M. VISWANATHANversusM/S. S.K. TILES & POTTERIES P. LTD. & ORS.
- Citation
- 2008 INSC 1342
- Decided
- 25 November 2008
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- ARIJIT PASAYAT
Holding
The High Court erred in quashing the criminal proceedings; the complaint disclosed offences and Section 482 could not be invoked, so the order was set aside.
Summary
M. Viswanathan filed a criminal complaint alleging theft of documents, forgery, and intimidation by S.K. Tiles & Potteries Ltd. and others, leading to charges under IPC sections 379, 468, 471, 420 and 506(ii). The respondents sought quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 of the CrPC, arguing that the grievance was civil in nature. The Madras High Court allowed the quash petition, holding that no forgery existed and the matter should be decided in a civil forum. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the scope of the High Court’s inherent power under Section 482, emphasizing that it is an exception, not a rule, and may be exercised only to prevent abuse of process or to secure justice. The Court found that the complaint disclosed substantial allegations of offence, that the High Court had erred in diverting the matter to a civil forum, and therefore set aside the quash order.
Issues considered
- The appropriateness of exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash the criminal proceedings.
- Whether the complaint disclosed a cognizable offence warranting continuation of prosecution.
- Whether the dispute should be resolved in a civil forum or Company Law Board rather than criminal court.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 200, s. 482
- Companies Acts. 627, s. 628, s. 629, s. 630
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 379, s. 420, s. 468, s. 471, s. 506(ii)
Subjects
Judgment
[2008] 16 S.C.R. 583
M. VISWANATHAN
v. A
M/S. S.K. TILES & POTTERIES P. LTD. & ORS.
(Criminal Appeal No. 1869 of 2008)
NOVEMBER 25, 2008
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND DR. MUKUNDAKAM
SHARMA, JJ.]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s. 482 - Quashing
of criminal proceedings - Power of High Court - Scope of - C
Explained - On facts, accused tried for commission of
offences punishable uls. 379, 468, 471, 420 and 506(ii) !PC
- Application uls. 482 - Allowed by High Court holding that
grievance, if any, to be redressed through civil forum -
Interference with - Held: Complaint clearly shows that the
a/legations were substantially made out - High Court erred D
in holding that the matter in issue was to be decided by a civil
forum - Thus, case not made out for High Court to exercise
jurisdiction u/s. 482 - Order of High Court set aside.
Respondent company-owner of certain property E ·
entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the
appellant-complainant for development of the said land.
Appellant filed criminal complaint against the
respondents alleging theft of document, forgery of
certain records and criminal intimidation. The police F
investigated the matter. Respondents were charged for
commission of offences punishable u/ss. 379, 468, 471,
420 and 506 (ii) IPC. They filed application u/s. 482 Cr.P .C.
for quashing of the criminal proceedings. High Court
allowed the application holding that there was no forgery G
+
of documents and the grievance, if any of the
complainant would have to be redressed through the civil
forum or the company law board. Hence the present
appeal.
583 H
584 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 16 S.C.R.
A Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1. Exercise of power under Section 482 of
the Code in a case of this nature is the exception and not
the rule. The Section does not confer any ne~ powers
on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which
8
the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code.
It envisages three circumstances under which the
inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give
effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse
of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the
C ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay
down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise
of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing
with procedure can provide for all cases that may
possibly arise. ·Courts, therefore,· have inherent powers
D apart from express provisions of law .which are
necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties
imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which
finds expression in ~he section which merely recognizes
and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All
E courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence
of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution,
ali such powe'rs as are necessary to do the right and to
undo a· wrong in course of administration· of justice on
the principle "quando Jex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere
F · videtur et id sine quo res ipsae. esse non potest" {when the
law gives a person· anything it gives him that without
which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the
section, the court does not function as a court of appeal
or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section
G though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and
with caution and only when such exercise is justified by
the tests specifically laid down in ·the section itself. It is
to be ex·ercised ex debito justitiae to do real and
substantial justice for the administration of which alone
H courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement
M. VISWANATHAN v. S.K. TILES & POTTERIES P. LTD. 585
• & ORS.
A
-I' of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that
authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power
to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the
court to allow any action which would result in injustice
and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the
powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding B
if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to
abuse of the process of court or quashing of these
proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice.
When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court
may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is G
sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the
materials to assess what the complainant has alleged
and whether any offence is made out even if the
allegations are accepted in toto. [Para 14] [594-H; 595-A-
H; 596-A-B] D
1.2. The distinction between a case where there is no
+ legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly
inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case
where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may
E
or may not support the accusations" When exercising
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High
Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry
whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or
whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation
...._ would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial F
Judge. Judicial process should not be an instrument of
oppression, or, needless harassment. Court should be
circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and
should take all relevant facts and circumstances into
consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an G
. • instrument in the hands of a private complainant to
unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the
same time the section is not an instrument handed over
to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring
about its sudden death. [Para 16] [596-F-H; 597--A-B] H
I
586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 16 S.C.R
f--
.,
A 1.3. The powers possessed by the High Court under ~ I
Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very
plenitude of the power requires great caution in its
exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision
in. exercise of this power is based on sound principles.
B The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a
legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest
court of a State should normally refrain from giving a ~
prima facie decision :in a case where the entire facts are
incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not
c been collected and produced before the Court and the
issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of
magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective
. without sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast
rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High
D Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of
quashing the proceeding at any stage. [Para 16] [598-F-
H; 599:A]
._,.
1.4. It would not be proper for the High Court to
analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all
E probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction
would be sustainable and on such premises arrive at a
conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It
would be erroneous to assess the material before it and
conclude that the com~laint cannot be proceeded with.
F In a proceeding instituted on complaint, exercise of the
inherent powers to quash the proceedings is called for >
only in a case where the complaint does not disclose any
offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the
allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the
G offence of which cognizance has been taken by the
Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same
....
in' exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 of -+
the Code. It is not, however, necessary thatthere should
be meticulous analysis of the case b~fore the trial to find
H out whether the case would end in conviction 6r acquittal.
M. VISWANATHAN v. S.K. TILES & POTTERIES P.·LTD . 587
...
& ORS.
-i _;.. The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears that A
on consideration of the allegations in th·e light of the
statement made on oath of the complainant that the
ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and
there is no material to show that the complaint is mala
fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be B
no justification for interference by the High Court. When
'>- an information is lodged at the police station and an
offence is registered, then the ma/a fides of the informant
would be of secondary importance. It is the material
collected during the investigation and evidence led in c
court which decides the fate of the accused person. The
allegations of. ma/a fides against the informant are of no
consequence and cannot by themselves be the basis for
quashing the proceedings. [Para 16] [599-A-G]
I
D
2. Reading of the complaint clearly shows that the I
allegations are substantially made out. This is not a case i
where the jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was to
be exercised. The High Court wrongly came to the
conclusion that the matter in issue was to be decided by
a Civil Court or the Company Law Board. The High Court E
referred to the four types of allegations. Some of the
allegations are certainly not adjudicable by the Civil Court
or the Company Law Board. That being so the exercise
of jurisdiction by the High Court in terms of Section 482
Cr.P.C. cannot be maintained. The impugned o~der is F
...,
indefensible and is set aside. [Paras 12 and 18] [594-E;
600-C·D]
Janata Dal v. H. S. Chowdhary 1992 (4) SCC 305;
Raghubir Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar AIR 1964 SC 1; G
Dhana/akshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar 1990 Supp SCC 686;
.
_,,.
-;- State of Bihar v. P. P. Sharma AIR 1996 SC 309; Rupan Deol
Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill 1995 (6) SCC 194; State of
Kera/av. 0. C. Kuttan AIR 1999 SC 1044; State of U.P. v. 0.
P. Sharma 1996 (7) SCC 705; Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh H
588 ,.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 16 S.C.R.
A Kumar Bhada 1997 (2) SCC 397; Satvinder Kaur v. State -"'--
Govt. of NCT of Delhi AIR 1996 SC 2983 and Rajesh Bajaj
v. State NCT of Delhi 1999 (3) sec 259, relied on.
Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. an~ Ors. v. Mof1d.
B Sharaful Haque and Anr. 2005(1) SCC 122; R. P. Kapur v.
State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866 and State of Haryana v.
-<
Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1) 335, referred to.
Case Law Reference:
c AIR 1960 SC 866 Referred to. Para 15
1992 Supp (1) 335 Referred lo. Para 16
1992 (4) sec 305 Relied on. Para 16
AIR 1964 SC 1 Relied on. Para 16
D 1990 Supp sec 686 . Relied on. Para 16
AIR 1996 SC 309 Relied on. Para 16
1995 (6) sec 194 Relied on. Para 16
AIR 1999 SC 1044 Relied ·On. Para 16
E
1996 (7) sec 105 Relied on. Para 16
1997 (2) sec 397 Relied on. Para 16
AIR 1996 SC 2983 Relied on. Para 16
F 1999 (3) sec 259 Relied on. Para 16
2005( 1> sec 122 Relied on. Para 17
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 1869 of 2008.
G
From the final Judgment and Order dated 24.2.2006 of the
High Court of Judicature at Madras in Crl. O.P. No. 23254 of -+ ·.-
2005 and Crl. M.P. Nos.10058 and 6694 of 2005.
N. Natarajan, V. Balachandram for the Appellant.
H
....,
M. VISWANATHAN v. S.K. TILES & POTIERIES P. LTD. 589
& ORS.
~·
U.U. Lalit, H.L. Agarwal, V. Kanagaraj, Goklaney, C.K.R. A
Lenin Sekar, K.K Mani and S.Thananjayan for the
Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B
.. DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.1. Leave granted .
2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a learhed
Single Judge of the Madras High Court allowing the application
filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (in short the 'Cr.P.C.'). Prayer in the petition was to call c
.
....
for the records in Crime No.576 of 2005 in the file of the
Inspector of Police Team IV, Central Crime Branch, Chennai,
and to quash the same. The respondents 1 to 4 were booked
for alleged commission of offences punishable under Sections
379, 468, 471, 420, 506(ii) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in D
short the 'IPC') based on the reference made by learned
Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, on! the
complaint presented by the present appellant under Section
200 of the Cr.P.C.
E
3. In the complaint essentially it was stated as follows:
"3. The first accused is M/s. Sri Krishna Tiles and Potteries
(Madras) Pvt. ltd., the second accused is A.R.
Santhanakrishnan, Director of the first accused-company,
the third accused is Mrs. Radhika Santhanakrishnan, yet F
another Director of the first accused-company and the -
fourth accused is Chandrasekaran, workin91 as
Commercial Manager of M/s. Sai Sri Krishna Properties
and Facilitators (P) Ltd.
G
4. M/s. Sri Krishna Tiles and Potteries (Madras) Pvt. Ltd.,
is the owner of property to an extent of 34.04 acres in
Thirumangalam Village, Anna Nagar (West), Chennai. The
first accused-company entered into a Memorandum of
Understanding with the complainant dn 2.7.2001, as per H
590 ., S_UPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 16 S.C.R.
A which the first accused-company entrusted the land for
development with the complainant. The complainant
started developing the properties through his partnership
firm 'M/s. Sai Sri Krishna Properties'. 'M/s. Sai Sri Krishna
Properties' was ·converted to a private limited company,
B in which the complainant was the Managing Director and
the third accused was the Director. An agreement was
entered into between the said · M/s. Sai Sr.i Krishna
.Properties' and ·Sri Krishna Tiles and Potteries (Madras)
Pvt.. Ltd.' on 24.6.2002. The newly floated 'M/s. Sal Sri
c Krishna Properties' was appointed as a Facilitator by the
accused Nos. 1 to 3 for developing the properties after
obtaining approval from Chennai Metropolitan
Development Authority (C.M.D.A.). Since the accused
Nos.1 to 3 were not in a position to obtain approval from
0 C.M.D.A., the project could not be completed at .the
earliest.
5. Pursuant to the, above agreements, the complainant
entered into an agreement to sell and an agreement to
construct with 146 purchasers and received a sum of
E Rs.2,54,67,091/- as sale advance. The complainant had
invested a total sum of Rs.3 crores approximately including
the said sum of Rs.2;54,67,091/- for the purpose of
developing the project and maintaining the property. The
complainant had r~turned a sum of Rs;21,71,360/- to 47
F allottees out of the 146 allottees. A sum of Rs.2,29,71,775/
- has to be refunded by me complainant to the remaining
99 allottees. The accused Nos.1 to 3 are also negotiating
with the allottees for reJunding the advance sale
consideration received from them. The purchasers
G informed the complainant that the agreement between the
accused Nos.1 to 3 and -the cpmplainant's private limited
company had been terminated by mutual consent. The
complainant was shocked to see that the records and the
accounts relating to the said private limited company were
H found missing at its office. The third accused had illegally
M. VISWANATHAN v. S.K. TILES & POTTERIES P. LTD. 591
& ORS. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
taken away all the records and accounts relating to the said A
private limited company, including the originals of the
aforesaid two agreements dated 24.6.2002. Refunds have
I
also been made to few of the purchasers with a mala fide
intention of cheating the complainant. The complainant
never entered into any mutual agreement for termination B
of the aforesaid agreements. The accused Nos.1 to $ have
}-
fabricated a termination agreement as if it had been I
signed by the complainant. On complainant's enquiry, the
accused Nos.1 to 3 are threatening to kill him."
4. In seeking quashment of the proceedings stand .of the
c
respondents 1 to 4 was as follows:
(1) Though_ the complainant committed as per
Memorandum of Understanding that he will deposit ~s.2.5
crores for development of the project, he did not tjo so. D
As per the terms and conditions of the Memorandum of
Understanding, it will get rescinded if the said amount was
not deposited by the complainant within one month from
the date of Memorandum of Understanding. The
- Memorandum of Unde;standing has become a void
agreement as the said amount was not deposited. By way
of abundant caution, the Memorandum of Understanding
was terminated as on 4.8.2001. As the Board of M/s. Sai
E
Sri Krishna Properties and Facilitators (P) Ltd, decided
to remove the complainant from his office as Managing F
Director, a resolution to that effect was passed on
7.7.2005 in a board meeting conducted to the effect that
the complainant was ousted from his office as Managing
Director.
G
(2) The accused with a good intention in order to avoid any
"7"
unwanted complications, made arrangements for
repayment of the funds collected by the complainant'. The
seconc;t and third accused also made arrangements by
pledging their own personal properties and the advance
H
592 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 16 S.C.R.
A received for allotment of flats was repaid. There cannot be
a case of theft as against a partner or a director of the
company with regard to its own property. The complainant
will have to remedy his grievances invoking Sections 627
to 630 of the Companies Act. The allegations made by the
B complainant will not attract the penal provisions of the
Indian Penal Code. Therefore the accused seek for
quashment of the criminal proceedings.
5. The Inspector of Police, inter a/ia, stated as follows in
C the counter affidavit:
"The investigation reveals that the complainant had spent
nearly a sum of Rs.3 crores for the development of the
property by doing enormous earthwork, laying of roads etc.
After the complainant asked for the records of the
D company, the accused have taken away all the records,
books of accounts, returns, statutory registers, agreements
etc. The complainant filed a petition before the Company
Law Board in C.P.No. 44 of 2005 praying to set aside the
allotment of shares and appointment of Additional Director.
E The accused filed a counter along with two documents
forging the signatures of the complainant and the Postal
Authority. It is found that the postal seal on the document
does not tally with the seal of the Postal Department. The
Forensic Science Department has given a report that the
F writings of the complainant in the documents dated
29.1.2004 and 5.12.2004 are forged. The accused are
also involved in several other cases pending before the
Central Crime Branch (Economic Offences Wing),
Chennai."
G
6. Respondents 1 to 4 further submitted that the
co~plainant was not a party to the termination agreement and * '
his signature also did not find place in the agreement and,
therefore, the question of manipulation of the said doc.ument
does not arise. He was curious to allege that one· of the
H
M. VISWANATHAN·v. S.K. TILES & POTTERIES P. LTD. 593
& ORS. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
~·
directors of the company had taken away the original A
documents and records from the company. The amounts which
had been received by the complainant from the intending
purchasers had been completely accounted by the company.
The complainant's stand was that the complaint discloses
commission of theft of document, forgery of certain records ~nd B
..., criminal intimidation and, therefore, the police had rightly started
the investigation.
r
7. Learned counsel for the State also submitted that during
the course of investigation it was found that the. seal of ,the
postal department found a particular document did not tally with
c
I
the postal seal. It was also submitted that the alleged writing
of the complainant in certain documents were not to be in' his
hand writing.
8. The High Court noted in para 12 as follows: D
"In the complaint, four types of allegations have been
made. The first allegation i~ that Mrs. Radhika
Santhanakrishnan, the third acqused in this case .had
illegally.taken away all the records and accounts relating E
to Mis. Sai Sri Krishna Properties and Facilitators (P} Ltd.
The Second allegation is that the c;1ccused have fabricated
a termination agreement as if the same had been signed
by the complainant. The third allegation is that the advance
amount received from the prospective purchasers was F
returned behind the back of the complainant in order to
cheat him and the last allegation is "on complainant's
enquiry, the accused 1 to 3 are threatening to kill him."
9. After noticing the factual aspects the High Court referred
to some judgments and came to an abrupt conclusion iri the G
... following words:
"Here in this case, there is no forgery of documents
referred to in the complaint. The first respondent invents
certain documents to show that those documents wefe not H
594 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 16 S.C.R.
-1-- ;
A in the handwriting of the complainant. Further, there is no
allegation that by using such forged document, the accused
has acquired gains. Therefore the above authority will not
apply
-
to the
- '
facts and circumstances of this case."
~
B · 10. Accordingly, the prosecution was quashed holding that
the grievance, if any, of the complainant will have to be '(
redressed through the Civil Forum or the Company Law Board.
He cannot prosecute the respondents on the basis of bald
allegation without any basis. Accordingly, prosecution has
quashed.
c
11. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that while
exercising powers conferred under Section 482 Cr.P.C. the
parameters have not been kept in view by the High Court and
matters which are essentially to be resolved during trial, have
D been quashed by a practically non-reasoned order.
. 12. Reading of the complaint clearly shows that the +
allegations are substantially made out. This ·is not a case where
the jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was to be exercised.
E Per contra learned counsel for the respondents 1 to 4 supported
the judgment placing strong reliance on a decision of this Court
in Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. & Ors. v. Mohd~ Sharafu/
Haque & Anr. [2005(1) SCC 122] contending that the
parameters for exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
F have been kept out and there is nothing illicit in the impugned
judgment to warrant interference.
13. Learned counsel for the State supported the stand
taken by the appellant.
G 14. Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code in
a case of this nature is the exception and not the rule. The .... ~
Section does not confer any new powers 'on the High Cou_rt. It
only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed
before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three
H circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be
'
-i
M. VISWANATHAN v. S.K. TILES & POTTERIES P. LTD. 595
& ORS. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
.,.._
exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, A
(ii) .to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to'
otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor;
desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the
exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment
dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may B
possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart
from' express provisions of law which are necessary for proper
discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. :
That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which ,
merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the High : c
Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the '
absence of any express provision, as inherent in their i
constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right·
and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on
the principle "quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere D
videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non potesf' (when the
~ law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it
cannot exist). While exercising powers under the-section, the
court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent
jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised , E
sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such
exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the
section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real ,
and substantial justice for the administration of which alone
courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of F
+
justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so
as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent abuse.
It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action
which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. '
In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any G
proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts
-+
to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these
proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When
no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may
examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to H
596 -SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 16 S.C.R.
A be quashed, -it is permissible to look into the materials to ~
assess what the complainant has alleged, and whether any
offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto.
15. In R. P. Kapur v. State of Punjab (AIR 1960 SC 866)
B this
I
Court summarized some categories of cases where
inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the
proceedings. ¥
(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar
against the institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction;
c
(ii) where the allegations in the first information report or
complaint taken at its face value and accepted in their
.~
entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;
D (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there
is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced
clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.
11 fl
+
16. In dealing with the last case, it is important to bear in
mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal
E evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly
inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where
there is legal evidence which, on appreciation,
I
may or may not
support! the accusations. VVhen exercising jurisdiction under
Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily
F embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is
reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it +
accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the
trial Judge. Judicial process should not be an instrument of
oppression, or, needless harassment. Court should be
G circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should
take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration
before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the +
hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harqss
any person needlessly. At the same time the section is ndt an
H instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a
M. VISWANATHAN v. S.K. TILES & POTTERIES P. LTD. 597
I-
& ORS. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
prosecution and bring about its sudden death. The scope of A
exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code and the
categories of cases where the High Court may exercise it:;;
power under it relating to cognizable offences to prevent ·abuse
of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice were set out in some detail by this Court in State of 8
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp (1) 335). A note of caution
was, however, added that the power should be exercised
sparingly and that too in rarest of rare cases. The illustrative
categories indicated by ~his Court are as follows:
"(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
c
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face
value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie
constitute any offence or make out a case against the
accused.
D
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and
other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not
djsclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation
by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except
under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of E
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR
or complaint and the evidence collected in support ofthe
same do not disclose the commissio.n of any offence and F
make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in'the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute .only a non-cognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under G
Section 155{2) of the Code.
· (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are
so absurd and inherently impr9bable on the basis of which
no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that H
598 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 16 S.C.R.
A there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal .bar engrafted in any
of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under
B which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution
and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is 't
a specific provision in the Code or Act concerned,
providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the
aggrieved party.
c (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
with ma/a fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance
on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private
and personal grudge."
D
As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under
Section 482 of the 'Code are very wide and. the very plenitude
of the power requires great caution in· its exercise. Court must
be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is
E based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be
·exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court
being the highest court of a State should normally refrain from
giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts
are incompiete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not
F been collected and produced before.the~G.ourt and the issues +
involved, whether factual or leg~I. are of magnitude and cannot
be seen ·in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of
course, no hard-and-fasf rllle can be laiff down in regard to
cases in which. the High Court will exercise its extraordinary
G jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. (See:
Janata Oaf v. H. S. Chowdhary (1992 (4) SCC 305), and
Raghubir Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar (Al R 1964 SC 1). It would
not be proper for the High Co~rt to analyse the case pf the
complain~nt in the light of all probabilities in order to determine
H whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such
M. VISWANATHAN v. S.K. TILES & POTTERIES P. LTD. 599
& ORS. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.)
premises arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings ar~ to be A
quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material before
it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with.
In a proceeding instituted on complaint, exercise of the inherent
powers to quash the proceedings is called for only in a case
where the complaint does not disclose any offence. or is B
frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set' out in
the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance
has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the High ·.c ourt
to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under
Section 482 of the Code. It is not, however, necessary that.there c
should be meticulous analysis of the case before the trial tb find
out whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal. The
complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears that on
consideration of the allegations in the light of the statement
made on oath of the complainant that the ingredients o.f the o
offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to
show that the complaint is mala fide,-.frivolous or vexatious, in
that event there would be no justification for interference by the
High Court. When an information is lodged at the police station
and an offence is registered, then the ma/a fides of the E
informant would be of secondaiy importance. It is the material
collected during the investigation and evidence led in court
which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegatf9ns
of ma/a fides against the inf9rmant are of no consequence and
cannot by themselves be the basis for quashing the F
proceedings. (See: Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar
(1990 Supp SCC 686), State of Bihar v. P. P. Sharma (AIR
1996 SC 309), Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill
(1995 (6) SCC 194), State of Kera/av. 0. C. Kuttan (AIR 1999
SC 1044), State of UP. v. 0 . P. Sharma (1996 (7) SCC 705), G
Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada (1997 (2) SCC 397),
Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) (AIR 1996 SC
2983) and Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi (1999 (3) sec
259.
17. The above position was recently highlighted in Zandu H
. . . ..... ~i. '• • \ •
,,
600 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008] 16 S.C.R.
A Pharmaceutical :Works Ltd. & Ors. · v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque
and Another(2009 (1) SCC 122). - ·
In.
18. the instant cas~ the only cpnclusions arrived at by
.. 8
the High Court is in para 23 of t~e judgment which have been
quoted · above. The High Court has wro-ngly come to the
conclusion that the matter in issue has to be decided by a Civil
Court or th~ Company Law Bq~rd. The High Court had referred
t~ th~ four.types of allegations. Some of the allegations are
certainly, not adjudicable ~y the Civil Court or the Company Law
C Board. !~at being so the exercise of juri~diction by the High
Court !n terms of Section 482 Cr.P.C. cannot ~e maintained .
The impµgne~ <?rd,er is indefensible and is set aside.
· 19. T~e_ appeal is allowed.
N.J; Appeal allowed.
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