M/S. THE INDIAN CABLE CO., LTD. CALCUTTAversusCOLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, CALCUTTA AND ORS..

A          MIS. THE INDIAN CABLE CO., LTD. CALCUITA
                              v.
       COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, CALCUITA AND ORS.

                              SEPTEMBER 20, 1994

B                [B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, SUHAS C. SEN AND
                           K.S. PARIPOORNAN, JJ.)

           Central Excises and Salt Ac~ 1944/Central Excise Rules, 1944-Ss. 2(d),
    2(f)/Rule JO-Classification under item 15A(l)(ii)--PVC compound
C   produced from out of duty paid PVC resin-Levy of duty treating it as a
    different product having different use-Validity of-Processes undertaken to
    produce PVC compound-Whether amounts to manufacture-''Manufac-
    ture'L....!'Marketability''- "Excisable goods''-Meaning of.

          Words & Phrases :
D
          ''Manufacture''-"Excisable goods''-"Marketability''-Meaning of in the
    context of Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944.

          The appellant-assessee was producing PVC compound from out of
E   the duty paid PVC resin. The Assistant Collector of Central Excise held
    that the PVC compound in the form of granules produced by the assessee
    was exigible to duty under Rule 10 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944. He
    allowed set off in respect of the duty paid on PVC resins used in the
    production of PVC compound.

F        In appeal, the Appellate Collector held that the assessee manufac-
  tured PVC compound (granule) for insulation of their products viz.,
  electric wires and cables and the resultant PVC compound is a new
  product having different use than that of PVC resins and so the process
  undertaken by the assessee amounted to manufacture within the meaning
  of S.2(f) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. He, therefore, held that
G PVC compound would fall under sub-item (ii) or item lSA(l) and excise
  duty was accordingly leviable.

        In second appeal, the Customs, Excise & Gold (control) Appellate
  Tribunal by a majority ~ecision upheld the order of the Appellate Collec-
H tor. Against this order, the assessee preferred the present appeal.
                                      678
               INDIAN CABLE v. COLLECTOR OF C. EXCtSE                    679

      The assessee contended that the PVC compound or granules                  A
produced out of duty paid PVC resins is only a modified form of PVC
resins and the same cannot be called different goods commercially; nor is
it a marketable commodity. It was also contende_lf Jhat even if the process
employed by the assessee amounts to "manufacturer" within the meaning
of S.2(t) of the Act, it would not attract excise duty unless it was further
                                                                                B
found out that the commodity is a marketable commodity.

     Revenue contended that the PVC compound manufactured by the
assessee, being a distinct and different commercial product and
marketable as such, excise duty ~ould be levied on the same.
                                                                                c
     Remitting the matter to the Customs Excise and Gold(Control)
Tribunal, this Court

       HELD : 1. Though the majority of the members of the Tribunal held
that the process employed by the appellants amounts to "manufacture"
within the meaning of Section 2(1) of the Act, the dissenting Judicial Mem-     D
her held that it was not. At this stage, this Court need not pronounce on the
correctness or otherwise of the rival views so expressed by the members. of
the Tribunal, since the matter requires a remit for other reasons. But in
construing the relevant item or entry, in fiscal statutes, if it is one of
everyday use, the concerned authority must nonnally construe it, as to how      E
it is understood in common parlance or in the commercial world or trade
circles. It must be given its popular meaning. Nor should the entry be
understood in any technical or botanical or scientific sense. In the case of
technical words, it may call for a different approach. [685-D to G]

      Unwin v. Hanson, [1891) 2 QB 115, at 119, referred to.                    F

     New Encyclopaedia Britannica Vol. 21 PP. 290-292 and Mcgraw-Hill
Encyclopedia of Science & Technology, 7th Edn., PP 182-184, referred to.

       2. "Marketability" is a decisive te.st for dutiability. It .only means   G
"saleable", or "suitable for sale". It need not be in fact, "marketed". The
article should be, capable or being sold or being solcl, to consumers in the
market, at it is without anything more. The Tribunal has not adverted to
the above vitai. aspects nor has it entered a finding that the PVC compound
(granules) is a "marketable product" as understood in law. The Tribunal
was swayed by the fact that the conversion of PVC resin into PVC com-           H
    680                   . SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A pound by the process employed by the appellants amounts to "manufac-
    ture" within the meaning of Section 2(t) of the Act and that by_itself will
    justify the levy of duty. This is a palpable error committed by the Tribunal.
    In the absence of a finding, that the goods are "marketable" i.e., saleable
    or suitable for sale, the order of the Tribunal is infirm. (689-G-H, 690-A-B]

B        Union of India v. Delhi Cloth and General Mill Co. Ltd., AIR (1963)
    SC 791, followed.

           South Bihar Sugar Mills v. Union of India, AIR (1968) SC 928        =
    (1968] 3 SCR 21; Bhor Industries v. Collector, (1989] 1 SCC 602; Hindustan
C   Polymers v. Collector, (1989) 43 ELT 165(SC); Collector of Central Excise v.
    Ambalal Sarabhai, JT (1989) 3 SC 341   =   (1989) 43 ELT 214; Union Carbide
    v. Union of India, (1986) 24 ELT 169       =    (1986) SC JT 453 and A.P.
    Electricity Board v. Collector of Central Excise, JT (1994) 1 SC 545, relied
    on.

D            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3347 of
    .1984.

          From the Judgment and Order dated 11.11.83 of the Central Cus-
    toms, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi in O.No.
    348 of 1983.
E
             AK. Ganguli and K. Swamy for the Appellant.

             Joseph Vellapalli, AK. Srivastava and V.K. Verma for the Respon-
    dents.

F            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

            PARIPOORNAN, J. This is an appeal filed by an assessee agajnst the
     order passed by the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate
     Tribunal, New Delhi, dated 11.11.1983, under Section 35-L(b) of the
     Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act').
G    The respondents represent the revenue. The short question that arises for
     consideration in this appeal is whether a duty of excise was validly levied
     on "PVC compound" produced by the appellant from out of the duty paid
     PVC resin. The . levy of duty relates to the period from 18.6.1977 to
    /28.6.1977. The Assistant Collector of Central Excise, by his order dated
H    28.7.1978, held that the PVC compound in the form of granules produced
    iNDIAN CABLE v. COLLECTOR OF C. EXCISE (PARIPOORNAN, J.] 681

by the assessee were exigible to duty for the period from 18.6.1977 to A
28.6.1977, under Rule 10 of Central Excise Rules, 1944. He allowed set off
in respect of the duty paid on PVC resins and used in the production of
PVC compound. In appeal, the Appellate Collector of Central Excise, by
his order dated 28.8.1979, held that the appellant manufactured PVC
compound (granule) for insulation of their products, electric wires and B
cables, and the resultant PVC compound is a new product having different
use than that of PVC resins and the processes undertaken by the appellant
amount to manufacture within the meaning of Section 2(t) of the Act. He
held that PVC compound would fall under sub-item (ii) of item 15A(l)
and excise duty is accordingly leviable. In Second Appeal, filed by the
assessee, the Customs, Excise & Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, New C
Delhi, by a majority held that the appellant purchased PVC compound or
moulding granules, and though, no polymerisation or co-polymerisation
results nor any changes in the structural identity of the polymer molecules,
the conversion· of PVC resins into PVC compound by the process
employed by the appellant amounts to "manufacture" within the meaning D
of Section 2(t) of the Act. It was further held that goods so manufactured
by the appellant will fall for classification under item 15A(l)(ii) of the Act.
The Judicial Member in his dissenting order took the view that the change
in from PVC resins to PVC compound or moulding granules, does not
amount to "manufacture" and the process employed is of no significance,
and there is no legislative intent to bring to levy the product every time E
when there is a change in form. The appeal filed by the assessee was
dismissed in view of the majority decision. It is from the aforesaid order
passed by the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal,
New Delhi, the assessee has filed this appeal to this .Court.
                                                                             F
      2. We heard Sri A.K. Ganguli, Senior Counsel who appeared for the
appellant (assessee) and also Sri Joseph Vellapalli, Senior Counsel who
appeared for the respondents- revenue. The arguments advanced before
us covered a wide field. Sri A.K Ganguli argued that the appellants are
manufacturers of electric wires and cables and they produce among other      G
things a substance known as PVC compound (granule) out of duty paid
PVC resins. During the material time, namely, 13.6.1977 to 28.6.1977, they
manufactured 31 M.Ts. of PVC compound and removed the same for
captive consumption within the factory. The PVC compound or granules
produced out of duty paid PVC resins is only a modified form of PVC
resins and the same cannot be called different goods commercially. The       H
    682                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A   PVC compound in the form of granules, is not a marketable commodity,
    and that there is no finding of any statutory authority that it is otherwise.
    Even if the finding of the statutory authorities to the effect that the PVC
    compound in the form of granules produced by the appellants is a distinct
    and different commodity and the process employed by the assessee
B   amounts to "manufacture" within the meaning of Section 2(t) of the Act is
    justified, it will not attract "excise duty" unless it is further found that the
    commodity namely, PVC compound in the form of granules, is a
    "marketable commodity''. In the absence of such a finding, the statutory
    authorities were in error in holding that PVC compound in the from of
    granules produced out of duty paid PVC resins is exigible to excise duty.
C   On the other hand, counsel for the revenue Sri Vellapally contended that
    the PVC compound in the form of granules produced from out of the duty
    paid PVC resins, is a distinct and different product in the commercial
    world and since it is a different comme~cial product, it is implicit therefrom
    that it is "marketable". It was further argued that the goods produced by
D   the appellant, namely, PVC.compound.(granules) cannot b~ said to be the
    same goods as the PVC resins purchased by the assessee on which duly
    was paid. It is a distinct and 'different product in the commercial world and
    is exigible to excise dufy as found by the statutory authorities.

          3. We were referred to a few standard books to highlight what is
E meant and understood by "plastics" and "resins" in the commercial world
   and whether the PVC compound (granules) in the instant case, after having
   undergone the process as found by the Appellate Tribunal, is or is not a
   distinct and different product in the commercial world attracting levy of
   excise duty though removed for captive consumption. Our attention was
F invited to the New Encyclopaedia Britannica Vol. 21, pp. 290-292 and
   McGraw-Hill Encyclopaedia of Science & Technology, 7th Eda, PP. 182-
   184, to understand the nature, quality, uses and characteristics of "plastics"
   and "resins" in general, the various components of the said products, and
   the technology employed in them. The Appellate Tribunal in its order has
G referred to Hawley's Condensed Chemical Dictionary to illustrate what is
   meant by "modification" {10th Edn. P.699), to ascertain whether "PVC
   compound" is a chemically modified PVC resin. We do not think that we
   should go int<? technical aspects in detail in the light of the conclusion
   reached by us,' on another vital aspect in this case, which requires further
  -probe. In this case, the Appellate Tribunal after adverting to the facts that
H the .appellants produced PVC compound (granules) from duty paid PVC
    INDIAN CABLE v. COLLECTOR OF C. EXOSE (PARIPOORNAN, J.] 683

resins and that they were not polymerisation and co-polymerisation                   A
products, referred to the detailed tour note of chemical Examiner, in para
11 of its order, wherein it was concluded to the following effect :

        "It may be seen that the manufacture process adopted for the
        production of PVC compound from PVC resin-powder does not
        involve any polymerisation and co-polymerisation reaction of the             B
        initial resin molecules. By compounding PVC resin,s with various
       ·ingredients like plasticizers, stabilizer filler & lubricants, some of the
        physical & mechanical properties of the initial polymer/resin are
        greatly modi.fled, the ·pvc compound or. modifitd fonn of PVC resin
        is obtained without bringing ~ change in the structural identity of the      C
        polymer molecules."
                                        .                           .
      In the light of the above, the majority members of the· appellate
Tribunal came to the conclusion that the conversion of PVC resin into PVC
compound by the processes employed by the assessee, amounts to D
"manufacture" within the meaning of section 2(f) of the Act. The Tribunal
stated thus in paragraphs 12 & 13 of its Order:

        "It is clear that a good deal of processing is involved and what
        emerges is a homogeneously mixed material which is first formed E
        into a sheet and then broken into granules or chips. Evidently, it
        is not a case of simple loose mixture such as sand and pebble
        capable of being separated by simple physical means. It is also
        clear that the processing results in some of the physical and
        mechanical properties of the original PVC polymer or resin being
        modified through the structural identity of the polymer molecules F
        does not undergo change. We are of the opinion that there is a
        definite process of manufacture involved in the subject
        process .................. .It is not disputed that PVC resin and PVC
        compound or moulding granules afe not one and the same thing.
        We have seen that the conversion of PVC reshi into PVC com-
        pound involves the addition of fillers, plasticizers, stabilizer and G
         lubricant, the ingredients being intimately and homogenously
         mixed with the aid of heat and machines into a sheet which is then
         broken upto into granules or chips. Again, the two products are
         known by different names. What the appellants purchase is PVC
         resin and what they manufacture is PVC compound or moulding H
    684                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A           granules. It is in evidence, as seen from the Chemical Examiner's
            Notes, which have been referred to by the appellants, that some
            of the physical and mechanical properties of PVC resin are greatly
            modified by its conversion to PVC compound though, admittedly,
            no p~lymerisation or co-polymerisation results nor any changes in
            the structural identity of the polymer molecules."
B
    It is on the basis of the aforesaid finding the Tribunal held that the PVC
    compound produced by the appellants, out of the duty paid PVC resin, was
    liable to be charged with excise duty under item No. 68, from 18.6.1977 to
    28.6.1977.
c        4. The wordings of Item lSA in the Act prior to 18.6.77, and on and
    from 18.6.77, is extracted in paragraph 15 of the Tribunal's order to the
                                                 \
    following effect :

            ''Prior to 18. 6. 77:
D
            15 A. ARTIFICIAL OR SYNTHETIC RESINS AND PLASTIC
            MATERIALS AND ARTICLES THEREOF.

            (1) Artificial or synthetic resins and plastic materials in any form
            whether solid, liquid or pasty, or as powder granules or flakes, or
E           in the form of moulding powders, the following namely:

            (i) Condensation, Polycondesation and polyaddition products,
            whether or not modified or polymerised, including phenoplasts,
            Aminoplasts, Alkyds, Polyamides, Polyurethane, Polyallyl, Esters
            and other unsaturated polysters;
F
            (ii) polymerisation and co-polymerisation products including
            polyethylene and Polytetrahaloethylene Polyisobutylene, Polystyrene
            Polyvinyl Chloride, Ployvintacetate, Polyvinyl Chloroacetate and
            other Polyvinyl derivatives, Polyacrylic and Polymethacrylic deriva-
G           tives and coumarene-Indene resin; and................"

            "On and from 18.6. 77:

            ARTIFICIAL OR SYNTHETIC RESINS AND PLASTIC
            MATERIALS AND CELLULOSE ESTERS AND ETHERS,
H           AND ARTICLES THERE OF -
    INDIAN CABLE v. COLLECTOR OF C. EXCISE [PARIPOORNAN, J.]                685

         (1) The following artificial or synthetic resins and plastic materials,   A
         and cellulose esters and ethers, in any form, whether solid, liquid
         or pasty, or as powder, granules or flakes, or in the form of
         moulding powders, namely :

         (i) Condenstaion, Poly-condensation and Polyaddition products,
         whether or not modified or polymerised, and whether or not linear         B
         such as Phenoplasts, Aminoplasts Alkyds, Polyamides, Super
         Polyamides, Polyesters, Polyallyl esters, Polycarbonates Polyethers,
         Polyethylenemines Polyurethanes, Epoxide resin and Silicones;

        (ii) Polymerisation and co-polymerisation products such as                 c
        polyethylene, Polytma- haleotheylenes, Polyisobutylene Polys-
        tyrene, Polyvinyl Chloroacetate and other Polyvinyl derivatives,
        Polyacrylic and Polymethacrylic derivatives, Polyacrylic and
        Polymethacrylic derivatives and Coumarones-Indene Resins; and

                                                                                   D
Though the majority of the members of the Appellate Tribunal held that
the process employed by the appellants ·amounts to "mar1ufacture" within
the meaning of Section 2(t) of the Act, the dissenting Judicial Member held
that it was not. We do not wish to pronounce finally, at this stage, regarding
the correctness or otherwise of the rival views so expressed by the members        E
of the Tribunal since the matter requires a remit, for other reasons. But
we would like to point out that in construing the relevant item or entry, in
fiscal statutes, if it is one of everyday use, the concerned authority must
normally, construe it, as to how it is understood in common parlance or in
the commercial world or trade circles. It must be given its popular mean-
                                                                                   F
ing. The meaning given in the dictionary must not prevail. Nor should the
entry be understood in any technical or botanical or scientific, sense. In the
case of technical words, it may call for a different approach. The approach
to be made in such cases has stated by Lord Esher in Unwin v. Hanson,
[1891] 2 QB 115, at 119 thus :
                                                                                   G
        "If the Act is directed to dealing with matters affecting everybody
         generally, the words used have the meaning attached to them in
         the common and ordinary use of language. If the Act is one passed
         with reference to a particular trade, business, or transaction, and
         words are used which everybody conversant with that trade, busi-          H
    686                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A           ness· or transaction knows and understands to have a particular
            meaning in it then the words are to be construed as having that
            particular meaning, though it may differ from the common or
            ordinary meaning of the words".

B We would only add that there should be material to enter appropriate
    finding in the case. The materials may be either oral or documentary
    evidence. For the purpose of this appeal, we will proceed on the basis that
    there is "manufacture" of the product or goods; but the question is, even
    so, is the duty of excise exigible herein?

c "excisable
        5. In this connection it is only proper to quote the definition of
             goods" and "manufacturer" as contained in Section 2(d) and 2
    (t) of the Act.

             "2(d) 'Excisable goods' means goods specified in the Schedule to
             the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 (5of1986) as being subject to
D            a duty of excise and includes salt;

             "2(t) 'manufacture' includes any process, -

             (i) incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured
             product; and
E
             (ii) which is specified in relation to any goods in the Section or
             Chapter notes of the Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act,
             1985 (5 of 1986) as amounting to manufacture, and the word
             "manufacture" shall be construed accordingly and shall include not
F            only a person who employs hired labour in the production or
             manufacture of excisable goods, but also any person who engages
             in their production or manufacture on his own account;"              -,

          As to what constitutes "manufacture" generally has been explained in
G innumerable decisions of this Court. In one of the early decisions, in Union
    of India v. Delhi Cloth and General Mill Co. Ltd., AIR (1963) SC 791, a
    Constitution Bench of this Court, in paragraph 14 of the Judgment quoted
    the following passage occurring in Permanent Edn. of Words and Phrases,
    Vol. 26, with approval.

H            "'Manufacture' implies a change, but every change is not manufac-
          INDIAN CABLE v. COLLECTOR OF C. EXCISE [PARIPOORNAN, J.] 687

               tured and yet every change of an article is the result of treatment, A
               labour and manipulation. But something more is necessary and
               there must be transformation; a new and different article must

...            emerge having a distinctive name, character or use."

      Again at para 18, the Court observed thus :
                                                                                        B
               "'manufacture' which is liable to excise duty under the Central
               Excises and Salt Act, 1944 must be the bringing into existence of
               a new substance r.nown to the market."

      This and other subsequent decisions were surveyed in a later Constitution         C
      Bench decision in Ujagar Prints & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., [1989] 3
      SCC 488. At page 511, Venkatachaliah, J., as he then was, stated the law
      thus:

              "The prevalent and generally accepted test to ascertain that there
              is 'manufacture' is whether the change or the series of changes           D
              brought about by the application of processes take the commodity
              to the point where commercially, it can no longer be regarded as
              the original commodity but is, instead, recognised as a. distinct and
              new article that has emerged as a result of the processes. The
              principles are clear. But difticulties arise in their application in      E
              individual cases. There might be borderline cases where either
              conclusion with equal justification be reached. Insistence on any
              sharp or intrinsic distinction between 'processing' and
              'manufacture', we are afraid, results in ~ oversimplification of
              both and tends to blur their interdependence in cases such as the         F
              present one."

      We need not elaborate on this aspect of the case since, according to us,
      finding on another important aspect necessary to sustain the levy of excise
      duty, is totally absent in this case and the entire matter requires recon-        G
      sideration by the Tribunal.

             6. Counsel for the appellant Shri A.K. Ganguli very forcefully argued
      that a finding that the PVC compound (granules) is a marketable product,
      is essential to hold that the said product is exigible to excise duty. The plea
      is that there is no such finding herein. And so, the orders of the authorities    H
    688                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 3 S.C.R

A holding that the excise duty is exigi"ble in this is vitiated.
           We perused the order of the Appellate Tribunal with care. We do


                                                                                     -
    not find any finding to the effect that the PVC compound (granules) is a
    "marketable" product. Indeed the counsel for the respondents Mr. Vel-
                  '                                                    .
    lapalli fairly agreed that there is no such finding.
B
          7. We are of the view that the provisions of the Act mandate that a
    finding that the goods are marketable is a prerequisite or "sine qua non"·
    for the levy of duty. Section 3 of the Act is the charging section:

             "Section 3. Duties, specified in the Schedule to the Central Excise
c            Tariff Act, 1985 to be levied - There shall be levied and collected
             in such manner as may be prescribed duties of excise on all
             excisable goods other than salt which are produced. or manufac-
             tured in India and a dutv on salt manufactured in, or imported by
             land into, any part of India as, and at the rates, set forth in the
D            Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985....."

    Section 2(d) defines "excisable goods". Webave quoted the definition in
    para 5 supra. The word "goods" is not defined in the Act.

          After adverting to the aforesaid definition of "excisable goods" and
E the meaning of the word "goods", a Constitution Bench of the Supreme
    Court in Union Of India v. Delhi Cloth and General Mills, AIR (1963) SC
    791, at p.795, stated in paragraph 17th~:

             "There definitions made it clear t~at to become 'goods' an article
             must be something which can ordinarily come to the market to be
F            bought and sold."

          In a series of decisions, this Court has held that "marketability" is an
    essential ingredient, to hold that an article is dutiable exigible to duty of
    excise. The important decisions of this Court which have laid down the law
G   on this aspect, are the following :

           (1) Union of India v. Delhi Ooth and General Mills, Co. Ltd., AIR
               (1963) SC 791.

          (2) South Bihar Sugar Mills v. Union of India, AIR (1968) SC 928 =
H              (1968] 3 SCR 21.
    INDIAN CABLE v. COLLECTOR OF C. EXCISE [PARIPOORNAN, J.] 689

      (3) Bhor Industries v. Collec(or, [1989] 1 SCC 602.                        A
      (4) Hindustan Polymers v. Collector, [1989] 43 BLT 165 (SC).

      (5) Collector of Central Excise v. Ambala Sarabhai, JT (1989) 3 SC
          341 = (1989] 43 BLT 214.
                                                                                 B
      (6) Union Carbide v. Union of India, [1968] 24 BLT 169 = (1986)
          SC JT 453

      (7) A.P. Electricity Board v. Collector of Central Excise, JT (1994) 1
          oc~                                                                    c
       In the latest decision in A.P. State Electricity Board v. Collector of
Central Excise, Hyderabad, JT (1994) 1 SC 545, one of us (B.P. Jeevan
Reddy, J) speaking for the Bench succinctly stated the law thus at pages
549 & 550:
                                                                                 D
        ".....Marketability is an essential ingredient in order to be dutiable
        under the Schedule to the Act.. ......... The 'marketability' is thus
        essentially a question of fact to be decided in the facts of each
        case. There can be no generalisation. The fact that the goods are
        not in fact marketed is of no relevance. So long as the goods were       E
        marketable, they are goods for the purposes of Section 3. It is not
        also necessary that the goods in question should be generally
        available in the market. Even if the good are available from only
        one source or from a specified market, it makes no difference so
        long as they are available for purchasers ....... The marketability of   F
        articles does not depend upon the number of purchasers nor is the
        market confined to the territorial limits of this country."

"Marketability'' is a decisive test for dutiability. In only means "saleable", or
"suitable for sale". It need not be in fact, "marketed". The article should be,
capable of being sold or being sold, to consumers in the. market, as it is G
without anything more. The. Appellate Tribunal has not adverted to the
above vital aspects nor has it entered a finding that the PVC compound
(Granules) is a "marketable product" as understood in law. The Appellate
Tribunal was swayed by the fact that the conversion of PVC resin into PVC
compound .by the process employed by the appellants amounts to H
    690                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A   "manufacture" within the meaning of Section 2 (f) of the Act and that by
    itself will justify the levy of duty. In our view, this is a palpable error
    committed by the Tribunal. In the absence of a finding, that the goods are
    "marketable' i.e. saleable or suitable for sale, we hold that the order of the

B
    Appellate Tribunal is infirm. It should be set aside and we hereby do so.
    We order a remit of the matter to the Appellate Tribunal to consider the
                                                                                     ....
    appeal afresh and dispose of the same in accordance with law. There shall
    be no order as to costs in this appeal.

    G.N.                                                    Appeal disposed of.




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