Holding

When the appellant discharges the burden of showing that the lower courts' concurrence on a landlord's personal requirement is manifestly unjust, the Supreme Court has a duty to intervene under Article 136 and may set aside the eviction decree.

Summary

The landlord filed seven eviction suits under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, claiming a bona‑fide personal requirement for the premises. The trial court decreed eviction against all tenants; the appellate authority upheld the decrees for the four ground‑floor shop tenants and one first‑floor residential tenant, while allowing appeals of two other residential tenants. One ground‑floor tenant (the appellant) sought civil revision, which the High Court dismissed. On special leave under Article 136, the Supreme Court examined whether the lower courts' concurrence on the landlord's personal requirement was manifestly unjust. It found the landlord had failed to produce evidence of loss in his wholesale business and that his need was already satisfied by the eviction of other tenants. The Court held that once the appellant discharged the burden of showing injustice, the Supreme Court must intervene, and it set aside the eviction decree against the appellant.

Issues considered

The scope of the Supreme Court's power under Article 136 to review decisions where three lower courts have concurred on a landlord's bona‑fide personal requirement.
Whether the landlord satisfactorily proved a bona‑fide personal requirement under Section 10(3)(i) and (iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960.
The burden of proof on the appellant to demonstrate that the lower courts' decisions are manifestly unjust.
The effect of subsequent events, namely the landlord's acquisition of possession of other tenants, on the continued existence of his personal requirement.
The proper interpretation of 'personal requirement' under the rent‑control statute.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. 136
Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960s. 10(3)(i), s. 10(3)(iii)

Subjects

evictionpersonal requirementrent controlspecial leaveArticle 136burden of proofsubsequent eventslandlord‑tenantTamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act

Judgment

101

A
M/S. VARIETY EMPORIUM

v.
.\ ~

V. R. M. MOHD. IBRAHIM NAINA
B November 27, 1984

[Y. V. CHANDRACHUD C. J., AND M.. P. THAKKAR n
C!>nstitution of India, 1950, Article 136-Power to grant special leave in
Rent cases where three courts have accepted the plea of bona fide personal require·
c ments-Onus ofproof lies on the petilioner to prove unjustness of the decisions of
the Court as to bona fide personal need-Subsequent events must also be looked
into bJ the cOurts cis regards continued requirement for personal purposes-Tamil
Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) A.ct, 1960, Section 10 (3) (i) and (iii),
scope of,

The respondent-landlord through an instrument inter vi'vos, filed seven peti·
D tions for ejectment under section 10 (3) (i) and (iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings
(Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (Tamil Nadu Act XVIII of 1960 as amended
by Act I of 1980) against seven different toenants. Four out of these occupied shop
premises on the ground floor while the other three occupied residential premises
on the first floor of a building situated at Door No. 14, Pursuawalkam High
Road, Madras. The plea of bona fide personal repuirem~nt was accepted by the
trial Judge who decreed all the petitioner and passed orders of eviction against
E every one of the seven tenants. One of these, who occupied a so-caHcd shop
measuring 4' x 4' under a stairway, and another tenant in the residential portion
on the first floor acquiesced in the decree of evictiJn passed against them. Five
out of the seven tenants filed appeals against the orders of their eviction. The
Appellate Authority dismissed all the three appear. of the tenants of the shop
premises on the ground floor, but allowed the appeals filed by the two tenants of
F
the residential premises on the first floor. Thus the respondent succeeded in r-
obtaining decrees for possession agaidst all the four tenants on the ground floor
and one tenant on the first floor. Against the said orders of the Appellate
Court, the appellant alone preferred a Civil Revision Petition (CRP. 122 of
1979) before the High Court. The High Court dismissed the petition. Hence •
the tenant's appeal by special leave of the Court.

G Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD : J. 1 The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to ~nt special
lca\11 to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution has to be exercised sparin..
a;IY. Coocurrence of three Courts, as in this case that the respondent has
proved that _he requires the suit premises bona fide for his personal need,
ff undoubtedly has relevance on the question whether the Supreme Court should
YARIEtY EMPORIUM v. V. R. MOHD. io~

exercise its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution to review a parti~
cular decision of the Courts b~low. But, that cannot possibly mean that injustice
must be perpetuated because it has been done three times in a case. [105G·H]

I. 2 Ia the instant caseJ by drawing a priori conc1usions the Courts have
denied justice to the appellant. The trial court deluded itself into believing
as proved, what remained to be proved by the production of evidence which
could have been produced but was not only not produced but was suppressed. The B
first appellate court decided the question of landlord's bor.a fide requirement by
, the application of formula which confuses 'requirement' or 'need' with 'desire'.
And, the High Court refused to apply its mind to a question which, if eXami-
ned, could have altered the course of justice. [106E-FJ

I. 3 The burden of showing that a concurrent decision of two or more
Courts or Tribunals i~ manifestly unjusl lies on the appe11ant. But once that G
burden is discharged, it is not only the right but the duty of the Supreme Court
to remedy the injustice. [I llA·Bl

I. 4 The argument that such an interference by the Supreme Court may
lead and in practice, does lead to different standards being applied by different
courts to find out whether a concurrent decision is patently illeg31 or unjust is D
inevitable in the present dispensation. Quantatively, the Supreme Court has a
vast jurisdiction which extends over matters as far apart as Excise to Elections
and Constitution to Crimes. The Court sits in Benches and not en bane, as the
AmeriCan Supreme Court does. Indeed, even if the entire Court were to sit to
hear every one of the matters which have been filed during any year a certain
amount of individuality in the response to injustice cannot be avoided.
It is a well-known fact of constitutional history, even in countries where the E
whole court sits to hear every case, that the composition of majorities is not
static. It changes from subject to subject though, perhaps, not from case to
case. Personal responses to injustice are not esotenic. Indeed, they furnish
refreshiog assurance of close and carefuJ attention which the Judges give to the
cases which come before them. The litigating public will not prefer a compu..
terised system of administration of justice : only, that the Chancellor's foot must
tread warily. [106A·Dl F

1. S In appropriate cases the Court must have regard to events q,_,-~
present themselves at the time when it is hearing the proceeding before ii ·And
mould the relief in the light of those events. (II IE] ·-

• Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad [1981] 3 SCR 605 followed
G
OBSER,VATION: [It is quite disparaging to describe a tenant's attempt
to resist eviction by lawful means as a "hue and cry". And, it is inequitous in
the extreme that aay ·court of Jaw, and least of all a Rent -Act tribunal which has
to deal with a. lmman problem of great magnitude, should regard it as a matter
of no moment that a_n order of eviction will throw the tenant on the street. A
judge does not have to wear a shoe in order to know where it pinches. There..
-fore, he does not have to face the prospect of being driven to the street in order H
164 SUPREME COURT kEPORtS (1985) :i S.C.R.

to realise what it means. His training legal equipment and experi~nce of life
are his tools of education and social awareness. This does not mean that a
decree of eviction can never be passed against a tenant but, whether the provi~
sions of a law specifically require it or not the court has to have regard for all
the aspects of the matter before it and the foreseeable consequences of the order
which it proposes to pass]. [!OBD·F]

B
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 3358
of 1979. •
Appeal by Special leave form the Judgment and Order dated
the 31st october, 1979 of the Madras High Court in C. R. P. No.
122of1979.
c •
C. S. Vaidyanathan for the appellant.

V. M. Tarkunde and Shakeel Ahmed for the Respondent.

D The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

CHANDRACHUD, C.J.: The respondent-landlord filed 7 petitions
for ejectment against 7 different tenants. Four out of these occupied
shop premises on the ground floor and the other 3 occupied residen-
tial premises on the first floor of a building situated at Door No. 14,
E Pursuawalkam High Road, Madras. The appellant is one of the
four tenants of a shop on the ground floor.

The case of the respondent is that he is running a wholesale
business in textiles on the first floor of a building at 93, Godown
Street, madras ; that it is inconvenient and uneconomical for him
F to carry on his business there; that he was incurring heavy losses
in his wholesale business by reason of conditions peculiar to the
location of his business and that, therefore, he wanted to wind up
the wholesale business and start a retail business in the building
which was in the occupation of bis tenants.
•
The learned trial Judge decreed all the petitions and passed
orders of eviction against every one of the 7 tenants. One of these,
who occupied a so-called shop measuring 4' x 4' under a stairway,
acquiesced in the decree of eviction passed against him. The other
3 tenants of the shop premises challenged the decrees of eviction ..
H passed against them by filing appeals before the Appellate Authority.
VARIETY EMPORIUM v. V.R. MOHD. (Chandrachud, J.) 105

• I In so far as the residential premises are concerned, 2 out of the 3
A
tenants on the first floor filed appeals against the eviction decrees.
The third tenant, like the ground floor tenant under the stairway,
acquiesced in the decree. In short, 5 out of the 7 tenants against
whom decrees for eviction were passed, filed appeals while the
remaining two did not.
' B
The Appellate Authority dismissed all the 3 appeals of the
tenants of the shop premises on the ground floor but, allowed the
appeals filed by the two tenants of the residential premises on the
first floor. The combined result of the proceedings in the trial
Court and the first appellate Court was that the respondent succeed-
ed in obtaining decrees for possession against all the 4 tenants on c
the ground floor and I tenant on the first floor.

Out of the 3 tenants on the ground floor against whom decrees
for eviction were confirmed by the Appellate Authority (the fourth
tenant not having appealed), only one, namely, the appellant herein.,
went to the High Court by way of a civil revision petition (C.R.P. D
No. 122 of 1979). The other two tenants on the ground floor
accepted the decree of eviction confirmed by the Appellate
Authority. Thus, the position which obtained during the pendency
-\ of the civil revision petition before the High Court was that the
respondent had succeeded, finally and conclusively, in establishing E
his right to recover or in recovering possession from 3 out of the 4
tenants of the shop premises on the ground floor and I out of the
3 tenants of the residential premises on the first floor. The High
Court having dismissed the civil revision petition, the appellant
has filed this appeal by special leave.
F
It cannot be overlooked that three courts have held concur-
rently in this case that the respondent has proved that he require!
the suit premises bona fide for his personal need. Such concurrence,
undoubtedly, has relevance on the question whether this Court
should exercise its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution
to review a particular decision. That jurisdiction has to be exerci- G
sed sparingly. But, that cannot possibly mean that injustice must
be perpetuated because it has been done three times in a case. The
burden of showing that a concurrent decision of two or more
Courts or Tribunals is manifestly unjust lies on the appellant. But
once that burden is discharged, it is not only the right but the duty
of this Court to remedy the injustice. Shri Tarkunde, who appears If
106 StlPRBMB COPT REPORTS [19ilSJ 2 s.c.!t.

A for the respondent, argued that this may leac;I and, in practice, does
lead to different standards being applied by different courts to find
out whether a concurrent decision is patently illegal or unjust. That
in the present dispensation, is inevitable. Quantitatively, the
Supreme Court has a vast jurisdiction which extends over matters
as far apart as Excise to Elections and Constitution to Crimes. The
8 Court sits in Benches and not en bane, as the American Supreme
Court does. Indeed, even if the entire Court were to sit to hear
every one of the eighty-thousand matters which have been filed this •
year, a certain amount of individuality in the response to injustice
cannot be avoided. It is a well-known fact of constitutional history,
even in countries where the whole court sits to hear every case,
c that the composition of majorities is not static. It changes from
subject to subject though, perhaps, not from case to case. Personal
responses to injustice are not esoteric. Indeed, they furnish refresh-
ing assurance of close and careful attention which the Judges give
to the cases which come before them. We do not believe that the
litigating public will prefer a computerised system of administration
D of justice: only, that the Chancellor's foot must tread warily.

Counsel for the appellant, Shri Vaidyauathan, has discharged
admirably the heavy onus which lies upon him to establish that the
decision come to by three courts in this case is such as cannot
E possibly be accepted. We will proceed to show immediately how
by drawing a priori conclusions, the courts, with great respect, have
denied justice to the appellant. The trial court deluded itself into
be\ieving as proved, what remained to be proved by the production
of evidence which could have been produced but was not produced.
The first.appellate court decided the question of landlord's bona
F fide requirement by the application of a formula which confuses
'requirement' or 'need' with 'desire'. And, the High Court refused •
to apply its mind to a question which, if examined, could have alter·
e.d the course of justice.

,
G The firm called 'Artex company' of which the respondent is a
partner, is in occupation of business premises situated at 93; Go-
down Street, Madras. The firm took those premises on a lease
dated December 21, 1973 for a period of 21 years ending with
December 21, 1994. Even to-day that lease is good for another
ten years. The reasons given by the respondent for seeking the
eviction of the appellant and the other six tenants are these. The
H· main .gate of the Godown Street premises is opened at 9.00 a.m. a~d
VARIETY EMPOlliUM v. V.R. MOHD. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 101

is closed at 5.00 p.m., meking it impossible for him to receive his
A
customers before 9.00 A.M. or after 5.00 P.M. ; there is severe
competition amon'gst the wholesale businessmen in the Godown
Street ; and, there is a great deal of traffic congestion on the
Godown Street. These circumstances have enormously affected the
business and since, the firm is incurring losses day by day, it wanted
to wind up the wholesale business and start a retail b™;iness in the B
premises which are in the occupation of the tenants.

The appellant challenged the contention of the respondent
that he was incurring losses in his wholesale business at Godown
Street and called upon him to produce the balance-sheet, Income-
tax returns and account-books of the firm. Instead of producing c
these documents which would have reflected the financial position
of the wholesale business, the appellant offered the lame excuse
that the balance-sheet was in the custody of his auditor who was
out of station. It seems to us surprising that, insted of drawing an
adverse inference against the respondent for non-production of
documents which he was called upon to produce, the trial court D
accepted the ipse dixit of the respondent that he was incurring
losses in his wholesale business, wherefor it had become necessary
for him to obtain possession of the suit premises in order to start a
retail ·business. The sole or, at least, the main reason why the·
respondent requires the suit premises is that his present place of ·
business is so located as to cause loss to the business. Evidence E
showing that the business was running into a loss was not only not
produced but suppressed .

. Having seen that the trial Court accepted the case of the
respondent without an objective and careful assessment of the
evidence bearing upon the. so-called requirement of the landlord, F
w~ will turn to the judgment of the Appellate Authority. The
learned appellate Judge says that the single circumstance that the
respondent was running his business in tenanted premises was
sufficient to j11stify the ~onclusion tl;iat his requirement of the suit
premises was bon~fi~e. After recording this conclusion, the
G
learned appellate Judge proceeds to say:

"The hue and cry of the tenants in the ground floor
portion of the petition-mentioned premises that they will be
thrown to the street in the event of an order of eviction
being passed need not at all be considered. The very fact H
!OS SUPREME COURT REPORTS (19SSJ 2 s.c.R.

A that the respondent had filed this petition immediately aiLe• - · · ~'.
his purchase of the property in the year 1975 goes a long
way to prove that his very purpose of purchasing the
·premises must have been to set up his business whether ·
· wholesale or retail in the. petition-metioned premises."

B
The appellate Court went one step ahead of the respondent
by making out a case for him which he himself did not think it
proper to make. It was not his case that he wanted possession of
the suit premises for the reason that he was carrying on his business
in tenanted premises. His case was that it had become uneconomical ·
"c to run the wholesale business in the. Godown Street premises and
therefore he wanted to start a retail business in his own building
, which was in possession of !he appellant and other tenants. ·

Apart from this, it is quite disparaging to ·describe a tenant's
attempt to resist eviction by lawful means as a "hue and cry". And,
D' it is inequitous in the extreme that any court oflaw, and least of·
all a Rent Act tribuna(which has to deal with a human problem of
great magnitude, should regard it as a matter of no moment that an
order of eviction will throw the tenant on the street. A judge does
not have to wear a shoe in order to know where it pinches. There-
fore, he does not have to 'face the prospect of being driven to the
'E street in order .to realise what it means. His training, legal equip-
ment and experience of life are his tools. education and social
awareness. We do not suggest that a decree of eviction can never
be passed against a tenant but, whether the provisions of a law
specifically require it or not, the court has to have regard for all the
aspects of the matter before it and the foreseeable consequences of
F. the· order which it proposes to pass. Finally, it is impossible to
subscribe to the view of the appellate Court that the very fact that
the respondent had filed the eviction petitions ·immediately after he
purchased the property, proves that the purpose of purchasing the
property. was to set up a business there, "whether wholesale or
G retail".

The judgment of the High· Court is in the nature of an order
of summary dismissal of the revision petition. After allotting a
page and three quarters to the re-statement of the arguments made ·
before it, the High Court disposed of the proceeding in the following
II . few lines :
VARIETY EMPORIUM v. V.R. MOHD. (Chandrachud, C,J.) 109
"I am afraid that once the authorities below have
taken into account all these circumstances and have come A
to the conclusion that the requirement of the respondent is
bonafide, it is not for this Court, as if a court of appeal, to
go into these facts again and hold against the respondent
herein. Consequently, the civil revision petition fails and
is dismissed." B
The High Court is right that, sitting in revlS!on, it could
not have reappreciated the evidence in!the case as if it were a court
of appeal. But, in saying so, the High Court, with respect, missed
the real point in the case.

The main contention of the appellant before the High Court
was that so long as the eviction petitions were pending in the trial
Court and the first appellate Court, it could not be predicated with
certainty as to in how many cases the respondent would succeed
finally. That position had crystalised after the Appellate Authority
had rendered its judgment. As stated by us at the beginning of D
this judgment, 1 out of the 3 tenants on the first floor did not
challenge the decree for eviction passed by the trial Court. The
landlord had, therefore, succeeded finally against him. Out of the
4 tenants of the shop premises on the ground floor, the tenant under
the stairway did not challenge the decree for eviction passed against
him by the trial Court. We will, however, leave that gentleman E
alone, since he was in possession of an area measuring 4' X 4' only.
The remaining 3 tenants on the ground floor, including the appellant,
had filed appeals against the decrees of eviction but, all the three
appeals were dismissed by the Appellate Authority. Two out of
these 3 tenants did not challenge the decrees passed by the Appellate
Authority, with the result that the respondent succeeded finally and F
conclusively against those 2 tenants. The position which thus
emerged for the first time when the civil revision petition was being
argued before the High Court was that, the landlord had succeeded
finally in obtaining orders for eviction against 3 out of the 4 tenants
on the ground floor and I out of the 3 tenants on the first floor. G
This position had undoubtedly brought about a change in the state
of affairs which existed at the inception of the ejectment proceedings
and which existed partly during the pendency of the proceedings
before the Appellate Anthority. Basing himself on the change in
the factual position which had come about after the Appellate
Authority gave its decision, the appellant argued before the High ff
no SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985) 2 S.C.R.

Court that the subsequent events ought to be taken into account
A for the purpose of finding out whether the landlord still required
the shop premises in possession of the appellant, which, it would
appear, ad measure about 308 square feet. That contention was
brushed aside by the High Court with the short order extracted
above.
B No authority is needed for the proposition that, in appropriate •
cases, the Court must have regard to events as they present them·
selves at the time when it is hearing the proceeding before it and
mould the relief in the light of those events. We may, however,
draw attention to a decision of this Court in Hasmat Rai v. Raghu·
nath Prasad,(') the ratio of which may be stated thus :
c
When an action is brought by a landlord for the eviction
of a tenant on the ground of personal requirements, the
landlord's need must not only be shown to exist at the date ·
of the suit, but it must exist on the date of the appellate
decree, or the date when a higher Court deals with the
D
matter. During the progress and passage of proceeding
from court to court, if subsequent events occur which, if
noticed, would non-suit the landlord, the court has to
examine and evaluate those events and mould the decree
accordingly. The tenant is entitled to show that the need
E or requirement of the landlord no more exists by pointing
out such subsequent events, to the court, including the
appellate court. In such a situation, it would be incorrect
to say that as a decree or order for eviction is passed
against the tenant, he cannot invite the Court to take into
consideration subsequent events. The tenant can be pre- r-
F cluded from so contending only when a decree or order for
eviction has become final. (See pages 606-607).

Justice R.S. Pathak, who concurred with Justice D.A. Desai and
Juatice Venkataramiah, expressed the same view thus :
G
It is well settled now that in a proceeding for the eject·
ment of a tenant on the ground of personal requirement
under a statute controlling the eviction of tenants, unless
the statute prescribes to the contrary, •be requirement must

(I) [1911]3 S.C.R. 60S
H
VARIETY EMPORIUM v. V.R. MOHD. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 111

continue to exist on the date when the proceeding is finally A
disposed of either in appeal or revision, by the relevant
authority. That position is indisputable. (See page 624).
The High Court having failed to consider the circumstances
which had arisen before it for the first time, it becomes our duty
to have regard to them. Having considered the evidence in the
• B
case, particularly the fact that the landlord has obtained decrees
for possession against 3 out of the 4 tenants on the ground floor
and I out of the 3 tenants on the first floor, we do not see any
justification for evicting the appellant from the premises in his
occupation. The landlord's requirement, such as it is, is more c
than adequately met by the eviction of those 4 tenants.

It is doubtful whether the respondent would have at all
succeeded in any one of the 7 cases if, the trial court had correctly
appreciated the effect of suppression of the material documentary D
evidence by him. But, the eviction decrees passed against 6 out
of the 7 tenants are now an accomplished fact and those matters,
having been finally determined, cannot be reopened.

For these reasons, we allow this appeal and set aside the E
judgments of the High Court, the Appellate Authority and the
trial Court. The respondent's petition for eviction of the appellant
will stand dismissed. Respondent shall pay to the appellant the
costs of all the three Courts, whicb we quantify at rupees five
thousand. F

S.R. Appeal allowed.

)