12 SCC 427; Vikram Tractors v.
Escorts Ltd., (2005) 10 SCC 80; Videocon International
Ltd. v. Sujana Corpn. Ltd., (2005) 13 SCC 125.
The Petitioner submits that the same principle is
applicable here, since two separate prosecutions
relating to the same transaction are being undertaken
in different jurisdictions against him.
viii. In BR Gupta & Anr. vs. Rohit Jain, (2007) 7 SCC
454, this Hon’ble Court exercised its power under
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 725

M/s Shri Sendhur Agro & Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd.

Section 406 CrPC since the Petitioner therein was
being subjected to a Section 138 NI Act complaint
case as well as an FIR for cheating and forgery
relating to the same transaction, in two different
jurisdictions.
ix. A 3-judge bench of this Hon’ble Court in Harman
Electronics (P) Ltd. v. National Panasonic India (P)
Ltd., (2009) 1 SCC 720, para 21 had also noted that -
“We cannot, as things stand today, be oblivious of the
fact that a banking institution holding several cheques
signed by the same borrower can not only present
the cheque for its encashment at four different places
but also may serve notices from four different places
so as to enable it to file four complaint cases at four
different places. This only causes grave harassment
to the accused. It is, therefore, necessary in a case
of this nature to strike a balance between the right of
the complainant and the right of an accused vis-a-vis
the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure.”
x. For interpreting the phrase “expedient for the
ends of justice”, it is worthwhile to mention this
Hon’ble Court’s interpretation of the phrase “justice,
equality and good conscience”. In M. Siddiq (Ram
Janambhumi Temple-5 J.) v. Suresh Das, (2020) 1
SCC 1, this Hon’ble Court traced the origins of the
phrase in Roman law. Paragraphs 1000 - 1022 deal
with the origin of this phrase and broadly refers to
a situation where adherence to written law leads to
“Unjust Outcome” (Paragraph 1001). It is this principle,
in most humble submission of the Petitioner, which
ought to be the basis for Section 406 Petitions.
xi. The other factors which this Hon’ble Court
has considered towards ends of justice is not the
convenience of the accused but the convenience of
possible witnesses, the cost to be incurred by both
the prosecution and the defence witness to travel a
long way, the language in which the proceedings will
be undertaken, etc.
726 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

G. The following set of judgments may be considered
in addition to the abovementioned-
i. The proposition that the power under Section 406
would not be ever used for the convenience of the
accused is too broad and defeats the expression in
Section 406, i.e. ‘expedient for the ends of justice’.
This proposition has been used in cases where this
Hon’ble Court has held that it is not the convenience
of a single accused, rather the convenience of the
other accused (if any), the witnesses, the prosecution
and the larger interest of the society needs to be
cumulatively seen - held in Abdul Nazar Madani vs.
State of Tamil Nadu & Anr., (2000) 6 SCC 204, para
7 - followed in Nahar Singh Yadau vs. Union of India,
(2011) 1 SCC 307; Mrudul M Damle & Anr. s. CBI,
(2012) 5 SCC 706; Harita Sunil Parab vs. State of
NCT of Delhi, (2018) 6 SCC 358. In Sri Jayendra
Saraswathy vs. State of TN & Ors, (2005) 8 SCC
771, para 25, apart from the above consideration
of convenience, this Hon’ble Court also took into
account the language in which the proceedings will
take place, and the witnesses will testify in before
allowing the transfer petition.
ii. There are judgments on Section 138 NI Act in
which Transfer Petitions have been dismissed, like
Kaushik Chatterjee Vs. State of Haryana. & Ors.,
(2020) 10 SCC 99. However, these are cases where
the respective Petitioners argued the issue of territorial
jurisdiction.
iii. This Hon’ble Court has dealt with various stages
of development of law of jurisdiction under NI Act in
Yogesh Upadhyay & Anr. as. Atlanta Ltd., 2023 SCC
OnLine SC 170, paras 5-13. This is cited to indicate
a recent decision on how general jurisdiction under
Section 138 NI Act has been viewed by this Hon’ble
Court.”
8. In such circumstances referred to above the petitioner prayed that
there being merit in his transfer petition the same may be allowed
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 727

M/s Shri Sendhur Agro & Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd.

and the proceedings be transferred from the UT of Chandigarh to
the State of Tamil Nadu.

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
BANK:
9. The written submissions filed by the respondent Bank read as under:
“A. It is submitted that the Respondent is Banking
company within the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. On
the basis of representations made by the petitioner, the
respondent extended credit facilities to the petitioner and
its group companies. The petitioners however defaulted
on repayments and as of July 2022, owed a sum of more
than Rs. 34.14 Cr. to the Respondent.
B. The Respondent Bank filed a Complaint under Section
138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act (hereinafter referred
to as ‘the said Act’) in accordance with law before the
competent court within whose jurisdiction the branch of the
bank where the payee maintains the account is situated.
In this regard it is submitted the Cheque was presented
at Respondent’s Chandigarh Branch for the reason that
the routing/collection account in respect of the subject
cheque (in a NPA account) was located at Chandigarh.
C. Significantly, the petitioner has in its written submissions
clarified that it is not disputing the jurisdiction of the court
where the complaint was filed. In fact, it is the petitioner’s
contention that the filing of the transfer petitions (as
opposed to a quashing petition) pre-supposes the existence
of jurisdiction of the court from where the proceedings are
sought to be transferred.
D. Section 142 A of the Negotiable Instrument Act stipulates
the conditions when the Complaint filed under Section 138
may be transferred. The object of the provision is that all
the complaint cases arising out of one transaction should
be tried at one place. In the present cases as well as
the connected cases, the Respondent has filed cases at
Chandigarh only; thus, no ground under Section 142 A to
seek transfer arises.
728 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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E. The transfer petitions are not supported by any sufficient
grounds It is most respectfully submitted that the Petitioner
has sought transfer only on the general grounds viz the
distance and the difference in language. The Petitioner has
not pleaded (i) any specific problem or health issue which
would make it difficult for him to attend the proceedings
at Chandigarh (ii)any miscarriage of justice that may
happen if the proceedings are continued at Chandigarh
(iii) difficulty in understanding English language which
is uniformly used in all the courts. It is most respectfully
submitted that powers under Section 406 of the CrPC to
transfer cases may be exercised only when such transfer
is expedient for the ends of justice. This Hon’ble Court has
consistently held that the powers under Section 406 of
the CrPC are discretionary powers and ought to be used
sparingly. In Bhiaru Ram Vs. CBI (Transfer Petition (Crl.)
No. 37 of 2009) (judgment and order dated 3.8.2010),
this Hon’ble Court observed that “that for the ends of
justice, this Court can transfer any criminal case or appeal
to any place. In order to transfer a case from one State
to another or from one place to another, there must be
“reasonable apprehension” on the part of the party to a
case that justice may not be done. Mere allegation that
there is apprehension that justice will not be done, cannot
be the basis of transfer.”
It is humbly submitted that the petitioner has failed to
make-out a case which would warrant exercise of powers
by this Hon’ble Court under Section 406 of the Cr.P.C.
F. It is submitted that the Virtual Facility is available in
courts in Chandigarh and the option to attend the hearing
virtually is always available to the Petitioner. Instead of
approaching Trial Court and moving an application for
exemption therein and satisfying the Trial Court regarding
the necessity of such exemption, the Petitioner has directly
approached this Hon’ble Court.
G. It is submitted that the cheque bouncing cases filed
by the respondent in Chandigarh were prior in time to
the original application filed before the DRT, Coimbatore.
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 729

M/s Shri Sendhur Agro & Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd.

H. It is further submitted that there are a batch of cases
pending in Chandigarh. The Respondent has filed all
cases arising out of the transaction at one single place
viz Chandigarh. Thus, no inconvenience could have been
caused to the Petitioner.
I. It is further submitted that there are various cases
pending at Chandigarh District Court arising out the
same transaction in which no Transfer Petition has been
filed. It is submitted that there are 23 cases pending in
Chandigarh out of which the transfer petition has been
filed by the petitioner only in the present batch of cases
and in two more cases. To the best of knowledge of the
respondent, no other transfer petition has been filed in
the other connected cases. A list of the cases pending in
Chandigarh court are annexed herewith and marked as
Annexure -A (Page No. 6 to 7).
J. It is submitted that transfer of some of the cases arising
out of the transaction would be contrary to the object of
the Amendment Act of 2015 and in particular Section 142A
(2) & (3) inserted vide the said amendment.
K. The Respondent seek to put forth the following heads
of submissions alongwith citations in support thereof:-
(a) Complaint case Under Section 138 of the NI Act cannot
be transferred at the convenience of the accused
(i) S. Nalini Jayanthi vs M. Ramasubba Reddy, TP (Crl)
655/2022 (Paragraph 2)
(ii) Kasthuripandian S Vs RBL Bank Limited, TP (Crl)
No.515/2024 (Paragraph 1)
(b) Under Section 142 (2) (a) of the NI Act, the court within
whose jurisdiction the branch of the bank where the payee
maintains the account is situated, will have jurisdiction to
try the offence. The ground that when head office was in
Siliguri, the complaint has been filed in Agra to harass the
Petitioner, was held, in the facts of that case, not to be
sufficient ground to seek transfer.
730 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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(i) Himalaya Self Farming Group & Ant vs M/s Goyal Feed
Suppliers, TP (Crl) 273/2020 (Paragraph 5)
(c) Mere language factor/convenience of a party is not
enough ground to seek transfer.
(i) Rajkumar Sabu vs Sabu vs Sabu trade private limited,
2021 SCC Online SC 378 (Paragraph 8-10)
(d) Mere convenience of a party is not enough. The
apprehension must be reasonable.
(i) Bhiaru Ram & Ors. vs CBI & Anr., (2010) 7 SCC 799
(Paragraph 9 to 15)
(e) Jurisdiction under the Section 406 of the CrPC ought
to be sparingly used.
(i) Nahar Singh Yadav vs UOI & Ors, (2011) 1 SCC 307
(Paragraph 29)”
10. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned counsel
appearing for the Bank prayed that there being no merit in the
transfer petition, the same may be rejected.

ANALYSIS
11. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and
having gone through the materials on record the following questions
fall for our consideration.
i. Whether a complaint filed under Section 138 of the N.I. Act
can be ordered to be transferred from one court to the other
in exercise of powers under Section 406 of the Cr.P.C. on the
ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction of the court in which the
complaint is filed?
ii. Assuming that the court in which the complaint filed under
Section 138 of the N.I. Act lacks territorial jurisdiction to try the
same, then is it permissible for this court in exercise of powers
under Section 406 of the Cr.P.C. to transfer the said complaint
to the court having territorial jurisdiction to try the offence?
iii. Whether the expression “that for the ends of justice, this Court
can transfer any criminal case or appeal to any place.” in Section
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 731

M/s Shri Sendhur Agro & Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd.

406 Cr.P.C. embraces in itself the lack of territorial jurisdiction
of the court to try the offence under Section 138 N.I. Act?
12. Before adverting to the rival submissions canvassed on either side,
we must look into a few relevant provisions of the N.I. Act. Section
138 of the N.I. Act reads thus:
“138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds
in the account.—
Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account
maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount
of money to another person from out of that account for
the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other
liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of
the amount of money standing to the credit of that account
is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds
the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an
agreement made with that bank, such person shall be
deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without
prejudice to any other provisions of this Act, be punished
with imprisonment for a term which may be extended to
two years, or with fine which may extend to twice the
amount of the cheque, or with both:
Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply
unless—
(a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a
period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or
within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier;
(b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque,
as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of
the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to
the drawer of the cheque, [within thirty days of the receipt
of information by him from the bank regarding the return
of the cheque as unpaid; and
(c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment
of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case
may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within
fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice.”
732 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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13. What is relevant for our purpose is Section 142 of the N.I. Act. Section
142 relates to the cognizance of offences. Section 142 reads thus:
“142. Cognizance of offences.—
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)—
(a) no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable
under section 138 except upon a complaint, in writing,
made by the payee or, as the case may be, the holder in
due course of the cheque;
(b) such complaint is made within one month of the date
on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the
proviso to section 138: Provided that the cognizance of a
complaint may be taken by the Court after the prescribed
period, if the complainant satisfies the Court that he had
sufficient cause for not making a complaint within such
period.
(c) no court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or
a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence
punishable under section 138.
(2) The offence under section 138 shall be inquired into
and tried only by a court within whose local jurisdiction, —
(a) if the cheque is delivered for collection through an
account, the branch of the bank where the payee or
holder in due course, as the case may be, maintains the
account, is situated; or
(b) if the cheque is presented for payment by the payee or
holder in due course, otherwise through an account, the
branch of the drawee bank where the drawer maintains
the account, is situated.”
14. Section 142-A of the N.I. Act provides for validation for transfer of
pending cases. Section 142-A reads thus:
“Validation for transfer of pending cases.—
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 or any judgment, decree, order
or direction of any court, all cases transferred to the court
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 733

M/s Shri Sendhur Agro & Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd.

having jurisdiction under sub-section (2) of section 142,
as amended by the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment)
Ordinance, 2015, shall be deemed to have been transferred
under this Act, as if that sub-section had been in force at
all material times.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2)
of section 142 or sub-section (1), where the payee or
the holder in due course, as the case may be, has filed
a complaint against the drawer of a cheque in the court
having jurisdiction under sub-section (2) of section 142
or the case has been transferred to that court under sub-
section (1) and such complaint is pending in that court, all
subsequent complaints arising out of section 138 against
the same drawer shall be filed before the same court
irrespective of whether those cheques were delivered for
collection or presented for payment within the territorial
jurisdiction of that court.
(3) If, on the date of the commencement of the Negotiable
Instruments (Amendment) Act, 2015, more than one
prosecution filed by the same payee or holder in due
course, as the case may be, against the same drawer of
cheques is pending before different courts, upon the said
fact having been brought to the notice of the court, such
court shall transfer the case to the court having jurisdiction
under sub-section (2) of section 142, as amended by the
Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015,
before which the first case was filed and is pending, as if
that sub-section had been in force at all material times.”
15. This court in the case of Yogesh Upadhaya and Another v. Atlanta
Limited reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 170 had the occasion
to consider the plea for transfer filed under Section 406 Cr.P.C. in
connection with six complaint cases filed under Section 138 and 142
of the N.I. Act respectively. While considering the plea for transfer,
the court had the opportunity to consider Section 142(2) contained
in the statute book along with Section 142-A.
16. The relevant observations in Yogesh Upadhaya (Supra) read as thus:
“ 6. In K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan [(1999)
7 SCC 510], this Court held that an offence under Section
734 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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138 of the Act of 1881 has five components : (1) drawing
of the cheque, (2) presentation of the cheque to the bank,
(3) returning of the cheque unpaid by the drawee bank,
(4) giving notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque
demanding payment of the cheque amount, and (5) failure
of the drawer to make payment within 15 days of the receipt
of the notice. It was further held that the Courts having
jurisdiction over the territorial limits wherein any of the
five acts, that constitute the components of the offence,
occurred would have the jurisdiction to deal with the case
and if the five acts were done in five different areas, any
one of the Courts exercising jurisdiction in those five areas
would have jurisdiction and the complainant could choose
any one of those Courts.
7. Thereafter, in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of
Maharashtra [(2014) 9 SCC 129], a 3-Judges Bench of
this Court observed that the return of the cheque by the
drawee bank would alone constitute commission of the
offence under Section 138 of the Act of 1881 and would
indicate the place where the offence is committed. It was,
therefore, held that the place, situs or venue of judicial
inquiry and trial of the offence must logically be restricted
to where the drawee bank is located, i.e., where the
cheque is dishonoured upon presentation and not where
the complainant’s bank is situated.
8. In this regard, it may be noted that Section 142 of the
Act of 1881, titled ‘Cognizance of Offences’, provided
that, notwithstanding anything contained in the Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973, no Court shall take cognizance
of an offence punishable under Section 138 except on a
complaint in writing made by the payee or, as the case
may be, the holder in due course of the cheque; such
complaint is made within one month of the date on which
the cause of action arises under clause I of the proviso to
Section 138; and no Court inferior to that of a Metropolitan
Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class shall
try an offence punishable under Section 138.
9. Significantly, the aforestated original Section 142
of the Act of 1881 was renumbered as Section 142(1)
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 735

M/s Shri Sendhur Agro & Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd.

when amendments were made in the Act of 1881 by the
Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Act, 2015 (Act 26 of
2015). Further, Section 142(2) was inserted in the statute
book along with Section 142-A. The newly inserted Section
142(2), to the extent relevant, states that the offence
under Section 138 shall be inquired into and tried only by
a Court within whose local jurisdiction - (a) if the cheque
is delivered for collection through an account, the branch
of the bank where the payee or holder in due course, as
the case may be, maintains the account, is situated.
10. This being the statutory scheme, stress is laid by Mr.
Chirag M. Shroff, learned counsel, upon the words: ‘shall
be inquired into and tried only by a Court within whose
local jurisdiction……’in Section 142(2) to contend that
the Courts at Nagpur would have exclusive jurisdiction
in relation to the dishonoured cheques presented by the
respondent company through its bank at Nagpur.
11. Perusal of the Statement of Objects and Reasons
in Amendment Act 26 of 2015 makes it amply clear that
insertion of Sections 142(2) and 142-A in the Act of 1881
was a direct consequence of the judgment of this Court in
Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod (supra). Therefore, the use of
the phrase: ‘shall be inquired into and tried only by a Court
within whose local jurisdiction……’in Section 142(2) of the
Act 1881 is contextual to the ratio laid down in Dashrath
Rupsingh Rathod (supra) to the contrary, whereby territorial
jurisdiction to try an offence under Section 138 of the Act
of 1881 vested in the Court having jurisdiction over the
drawee bank and not the complainant’s bank where he had
presented the cheque. Section 142(2) now makes it clear
that the jurisdiction to try such an offence would vest only in
the Court within whose jurisdiction the branch of the Bank
where the cheque was delivered for collection, through the
account of the payee or holder in due course, is situated. The
newly inserted Section 142-A further clarifies this position
by validating the transfer of pending cases to the Courts
conferred with such jurisdiction after the amendment.
12. The later decision of this Court in Bridgestone India
Private Limited v. Inderpal Singh [(2016) 2 SCC 75] affirmed
736 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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the legal position obtaining after the amendment of the
Act of 1881 and endorsed that Section 142(2)(a) of the
Act of 1881 vests jurisdiction for initiating proceedings
for an offence under Section 138 in the Court where the
cheque is delivered for collection, i.e., through an account
in the branch of the bank where the payee or holder in
due course maintains an account. This Court also affirmed
that Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod (supra) would not non-suit
the company in so far as territorial jurisdiction for initiating
proceedings under Section 138 of the Act of 1881 was
concerned.”
(Emphasis supplied)

17. In Yogesh Upadhaya (Supra), this Court also considered the effect
of the non obstante clause in Section 142(1) of the N.I. Act so as to
examine whether the same would override Section 406 Cr.P.C. In
this regard the court observed thus:
“13. Therefore, institution of the first two complaint cases
before the Courts at Nagpur is in keeping with the legal
position obtaining now. However, the contention that the
non obstante clause in Section 142(1) of the Act of 1881
would override Section 406 Cr. P.C. and that it would
not be permissible for this Court to transfer the said
complaint cases, in exercise of power thereunder, cannot
be countenanced. It may be noted that the non obstante
clause was there in the original Section 142 itself and
was not introduced by way of the amendments in the
year 2015, along with Section 142(2). The said clause
merely has reference to the manner in which cognizance
is to be taken in offences under Section 138 of the Act
of 1881, as a departure has to be made from the usual
procedure inasmuch as prosecution for the said offence
stands postponed despite commission of the offence
being complete upon dishonour of the cheque and it must
necessarily be in terms of the procedure prescribed. The
clause, therefore, has to be read and understood in the
context and for the purpose it is used and it does not
lend itself to the interpretation that Section 406 Cr. P.C.
would stand excluded vis-à-vis offences under Section
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 737

M/s Shri Sendhur Agro & Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd.

138 of the Act of 1881. The power of this Court to transfer
pending criminal proceedings under Section 406 Cr. P.C.
does not stand abrogated thereby in respect of offences
under Section 138 of the Act of 1881. It may be noted
that this Court exercised power under Section 406 Cr.
P.C. in relation to offences under Section 138 of the Act
of 1881 even during the time the original Section 142
held the field. In A.E. Premanand v. Escorts Finance
Ltd. [(2004) 13 SCC 527], this Court took note of the
fact that the offences therein, under Section 138 of the
Act of 1881, had arisen out of one single transaction
and found it appropriate and in the interest of justice
that all such cases should be tried in one Court. We,
therefore, hold that, notwithstanding the non obstante
clause in Section 142(1) of the Act of 1881, the power
of this Court to transfer criminal cases under Section
406 Cr. P.C. remains intact in relation to offences under
Section 138 of the Act of 1881, if it is found expedient
for the ends of justice.
14. In the case on hand, as the six complaint cases
pertain to the same transaction, it would be advisable
to have a common adjudication to obviate the possibility
of contradictory findings being rendered in connection
therewith by different Courts. As four of the six cases
have been filed by the respondent company before the
Dwarka Courts at New Delhi and only two such cases
are pending before the Courts at Nagpur, Maharashtra, it
would be convenient and in the interest of all concerned,
including the parties and their witnesses, that the cases
be transferred to the Dwarka Courts at New Delhi.”
18. Thus, in Yogesh Upadhaya (supra), this Court took note of
K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan reported in (1999) 7
SCC 510, wherein it was held that an offence under Section 138 of
the N.I. Act has five components:
(i) drawing of the cheque,
(ii) presentation of the cheque to the bank,
(iii) returning of the cheque unpaid by the drawee bank,
738 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

(iv) giving notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque demanding
payment of the cheque amount, and
(v) failure of the drawer to make payment within 15 days of the
receipt of the notice.
19. It was further held that the jurisdiction to deal with the case vests in
the Court having jurisdiction over the territorial limits wherein any of
the five acts referred to above that constitute the components of the
offence, occurred. If the five acts were done in five different areas,
then any one of the Courts exercising jurisdiction in those five areas
would have jurisdiction and the complainant could choose any one
of those Courts.
20. Further, it relied on Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of
Maharashtra, reported in (2014) 9 SCC 129, wherein it was held
that the place, situs or venue of judicial inquiry and trial of the offence
must logically be restricted to where the drawee bank is located, i.e.,
where the cheque is dishonoured upon presentation and not where
the complainant’s bank is situated.
21. The Court took note of Section 142 of the N.I. Act and the Negotiable
Instruments (Amendment) Act, 2015, and said that the newly inserted
Section 142(2) provides that the offence under Section 138 shall be
inquired into and tried only by a Court within whose local jurisdiction –
(a) if the cheque is delivered for collection through an account, the
branch of the bank where the payee or holder in due course, as the
case may be, maintains the account, is situated.
22. The Court after examining the Statement of Objects and Reasons in
the N.I. Amendment Act, 2015, stated that the insertion of Sections
142(2) and 142-A in the N.I. Act was a direct consequence of the
judgment in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod (supra). Section 142(2)
now makes it clear that the jurisdiction to try such an offence would
vest only in the Court within whose jurisdiction the branch of the Bank
where the cheque was delivered for collection, through the account
of the payee or holder in due course, is situated. The newly inserted
Section 142-A further clarifies this position by validating the transfer
of pending cases to the Courts conferred with such jurisdiction after
the amendment came into force.
23. The Court further noted that Bridgestone India Private Limited
(Supra) affirmed the change in legal position after the amendment
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 739

M/s Shri Sendhur Agro & Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd.

of the N.I. Act and endorsed that Section 142(2)(a) vests jurisdiction
for initiating proceedings for an offence under Section 138 in the
Court where the cheque is delivered for collection, i.e., through an
account in the branch of the bank where the payee or holder, in due
course, maintains an account.
24. Therefore, the Court said that the institution of the first two complaint
cases before the Courts at Nagpur would be in accordance with the
changed legal position after the amendment came into force. However,
it rejected the contention that the non obstante clause in Section 142(1)
of the NI Act would override Section 406 CrPC and that it would not
be permissible for this Court to transfer the said complaint cases.
25. The Court noted that the non obstante clause was already present
in the original Section 142(1) and was not introduced by way of
the amendments in the year 2015, along with Section 142(2). The
non obstante clause merely has reference to the manner in which
cognizance is to be taken in an offence under Section 138. The
same must not be construed to mean that the power of this Court
to transfer pending criminal proceedings under Section 406 CrPC
stands abrogated thereby in respect of an offence under Section
138 of the NI Act.
26. After placing reliance on A.E. Premanand v. Escorts Finance Ltd.,
reported in (2004) 13 SCC 52, the Court had held that notwithstanding
the non obstante clause in Section 142(1) of the NI Act, the power of
this Court to transfer criminal cases under Section 406 Cr.P.C. remains
intact in relation to an offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, if
it is found expedient for the ends of justice to order such transfer.
27. Before we proceed further it is necessary to clarify that in Yogesh
Upadhaya (supra) this Court was dealing with the transfer of six
complaint cases under Sections 138 and 142 of the N.I. Act. Ultimately,
considering Section 142(2) along with Section 142-A of the N.I. Act,
this Court held that two out of six complaints instituted at Nagpur
were in accordance with the legal position. However, since the other
four complaints also pertained to the same transaction, the court
felt that it would be advisable to have a common adjudication with
a view to obviate the possibility of any contradictory findings being
rendered in connection with the said complaints by different courts.
In such circumstances, all the six complaints were ordered to be
transferred to the South-west district courts, Dwarka, New Delhi.
740 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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SECTION 406 OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973
28. We now proceed to consider Section 406 of the Cr.P.C. Section 406
Cr.P.C. reads as under:
“406. Power of Supreme Court to transfer cases and
appeals.
(1) Whenever it is made to appear to the Supreme Court
that an order under this section is expedient for the ends
of justice, it may direct that any particular case or appeal
be transferred from one High Court to another High Court
or from a Criminal Court subordinate to one High Court
to another Criminal Court of equal or superior jurisdiction
subordinate to another High Court.
(2)The Supreme Court may act under this section only
on the application of the Attorney-General of India or of a
party interested, and every such application shall be made
by motion, which shall, except when the applicant is the
Attorney-General of India or the Advocate-General of the
State, be supported by affidavit or affirmation.
(3) Where any application for the exercise of the powers
conferred by this section is dismissed, the Supreme
Court may, if it is of opinion that the application was
frivolous or vexatious, order the applicant to pay by way
of compensation to any person who has opposed the
application such sum not exceeding one thousand rupees
as it may consider appropriate in the circumstances of
the case.”
29. The present section corresponds to Section 527 of the old Cr.P.C.
The Cr.P.C. clothes this Court with the power under Section 406 to
transfer a case or appeal from one High Court or a Court subordinate
to one High Court to another High Court or to a Court subordinate
thereto. The expression therein “expedient for the ends of justice”
assumes significance.
30. The power to transfer vested in the High Court, so far as the Cr.P.C.
is concerned, is dealt with and was intended by the Legislature to
be dealt with solely by Section 407 (Section 526 of the old Cr.P.C.).
On the other hand, Section 406(1) (Section 527(1) of the old CrPC)
clearly implies that it is only the Supreme Court that has the power
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 741

M/s Shri Sendhur Agro & Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd.

to transfer a case pending in a Court subordinate to one High Court
to be tried by a Court subordinate to another High Court.
31. A case is transferred by virtue of the powers under Section 406
if there is a reasonable apprehension on the part of a party to a
case that justice will not be done. There, however, must be reliable
material from which it can be inferred that there are impediments
that are interfering or likely to interfere, either directly or indirectly,
with the cause of justice.

POSITION OF LAW
32. In Kaushik Chatterjee v. State of Haryana and Ors. reported in
(2020) 10 SCC 92, this Court, in an identical situation like the one
on hand, held as under:
“8. Thus, in effect, transfer is sought primarily on two
grounds, namely, (i) lack of territorial jurisdiction and (ii)
apprehension of bias.

xxx xxx xxx
17. As seen from the pleadings and the rival contentions,
the petitioner seeks transfer, primarily on the ground of
lack of territorial jurisdiction. While the question of territorial
jurisdiction in civil cases, revolves mainly around (i) cause
of action; or (ii) location of the subject-matter of the suit
or (iii) the residence of the defendant, etc., according as
the case may be, the question of territorial jurisdiction in
criminal cases revolves around (i) place of commission
of the offence or (ii) place where the consequence of an
act, both of which constitute an offence, ensues or (iii)
place where the accused was found or (iv) place where
the victim was found or (v) place where the property in
respect of which the offence was committed, was found
or (vi) place where the property forming the subject-matter
of an offence was required to be returned or accounted
for, etc., according as the case may be.
18. While jurisdiction of a civil court is determined by (i)
territorial and (ii) pecuniary limits, the jurisdiction of a
criminal court is determined by (i) the offence and/or (ii)
the offender. But the main difference between the question
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of jurisdiction raised in civil cases and the question of
jurisdiction arising in criminal cases, is two-fold.
18.1. The first is that the stage at which an objection as
to jurisdiction, territorial or pecuniary, can be raised, is
regulated in civil proceedings by Section 21 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908. There is no provision in the
Criminal Procedure Code akin to Section 21 of the Code
of Civil Procedure.
18.2. The second is that in civil proceedings, a plaint can
be returned, under Order 7 Rule 10 CPC, to be presented
to the proper court, at any stage of the proceedings. But
in criminal proceedings, a limited power is available to a
Magistrate under Section 201 of the Criminal Procedure
Code, to return a complaint. The power is limited in the
sense (a) that it is available before taking cognizance,
as Section 201 uses the words “Magistrate who is not
competent to take cognizance” and (b) that the power
is limited only to complaints, as the word “complaint”, as
defined by Section 2(d), does not include a “police report”.
19. Chapter XIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
contains provisions relating to jurisdiction of criminal courts
in inquiries and trials. The Code maintains a distinction
between (i) inquiry; (ii) investigation; and (iii) trial. The
words “inquiry” and “investigation” are defined respectively,
in clauses (g) and (h) of Section 2 of the Code.
20. The principles laid down in Sections 177 to 184 of the
Code (contained in Chapter XIII) regarding the jurisdiction
of criminal courts in inquiries and trials can be summarised
in simple terms as follows:
20.1. Every offence should ordinarily be inquired into
and tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction it
was committed. This rule is found in Section 177. The
expression “local jurisdiction” found in Section 177 is
defined in Section 2(j) to mean “in relation to a court or
Magistrate, means the local area within which the court
or Magistrate may exercise all or any of its or his powers
under the Code”.
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 743

M/s Shri Sendhur Agro & Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd.

20.2. In case of uncertainty about the place in which,
among the several local areas, an offence was committed,
the Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas
may inquire into or try such an offence.
20.3. Where an offence is committed partly in one area
and partly in another, it may be inquired into or tried by
a court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas.
20.4. In the case of a continuing offence which is committed
in more local areas than one, it may be inquired into or tried
by a court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas.
20.5. Where an offence consists of several acts done in
different local areas it may be inquired into or tried by
a court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas.
(Numbers 2 to 5 are traceable to Section 178)
20.6. Where something is an offence by reason of the
act done, as well as the consequence that ensued, then
the offence may be inquired into or tried by a court within
whose local jurisdiction either the act was done or the
consequence ensued. (Section 179)
20.7. In cases where an act is an offence, by reason of
its relation to any other act which is also an offence, then
the first mentioned offence may be inquired into or tried
by a court within whose local jurisdiction either of the acts
was done. (Section 180)
20.8. In certain cases such as dacoity, dacoity with murder,
escaping from custody, etc., the offence may be inquired into
and tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction either the
offence was committed or the accused person was found.
20.9. In the case of an offence of kidnapping or abduction,
it may be inquired into or tried by a court within whose
local jurisdiction the person was kidnapped or conveyed
or concealed or detained.
20.10. The offences of theft, extortion or robbery may
be inquired into or tried by a court within whose local
jurisdiction, the offence was committed or the stolen
property was possessed, received or retained.
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20.11. An offence of criminal misappropriation or criminal
breach of trust may be inquired into or tried by a court
within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed
or any part of the property was received or retained or was
required to be returned or accounted for by the accused
person.
20.12. An offence which includes the possession of stolen
property, may be inquired into or tried by a court within
whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed or the
stolen property was possessed by any person, having
knowledge that it is stolen property. (Nos. 8 to 12 are
found in Section 181)
20.13. An offence which includes cheating, if committed
by means of letters or telecommunication messages, may
be inquired into or tried by any court within whose local
jurisdiction such letters or messages were sent or received.
20.14. An offence of cheating and dishonestly inducing
delivery of the property may be inquired into or tried by
a court within whose local jurisdiction the property was
delivered by the person deceived or was received by the
accused person.
20.15. Some offences relating to marriage such as Section
494 IPC (marrying again during the lifetime of husband or
wife) and Section 495 IPC (committing the offence under
Section 494 with concealment of former marriage) may
be inquired into or tried by a court within whose local
jurisdiction the offence was committed or the offender last
resided with the spouse by the first marriage. (Nos. 13 to
15 are found in Section 182)
20.16. An offence committed in the course of a journey or
voyage may be inquired into or tried by a court through or
into whose local jurisdiction that person or thing passed
in the course of that journey or voyage. (Section 183).
20.17. Cases falling under Section 219 (three offences of
the same kind committed within a space of twelve months
whether in respect of the same person or not), cases falling
under Section 220 (commission of more offences than one,
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 745

M/s Shri Sendhur Agro & Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd.

in one series of acts committed together as to form the
same transaction) and cases falling under Section 221,
(where it is doubtful what offences have been committed),
may be inquired into or tried by any court competent to
inquire into or try any of the offences. (Section 184).
21. Apart from Sections 177 to 184, which lay down in
elaborate detail, the rules relating to jurisdiction, Chapter
XIII of the Code also contains a few other sections.
Section 185 empowers the State Government to order
any case or class of cases committed for trial in any
district, to be tried in any Sessions Division. Section 186
empowers the High Court, in case where two or more
courts have taken cognizance of the same offence and
a question as to which of them should inquire into or try
the offence has arisen, to decide the district where the
inquiry or trial shall take place. Section 187 speaks of the
powers of the Magistrate, in case where a person within
his local jurisdiction, has committed an offence outside
his jurisdiction, but the same cannot be inquired into or
tried within such jurisdiction. Sections 188 and 189 deal
with offences committed outside India.
22. After laying down in such great detail, the rules relating
to territorial jurisdiction in Chapter XIII, the Code of Criminal
Procedure makes provisions in Chapter XXXV, as to the
fate of irregular proceedings. It is in that Chapter XXXV
that one has to search for an answer to the question as
to what happens when a court which has no territorial
jurisdiction, inquires or tries an offence.
23. Section 460 lists out 9 irregularities, which, if done
in good faith by the Magistrate, may not vitiate his
proceedings. Section 461 lists out 17 irregularities, which
if done by the Magistrate, will make the whole proceedings
void. Clause (l) of Section 461 is of significance and it
reads as follows:
“461. Irregularities which vitiate proceedings.—If
any Magistrate, not being empowered by law
in this behalf, does any of the following things,
namely—
746 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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(a)-(k) ***
(l) tries an offender:
***
his proceedings shall be void”
24. Then comes Section 462, which saves the proceedings
that had taken place in a wrong Sessions Division or
district or local area. But this is subject to the condition
that no failure of justice has occasioned on account of the
mistake. Section 462 reads as follows:
“462. Proceedings in wrong place.—No finding,
sentence or order of any criminal court shall be
set aside merely on the ground that the inquiry,
trial or other proceedings in the course of which
it was arrived at or passed, took place in a wrong
Sessions Division, district, sub-division or other
local area, unless it appears that such error has
in fact occasioned a failure of justice.”
25. A cursory reading of Sections 461(l) and 462 gives an
impression that there is some incongruity. Under clause
(l) of Section 461 if a Magistrate not being empowered by
law to try an offender, wrongly tries him, his proceedings
shall be void. A proceeding which is void under Section 461
cannot be saved by Section 462. The focus of clause (l) of
Section 461 is on the “offender” and not on the “offence”.
If clause (l) had used the words “tries an offence” rather
than the words “tries an offender”, the consequence might
have been different.
26. It is significant to note that Section 460, which lists out
nine irregularities that would not vitiate the proceedings,
uses the word “offence” in three places, namely, clauses
(b), (d) and (e). Section 460 does not use the word
“offender” even once.
27. On the contrary Section 461 uses the word “offence”
only once, namely, in clause (a), but uses the word
“offender” twice, namely, in clauses (l) and (m). Therefore,
it is clear that if an offender is tried by a Magistrate not
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 747

M/s Shri Sendhur Agro & Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd.

empowered by law in that behalf, his proceedings shall be
void under Section 461. Section 462 does not make the
principle contained therein to have force notwithstanding
anything contained in Section 461.
28. Section 26 of the Code divides offences into two
categories, namely, (i) offences under IPC and (ii) offences
under any other special law. Insofar as offences under
IPC are concerned, clause (a) of Section 26 states that
they may be tried by (i) the High Court or (ii) the Court
of Session or (iii) any other court, by which such offence
is shown in the first Schedule to be triable. In respect of
offences under any other law, clause (b) of Section 26
states that they shall be tried by the court specifically
mentioned in such special law. In case the special law is
silent about the court by which it can be tried, then such
an offence may be tried either by the High Court or by any
other court by which such offence is shown in the First
Schedule to be triable.
29. But clause (a) of Section 26 makes the provisions
contained therein, subject to the other provisions of the
Code. Therefore, a question arose before this Court in
State of U.P. v. Sabir Ali [State of U.P. v. Sabir Ali, AIR
1964 SC 1673 : (1964) 2 Cri LJ 606] as to whether a
conviction and punishment handed over by a Magistrate of
First Class for an offence under the Uttar Pradesh Private
Forest Act, 1948 were void, in the light of Section 15(2) of
the Special Act. Section 15(2) of the Uttar Pradesh Private
Forest Act made the offences under the Act triable only by
a Magistrate of Second or Third Class. Though the entire
trial in that case took place before a Magistrate of Second
Class, he was conferred with the powers of a Magistrate
of First Class, before he pronounced the judgment. This
Court held that the proceedings were void under Section
530(p) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (as it stood
at that time). It is relevant to note that Section 461(l) of
the 1973 Code is in pari materia with Section 530(p) of
the 1898 Code.
30. What is now clause (a) of Section 26 of the 1973 Code,
is what was Section 28 of the 1898 Code. The only difference
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between the two is that Section 28 of the 1898 Code referred
to the eighth column of the Second Schedule, but Section
26(a) of the 1973 Code refers to the First Schedule. Similarly,
clause (b) of Section 26 of the 1973 Code is nothing but
what was Section 29 of the 1898 Code.
31. What is significant to note from the 1898 Code and the
1973 Code is that the question of jurisdiction dealt with
by Sections 28 and 29 of the 1898 Code and Section 26
of the 1973 Code, is relatable only to the offence and not
to the offender. The power of a court to try an offence is
directly governed by clauses (a) and (b) of Section 26 of
the 1973 Code, as it was governed by Sections 28 and
29 of the 1898 Code.
32. In other words, the jurisdiction of a criminal court is
normally relatable to the offence and in some cases, to the
offender, such as cases where the offender is a juvenile
(Section 27) or where the victim is a women [the proviso
to clause (a) of Section 26]. But Section 461(l) focuses
on the offender and not on the offence.
33. The saving clause contained in Section 462 of the 1973
Code is in pari materia with Section 531 of the 1898 Code.
In the light of Section 531 of the 1898 Code, a question
arose before the Calcutta High Court in Ramnath Sardar v.
Rekharani Sardar [Ramnath Sardar v. Rekharani Sardar,
1975 SCC OnLine Cal 168 : 1975 Cri LJ 1139], as to the
stage at which an objection to the territorial jurisdiction of
the court could be raised and considered. In that case,
the objection to the territorial jurisdiction raised before a
Magistrate in a petition for maintenance filed by the wife
against the husband, was rejected by the Magistrate both
on merits and on the basis of the saving clause in Section
531. But the High Court held [Ramnath Sardar v. Rekharani
Sardar, 1975 SCC OnLine Cal 168 : 1975 Cri LJ 1139]
that Section 531 would apply only after the decision or
finding or order is arrived at by any Magistrate or court in a
wrong jurisdiction and that if any objection to the territorial
jurisdiction is taken in any proceeding, it would be the duty
of the Magistrate to deal with the same.
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 749

M/s Shri Sendhur Agro & Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd.

34. In Raj Kumari Vijh v. Dev Raj Vijh [Raj Kumari Vijh v.
Dev Raj Vijh, (1977) 2 SCC 190 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 294 :
AIR 1977 SC 1101] , which also arose out of a case filed
by the wife for maintenance against the husband, the
Magistrate rejected a prayer for deciding the question of
jurisdiction before recording the evidence. Actually the
Magistrate passed an order holding that the question of
jurisdiction must await the recording of the evidence on
the whole case. Ultimately the Magistrate held that he
had jurisdiction to entertain the application. One of the
reasons why he came to the said conclusion was that
in the reply filed by the husband there was no specific
denial of the wife’s allegation that the parties last resided
together within his jurisdiction. When the matter eventually
reached this Court, this Court relied upon the decision in
Purushottamdas Dalmia v. State of W.B. [Purushottamdas
Dalmia v. State of W.B., AIR 1961 SC 1589 : (1961) 2 Cri
LJ 728] to point out that there are two types of jurisdictional
issues for a criminal court, namely, (i) the jurisdiction with
respect of the power of the court to try particular kinds of
offences, and (ii) its territorial jurisdiction.
35. It was specifically held by this Court in Raj Kumari Vijh
[Raj Kumari Vijh v. Dev Raj Vijh, (1977) 2 SCC 190 : 1977
SCC (Cri) 294 : AIR 1977 SC 1101] that the question of
jurisdiction with respect to the power of the court to try
particular kinds of offences goes to the root of the matter
and that any transgression of the same would make the
entire trial void. However, territorial jurisdiction, according
to this Court “is a matter of convenience, keeping in mind
the administrative point of view with respect to the work
of a particular court, the convenience of the accused …
and the convenience of the witnesses who have to appear
before the Court”. (SCC p. 194 para 7)
36. After making such a distinction between two different
types of jurisdictional issues, this Court concluded in that
case, that where a Magistrate has the power to try a
particular offence, but the controversy relates solely to his
territorial jurisdiction, the case would normally be covered
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by the saving clause under Section 531 of the 1898 Code
(present Section 462 of the 1973 Code).
37. From the above discussion, it is possible to take a
view that the words “tries an offence” are more appropriate
than the words “tries an offender” in Section 461(l). This
is because, lack of jurisdiction to try an offence cannot be
cured by Section 462 and hence Section 461, logically,
could have included the trial of an offence by a Magistrate,
not empowered by law to do so, as one of the several
items which make the proceedings void. In contrast,
the trial of an offender by a court which does not have
territorial jurisdiction, can be saved because of Section
462, provided there is no other bar for the court to try the
said offender (such as in Section 27). But Section 461(l)
makes the proceedings of a Magistrate void, if he tried an
offender, when not empowered by law to do.
38. But be that as it may, the upshot of the above
discussion is:
38.1. That the issue of jurisdiction of a court to try an
“offence” or “offender” as well as the issue of territorial
jurisdiction, depend upon facts established through
evidence.
38.2. That if the issue is one of territorial jurisdiction, the
same has to be decided with respect to the various rules
enunciated in Sections 177 to 184 of the Code.
38.3. That these questions may have to be raised before
the court trying the offence and such court is bound to
consider the same.
39. Having taken note of the legal position, let me now
come back to the cases on hand.
40. As seen from the pleadings, the type of jurisdictional
issue, raised in the cases on hand, is one of territorial
jurisdiction, at least as of now. The answer to this depends
upon facts to be established by evidence. The facts to be
established by evidence, may relate either to the place of
commission of the offence or to other things dealt with by
Sections 177 to 184 of the Code. In such circumstances,
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 751

M/s Shri Sendhur Agro & Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd.

this Court cannot order transfer, on the ground of lack of
territorial jurisdiction, even before evidence is marshalled.
Hence, the transfer petitions are liable to be dismissed.
Accordingly, they are dismissed.
41. However, it is open to both parties to raise the issue
of territorial jurisdiction, lead evidence on questions of fact
that may fall within the purview of Sections 177 to 184 read
with Section 26 of the Code and invite a finding. With the
above observations the transfer petitions are dismissed.
There will be no order as to costs.”
33. Thus, this Court said the following:
(i) the issue of jurisdiction of a court to try an “offence” or “offender”
as well as the issue of territorial jurisdiction, depend upon facts
established through evidence;
(ii) if the issue is one of territorial jurisdiction, the same has to be
decided with respect to the various rules enunciated in sections
177 to 184 of the Code; and
(iii) these questions may have to be raised before the court trying
the offence and such court is bound to consider the same.
34. While jurisdiction of a civil court is determined by (i) territorial and (ii)
pecuniary limits, the jurisdiction of a criminal court is determined by (i)
the offence and/or (ii) the offender. But the main difference between
the question of jurisdiction raised in civil cases and the question of
jurisdiction arising in criminal cases, is two-fold i.e.:

CIVIL COURT CRIMINAL COURT

The stage at which an objection There is no provision in the Criminal
as to jurisdiction, territorial or Procedure Code akin to Section
pecuniary, can be raised, is 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
regulated in civil proceedings by
Section 21 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908.

In civil proceedings, a plaint can But in criminal proceedings, a
be returned, under Order VII, Rule limited power is available to a
10, CPC, to be presented to the Magistrate under section 201 of the
proper court, at any stage of the Code, to return a complaint. The
proceedings power is limited in the sense that:
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But in criminal proceedings, a
limited power is available to a
Magistrate under section 201 of the
Code, to return a complaint. The
power is limited in the sense that:
1. it is available before taking
cognizance, as section 201
uses the words “Magistrate
who is not competent to take
cognizance”
2. the power is limited only
to complaints, as the word
“complaint”, as defined by
section 2(d), does not include
a “police report”.

35. The Court looked into the following distinction:
“TRIES AN OFFENCE” VERSUS “TRIES AN OFFENDER” UNDER
SECTION 461(l) CrPC, WHICH IS MORE APPROPRIATE?
The rules relating to territorial jurisdiction are given in Chapter XIII in
detail. However, it is in that Chapter XXXV that one has to search for
an answer to the question as to what happens when a court which
has no territorial jurisdiction, inquires or tries an offence.
A cursory reading of Section 461(l) and Section 462 gives an
impression that there is some incongruity. Under Clause (l) of Section
461 if a Magistrate not being empowered by law to try an offender,
wrongly tries him, his proceedings shall be void.

A proceeding which is void under Section 461 cannot be saved
by Section 462
36. The focus of clause (l) of Section 461# is on the “offender” and not
on the “offence”. If clause (l) had used the words “tries an offence”
rather than the words “tries an offender”, the consequence might
have been different.
37. Section 460, which lists out nine irregularities that would not vitiate
the proceedings, uses the word “offence” in three places namely
clauses (b), (d) and (e). Section 460 does not use the word “offender”
# Ed. Note: “Section 461” instead of “Section 461 18” in terms of subsequent corrigendum.
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 753

M/s Shri Sendhur Agro & Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd.

even once. On the contrary Section 461 uses the word ‘offence’
only once, namely in clause (a), but uses the word “offender” twice
namely in clauses (l) and (m).
38. Therefore, it is clear that if an offender is tried by a Magistrate not
empowered by law in that behalf, his proceedings shall be void under
Section 461. Section 462 does not make the principle contained therein
to have force notwithstanding anything contained in Section 461.
39. Hence, the jurisdiction of a criminal Court is normally relatable to the
offence and in some cases, to the offender, such as cases where the
offender is a juvenile (section 27) or where the victim is a women
[the proviso to clause (a) of section 26]. But Section 461(l) focuses
on the offender and not on the offence. The saving clause contained
in Section 462 of the Code of 1973 is in pari materia with Section
531 of the Code of 1898.
40. Considering the aforementioned scheme of CrPC, the Court held
that the words “tries an offence” are more appropriate than the
words “tries an offender” in section 461 (l). This is because, lack of
jurisdiction to try an offence cannot be cured by section 462 and
hence section 461, logically, could have included the trial of an
offence by a Magistrate, not empowered by law to do so, as one of
the several items which make the proceedings void.
41. In contrast, the trial of an offender by a court which does not have
territorial jurisdiction, can be saved because of section 462, provided
there is no other bar for the court to try the said offender (such as in
section 27). But Section 461 (l) makes the proceedings of a Magistrate
void, if he tried an offender, when not empowered by law to do.
42. Thus, in the aforesaid case, this Court declined to transfer the matter
having noticed that the case was one of territorial jurisdiction. In
such circumstances, this Court left it open to both the parties, i.e.,
the accused and the complainant to raise the issue of territorial
jurisdiction before the court concerned.
43. In the case of United States v. National City Lines, reported in 337
U.S. 78, the U.S. district court of the southern district of California
observed thus:

“The Discretionary Power to Transfer:
There remains the question: Do the facts warrant the
granting of the motion?
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A Conditions for Transfer
Before answering this question by reference to the
facts, we consider briefly the meaning of the transfer
provision.
The wording of the clause is different from that of the
corresponding provision in the criminal rules. The latter
calls for a transfer “if the court is satisfied that in the
interest of justice the proceeding should be transferred.”
The section under consideration provides for transfer “for
the convenience of parties and witnesses in the interest
of justice” While both sections use the identical phrase
“in the interest of justice” as a criterion, the civil transfer
rule uses the phrase in juxtaposition with the convenience
requirement. But the meaning of the phrase is the same
in both instances:
“It implies conditions which assist, or are in aid of or in
the furtherance of, justice. Both call for the doing of things
which bring about the type of justice which results when
law is correctly applied and administered. They import the
exercise of discretion which considers both the interests
of the defendant and those of society. When commanded
by a statute, they do not attempt to determine, in advance,
the type of judicial action to be taken.”
In the case in which the phrase just quoted occurs,
I considered the convenience of parties and witnesses as
one of the criteria in determining whether a transfer should
be made. And in the present case, I took into account
the same element in considering the application of the
doctrine of forum non conveniens. In so doing, I did not
weigh the convenience of the defendants only, but that of
the Government also. The conclusion was arrived at after
a balancing of conveniences. This is of the very essence
of the judicial process in any matter which calls for the
exercise of discretion. Indeed, I wrote:
“A court of equity should aim to balance societal and
individual interest and to [41] maintain the proper
equilibrium between private rights and public weal.”
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 755

M/s Shri Sendhur Agro & Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd.

*743 The transfer provision which concerns us here
depends on discretion for its application, as do the
kindred provision in the criminal cases and the doctrine
of inconvenient forum.

B Should the Discretion be Exercised?
Having determined that the transfer provision is applicable
to this litigation, our next inquiry is whether the discretion
should be exercised under the facts in the case.
The factual situation did not change while the matter
was before the Supreme Court. It is the same as existed
when I granted the motion to dismiss. The affidavits filed
with the prior motion have been refiled and adopted for
the purposes of the present motions. The Government
has filed no additional affidavits. But it was agreed at
the hearing that the additional facts contained in the
affidavit of Jesse R. O’Malley, one of counsel for the
Government, in opposition to the affidavit of Denis B.
Sullivan, filed in opposition to the Government’s motion
for an early trial date, might be considered. The affidavit
merely recites that a transfer to the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, might result in delay because
of the crowded condition of the calendar of that court. It
points to the fact that the transfer of the criminal case
had resulted in delay.
Speculations as to possible time of trial are not determinative
of the matter. Regardless of the condition of their calendars,
district courts have it within their power to advance cases
when public interest so requires. And if the need for
immediate action is brought home to the judges of the
District Court of Illinois, I am certain that they will arrange
for as early a trial of this cause as could be had in this
district. In the instant case, the Government could very
readily have avoided the delay which resulted from its direct
appeal from my ruling by refiling the case immediately in
the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, especially
when the defendants had stipulated that they would not
seek a dismissal if so refiled.
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I do not question the Government’s right to seek the
alternative of appeal in order to avoid a decision which
it disapproved and which it did not desire to become
established as an unchallenged precedent. However, in
balancing the conveniences, we must exclude situations
such as delay brought on by the voluntary act of the
Government when it had another alternative.
*744 I need not repeat the summary of the affidavits given
in the two previous opinions.” Having re-examined them,
and having considered the additional affidavits and facts
in the record to which my attention has been called by
both parties, I am of the view that the convenience of the
parties and witnesses require the transfer of this case in
the interest of justice.
Anticipating that such conclusion might be based on a
balancing of conveniences, counsel for the Government
intimated at the hearing that no resort could be had to such
method in resolving the conflicting contentions. I agree that
when the section speaks of the convenience “of parties
and witnesses, it means that the convenience of both sides
must be examined. But I know of no way of applying the
requirement to a particular situation than by viewing the
facts from both standpoints and giving preference to those
which, in the court’s opinion, preponderate to such an extent
as to make the choice in the interest of justice. Unless
the right to choose between conflicting facts or assertions
exists, the court could never determine a motion under
this section on the facts. For if the mere assertion by the
Government of its own convenience and the convenience
of its witnesses were sufficient to stay action, we would
be confronted with a power to paralyze judicial discretion,
beside which the devastating effect of the historic liberum
veto (“Nie Pozwalan” “I don’t permit”) of the Polish nobles
in their Diet (1572-1697) would dim into insignificance.
As I cannot so interpret the meaning of the section,
I conclude that the showing in this case warrants transfer
to the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.”
(Emphasis supplied)
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 757

M/s Shri Sendhur Agro & Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd.

44. In Bhiaru Ram & Ors. v. Central Bureau of Investigation & Ors
reported in (2010) 7 SCC 799 this Court observed thus:
“7. Section 406 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
empowers this Court to transfer any case or appeal from
one High Court to another High Court or from a criminal
court subordinate to one High Court to another criminal
court of equal or superior jurisdiction subordinate to another
High Court. We are concerned about sub-section (1) of
Section 406 which reads as under:
“406. Power of Supreme Court to transfer cases and
appeals.—(1) Whenever it is made to appear to the
Supreme Court that an order under this section is expedient
for the ends of justice, it may direct that any particular case
or appeal be transferred from one High Court to another
High Court or from a criminal court subordinate to one
High Court to another criminal court of equal or superior
jurisdiction subordinate to another High Court.”
8. It is clear from the abovesaid provision that for the ends
of justice, this Court can transfer any criminal case or
appeal to any place. In order to transfer a case from one
State to another or from one place to another, there must
be “reasonable apprehension” on the part of the party to
a case that justice may not be done. Mere allegation that
there is apprehension that justice will not be done, cannot
be the basis of transfer. In fact, in the case on hand, it is
not the claim of the petitioners that they may not get fair
justice at Special Court, CBI, Greater Mumbai but they
are seeking transfer mainly on the basis of convenience
stating that all of them are hailing from Rajasthan and
majority of the witnesses going to be examined are from
Jaipur, Rajasthan.
9. In a recent judgment pronounced on 23-7-2010 in
D.A.V. Boys Sr. Sec. School v. D.A.V. College Managing
Committee [(2010) 8 SCC 401], this Court while considering
the power of this Court to transfer suits, appeals, etc. on
the civil side under Section 25 of the Civil Procedure Code
has held that:
758 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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“Section 25 of the Code itself makes it clear
that if any application is made for transfer, after
notice to the parties, if the Court is satisfied that
an order of transfer is expedient for the ends of
justice necessary direction may be issued for
transfer of any suit, appeal or other proceedings
from a High Court or other civil court in one State
to another High Court or other civil court in any
other State. In order to maintain fair trial, this
Court can exercise this power and transfer the
proceedings to an appropriate court. The mere
convenience of the parties may not be enough
for the exercise of power but it must also be
shown that trial in the chosen forum will result in
denial of justice. Further illustrations are, balance
of convenience or inconvenience to the plaintiff
or the defendant or witnesses and reasonable
apprehension in the mind of the litigant that he
might not get justice in the court in which suit
is pending. The abovementioned instances
are only illustrative in nature. In the interest of
justice and to adherence of fair trial, this Court
exercises its discretion and order transfer in a
suit or appeal or other proceedings.”
From the above, it is clear that the abovementioned
principles have to be kept in mind while dealing with
transfer petitions.
10. In the case on hand, except convenience, the petitioners
have not pressed into service any other ground for transfer.
In fact, Mr P.H. Parekh, informed this Court that the
petitioners are willing to attend the proceedings at Delhi,
if the case is transferred to Special Court, CBI, Delhi.
11. Mr. H.P. Raval, learned Additional Solicitor General,
after taking us through specific averments made in the
counter-affidavit filed on behalf of Respondents 1 and 2
(CBI), submitted that the main accused Shri B.R. Meena
is a very influential person in the State of Rajasthan and
there is strong apprehension that due to influence of Shri
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 759

M/s Shri Sendhur Agro & Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd.

B.R. Meena, there would be no fair trial at Jaipur or any
other place in the State of Rajasthan. He also pointed out
that the Court of Special Judge, CBI at Greater Mumbai
has ample jurisdiction to try this case because various
movable properties have been found in Mumbai and the
main accused, Shri B.R. Meena, was posted in Mumbai
from 2001 to the end of the check period i.e. 4-10-2005
and this is the period during which most of the properties
were allegedly acquired by him and his family members.
12. We have already adverted to the fact that against the
main accused Shri B.R. Meena, (IRS 1977), Commissioner
of Income Tax, Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai,
a case has been registered on 29-9-2005 under Section
13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 for possession of assets in his own
name and in the name of his family members to the
extent of Rs 43,29,394 which were disproportionate to his
known sources of income and could not be satisfactorily
accounted for. It further shows that Respondent 3, during
the check period i.e. 1-4-1993 to 4-10-2005, acquired
assets disproportionate to his known sources of income
to the extent of Rs 1,39,39,025.
13. The petitioners have been charge-sheeted for
commission of offences under Section 109 read with
Section 193 IPC read with Section 13(2) read with Section
13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 for
having actively aided and abetted Respondents 3 to 4
by fabricating false evidence through preparation of false
agreements to sell with the object to justify/explain the
huge cash recoveries from the residential premises of
Respondent 3. It further reveals that the petitioners entered
into false transactions with Respondent 3 showing receipt
of cash amounts against alleged purchase of immovable
properties from him. The stamp papers were purchased
against (sic after) registration of case and false agreements
to sell were prepared in connivance with each other.
14. A perusal of the charge-sheet containing all these
details clearly shows that witnesses to be examined are
760 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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not only from Jaipur, Rajasthan, but also from various
other places including Mumbai. Though the petitioners
may have a little inconvenience, the mere inconvenience
may not be sufficient ground for the exercise of power of
transfer but it must be shown that the trial in the chosen
forum will result in failure of justice.
15. We have already pointed out that except the plea of
inconvenience on the ground that they have to come all
the way from Rajasthan no other reason was pressed
into service. Even, the request for transfer to Delhi cannot
be accepted since it would not be beneficial either to the
petitioners or to the prosecution. In fact, the main accused,
Respondents 3 and 4 have not filed any petition seeking
transfer. In such circumstances, the plea of the petitioners
for transfer of the case from the Court of Special Judge,
CBI, Greater Mumbai to Special Judge, CBI, Jaipur on the
ground of inconvenience cannot be accepted.”
(Emphasis supplied)

45. In Rajkumar Sabu v. Sabu Trade Private Limited reported in 2021
SCC OnLine SC 378 this Court observed thus:
“5. Now the petitioner wants the criminal case pending in
the Salem Court to be transferred to the Patiala House
Court, New Delhi. Two main grounds have been urged on
behalf of the petitioner in support of his plea, argued by
Mr. S. Guru Krishnakumar, learned Senior Advocate.
One is that the points involved in the criminal case are
similar to the suits which are being tried and determined
by the Delhi High Court. The other ground taken is that
the proceeding in the Salem Court is being conducted in
Tamil, which the petitioner does not understand. It has also
been urged on behalf of the petitioner that it would be more
convenient for the parties to conduct the proceeding in New
Delhi as the civil suits are being heard in the Delhi High
Court only. The petitioner also complains about distance
of over 2000 kilometres between Salem and petitioner’s
own place of residence at Indore and alleges that there
is no direct connectivity between these two places. The
authorities relied upon by the petitioner are (i) Sri Jayendra
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 761

M/s Shri Sendhur Agro & Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd.

Saraswathy Swamigal (II), T.N. v. State of Tamil Nadu
[(2005) 8 SCC 771] and Mrudul M. Damle v. Central Bureau
of Investigation, New Delhi [(2012) 5 SCC 706]. It is also
asserted on behalf of the petitioner that the respondents
have influence in Salem and he has apprehension that he
would not get impartial enquiry/investigation/trial at Salem.
6. Mr. Gopal Sankarnarayan, learned Senior Advocate has
highlighted, in course of his submissions on behalf of the
respondent, the delay in approaching this Court seeking
transfer of the criminal case. As per his submission,
proceeding was registered on 5th April, 2018 and has
made substantial progress. The complaint has reached
the stage of cross examination of the complainants'
witnesses by the petitioner. The transfer petition was filed
on 12th January, 2021. He also points out that personal
appearance of the petitioner during trial stood dispensed
with by an order of the Madras High Court. It is also his
submission that the case pending in the Salem Court
has criminal elements, which ought not to be mixed up
with the civil suit. Relying on a judgment of a Coordinate
Bench in the case of Umesh Kumar Sharma v. State
of Uttarakhand [2020 SCC OnLine SC 845] and an
earlier decision of this Court in the case of Gurcharan
Dass Chadha v. State of Rajasthan [(1966) 2 SCR 678],
he has argued that to sustain allegation of lack of neutrality
in trial as a ground for transfer, credible materials will
have to be brought before the Court. His argument is
that there is no such material that would justify transfer
on this ground. Certain decisions have been referred to
on behalf of the respondents on the point that civil and
criminal proceedings can go on simultaneously in relation
to similar transactions. But I do not consider it necessary
to deal with these authorities, as that point does not arise
in the present proceeding, which is a Transfer Petition.
7. I shall proceed on the basis that the suits being heard
by the Delhi High Court would have points which could
overlap with those involved in the criminal case pending in
the Salem Court. But that very fact, by itself, in my view,
would not justify transfer of the said case. Substantial
762 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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progress has been made in the said complaint before
the Salem Court. So far as the subject-criminal case is
concerned, the ground of overlapping points in any event
cannot justify the petitioner’s case for transfer as even
if the petition is allowed, the criminal case shall have to
proceed in the Court of Judicial Magistrate and not in the
High Court where the civil suits are being heard. Two
different judicial fora would be hearing the civil cases and
the criminal case. Whether the civil cases and the criminal
case would continue together or not is not a question which
falls for determination in this Transfer Petition. Moreover,
it does not appear that earlier any complaint was made
about the proceeding being carried on at Salem. In fact,
the petitioner had applied for quashing the complaint
before the Madras High Court but at that point of time,
no proceeding was taken out for transferring the criminal
complaint. Moreover, on 8th June 2018, the petitioner had
appeared before the Salem Court and received copy of
the criminal complaint. This has been stated in the list of
dates forming part of the Transfer Petition. At that point
of time, the two earlier Transfer Petitions were pending.
Those two petitions were disposed of on 18th July 2018.
The petitioner does not appear to have had expressed their
grievances on the basis of which this petition has been
filed at that point of time. Barring claims being made by
the petitioner of the respondents being influential person
in Salem, no material has been produced to demonstrate
that such perceived influence can impair a neutral trial.
These allegations, inter-alia, appear in an additional
affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioner affirmed on 26th
February, 2021. The claims of the petitioner do not match
the level of unjust influence exerted on the defence in the
case of Sri Jayendra Saraswathy Swamigal (supra), on
the basis of which the transfer petition was allowed. In that
case, this Court found the prosecuting authorities were
harassing the defence team of lawyers and there were
materials demonstrated by the petitioner to show that the
State machinery was going out of its way in preventing
the accused from defending himself. The petitioner's
case of possible tainted trial is unfounded and does not
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 763

M/s Shri Sendhur Agro & Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd.

meet the standard laid down in the cases of Gurucharan
Dass Chadha (supra) and Umesh Kumar Sharma (supra).
I cannot come to a conclusion that justice would be in peril
if the case continues in the Salem Court. I am not satisfied
on the basis of materials available that the petitioner would
not get impartial trial in the Salem Court.
8. Next, I shall turn to the question of the problem of
language faced by the petitioner. The respondents seem
to be carrying on their business from Salem. In course
of hearing before me, no question has been raised
as regards territorial jurisdiction of the Salem Court in
proceeding with the case, the transfer of which is asked
for. Now, complaint is being made that the petitioner not
being able to understand Tamil language, the case ought
to be transferred to a Court in Delhi. Language was a
factor considered by this Court in the case of Sri Jayendra
Saraswathy Swamigal (supra), while selecting the Court
to which the case was to be transferred. But language
was not the criteria based on which transfer of the case
was directed. I have briefly discussed earlier the reason
for which transfer of the case was directed. The language
factor weighed with this Court while deciding the forum to
which the case was to be transferred after decision was
taken to transfer the case for certain other reasons.
9. Ordinarily, if a Court has jurisdiction to hear a case, the
case ought to proceed in that Court only. The proceeding
in the Salem Court has not been questioned on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction but on the ground contemplated in
Section 406 of the 1973 Code. Jurisdiction under the
aforesaid provision ought to be sparingly used, as held in
the case of Nahar Singh Yadav v. Union of India [(2011) 1
SCC 307]. Such jurisdiction cannot be exercised on mere
apprehension of one of the parties that justice would not
be done in a given case. This was broadly the ratio in the
case of Gurcharan Dass Chadha (supra). In my opinion if a
Court hearing a case possesses the jurisdiction to proceed
with the same, solely based on the fact that one of the
parties to that case is unable to follow the language of
that Court would not warrant exercise of jurisdiction of this
764 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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Court under Section 406 of the 1973 Code. Records reveal
that aid of translator is available in the Salem Court, which
could overcome this difficulty. If required, the petitioner
may take the aid of interpreter also, as may be available.
10. The petitioner’s plea for transfer is based primarily
on convenience. But convenience of one of the parties
cannot be a ground for allowing his application. Transfer
of a criminal case under Section 406 of the 1973 Code
can be directed when such transfer would be “expedient
for the ends of justice”. This expression entails factors
beyond mere convenience of the parties or one of them
in conducting a case before a Court having jurisdiction to
hear the case. The parties are related, and are essentially
fighting commercial litigations filed in multiple jurisdictions.
While instituting civil suits, both the parties had chosen
fora, some of which were away from their primary places of
business, or the main places of business of the defendants.
The ratio of the decision of this Court in the case of Mrudul
M. Damle (supra) cannot apply in the factual context of
this case. In that case, a proceeding pending in the Court
of Special Judge, CBI Cases, Rohini Courts, New Delhi
was directed to be transferred to the Special Judge, CBI
cases, Court of Session, Thane. Out of 92 witnesses
enlisted in the charge sheet, 88 were from different parts
of Maharashtra. That was a case which this Court found
was not “Delhi-centric”. The accused persons were based
in western part of this Country. It was because of these
reasons, the case was directed to be transferred. The
circumstances surrounding the case pending in the Salem
Court are entirely different. In the case of Rajesh Talwar v.
CBI [(2012) 4 SCC 217] it was held:—
“46. Jurisdiction of a court to conduct criminal
prosecution is based on the provisions of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. Often either the complainant or
the accused have to travel across an entire State to
attend to criminal proceedings before a jurisdictional
court. In some cases to reach the venue of the trial
court, a complainant or an accused may have to
travel across several States. Likewise, witnesses
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 765

M/s Shri Sendhur Agro & Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd.

too may also have to travel long distances in order
to depose before the jurisdictional court. If the plea
of inconvenience for transferring the cases from one
court to another, on the basis of time taken to travel
to the court conducting the criminal trial is accepted,
the provisions contained in the Criminal procedure
Code earmarking the courts having jurisdiction to try
cases would be rendered meaningless. Convenience
or inconvenience are inconsequential so far as the
mandate of law is concerned. The instant plea,
therefore, deserves outright rejection.”
11. For these reasons, I dismiss the present transfer
petition. Connected applications, if any, shall also stand
disposed of.”
(Emphasis supplied)

46. In Nahar Singh Yadav & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. reported in
(2011) 1 SCC 307, this Court observed thus:
“22. It is, however, the trite law that power under Section
406 CrPC has to be construed strictly and is to be exercised
sparingly and with great circumspection. It needs little
emphasis that a prayer for transfer should be allowed only
when there is a well-substantiated apprehension that justice
will not be dispensed impartially, objectively and without
any bias. In the absence of any material demonstrating
such apprehension, this Court will not entertain application
for transfer of a trial, as any transfer of trial from one State
to another implicitly reflects upon the credibility of not only
the entire State judiciary but also the prosecuting agency,
which would include the Public Prosecutors as well.”
(Emphasis supplied)

47. It follows from the above-mentioned exposition of law that transfer
of cases under Section 406 Cr.P.C. may be allowed when there is
a reasonable apprehension backed by evidence that justice may
not be done and mere convenience or inconvenience of the parties
may not by itself be sufficient enough to pray for transfer. The
court has to appropriately balance the grounds raised in the facts
766 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

and circumstances of each case and exercise its discretion in a
circumspect manner while ordering a transfer under Section 406.
48. In Amarinder Singh v. Parkash Singh Badal reported in (2009)
6 SCC 260, while dealing with two transfer applications preferred
under Section 406 Cr.P.C. on the ground that with the change in State
Government, the trial was suffering a setback due to the influence
of the new Chief Minister as also the lack of interest by the Public
Prosecutor, P. Sathasivam, J., speaking for a three-Judge Bench
has observed thus:
“18. For a transfer of a criminal case, there must be a
reasonable apprehension on the part of the party to a case
that justice will not be done. It is one of the principles of
administration of justice that justice should not only be done
but it should be seen to be done. On the other hand, mere
allegations that there is apprehension that justice will not
be done in a given case does not suffice. In other words,
the court has further to see whether the apprehension
alleged is reasonable or not. The apprehension must not
only be entertained but must appear to the court to be a
reasonable apprehension.
19. Assurance of a fair trial is the first imperative of the
dispensation of justice. The purpose of the criminal trial
is to dispense fair and impartial justice uninfluenced by
extraneous considerations. When it is shown that the public
confidence in the fairness of a trial would be seriously
undermined, the aggrieved party can seek the transfer of
a case within the State under Section 407 and anywhere
in the country under Section 406 CrPC.
20. However, the apprehension of not getting a fair and
impartial inquiry or trial is required to be reasonable and
not imaginary. Free and fair trial is sine qua non of Article
21 of the Constitution. If the criminal trial is not free and
fair and if it is biased, judicial fairness and the criminal
justice system would be at stake, shaking the confidence
of the public in the system. The apprehension must appear
to the court to be a reasonable one.”
(Emphasis supplied)
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 767

M/s Shri Sendhur Agro & Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd.

49. Thus, although no rigid and inflexible rule or test could be laid down
to decide whether or not the power under Section 406 Cr.P.C should
be exercised, yet it is manifest from a bare reading of sub-sections
(2) and (3) of the said section and on an analysis of the decisions
of this Court that an order of transfer of trial is not to be passed
as a matter of routine and more particularly on the plea of lack of
territorial jurisdiction of the court to try the offence under Section
138 of the N.I. Act. This power has to be exercised cautiously and
in exceptional situations, where it becomes necessary to do so to
provide credibility to the trial. Some of the broad factors which could
be kept in mind while considering an application for transfer of the
trial are:
(i) when it appears that the State machinery or prosecution is
acting hand in glove with the accused, and there is likelihood
of miscarriage of justice due to the lackadaisical attitude of the
prosecution;
(ii) when there is material to show that the accused may influence
the prosecution witnesses or cause physical harm to the
complainant;
(iii) comparative inconvenience and hardships likely to be caused to
the accused, the complainant/the prosecution and the witnesses,
besides the burden to be borne by the State exchequer in
making payment of travelling and other expenses of the official
and non-official witnesses;
(iv) a communally surcharged atmosphere, indicating some proof
of inability in holding a fair and impartial trial because of the
accusations made and the nature of the crime committed by
the accused; and
(v) existence of some material from which it can be inferred that
some persons are so hostile that they are interfering or are
likely to interfere, either directly or indirectly, with the course
of justice. [See: Nahar Singh Yadav & Anr. v. Union of India
& Ors., (2011) 1 SCC 307]
50. The above-mentioned factors are not exhaustive in nature and are
illustrative of the requirements of a fair trial. It is clear as a noon day
that ensuring a fair trial is the predominant consideration for a court
to rule on a motion for transfer of a case. This Court in Maneka
768 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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Sanjay Gandhi v. Rani Jethmalani, reported in (1979) 4 SCC 167
has held thus:
“2. Assurance of a fair trial is the first imperative of the
dispensation of justice and the central criterion for the
court to consider when a motion for transfer is made is not
the hypersensitivity or relative convenience of a party or
easy availability of legal services or like mini-grievances.
Something more substantial, more compelling, more
imperilling, from the point of view of public justice and its
attendant environment, is necessitous if the Court is to
exercise its power of transfer. This is the cardinal principle
although the circumstances may be myriad and vary from
case to case. We have to test the petitioner’s grounds
on this touchstone bearing in mind the rule that normally
the complainant has the right to choose any court having
jurisdiction and the accused cannot dictate when- the
case against him should be tried. Even so, the process of
justice should not harass the parties and from that angle
the court may weigh the circumstances.”
(Emphasis supplied)

51. In Maneka Sanjay Gandhi (supra), it was also held that as a general
rule, it is the complainant who has the right to choose the forum
that has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the courts do not
interfere with such a right unless circumstances that hamper the ends
of justice are brought to the notice of the court by the other party.
52. In the context of our present discussion, it is pertinent to note that
that Section 406 of the Cr.P.C. uses the expression “expedient
for the ends of justice”, while empowering this Court to transfer a
criminal case. The import of the expression “ends of justice” has
been discussed by this Court in Yakub Abdul Razak Memon v.
State of Maharashtra, reported in (2013) 13 SCC 1 wherein it has
been held that:
“1551. While dealing with such an issue, the court must
not lose sight of the fact that meaning of “ends of justice”
essentially refers to justice to all the parties. This phrase
refers to the best interest of the public within the four
corners of the statute. In fact, it means preservation of
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 769

M/s Shri Sendhur Agro & Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd.

proper balance between the Constitutional/statutory rights
of an individual and rights of the people at large to have
the law enforced. The “ends of justice” does not mean
vague and indeterminate notions of justice, but justice
according to the law of the land.”
(Emphasis supplied)

53. The expression “ends of justice” has been more elaborately elucidated
in context of procedural law in the decision of this Court in Mahadev
Govind Gharge v. LAO, reported in (2011) 6 SCC 321, wherein it
was held that:
“29. Thus, it is an undisputed principle of law that the
procedural laws are primarily intended to achieve the ends
of justice and, normally, not to shut the doors of justice
for the parties at the very threshold. We have already
noticed that there is no indefeasible divestment of right of
the cross-objector in case of a delay and his rights to file
cross-objections are protected even at a belated stage by
the discretion vested in the courts. But at the same time,
the court cannot lose sight of the fact that the meaning
of “ends of justice” essentially refers to justice for all the
parties involved in the litigation. It will be unfair to give an
interpretation to a provision to vest a party with a right at the
cost of the other, particularly, when statutory provisions do
not so specifically or even impliedly provide for the same.
—xxx—
34. The consistent view taken by this Court is that the
provisions of a statute are normally construed to achieve
the ends of justice, advance the interest of public and
to avoid multiplicity of litigation. In Dondapati Narayana
Reddy v. Duggireddy Venkatanarayana Reddy [(2001) 8
SCC 115] this Court expressed similar view in relation
to amendment of pleadings. The principles stated in that
judgment may aptly be applied generally in relation to the
interpretation of provisions of the Code. Strict construction
of a procedural law is called for where there is complete
extinguishment of rights, as opposed to the cases where
discretion is vested in the courts to balance the equities
770 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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between the parties to meet the ends of justice which
would invite liberal construction. (…)”
(Emphasis supplied)

54. Therefore, when a complainant institutes a case in a court of his
choosing and such a court has the territorial jurisdiction to adjudicate
the matter then the transfer of such case has to be guided by
principles that would achieve the ends of justice. The meaning of
“ends of justice” essentially refers to justice for all the parties involved
in the litigation.
55. Section 142 of the N.I. Act in clear terms, provides the complainant
with the right to lodge a complaint, before a court, within whose
jurisdiction, the branch of the bank where the cheque is delivered
for collection, is situated. Therefore, the argument of the accused
that another court might also be empowered to take cognizance of
the matter under Section 142, since the cause of action arose within
that jurisdiction, cannot by itself be a ground for seeking transfer
under Section 406 of the Cr.P.C.
56. Additionally, since Section 142(2) of the N.I. Act also speaks of cause
of action, we must try to understand what cause of action means.
A Court gets jurisdiction over the matter if the cause of action arises
within the local limits of its jurisdiction. Cause of action means: “the
whole bundle of material facts which it is necessary for the plaintiff
to prove in order to entitle him to succeed in the suit.” To ascertain
whether the bundle of facts give rise to the cause of action and to
determine whether one or more of those facts had occurred within
the territorial jurisdiction of the Court, the entire plaint needs to be
looked into and taken into consideration. In the decision rendered
in State of Madras v. C.P. Agencies reported in AIR 1960 SC
1309, this Court has quoted with approval the following observations
made in Mst. Chand Kour v. Pratab Singh reported in 15 Indian
Appeals 156:
“Now the cause of action has no relation whatever to the
defence which may be set up by the defendant, nor does
it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by
the plaintiff. It refers entirely to the grounds set forth in
the plaint as the cause of action, or, in other words, to the
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 771

M/s Shri Sendhur Agro & Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd.

media upon which the plaintiff asks the Court to arrive at
a conclusion in his favour.”
(Emphasis supplied)

57. This Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. K.P. Ghiara, reported
in 1956 SCC OnLine SC 85 held that the venue of enquiry or trial
of a case is primarily to be determined by the averments contained
in the complaint or charge sheet and unless the facts there are
positively disproved, ordinarily the Court, where the charge sheet
or complaint is filed has to proceed with the matter, except where
action has to be taken under Section 202 of the Criminal Procedure
Code.
58. The main plank of the submission canvassed on behalf of the
petitioner seeking transfer needs to be now looked into. According
to the petitioner, there was no good reason for the Bank to file the
complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act in Chandigarh more
particularly when the entire cause of action could be said to have
arose in Coimbatore. If not in the form of allegations, then at least
in the form of a serious grievance, the petitioner says that only with
a view to harass and cause inconvenience, the Bank lodged the
complaint in Chandigarh. The Bank says that the law permits it to file
the complaint in Chandigarh as the collection centre of the Bank is
in Chandigarh. According to the Bank, the law permits filing of such
a complaint at the place where a cheque is delivered for collection
at any branch of the Bank of the payee or holder in due course, as
the cheque is deemed to have been delivered to the branch of the
Bank in which the payee or holder in due course, as the case may
be , has an account maintained.
59. There is no challenge before us to the constitutional validity of Section
142(2) of the Negotiable Instrument Amendment Act, 2015 on the
ground that the same is ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of
India. There was a challenge at one point of time to the validity of
Section 142(2) of the Amendment Act, 2015 before the High Court of
Madras in the case of Refex Energy Ltd. v. Union of India reported
in 2019 SCC Online Mad 9941. While dismissing the writ petition
and holding that the amendment cannot be said to be ultra vires,
the division bench of the High Court held as under:
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“2. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner
is that this amendment amounts to setting at naught a
judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court which is not
permissible in law. The contention of the petitioner cannot
be accepted. It is well settled right from the decision in Shri
Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Broach Borough Municipality
reported in (1969) 2 SCC 283 : AIR 1970 Supreme Court
192 that Legislation can take away the basis of a judgment.
3. The Honourable Supreme Court in Dashrath Rupsingh
Rathod (supra) summed up the law relating to the place
of suing as under:
“56. To sum up:
(i) An offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881 is committed no sooner a
cheque drawn by the accused on an account being
maintained by him in a bank for discharge of debt/
liability is returned unpaid for insufficiency of funds
or for the reason that the amount exceeds the
arrangement made with the bank.
(ii) Cognizance of any such offence is however
forbidden under Section 142 of the Act except upon
a complaint in writing made by the payee or holder
of the cheque in due course within a period of one
month from the date the cause of action accrues to
such payee or holder under clause (c) of proviso to
Section 138.
(iii) The cause of action to file a complaint accrues
to a complainant/payee/holder of a cheque in due
course if
(a) the dishonoured cheque is presented to the
drawee bank within a period of six months from the
date of its issue.
(b) If the complainant has demanded payment
of cheque amount within thirty days of receipt of
information by him from the bank regarding the
dishonour of the cheque and
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 773

M/s Shri Sendhur Agro & Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd.

(c) If the drawer has failed to pay the cheque amount
within fifteen days of receipt of such notice.
(iv) The facts constituting cause of action do not
constitute the ingredients of the offence under Section
138 of the Act.
(v) The proviso to Section 138 simply postpones/
defers institution of criminal proceedings and taking
of cognizance by the Court till such time cause of
action in terms of clause (c) of proviso accrues to
the complainant.
(vi) Once the cause of action accrues to the
complainant, the jurisdiction of the Court to try the
case will be determined by reference to the place
where the cheque is dishonoured.
(vii) The general rule stipulated under Section
177 of Cr.P.C applies to cases under Section 138
of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Prosecution in
such cases can, therefore, be launched against the
drawer of the cheque only before the Court within
whose jurisdiction the dishonour takes place except
in situations where the offence of dishonour of the
cheque punishable under Section 138 is committed
along with other offences in a single transaction within
the meaning of Section 220(1) read with Section 184
of the Code of Criminal Procedure or is covered by
the provisions of Section 182(1) read with Sections
184 and 220 thereof.”
4. In order to resolve the concerns regarding the said
judgment, the President of India promulgated an Ordinance,
called Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Ordinance,
2015. The said Ordinance, thereafter, became an Act,
namely, Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Act, 2015.
Amendments were made by the Negotiable Instruments
(Amendment) Act, 2015, which read as under:
“An Act further to amend the Negotiable Instruments
Act, 1881.
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BE it enacted by Parliament in the Sixty-sixth Year
of the Republic of India as follows:—
1. (1) This Act may be called the Negotiable
Instruments (Amendment) Act, 2015.
(2) It shall be deemed to have come into force on
the 15th day of June, 2015.
2. In the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter
referred to as the principal Act), in section 6,-
(i) in Explanation I, for clause (a), the following clause
shall be substituted, namely:—
‘(a) “a cheque in the electronic form” means a cheque
drawn in electronic form by using any computer
resource and signed in a secure system with digital
signature (with or without biometrics signature) and
asymmetric crypto system or with electronic signature,
as the case may be;
(ii) after Explanation II, the following Explanation shall
be inserted, namely:—
‘Explanation III.-For the purposes of this section, the
expressions “asymmetric crypto system”, “computer
resource”, “digital signature”, “electronic form” and
“electronic signature” shall have the same meanings
respectively assigned to them in the Information
Technology Act, 2000.’.
3. In the principal Act, section 142 shall be numbered
as sub-section (1) thereof and after sub-section (1)
as so numbered, the following sub-section shall be
inserted, namely:—
“(2) The offence under section 138 shall be inquired
into and tried only by a court within whose local
jurisdiction,-
(a) if the cheque is delivered for collection through an
account, the branch of the bank where the payee or
holder in due course, as the case may be, maintains
the account, is situated; or
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 775

M/s Shri Sendhur Agro & Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd.

(b) if the cheque is presented for payment by the
payee or holder in due course, otherwise through an
account, the branch of the drawee bank where the
drawer maintains the account, is situated.
Explanation.- For the purposes of clause (a), where
a cheque is delivered for collection at any branch of
the bank of the payee or holder in due course, then,
the cheque shall be deemed to have been delivered
to the branch of the bank in which the payee or holder
in due course, as the case may be, maintains the
account.”.
4. In the principal Act, after section 142, the following
section shall be inserted, namely:—
“142A.(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or any judgment,
decree, order or direction of any court, all cases
transferred to the court having jurisdiction under
sub-section (2) of section 142, as amended by the
Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Ordinance,
2015, shall be deemed to have been transferred
under this Act, as if that sub-section had been in
force at all material times.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section
(2) of section 142 or sub-section (1), where the payee
or the holder in due course, as the case may be, has
filed a complaint against the drawer of a cheque in
the court having jurisdiction under sub-section (2)
of section 142 or the case has been transferred to
that court under sub-section (1) and such complaint
is pending in that court, all subsequent complaints
arising out of section 138 against the same drawer
shall be filed before the same court irrespective of
whether those cheques were delivered for collection or
presented for payment within the territorial jurisdiction
of that court.
(3) If, on the date of the commencement of the
Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Act, 2015, more
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than one prosecution filed by the same payee or
holder in due course, as the case may be, against the
same drawer of cheques is pending before different
courts, upon the said fact having been brought to
the notice of the court, such court shall transfer the
case to the court having jurisdiction under sub-section
(2) of section 142, as amended by the Negotiable
Instruments (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015, before
which the first case was filed and is pending, as if that
sub-section had been in force at all material times.
5. (1) The Negotiable Instruments (Amendment)
Second Ordinance, 2015, is hereby repealed.
(2) Notwithstanding such repeal, anything done or any
action taken under the principal Act, as amended by
the said Ordinance, shall be deemed to have been
done or taken under the corresponding provisions of
the principal Act, as amended by this Act.”
5. By virtue of the said amendment, the entire basis of the
judgment of Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod (supra) has been
removed. The power of the Legislature to take away the
basis of a judgment by making amendments is well settled.
It is trite law that the Legislature can take away the basis
of the judgment of a judicial pronouncement by either
passing a Validating Act or passing amendments to the
parent Act. [Refer. State of Karnataka v. Karnataka Pawn
Brokers Association reported in (2018) 6 SCC 363; State
of Karnataka v. Pro Lab reported in (2015) 8 SCC 557;
Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Broach Borough Municipality
reported in (1969) 2 SCC 283 : AIR 1970 Supreme Court
192; Gujarat Ambuja Cements v. Union of India reported
in (2005) 4 SCC 214; State Bank’s Staff Union (Madras
Circle) v. Union of India reported in (2005) 7 SCC 584]
6. In view of the above, there is no infirmity in the
amendment. Even otherwise, the Parliament is competent
to bring out the amendment under the Negotiable
Instruments Act. The said amendment cannot be said to
be ultra vires in view of the provisions of the Act or Part III
of the Constitution of India. The amendment cannot also
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 777

M/s Shri Sendhur Agro & Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd.

be called to be manifestly arbitrary in the absence of any
materials on record.
7. Accordingly, this writ petition is dismissed. No costs.
Consequently, connected writ miscellaneous petition is
also dismissed.”
60. Thus, indubitably, Section 142 of the N.I. Act was amended and
Section 142-A was introduced with effect from 15.06.2015, to clarify
the jurisdictional issue and to address the crisis of transfer of cases
as per the ratio in Dashrath Rupsingh (supra).
61. It is clear on a reading of Section 142(2)(a) and the Explanation thereto
that, for the purposes of clause (a), where a cheque is delivered for
collection at any branch of the bank of the payee or holder in due
course, then, the cheque shall be deemed to have been delivered to
the branch of the bank in which the payee or holder in due course,
as the case may be, maintains the account.
62. A conjoint reading of Section 142(2)(a) along with the explanation
thereof, makes the position emphatically clear that, when a cheque
is delivered or issued to a person with liberty to present the cheque
for collection at any branch of the bank where the payee or holder
in due course, as the case may be, maintains the account then, the
cheque shall be deemed to have been delivered or issued to the
branch of the bank, in which, the payee or holder in due course,
as the case may be, maintains the account, and the court of the
place where such cheque was presented for collection, will have
the jurisdiction to entertain the complaint alleging the commission
of offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. In that view
of the position of law, the word ‘delivered’ used in Section 142(2)
(a) of the N.I. Act has no significance. What is of significance is
the expression ‘for collection through an account’. That is to say,
delivery of the cheque takes place where the cheque was issued
and presentation of the cheque will be through the account of the
payee or holder in due course, and the said place is decisive to
determine the question of jurisdiction.
63. The strong assertion on the part of the petitioner that no part of the
cause of action could be said to have arisen within Chandigarh,
is of no avail to them, more particularly when the law itself allows
the institution of a complaint in Chandigarh. The enactment of sub-
section (2)(a) of Section 142 of the N.I. Act and the Explanation
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thereto allows the complainant to file a complaint before the courts
within whose jurisdiction the collection branch of the bank falls. In the
present case, while contending that the court in Chandigarh lack the
jurisdiction to entertain the case, it is not the case of the petitioner
that the respondent Bank has no collection branch in Chandigarh.
64. The argument canvassed on behalf of the petitioner that although
the Court in Chandigarh has the territorial jurisdiction to try the case
under Section 138 of the N.I. Act yet as the Court in Delhi also has
the territorial jurisdiction to try the case, the proceedings deserve to
be transferred to the Court in Delhi to take care of two situations for
the petitioner (i) language barrier and (ii) convenience.
65. For the purpose of transfer of any case or proceedings under Section
406 of the Cr.P.C., the case must fall within the ambit of the expression
“expedient for the ends of justice”. Mere inconvenience or hardship
that the accused may have to face in travelling from Coimbatore to
Chandigarh would not fall within the expression “expedient for the
ends of justice”. The case must fall within any of the five situations
as narrated in para 49 of this judgment. It is always open for the
petitioner accused to pray for exemption from personal appearance
or request the Court that he may be permitted to join the proceedings
online.

CONCLUSION
66. Having regard to the pleadings in the memorandum of the transfer
petition, we have reached the conclusion that no case is made out
for transfer of the proceedings in question under 406 CrPC.
67. In the result, the petition fails and is hereby dismissed. All other
connected transfer petitions are also disposed of in the aforesaid
terms.
68. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.

Result of the case: Transfer petitions disposed of.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain