M/S. SREE SURYA DEVELOPERS AND PROMOTERSversusN. SAILESH PRASAD AND ORS.

                        [2022] 3 S.C.R. 1081                             1081


     M/S. SREE SURYA DEVELOPERS AND PROMOTERS                            A
                                  v.
                N. SAILESH PRASAD AND ORS.
                   (Civil Appeal No. 439 of 2022)
                       FEBRUARY 09, 2022                                 B
          [M. R. SHAH AND SANJIV KHANNA, JJ.]
      Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Or. XXIII r.3A – Challenge to
Compromise Decree by instituting a separate suit – Maintainability
of – Held: Or.XXIII r.3A states that no suit shall lie to set aside a
                                                                         C
decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is
based was not lawful – A party challenging a consent decree based
on compromise has to approach the same court, which recorded the
compromise and institution of a separate suit challenging the consent
decree is not maintainable – Submission of plaintiff that in the suit
he has not specifically prayed for setting aside the Compromise          D
decree rather prayed to declare that the Compromise Decree is not
binding on him is not acceptable – A mere clever drafting would
not permit the plaintiff to make the suit maintainable which otherwise
is barred by law – Decree – Compromise decree.
      Allowing the appeals, the Court                                    E
      HELD: 1. A plain reading of Order XXIII Rule 3A CPC
would show that no suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the
ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was
not lawful. [Para 8][1090-C]
       2. The Trial Court was absolutely justified in rejecting the      F
plaint on the ground that the suit for the reliefs sought challenging
the Compromise Decree would not be maintainable. Now, so far
as the submission on behalf of the plaintiff that in the suit the
plaintiff has not specifically prayed for setting aside the
Compromise Decree and what is prayed is to declare that the              G
Compromise Decree is not binding on him and that for the other
reliefs sought, the suit would not be barred and still the suit would
be maintainable is concerned, the aforesaid cannot be accepted.
As held by this Court in a catena of decisions right from 1977

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                                1081
1082            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2022] 3 S.C.R.


 A     that a mere clever drafting would not permit the plaintiff to make
       the suit maintainable which otherwise would not be maintainable
       and/or barred by law. It has been consistently held by this Court
       that if clever drafting of the plaint has created the illusion of a
       cause of action, the court will nip it in the bud at the earliest so
       that bogus litigation will end at the earlier stage. [Paras 9, 10 ,
 B
       10.1][1095-F-H; 1096-A-B]
              3. Considering the reliefs of declaration of title, recovery
       of possession, cancellation of revocation of Gift Deed, the said
       reliefs can be granted only if the Compromise Decree dated
       13.01.2016 passed in O.S. No.1750 of 2015 is set aside. Therefore,
 C     by asking such multiple reliefs, the plaintiff by clever drafting
       wants to get his suit maintainable, which otherwise would not be
       maintainable questioning the Compromise Decree. All the said
       reliefs were subject matter of earlier suits and thereafter also
       subject matter of O.S. No.1750 of 2015 in which the Compromise
 D     Decree has been passed. Therefore, it is rightly held by the Trial
       Court that the suit in the present form and for the reliefs sought
       would be barred under Order XXIII Rule 3A CPC and therefore
       the Trial Court rightly rejected the plaint in exercise of powers
       under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC. The High Court has
       erred in setting aside the said order by entering into the merits
 E     of the validity of the Compromise Decree on the ground that the
       same was hit by Order XXXII Rule 7 CPC, which was not
       permissible at this stage of deciding the application under Order
       VII Rule 11 CPC and the only issue which was required to be
       considered by the High Court was whether the suit challenging
 F     the Compromise Decree would be maintainable or not. [Para
       11][1096-G-H; 1097-A-C]
             R. Janakiammal v. S.K. Kumarasamy, (2021) 9 SCC
             114; T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal and Anr., (1977)
             4 SCC 467 : [1978] 1 SCR 742; Ram Singh v. Gram
 G           Panchayat Mehal Kalan, (1986) 4 SCC 364 : [1986] 3
             SCR 831 – relied on.
             Banwari Lal v. Chando Devi, (1993) 1 SCC 581 : [1992]
             3 Suppl. SCR 524; Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder
             Singh & Ors., (2006) 5 SCC 566 : [2006] 3 Suppl. SCR
 H
M/S. SREE SURYA DEVELOPERS AND PROMOTERS v. N. SAILESH 1083
                   PRASAD AND ORS.

        370; Horil v. Keshav, (2012) 5 SCC 525 : [2012] 3 SCR            A
        1; R. Rajanna v. S.R. Venkataswamy & Ors., (2014) 15
        SCC 471 : [2014] 14 SCR 535; Madanuri Sri Rama
        Chandra Murthy v. Syed Jalal, (2017) 13 SCC 174 :
        [2017] 5 SCR 294; Canara Bank v. P. Selathal and
        Ors., (2020) 13 SCC 143; Raghwendra Sharan Singh
                                                                         B
        v. Ram Prasanna Singh, (2020) 16 SCC 601 : [2019] 4
        SCR 1069; Ram Singh v. Gram Panchayat Mehal Kalan,
        (1986) 4 SCC 364 : [1986] 3 SCR 831 – referred to.
                        Case Law Reference
[1992] 3 Suppl. SCR 524           referred to            Para 3.2        C
[2006] 3 Suppl. SCR 370           referred to            Para 3.2
[2012] 3 SCR 1                    referred to            Para 3.2
[2014] 14 SCR 535                 referred to            Para 3.2
(2021) 9 SCC 114                  relied on              Para 3.2        D
[1978] 1 SCR 742                  relied on              Para 3.4
[2017] 5 SCR 294                  referred to            Para 3.4
(2020) 13 SCC 143                 referred to            Para 3.4
[2019] 4 SCR 1069                 referred to            Para 3.4        E

[1978] 1 SCR 742                  referred to            Para 10.2
[1986] 3 SCR 831                  relied on              Para 10.3
        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 439 of
2022.                                                                    F
       From the Judgment and Order dated 01.10.2019 of the High Court
for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad in Appeal Suit No.454 of 2019.
        With
        Civil Appeal Nos. 440-441 of 2022.                               G
      Mukul Rohatgi, B. Adinarayana, Sr. Advs., S. Udaya Kumar Sagar,
Ms. Bina Madhavan, Uday Bhaskar, Krishna Kumar Singh, Tushar Gupta,
M/s Lawyer’s Knit & Co., Santosh Krishnan, Siddhant Buxy, Ms. Kanti,
B. Shravanth Shanker, D. Ramakrishna Reddy, Mrs. D. Bharathi Reddy,
Advs. for the appearing parties.                                         H
1084            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2022] 3 S.C.R.


 A           The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
             M. R. SHAH, J.
              1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment
       and order dated 01.10.2019 passed by the High Court for the State of
 B     Telangana at Hyderabad in Appeal Suit No.454 of 2019 by which the
       High Court has allowed the said appeal preferred by the respondent
       No.1 herein – original plaintiff and has quashed and set aside the order
       passed by the learned II Additional District Judge, Ranga Reddy District
       dated 02.05.2019 in I.A. No.108 of 2019 in O.S. No.537 of 2018 by
       which the learned Trial Court rejected the plaint under Order 7 Rule
 C     11(d) of the Civil Procedure Code (hereinafter referred to as “CPC”),
       the original defendants to O.S. No.537 of 2018 have preferred the present
       appeals.
             2. The facts leading to the present appeals in nutshell are as under:-

 D            2.1 That the suit schedule property was gifted to the respondent
       No.1 herein – original plaintiff during his minority by his paternal
       grandmother (respondent No.2 herein and original defendant in O.S.
       No.537 of 2018) vide registered Gift Deed dated 13.02.2003. That the
       said Gift Settlement Deed was revoked vide Revocation of Gift Deed
       dated 10.12.2004 by the grandmother of the respondent No.1 herein –
 E     original plaintiff. That thereafter a registered Development Agreement-
       cum-General Power of Attorney dated 18.01.2008 came to be executed
       between the grandmother of the plaintiff and the appellant herein – M/s.
       Sree Surya Developers and Promoters – original defendant No.2. It
       appears that under the said Development Agreement, the grandmother
 F     was entitled to 35,000 sq. ft. of fixed saleable super built-up area along
       with proportionate number of car parking spaces and undivided share in
       the land.
              2.2 The father of the respondent No.1 – original plaintiff (original
       respondent No.3 herein and defendant No.3 in O.S. No.537 of 2018)
 G     filed a suit being O.S. No.1750 of 2015 as the next friend of then minor
       respondent No.1 herein seeking for declaration that revocation of
       GiftDeed dated 10.04.2004 as being illegal and not binding on the plaintiff
       therein and also for perpetual injunction. Subsequently, a compromise
       was arrived at between the parties to O.S. No.1750 of 2015 vide
       Compromise Deed Dated 30.12.2015. Under the Compromise, it was
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M/S. SREE SURYA DEVELOPERS AND PROMOTERS v. N. SAILESH 1085
             PRASAD AND ORS. [M. R. SHAH, J.]

agreed that the respondent No.1 herein – original plaintiff would be entitled   A
to entire 35,000 sq. ft. of the constructed area, which was agreed to be
allocated to the grandmother under the Development Agreement. It was
further agreed as per the Compromise Decree that the Developer would
be entitled to assign the development rightsaccrued to it under the said
Development Agreement to the third parties. In furtherance of the
                                                                                B
compromise, I.A. No.31 of 2016 under Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC came
to be filed alongwith the Compromise Memo praying for passing of decree
in terms thereof. The father of the respondent No.1 (respondent No.3
herein – original defendant No.3) filed I.A. in the said suit under Rule
172 of the Civil Rules of Practice seeking permission to act on behalf of
the respondent No.1 herein and the Trial Court was pleased to permit            C
him to do so.
      2.3 Thereafter, the Compromise Decree came to be passed by
the VIII Additional Senior Civil Judge, RR District dated 13.01.2016 in
O.S. No.1750 of 2015 in terms of the Memorandum of Compromise
entered into by the father on behalf of respondent No.1 herein, the             D
grandmother and the appellant herein – Developer. It appears that
thereafter the appellant – Developer assigned its development rights
under the above-mentioned Development Agreement to respondent No.4
herein under a Deed of Assignment dated 06.04.2016 and on the basis
of the same, the respondent No.4 has started developing the subject             E
property in O.S. No.537 of 2018.
       2.4 That on attaining the age of majority, the respondent No.1
herein filed the present suit being O.S. No.537 of 2018 through his General
Power of Attorney praying inter alia declaration of right, title and interest
over the suit schedule property and declaration of Compromise Decree.           F
He also prayed the revocation of deed as null and void.
        2.5 That having been served with a notice of the suit, the appellant
filed written statement denying all the material allegations. The appellant
also filed I.A. No.108 of 2019 under order VII Rule 11 CPC for rejection
of the plaint on various grounds and mainly on the ground that the suit         G
for setting aside the consent decree/Compromise Decree would be barred
under Order XXIII Rule 3A of CPC. The Trial Court vide order dated
02.05.2019 allowed the said I.A. and rejected the plaint on the ground
that in view of Order XIII Rule 3A CPC, no independent suit would be
maintainable against the Compromise Decree.
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1086            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 3 S.C.R.


 A           2.6 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order passed by
       the Trial Court rejecting the plaint in exercise of powers under Order
       VII Rule 11(d) CPC on the ground that in view of the provisions of
       Order XXIII Rule 3A CPC, no independent suit would be maintainable
       against the Compromise Decree, the original plaintiff preferred the present
       appeal before the High Court.
 B
              2.7 By the impugned judgment and order, the High Court has
       allowed the said appeal and has quashed and set aside the order passed
       by the Trial Court rejecting the plaint and has remanded the matter to
       the Trial Court by observing that the effect of the provisions of Order
       XXXII Rules 1 to 7 CPC has not been considered by the Trial court,
 C
       which would have a direct bearing on the validity of the Compromise
       Decree dated 13.01.2016 in O.S. No.1750 of 2015.
             2.8 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment
       and order passed by the High court, the original defendant Nos. 2 and 4
       – Developer and its Assignee have preferred the present appeals.
 D
              3. Shri Mukul Rohatgi, learned Senior Advocate appearing on
       behalf of the appellant – Developer has vehemently submitted that in
       the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court has committed
       a grave error in quashing and setting aside the order passed by the Trial
       court rejecting the plaint in exercise of powers under Order VII Rule 11
 E
       CPC holding that in view of Order XXIII Rule 3A CPC, no independent
       suit would be maintainable against the Compromise Decree.
              3.1 It is submitted that Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC provides for
       compromise of suit. It is submitted that by way of amendment in 1976
 F     made by Act No.104 of 1976, Rule 3A has been inserted, which
       specifically provides that no suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the
       ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful.
       It is submitted that therefore the present suit filed by the respondent
       No.1 herein – original plaintiff challenging the Compromise Decree would
       be barred under Order XXIII Rule 3A CPC and therefore the Trial
 G     Court rightly rejected the plaint.
              3.2 It is further submitted by Shri Rohatgi, learned Senior Advocate
       appearing on behalf of the appellant – Developer and the learned counsel
       for the Assignee that as held by this Court in a catena of decisions, the
       only remedy available to the aggrieved party would be to submit an
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M/S. SREE SURYA DEVELOPERS AND PROMOTERS v. N. SAILESH 1087
             PRASAD AND ORS. [M. R. SHAH, J.]

appropriate application before the same Court which recorded the                  A
compromise. Reliance is placed on decisions of this Court in the case of
Banwari Lal Vs. Chando Devi, (1993) 1 SCC 581; Pushpa Devi
Bhagat Vs. Rajinder Singh &Ors., (2006) 5 SCC 566; Horil Vs.
Keshav, (2012) 5 SCC 525; R. Rajanna Vs. S.R. Venkataswamy
& Ors., (2014) 15 SCC 471 and recently in R. Janakiammal Vs.
                                                                                  B
S.K. Kumarasamy, (2021) 9 SCC 114.
        3.3 It is submitted that in the present case as such the original
plaintiff had already filed an application under Order XXIII Rule 3A
before the same court which passed the consent Compromise Decree.
It is submitted that in the present case even the original plaintiff has filed
                                                                                  C
a first appeal under Order XLIII before the first Appellate court
challenging the Compromise Decree. It is submitted that therefore as
such the plaintiff has already availed the other remedies available to
him. It is submitted that therefore the present suit is nothing but an abuse
of process of law. It is submitted that in any case, the substantive
independent suit questioning the Compromise Decree shall not be                   D
maintainable in view of Order XXIII Rule 3A CPC.
       3.4 It is further submitted by Shri Rohatgi, learned Senior Advocate
appearing on behalf of the appellant that in the present case the
respondent No.1 herein – original plaintiff has indulged in clever drafting
seeking one relief by way of drafting multiple prayers. It is submitted           E
that the only relief that the plaintiff seeks is setting aside the Compromise
Decree dated 13.01.2016 which he has sought by drafting multiple prayers
in order to avoid the bar to suit envisaged under Order XXIII Rule 3A of
CPC, which in other words is mere clever drafting. It is submitted that
as held by this Court in a catena of decisions by mere clever drafting of
                                                                                  F
the plaint, the plaintiff cannot be permitted to maintain the suit, which
otherwise would not be maintainable and/or barred by any law. It is
further observed and held by this Court that if clever drafting of the
plaint has created the illusion of a cause of action, the court will nip it in
the bud at the earliest so that bogus litigation will end at the earlier stage.
Reliance is placed on the decisions of this Court in the case of T.               G
Arivandandam Vs. T.V. Satyapal and Anr., (1977) 4 SCC 467;
Madanuri Sri Rama Chandra Murthy Vs. Syed Jalal, (2017) 13
SCC 174; Canara Bank Vs. P. Selathal and Ors., (2020) 13 SCC
143; and Raghwendra Sharan Singh Vs. Ram Prasanna Singh,
(2020) 16 SCC 601.
                                                                                  H
1088             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                             [2022] 3 S.C.R.


 A            3.5 Shri Rohatgi, learned Senior Advocate has further submitted
       that even otherwise the impugned judgment and order passed by the
       High Court is unsustainable. It is submitted that in the entire judgment,
       there is no discussion by the High Court on the maintainability of the suit
       and/or any discussion on Order XXIII Rule 3A CPC on the basis of
       which the Trial Court rejected the plaint.
 B
              3.6 It is submitted that on the contrary, the High Court has gone
       into the validity of the Compromise Decree considering Order XXXII
       Rules 1 to 7 CPC and the High Court has virtually given the findings
       relying upon Order XXXII Rule 7 CPC that the Compromise Decree
       was not binding to the plaintiff. It is submitted that the High Court ought
 C
       to have addressed itself to the maintainability of the suit and at this stage
       the High Court was not required to consider at all on the validity of the
       Compromise Decree.
              3.7 Number of other submissions have been made by learned
 D     counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant on the validity of the
       Compromise Decree. However, for the reasons stated hereinbelow, we
       propose to consider the only issue with respect to maintainability of the
       suit and the issue before this Court is not on the validity of the Compromise
       Decree, therefore, we do not propose to deal with any of the submissions
       on merits on the validity of the Compromise Decree.
 E
              4. Present appeals are vehemently opposed by Shri B. Adinarayana
       Rao, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the original
       plaintiff(s).
              4.1 it is submitted that in the present case, the Compromise Decree
 F     is hit by Order XXXII Rule 7 CPC. It is submitted that therefore on
       attaining the majority immediately when respondent No.1 herein – original
       plaintiff instituted a suit for various reliefs, which otherwise can be granted
       in a substantive independent suit, the High Court has rightly set aside the
       order passed by the Trial Court rejecting the plaint.

 G            4.2 It is vehemently submitted by learned Senior Advocate
       appearing on behalf of the original plaintiff that in the present case, the
       reliefs prayed in the suit are not only with respect to the Compromise
       Decree, but other reliefs are sought for which an independent substantive
       suit shall be maintainable. It is submitted that as such the plaintiff has not
       prayed to set aside the Compromise Decree. It is submitted that what is
 H
M/S. SREE SURYA DEVELOPERS AND PROMOTERS v. N. SAILESH 1089
             PRASAD AND ORS. [M. R. SHAH, J.]

prayed is to declare that the Compromise Decree is not binding on him.           A
It is submitted that therefore for the other reliefs sought, it can be said
that an independent suit under Order XXIII Rule 3A shall not be barred.
       4.3 However, the learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf
of the respondents – original plaintiff(s) is not disputing that the plaintiff
has already filed an application under Order XXIII Rule 3A before the            B
same Court, which passed the Compromise Decree. He is also not in a
position to dispute that in the said application, the plaintiff can very well
make submission on the validity of the Compromise Decree on whatever
grounds, which may be available to him including non-compliance of
Order XXXII Rule 7 CPC.
                                                                                 C
      5. We have heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respective parties at length.
        6. At the outset, it is required to be noted that in the present case,
the Trial Court rejected the plaint of O.S. No.537 of 2018 in exercise of
powers under Order VII Rule 11 CPC on the ground that the said suit              D
would not be maintainable in view of specific bar under Order XXIII
Rule 3A CPC. The High Court by the impugned judgment and order has
set aside the said order and has remanded the matter to the Trial Court
by observing that while passing the order rejecting the plaint, the Trial
Court had not considered the provisions of Order XXXII Rules 1 to 7
CPC. However, it is required to be noted that while passing the impugned         E
judgment and order, the High Court has not at all dealt with and considered
the provisions of Order XXIII Rule 3A CPC and has not considered at
all whether in fact the suit challenging the Compromise Decree and/or
for the reliefs sought in the suit would be maintainable or not. What was
required to be considered by the High Court was whether the independent          F
suit questioning the Compromise Decree would be maintainable or not.
The aforesaid crucial aspect has not been dealt with by the High Court
at all and High Court has gone into the validity of the Compromise Decree
in view of Order XXXII Rule 7 CPC. At the stage of deciding the
application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, the only thing which was
required to be considered by the High Court was whether the suit would           G
be maintainable or not and that the suit challenging the Compromise
Decree would be maintainable or not in view of Order XXIII Rule 3A
CPC and at this stage, the High Court / Court was not required to consider
on merits the validity of the Compromise Decree.
                                                                                 H
1090            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 3 S.C.R.


 A            7. Now, so far as the main issue whether the Trial Court rightly
       rejected the plaint in exercise of powers under Order VII Rule 11 CPC
       on the ground that an independent suit challenging the Compromise Decree
       would be barred in view of Order XXIII Rule 3A CPC is concerned, on
       plain reading of Order XXIII Rule 3A CPC, the Trial Court was justified
       in rejecting the plaint. Order XXIII Rule 3A CPC, which has been inserted
 B
       by amendment in 1976 reads as under:-
             “3A. Bar to suit. — No suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the
             ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was
             not lawful.”
 C             8. Therefore, on plain reading of Order XXIII Rule 3A CPC, no
       suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on
       which the decree is based was not lawful. Identical question came to be
       considered by this Court in the case of R. Janakiammal (supra). It is
       observed and held by this Court that Rule 3A of Order XXIII bars the
       suit to set aside the decree on the ground that the compromise on which
 D
       decree was passed was not lawful. It is further observed and held that
       an agreement or compromise which is clearly void or voidable shall not
       be deemed to be lawful and the bar under Rule 3A shall be attracted if
       compromise on the basis of which the decree was passed was void or
       voidable. In this case, this Court had occasion to consider in detail Order
 E     XXIII Rule 3 as well as Rule 3A. The earlier decisions of this Court
       have also been dealt with by this Court in paragraphs 53 to 57 as under:-
             “53. Order 23 Rule 3 as well as Rule 3-A came for consideration
             before this Court in large number of cases and we need to refer
             to a few of them to find out the ratio of judgments of this Court in
 F           context of Rule 3 and Rule 3-A. In Banwari Lal v. Chando Devi,
             (1993) 1 SCC 581, this Court considered Rule 3 as well as Rule
             3-A of Order 23. This Court held that the object of the Amendment
             Act, 1976 is to compel the party challenging the compromise to
             question the court which has recorded the compromise. In paras
             6 and 7, the following was laid down: (SCC pp. 584-85)
 G
                 “6. The experience of the courts has been that on many
                 occasions parties having filed petitions of compromise on basis
                 of which decrees are prepared, later for one reason or other
                 challenge the validity of such compromise. For setting aside
                 such decrees suits used to be filed which dragged on for years
 H
M/S. SREE SURYA DEVELOPERS AND PROMOTERS v. N. SAILESH 1091
             PRASAD AND ORS. [M. R. SHAH, J.]

       including appeals to different courts. Keeping in view the             A
       predicament of the courts and the public, several amendments
       have been introduced in Order 23 of the Code which contain
       provisions relating to withdrawal and adjustment of suit by the
       Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1976. Rule 1 Order
       23 of the Code prescribes that at any time after the institution
                                                                              B
       of the suit, the plaintiff may abandon his suit or abandon a part
       of his claim. Rule 1(3) provides that where the Court is satisfied:
       (a) that a suit must fail by reason of some formal defect, or (b)
       that there are sufficient grounds for allowing the plaintiff to
       institute a fresh suit for the subject-matter of a suit or part of a
       claim, it may, on such terms as it thinks fit, grant the plaintiff     C
       permission to withdraw such suit with liberty to institute a fresh
       suit. In view of Rule 1(4) if the plaintiff abandons his suit or
       withdraws such suit without permission referred to above, he
       shall be precluded from instituting any such suit in respect of
       such subject-matter. Rule 3 Order 23 which contained the
                                                                              D
       procedure regarding compromise of the suit was also amended
       to curtail vexatious and tiring litigation while challenging a
       compromise decree. Not only in Rule 3 some special
       requirements were introduced before a compromise is recorded
       by the court including that the lawful agreement or a
       compromise must be in writing and signed by the parties, a             E
       proviso with an Explanation was also added which is as follows:
          ‘Provided that where it is alleged by one party and denied
          by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been
          arrived at, the Court shall decide the question; but no
          adjournment shall be granted for the purpose of deciding            F
          the question, unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded,
          thinks fit to grant such adjournment.
          Explanation.—An agreement or compromise which is void
          or voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872),
          shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of this         G
          Rule.’
       7. By adding the proviso along with an Explanation the purpose
       and the object of the amending Act appears to be to compel
       the party challenging the compromise to question the same
       before the court which had recorded the compromise in                  H
1092      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 3 S.C.R.


 A        question. That court was enjoined to decide the controversy
          whether the parties have arrived at an adjustment in a lawful
          manner. The Explanation made it clear that an agreement or a
          compromise which is void or voidable under the Contract Act
          shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of the said
          Rule. Having introduced the proviso along with the Explanation
 B
          in Rule 3 in order to avoid multiplicity of suit and prolonged
          litigation, a specific bar was prescribed by Rule 3-A in respect
          of institution of a separate suit for setting aside a decree on the
          basis of a compromise saying:
             ‘3-A. Bar to suit.—No suit shall lie to set aside a decree
 C           on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is
             based was not lawful.’
       54. The next judgment to be noted is Pushpa Devi
       Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 566, R.V. Raveendran,
       J. speaking for the Court noted the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3
 D     and Rule 3-A and recorded his conclusions in para 17 in the
       following words: (SCC p. 576)
       “17. The position that emerges from the amended provisions of
       Order 23 can be summed up thus:

 E        (i) No appeal is maintainable against a consent decree having
          regard to the specific bar contained in Section 96(3) CPC.
          (ii) No appeal is maintainable against the order of the court
          recording the compromise (or refusing to record a compromise)
          in view of the deletion of clause (m) of Rule 1 Order 43.
 F        (iii) No independent suit can be filed for setting aside a
          compromise decree on the ground that the compromise was
          not lawful in view of the bar contained in Rule 3-A.
          (iv) A consent decree operates as an estoppel and is valid and
          binding unless it is set aside by the court which passed the
 G        consent decree, by an order on an application under the proviso
          to Rule 3 Order 23.
       Therefore, the only remedy available to a party to a consent decree
       to avoid such consent decree, is to approach the court which
       recorded the compromise and made a decree in terms of it, and
 H     establish that there was no compromise. In that event, the court
M/S. SREE SURYA DEVELOPERS AND PROMOTERS v. N. SAILESH 1093
             PRASAD AND ORS. [M. R. SHAH, J.]

    which recorded the compromise will itself consider and decide          A
    the question as to whether there was a valid compromise or not.
    This is so because a consent decree is nothing but contract between
    parties superimposed with the seal of approval of the court. The
    validity of a consent decree depends wholly on the validity of the
    agreement or compromise on which it is made. The second
                                                                           B
    defendant, who challenged the consent compromise decree was
    fully aware of this position as she filed an application for setting
    aside the consent decree on 21-8-2001 by alleging that there was
    no valid compromise in accordance with law. Significantly, none
    of the other defendants challenged the consent decree. For reasons
    best known to herself, the second defendant within a few days          C
    thereafter (that is on 27-8-2001) filed an appeal and chose not to
    pursue the application filed before the court which passed the
    consent decree. Such an appeal by the second defendant was not
    maintainable, having regard to the express bar contained in Section
    96(3) of the Code.”
                                                                           D
    55. The next judgment is R. Rajanna v. S.R. Venkataswamy,
    (2014) 15 SCC 471 in which the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3
    and Rule 3-A were again considered. After extracting the aforesaid
    provisions, the following was held by this Court in para 11: (SCC
    p. 474)
                                                                           E
       “11. It is manifest from a plain reading of the above that in
       terms of the proviso to Order 23 Rule 3 where one party alleges
       and the other denies adjustment or satisfaction of any suit by a
       lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the
       parties, the Court before whom such question is raised, shall
       decide the same. What is important is that in terms of              F
       Explanation to Order 23 Rule 3, the agreement or compromise
       shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of the said
       Rule if the same is void or voidable under the Contract Act,
       1872. It follows that in every case where the question arises
       whether or not there has been a lawful agreement or                 G
       compromise in writing and signed by the parties, the question
       whether the agreement or compromise is lawful has to be
       determined by the court concerned. What is lawful will in turn
       depend upon whether the allegations suggest any infirmity in
       the compromise and the decree that would make the same
                                                                           H
1094     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 3 S.C.R.


 A        void or voidable under the Contract Act. More importantly,
          Order 23 Rule 3-A clearly bars a suit to set aside a decree on
          the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based
          was not lawful. This implies that no sooner a question relating
          to lawfulness of the agreement or compromise is raised before
          the court that passed the decree on the basis of any such
 B
          agreement or compromise, it is that court and that court alone
          who can examine and determine that question. The court cannot
          direct the parties to file a separate suit on the subject for no
          such suit will lie in view of the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3-
          A CPC. That is precisely what has happened in the case at
 C        hand. When the appellant filed OS No. 5326 of 2005 to
          challenge the validity of the compromise decree, the court
          before whom the suit came up rejected the plaint under Order
          7 Rule 11 CPC on the application made by the respondents
          holding that such a suit was barred by the provisions of Order
          23 Rule 3-A CPC. Having thus got the plaint rejected, the
 D        defendants (the respondents herein) could hardly be heard to
          argue that the plaintiff (the appellant herein) ought to pursue
          his remedy against the compromise decree in pursuance of
          OS No. 5326 of 2005 and if the plaint in the suit has been
          rejected to pursue his remedy against such rejection before a
 E        higher court.”
       56. The judgments of Pushpa Devi [Pushpa Devi Bhagat v.
       Rajinder Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 566] as well as Banwari
       Lal [Banwari Lal v. Chando Devi, (1993) 1 SCC 581] were
       referred to and relied on by this Court. This Court held that no
 F     sooner a question relating to lawfulness of the agreement or
       compromise is raised before the court that passed the decree on
       the basis of any such agreement or compromise, it is that court
       and that court alone which can examine and determine that
       question.
       57. In subsequent judgment, Triloki Nath Singh v. Anirudh
 G
       Singh, (2020) 6 SCC 629, this Court again referring to earlier
       judgments reiterated the same proposition i.e. the only remedy
       available to a party to a consent decree to avoid such consent
       decree is to approach the court which recorded the compromise
       and separate suit is not maintainable. In paras 17 and 18, the
 H     following has been laid down: (SCC p. 638)
M/S. SREE SURYA DEVELOPERS AND PROMOTERS v. N. SAILESH 1095
             PRASAD AND ORS. [M. R. SHAH, J.]

          “17. By introducing the amendment to the Civil Procedure Code          A
          (Amendment) Act, 1976 w.e.f. 1-2-1977, the legislature has
          brought into force Order 23 Rule 3-A, which creates bar to
          institute the suit to set aside a decree on the ground that the
          compromise on which decree is based was not lawful. The
          purpose of effecting a compromise between the parties is to
                                                                                 B
          put an end to the various disputes pending before the court of
          competent jurisdiction once and for all.
          18. Finality of decisions is an underlying principle of all
          adjudicating forums. Thus, creation of further litigation should
          never be the basis of a compromise between the parties. Rule
          3-A Order 23 CPC put a specific bar that no suit shall lie to set      C
          aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which
          the decree is based was not lawful. The scheme of Order 23
          Rule 3 CPC is to avoid multiplicity of litigation and permit parties
          to amicably come to a settlement which is lawful, is in writing
          and a voluntary act on the part of the parties. The court can be       D
          instrumental in having an agreed compromise effected and
          finality attached to the same. The court should never be party
          to imposition of a compromise upon an unwilling party, still
          open to be questioned on an application under the proviso to
          Order 23 Rule 3 CPC before the court.”
                                                                                 E
      That thereafter it is specifically observed and held that a party to
a consent decree based on a compromise to challenge the compromise
decree on the ground that the decree was not lawful i.e., it was void or
voidable has to approach the same court, which recorded the compromise
and a separate suit challenging the consent decree has been held to be
not maintainable.                                                                F

       9. In view of the above decisions of this Court, the Trial Court
was absolutely justified in rejecting the plaint on the ground that the suit
for the reliefs sought challenging the Compromise Decree would not be
maintainable.
                                                                                 G
      10. Now, so far as the submission on behalf of the plaintiff that in
the suit the plaintiff has not specifically prayed for setting aside the
Compromise Decree and what is prayed is to declare that the
Compromise Decree is not binding on him and that for the other reliefs
sought, the suit would not be barred and still the suit would be maintainable
is concerned, the aforesaid cannot be accepted.                                  H
1096             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                             [2022] 3 S.C.R.


 A            10.1 As held by this Court in a catena of decisions right from 1977
       that a mere clever drafting would not permit the plaintiff to make the suit
       maintainable which otherwise would not be maintainable and/or barred
       by law. It has been consistently held by this Court that if clever drafting
       of the plaint has created the illusion of a cause of action, the court will
       nip it in the bud at the earliest so that bogus litigation will end at the
 B
       earlier stage.
            10.2 In the case of T. Arivandandam Vs. T.V. Satyapal, (1977)
       4 SCC 467, it is observed and held as under;-
              “5. We have not the slightest hesitation in condemning the petitioner
 C            for the gross abuse of the process of the court repeatedly and
              unrepentantly resorted to. From the statement of the facts found
              in the judgment of the High Court, it is perfectly plain that the suit
              now pending before the First Munsif’s Court, Bangalore, is a
              flagrant misuse of the mercies of the law in receiving plaints. The
              learned Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful — not
 D            formal — reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and
              meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, he
              should exercise his power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC taking
              care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if
              clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it
 E            in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly
              under Order 10 CPC. An activist Judge is the answer to
              irresponsible law suits.”
              10.3 In the case of Ram Singh v. Gram Panchayat Mehal
       Kalan, (1986) 4 SCC 364, this Court has observed and held that when
 F     the suit is barred by any law, the plaintiff cannot be allowed to circumvent
       that provision by means of clever drafting so as to avoid mention of
       those circumstances, by which the suit is barred by law of limitation.
              11. If we consider the reliefs of declaration of title, recovery of
       possession, cancellation of revocation of Gift Deed, declaration for DGPA
 G     and Deed of Assignment-cum-DGPA, the said reliefs can be granted
       only if the Compromise Decree dated 13.01.2016 passed in O.S. No.1750
       of 2015 is set aside. Therefore, by asking such multiple reliefs, the plaintiff
       by clever drafting wants to get his suit maintainable, which otherwise
       would not be maintainable questioning the Compromise Decree. All the
       aforesaid reliefs were subject matter of earlier suits and thereafter also
 H
M/S. SREE SURYA DEVELOPERS AND PROMOTERS v. N. SAILESH 1097
             PRASAD AND ORS. [M. R. SHAH, J.]

subject matter of O.S. No.1750 of 2015 in which the Compromise Decree        A
has been passed. Therefore, it is rightly held by the Trial Court that the
suit in the present form and for the reliefs sought would be barred under
Order XXIII Rule 3A CPC and therefore the Trial Court rightly rejected
the plaint in exercise of powers under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC.
The High Court has erred in setting aside the said order by entering into
                                                                             B
the merits of the validity of the Compromise Decree on the ground that
the same was hit by Order XXXII Rule 7 CPC, which was not permissible
at this stage of deciding the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC
and the only issue which was required to be considered by the High
Court was whether the suit challenging the Compromise Decree would
be maintainable or not.                                                      C
       12. As observed hereinabove and it is not in dispute that as such
the respondent No.1 – original plaintiff has already moved an appropriate
application before the concerned Court, which passed the decree setting
aside the compromise Decree by submitting an application under Order
XXIII Rule 3A CPC therefore the said application will have to be decided     D
and disposed of in accordance with law in which all the defences /
contentions which may have been available to the respective parties on
the validity of the Compromise Decree would have to be gone into by
the concerned court in accordance with law and on its own merits.
       13. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the        E
present appeals succeed. The impugned judgment and order passed by
the High Court allowing the appeal and quashing and setting aside the
order passed by the II Additional District Judge, Ranga Reddy District
passed on 02.05.2019 in I.A. No. 108 of 2019 in O.S. No.537 of 2018 is
hereby quashed and set aside. The order passed by the Trial Court dated
02.05.2019 in I.A. No.108 of 2019 in O.S. No. 537 of 2018 rejecting the      F
plaint is hereby restored. However, it is observed that we have not
expressed anything on merits on validity of the Compromise Decree and
the same shall have to be decided and considered by the Court which
passed the decree in an application under Order XXIII Rule 3A CPC,
which as observed hereinabove has been filed by the original plaintiff       G
and the said application be decided and disposed of by the concerned
Court in accordance with law and on its own merits and the contentions/
defences which may be available to the respective parties on the validity
of the Compromise Decree are kept open to be considered by the
concerned Court in accordance with law and on its own merits.
                                                                             H
1098              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2022] 3 S.C.R.


 A           Present appeals are allowed accordingly. However, in the facts
       and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
              Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.

       Devika Gujral                                               Appeals allowed.
 B     (Assisted by : Shevali Monga, LCRA)




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