Supreme Court of India
MADHU @ MADHURANATHA & ANR.versusSTATE OF KARNATAKA
- Citation
- 2013 INSC 794
- Decided
- 28 November 2013
- Disposal
- Disposed off
- Bench
- B S CHAUHAN
Holding
The conviction stands but the death sentence is commuted to 30 years imprisonment as the case does not meet the "rarest of rare" standard.
Summary
The appellants Maohu @ Madhuranatha and others were convicted for the robbery‑murder of the son of PW‑22, based largely on circumstantial evidence, and were sentenced to death under Sections 302 and 364 IPC read with Section 34. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that circumstantial evidence alone can sustain a conviction if the chain of facts is complete and points only to the guilt of the accused. It ruled that minor discrepancies in witness testimony and the fact that police officers acted as witnesses do not vitiate the prosecution case, and that procedural lapses under Sections 174 and 176 CrPC do not render the evidence inadmissible. However, the Court found that the crime did not satisfy the "rarest of rare" criterion required for the death penalty and therefore commuted the sentence to 30 years imprisonment without remission. The appeals were dismissed and the modified sentence imposed.
Issues considered
- Whether conviction can be based solely on circumstantial evidence
- Whether minor discrepancies in witness statements affect the credibility of the prosecution case
- Whether police officers can be admissible witnesses
- Whether non‑compliance with Section 174 and Section 176(3) CrPC invalidates the evidence
- Whether evidence obtained by illegal means is admissible
- Whether the "last seen together" theory imposes a duty on the accused to explain the death
- Whether Section 313 CrPC obliges the accused to explain incriminating circumstances
- Whether the death penalty is warranted under the "rarest of rare" doctrine
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 174, s. 176(3), s. 313
- Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 138, s. 146
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 201, s. 302, s. 34, s. 364
Subjects
circumstantial evidencedeath penaltyrarest of rare doctrineconvictionsentencingpolice witnessSection 174 CrPCSection 313 CrPCSection 364 IPCSection 302 IPCcommutation
Judgment
[2013] 12 S.C.R. 947
MAOHU @ MADHURANATHA & ANR. A
v.
STATE OF KARNATAKA
(Criminal Appeal Nos.1357-1358 of 2011)
NOVEMBER 28, 2013
B
[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN AND S.A. BOBDE, JJ.]
Evidence - Circumstantial evidence - Appreciation of -
Prosecution case that with the motive of committing robbery,
the three accused-appellants murdered the son of PW-22, C
robbed him, chopped off his head and buried the trunk of his
body and threw the head and the weapon of offence in the river
- On consideration of circumstantial evidence, both the courts
below reached to a conclusion that the appellants had
committed the crime - Convictiorrof appellants u/ss.364, 302, D
201 rlw s.34 alongwith death sentence - Challenge to - Held:
Conviction can be based solely on circumstantial evidence
- On facts, no reason to interfere with the concurrent findings
of fact arrived at by the Courts below- Conviction upheld -
However, the facts and circumstances involved do not meet E
the requirement of rarest of rare cases and it is not a fit case
where the death sentence awarded to the appellants should
. be affirmed - The ends of justice would meet if they are
awarded the sentence of 30 years without remission - Penal
Code, 1860- ss.364, 302, 201 rlw s.34. F
Evidence - Discrepancies in depositions of witnesses -
Appreciation of - Held: While appreciating the evidence of a
witness, minor discrepancies on trivial matters which do not
affect the core of the prosecution case must not prompt the
court to reject the evidence in its entirety - The covrt is not G
supposed to give vndve importance to omissions,
contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart
of the matter, and shake the basic version of the prosecvtion
witness.
947 H
948 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 12 S.C.R.
A Evidence - Last seen together theory - Held: In cases
where the accused was last seen with the deceased victim
(last seen-together theory) just before the incident, it becomes
the duty of the accused to explain the circumstances under
which the death of the victim occurred.
B
Witness - Police witness - Appreciation of - Held: No
prohibition to the effect that a policeman cannot be a witness
or that his deposition cannot be relied upon if it inspires
confidence.
C Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.174 - Inquest
report - Held: Neither the inquest report nor the post-mortem
report can be termed as basic or substantive evidence - Any
discrepancy occu"ing therein cannot be termed as fatal or
suspicious circumstance which would warrant benefit of doubt
D to the accused.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.313 -
Examination under - Obligation of the accused - Held: It is
obligatory on the part of the accused while being examined
E u/s.313 CrPC, to furnish some explanation with respect to the
incriminating circumstances associated with him - The court
must take note of such explanation even in a case of
circumstantial evidence, to decide whether or not the chain
of circumstances is complete.
F Sentence I Sentencing - Death sentence - When
wa"anted - Held: The extreme penalty of death need not be
inflicted except in gravest cases of extreme culpability - Life
imprisonment is the rule and death sentence is an exception
- The balance sheet of aggravating and mitigating
G circumstances has to be drawn up - The condition of providing
special reasons for awarding death penalty is not to be
construed linguistically but it is to satisfy the basic features
of a reasoning supporting and making award of death penalty
unquestionable - The circumstances and the manner of
H committing the crime should be such that it pricks the judicial
MAOHU @ MADHURANATHA & ANR. v. STATE OF 949
KARNATAKA
conscience of the court to the extent that the only and A
inevitable conclusion should be awarding of death penalty.
The prosecution case was that with the motive of
committing robbery, the three accused-appellants
murdered the son of PW-22, robbed him, chopped off his
head and buried the trunk of his body and threw the head 8
and the weapon of offence in the river. The prosecution
relied upon circumstantial evidence to prove its case. PW-
11 deposed about the motive and produced cash
amounting to Rs. 39000/- and a mobile phone along with
its SIM purchased from the total cash of Rs. 50000/- C
deposited by A-1 with him. A-1 made Oextra-judicial
confession before PW-13, requesting PW-13 to save him
and on his advice, surrendered before the police. A-3
made voluntary disclosure about the location of the dead
body wherefrom, the dead body was exhumed. PW-1 D
identified the trunk of the dead body. The D.N.A. report
confinned the body to be that of the deceased/son of PW-
22. The Post Mortem Report and the manner in which the
body was found irrefutably point to a homicidal death. A-
2 was arrested from the house of PW-10 who produced E
two articles and a gold chain-MOS before the police left
by A-2. PW-1 Identified the said gold chain to be that of
the deceased. Rs. 1,01,000/- was recovered from the
house of A-1 while Rs. 2,02,700/- was recovered from the
house of A-2 concealed in the cattle shed which Is F
unexplained and un-accounted. Mobile set M014
recovered from A-3 was identified by PW-1 as that of the
deceased. The deceased was last seen in the company
of the accused persons as deposed by PW-4 who was
acquainted with the deceased as well as the accused G
persons.
The Trial Court convicted the appellants under
Sections 364, 302, 201 read with Section 34 IPC and
sentenced them to death under Section 302 r/w 34 IPC
H
950 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 12 S.C.R.
A and lesser sentences under the other charging Sections.
The High Court affirmed the conviction and sentence of
the appellants.
In the instant appeals, the appellants challenged their
B conviction on various grounds and further contended
that under no circumstance they could have been
awarded the death sentence. The appellants inter a/ia
contended that there were discrepancies and
contradictions in the depositions of the witnesses; that
in some of the recoveries, though a large number of
C people were available, but only police personnel were
made recovery witnesses; and that the provisions of
Sections 174 and 176(3) Cr.P.C. had not been complied
with and the body had been exhumed by the
Investigating Officer without the permission of the
D Executive Magistrate.
Disposing of the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. It has consistently been held that conviction
can be based solely on circumstantial evidence. The
E prosecution's case must stand or fall on its own legs and
cannot derive any strength from the weakness of the
defence put up by the accused. However, a false defence
may be called into aid only to lend assurance to the court
where various links in the chain of circumstantial
F evidence are complete in themselves. The circumstances
from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should
be fully established. The facts so established should be
consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the
accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable
G or point to any other hypothesis except that the accused
is guilty. The circumstances should be of a conclusive
nature and tendency. The evidence produced by the
prosecution should be of such a nature that it makes the
conviction of the accused sustainable. In the instant case,
H both the courts below reached to a conclusion that the
MAOHU @ MADHURANATHA & ANR. v. STATE OF 951
KARNATAKA
appellants had committed the crime. There is no reason A
to interfere with such concurrent finding of fact. [Paras
6, 7] [964-C-F, G]
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra AIR
1984 SC 1622: 1985 (1) SCR 88; State of Uttar Pradesh v. B
Satish AIR 2005 SC 1000: 2005 (2) SCR 1132; Paramjeet
Singh @ Pamma v. State of Uttarakhand AIR 2011 SC 200:
2010 (11) SCR 1064 - relied on.
2. It is a settled legal proposition that while
appreciating the evidence of a witness, minor C
discrepancies on trivial matters which do not affect the
core of the case of the prosecution must not prompt the
court to reject the evidence in its entirety. Therefore,
irrelevant details which do not in any way corrode the
credibility of a witness should be ignored. The court has D
to examine whether evidence read as a whole appears to
have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is
undoubtedly necessary for the court to scrutinize the
evidence, more particularly keeping in view the
deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the E
evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out
whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence
given by the witnesses and whether the earlier evaluation
of the evidence is shaken, so as to render it unworthy of
belief. Thus, the court is not supposed to give undue F
importance to omissions, contradictions and
discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter,
and shake the basic version of the prosecution witness.
[Para 9] [965-B-E]
Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana JT 2013 (8) SC 181; G
State of U.P. v. M.K. Anthony AIR 1985 SC 48: 1985 (1) SCC
505; State rep. by Inspector of Police v. Saravanan &Anr. AIR
2009 SC 152: 2008 (14) SCR 405; Vijay@ Chinee v. State
of M.P. (201 O) 8 sec 191 : .201 o (8) SCR 1150 - relied on.
H
952 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 12 S.C.R.
A 3. The term 'witness' means a person who is capable
of providing information by way of deposing as regards
relevant facts, via an oral statement, or a statement in
writing, made or given in Court, or otherwise. A witness
is normally considered to be independent unless he
B springs from sources which are likely to be tainted and
this usually means that the said witness has cause to
bear such enmity against the accused so as to implicate
him falsely. In view of the above, there can be no
prohibition to the effect that a policeman cannot be a
c witness or that his deposition cannot be relied upon if it
inspires confidence. [Paras 10, 11) [965-H; 966-A]
Pradeep Narayan Madgaonkar & Ors. v. State of
Maharashtra AIR 1995 SC 1930: 1995 (4) SCC 255; Paras
Ram v. State of Haryana AIR 1993 SC 1212: 1992 (2) Suppl.
D SCR 55; Balbir Singh v. State (1996) 11 SCC 139: 1996 (7)
Suppl. SCR 50; Kalpnath Rai v. State (Through CBI) AIR
1998 SC 201: 1997 (8) SCC 732; M. Prabhulal v. Assistant
. '
Director, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence AIR 2003 SC
4311: · 2003 (3) Suppl. SCR 958; Ravinderan v.
E Superintendent of Customs AIR 2007 SC 2040: 2007 (6)
SCC 410 and Laxmibai (dead) Thr. L.Rs. & Anr. v.
Bhagwantbuva (dead) Thr. L.Rs. & Ors. AIR 2013 SC 1204:
2013 (1) SCR 632 - relied on.
F 4. Sub-section (1) of Section 174 Cr.P.C. only puts an
obligation on the part of the 10 to intimate the Executive
Magistrate empowered to hold inquest but there is nothing ·
in law which provides that investigation cannot be carried
out without his permission in writing or in his absence.
G Even otherwise, the provision stands qualified "unless
otherwise directed by any rule prescribed by the State
Government, or by any general or special order of the
District or Sub-divisional Magistrate." The object of the
inquest proceeding is merely to ascertain whether a
H person has died .under unnatural circumstances or an
MAOHU @ MADHURANATHA & ANR. v. STATE OF 953
KARNATAKA
unnatural death and if so, what is the cause of death. More A
so, the inquest report is not a piece of substantive
evidence and can be utilised only for contradicting the
witnesses to the inquest examined during the trial. Neither
the inquest report nor the post-mortem report can be
termed as basic or substantive evidence and thus, any B
discrepancy occurring therein cannot be termed as fatal
or suspicious circumstance which would warrant benefit
of doubt to the accused. [Para 13] [967-H; 968-A-D]
Pooda Narayan & Ors. v. State of A.P. AIR 1975 SC
1252: 1975 (0) Suppl. SCR 84; Rameshwar Dayal & Ors. v. C
State of U.P. AIR 1978 SC 1558: 1978 (3) SCR 59; Ku/deep
Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1992 SC 1944: 1992 (3) Suppl.
SCC 1; George & Ors. v. State of Kera/a & Anr. AIR 1998
SC 1376: 1998 (2) SCR 303; Suresh Rai & Ors. v. State of
Bihar AIR 2000 SC 2207: 2000 (2) SCR 796; Munshi Prasad D
. & Ors. v. State of Bihar AIR 2001 SC 3031: 2001 (4) Suppl.
SCR 25 - relied on.
5. So far as the provisions of Section 176 Cr.P.C. are
concerned, the said provisions are attracted when a E
person dies in police custody and there is suspicion that
death had been caused by the police itself. In other
eventualities also, as provided in Section 176 Cr.P.C., the
Magistrate may hold the enquiry. Even if the submission
of the appellants is considered to have some substance F
it will not tilt the balance in their favour. It is a settled legal
proposition that evidence collected even by improper or
illegal means is admissible if it is relevant and its
genuineness stands proved. However, the court may be
cautious while scrutinizing such evidence. In such a fact- G
situation, it may be considered a case of procedural lapse
on the part of the Investigating Officer and it should not
be discarded unless the appellant satisfies the court that
any prejudice has been caused to him. [Para 14] [968-F-
H; 969-A]
H
954 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013] 12 S.C.R.
A Umesh Kumar v. State of Andhra Pradesh JT 2013 (12)
SC 213; Pooran Mal v. Director of Inspection, Income-Tax,
New Delhi & Ors. AIR 1974 SC 348: 1974 (2) SCR 704 -
relied on.
8 6. A number of witnesses have deposed of seeing
the deceased in the company of the appellants before the
incident. In cases where the accused was last seen with
the deceased victim (last seen-together theory) just
before the incident, it becomes the duty of the accused
C to explain the circumstances under which the death of
the victim occurred. [Para 15] [969-C-D]
Nika Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh AIR 1972 SC
2077: 1973 (1) SCR 428; Ganesh/al 1r. State of Maharashtra
(1992) 3 sec 106: 1992 (2) SCR 502 - relied on.
D
7. It is obligatory on the part of the accused while
being examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., to furnish
some explanation with respect to the incriminating
circumstances associated with him, and the court must
E take note of such explanation even in a case of
circumstantial evidence, to decide whether or not the
chain of circumstances is complete. [Para 16] [969-0-E]
Musheer Khan @ Badshah Khan & Anr. v. State of
Madhya Pradesh AIR 2010 SC 762: 2010 (2) SCR 119 -
F relied on.
8. If the findings of the High Court regarding PW.13
and that of the Trial Court in respect of PW.11 are read
together, none of them has disbelieved either of the
G witnesses. Therefore, there is no force in the
submissions advanced by the appellants that one of the
said witnesses had been disbelieved by the Trial Court
and another by the High Cour1 and thus, none of them
could be relied upon. The courts below opined that even
H if evidence of one of them is eschewed, deposition of _
MAOHU @ MADHURANATHA & ANR. v. STATE OF 955
KARNATAKA
another is enough to lend support to the prosecution A
case. [Para 17] [970-C-D]
9. However, the facts of the case did not warrant
death penalty. The extreme penalty of death need not be
inflicted except in gravest cases of extreme culpability.
8
Before opting for the death penalty the circumstances of
the offender are also required to be taken into
consideration along with the circumstances of the crime
for the reason that life imprisonment is the rule and death
sentence is an exception. The penalty of death sentence C
may be warranted only in a case where the court comes
to the conclusion that imposition of life imprisonment is
totally inadequate having regard to the relevant
circumstances of the crime. The balance sheet of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances has to be
drawn up and in doing so, the mitigating circumstances D
have to be accorded full weightage and a just balance
has to be struck between the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances before the option is exercised. The
condition of providing special reasons for awarding
death penalty is not to be construed linguistically but it E
is to satisfy the basic features of a reasoning supporting
and making award of death penalty unquestionable. The
circumstances and the manner of committing the crime
should be such that it pricks the judicial conscience of
the court to the extent that the only and inevitable F
conclusion should be awarding of death penalty. The
facts and circumstances involved in the instant case do
not meet the requirement of rarest of rare cases and it is
not a fit case where the death sentence awarded. to the
appellants should be affirmed. The ends of justice would G
meet if they are awarded the sentence of 30 years without
remission. [Paras 18, 20] (970-E-H; 972-C, E]
Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1980 SC 898: 1980
(2) SCC 684; Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1983 SC H
956 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 12 S.C.R.
A 957: 1983 (3) SCR 413; Devender Pal Singh v. State of NCT
of Delhi AIR 2002 SC 1661: 2002 (2) SCR 767; State of
Maharashtra v. Goraksha Ambaji Adsul AIR 2011 SC 2689:
2011 (9) SCR 41 ; Neel Kumar v. State of Haryana (2012) 5
SCC 766: 2012 (5) SCR 696 ; Haresh Mohandas Rajput v.
B State of Maharashtra (2011) 12 SCC 56: 2011 (14) SCR 921;
Swamy Shraddanand (2) @ Murali Manohar Mishra v. State
of Kamataka (2008) 13 SCC 767: 2008 (11) SCR 93; State
of Uttar Pradesh v. Sanjay Kumar (2012) 8 SCC 537: 2012
(7) SCR 359; Gurvail Singh@ Gala v. State of Punjab (2013)
c 2 sec 713: 2013 (1) SCR 783 - relied on.
Case Law Reference:
1985 (1) SCR 88 relied on Para 6
2005 (2) SCR 1132 relied on Para 6
D
2010 (11) SCR 1064 relied on Para 6
JT 2013 (8) SC 181 relied on Para 9
1985 (1) sec 505 relied on Para 9
E 2008 (14) SCR 405 relied on Para 9
2010 (8) SCR 1150 relied on Para 9
1995 (4) sec 255 relied on Para 10
F 1992 (2) Suppl. SCR 55 relied on Para 10
1996 (7) Suppl. SCR 50 relied on Para 10
1997 (8) sec 132 relied on Para 10
2003 (3) Suppl. SCR 958 relied on Para 10
G
2001 (6) sec 410 relied on Para 10
2013 (1) SCR 632 relied on Para 12
1975 (0) Suppl. SCR 84 relied on Para 13
H
MAOHU @ MADHURANATHA & ANR. v. STATE OF 957
KARNATAKA
1978 (3) SCR 59 relied on Para 13 A
1992 (3) Suppl. sec 1 relied on Para 13
1998 (2) SCR 303 relie<! on Para 13
'
2000 (2) SCR 796 relied on Para 13
B
2001 (4) Suppl. SCR 25 relied on Para 13
JT 2013 (12) SC 213 relied on Para 14
1974 (2) SCR 704 relied on Para 14
1973 (1) SCR 428 relied on Para 15
c
1992 (2) SCR 502 relied on Para 15
2010 (2) SCR 119 relied on Para 15
1980 (2) sec 684 relied on Para 18 D
1983 (3) SCR 413 relied on Para 111
2002 (2) SCR 767 relied on Para 18
2011 (9) SCR 41 relied on Para 18 E
2012 (5) SCR 696 relied on Para 18
2011 (14) SCR 921 relied on Para 18
2008 (11) SCR 93 relied on Para 20
F
2012 (7) SCR 359 relied on Para 20
2013 (1) SCR 783 relied on Para 20
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 1357-1358 of 2011. G
From the Judgment & Order dated 08.09.2010 of the High
Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Criminal Appeal Nos. 833
and 864 of 2008.
H
958 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 12 S.C.R.
A WITH
Crl. A. No. 109 of 2013.
N.D.B., Raju Bharathi Raju, N. Ganpatlly, Amit Kumar,
Ankit Rajgarhia, Rituraj Kumar for the Appellants.
B V.N. Raghupathy, Varun Thakur for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.1. These criminal appeals have
been preferred against the impugned judgment and order dated
C 8.9.2010, passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore
in Criminal Appeal Nos.833, 855 and 864 of 2008 by which
the High Court has affirmed the death sentence and confirmed
the judgment and orders of the learned District & Sessions
Judge dated 11117.7.2008, passed in Sessions Case No.152
of 2005 with certain observation about the charging Sections
0
of the Indian Penal Code 1860 (hereinafter referred to as 'IPC')
by which and whereunder the appellants have been convicted
under Sections 364/302/201 r/w Section 34 IPC and for the
offences punishable under Section 364 r/w Section 34 IPC,
sentenced to undergo RI for 7 years and a fine of Rs.25,000/-
E each and in default of payment of fine to undergo a further
imprisonment for a period of 18 months. They have been further
convicted under Section 201 r/w Section 34 IPC and sentenced
to undergo RI for 5 years and a fine of Rs.10,000/- each and
in-default to undergo further RI for a period of 12 months. All
F the three appellants have been further convicted under Section
302 r/w Section 34 IPC and awarded death penalty.
2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to these appeals
are that:
A. Madhusudhan, deceased had gone from Anandpura to
G Sagar on being asked by his uncle Prahlad (PW.1) to collect
the outstanding dues in respect of sale and purchase of ginger
from K.B. Sreenath (PW.2) and K.S. Kiran (PW.12). As
Madhusudhan did not turn up, Prahlad (PW.1) got worried and
contacted K.B. Sreenath (PW.2) and K.S. Kiran (PW.12) to find
H out the whereabouts of Madhusudhan. Both K.B. Sreenath
MAOHU @ MADHURANATHA & ANR. v. STATE OF 959
KARNATAKA [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
(PW.2) and K.S. Kiran (PW.12) informed Prahlad (PW.1) that A
Madhusudhan had collected Rs.2,50,000/- and Rs.1,50,000/-
respectively from them at about 12.30 P.M. and left for
Anandpura. Prahl ad (PW.1) contacted all his relatives and
friends to find out the whereabouts of Madhusudhan but all in
vain. B
B. K.B. Sreenath (PW.2) and K.S. Kiran (PW.12) filed a
complaint FIR No. 148/2005 (Ex.P-84) in the Police Station,
Sagar against unnamed persons suspecting that Madhusudhan
had been kidnapped. In the meanwhile there were rumors in
Anandpura that the appellants had looted the money and killed C
Madhusudhan as some persons i.e. Nagesh (PW.4); Sirajuddin
(PW.5); Nagendra (PW.3); and Chandrashekar (PW.6) had
come forward and informed that they had seen Madhusudhan,
deceased in the company of appellants on 8.8.2005 at 12.45
P.M. D
C. In view of this, an FIR was lodged on 11.8.2005 against
the appellants and one Lakshmeesha under Section 365 r/w
Section 34 IPC at Police Station Anandpura. The Police tried
to trace Madhusudhan as well as the appellants. It came to the E
knowledge of the investigating agency that the deceased was
seen in the company of the appellants in a Maruti van bearing
Registration No.KA-15-3112 on which "Kadala Muttu" had been
written on the back side. Thus, the Investigating Officer tried to
search for the said vehicle and came to know that it belonged F
to Jayanna@ P. Aya (A.3).
D. The location of mobile phone of Jayanna @ P. Aya
(A.3) was put on surveillance/watch and thereby he was
arrested on 12.8.2005 at Anandpura and on the same day Rafiq
@ Munna (A.2) was arrested by a separate team of police at G
Bangalore from the house of Felix D'Costa (PW.10).
Madhuranatha (A.1) surrendered before the police on the same
day. They made certain voluntary statements, on the basis
whereof, recoveries were made. Jayanna@ P. Aya (A.3) took
H
960 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 12 S.C.R.
A the police and others persons (recovery witnesses) to the forest
area and pointed out to a place wherefrom the dead body was
exhumated. Only the trunk of the body was found as the head
had been chopped off and thrown in the nearby Nandi river.
Prahlad (PW.1), Srinivasa (PW.15), Shivananda (PW.16),
B Devaraja (PW.17) and K. Keshavamurthy (PW.22) witnessed
the said recovery and identified the corpse. However, in spite
of the efforts made by the police, the head could not be
recovered. Immediately thereafter recovery of most of the looted
amount had been made from the appellants. A mobile phone
c belonging to Jayanna@ P. Aya (A.3) purchased from the loot
amount was also recovered. A gold ring belonging to the
deceased was given to the Investigating Officer by Felix
D'Costa (PW.10) from whose house Rafiq (A.2) had been
arrested in Bangalore.
D E. After completing the investigation, chargesheet was filed
against the appellants and trial commenced.
F. In the court Nagesh (PW.4) and Chandrashekar (PW.6)
corroborated the prosecution case to the extent that they had
E seen the deceased in the company of al! the three appellants
on 8.8.2005 at about 12.45 P.M. Pranesh (PW.11) and
Sadananda (PW.13) supported the case of extra-judicial
confession as made by Madhuranatha (A.1) before (PW.11 ).
A.1 had also approached PW.13 for help to contact the police
F and disclosed that he had committed the murder of
Madhusudhan alongwith Rafiq (A.2) and Jayanna @ P. Aya
(A.3}.
G. Recovery of the dead body was supported by
Shivananda (PW.16) and Devaraja (PW.17). K.B. Sreenath
G (PW.2) and K.S. Kiran (PW.12) had supported the prosecution
case deposing about payment of money to Madhusudhan on
8.8.2005 at about 12.45 P.M. to the tune of Rs.4,00,000/-. The
issue of motive was proved by Prahlad (PW.1), K.B. Sreenath
(PW.2), Felix D'Costa (PW.10), Pranesh (PW.11), K.S. Kiran
H (PW.12) and Sadananda (PW.13). The dead body was
MADHU @ MADHURANATHA & ANR. v. STATE OF 961
KARNATAKA [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
identified and the evidence in respect of recovery of the dead A
body was given by PWs.1 and 22. The same stood affirmed
by the report of the DNA test. The Investigating Officer Bhaskar
Rai (PW .4 7) proved all the recoveries and furnished the details
as to how the investigation was carried out and how the arrest
of the appellants was made. B
H. On the basis of the above, the Trial Court convicted and
sentenced the appellants under Sections 364, 302, 201 read
with Section 34 IPC. No conviction was made under Sections
120A or B IPC.
c
I. Aggrieved, the appellants preferred appeals before the
High Court which have been dismissed by the impugned·
judgment and order with respect to death sentences while
maintaining the other sentences as well. However, the court
made a passing observation that the charge should have been D
framed under Section 364A IPC instead of Section 302 IPC.
Hence, these appeal.
3. Mr. N.D.B. Raju and Mr. Amit Kumar, learned counsel
appearing for the appellants have agitated all the issues which E
had been raised on behalf of the appellants before the Trial
Court as well as before the High Court and have taken us
through the evidence recorded before the Trial Court. According
to them there is nothing on record to show that the death of the
deceased was homicidal or he was even abducted by the F
appellants, what to talk of causing death of deceased
Madhusudhan. In the absence of any material on record to
prove that his head was chopped off by any of the appellants,
their conviction is bad, particularly in view of the fact that there
is no evidence to show that the appellants had buried the lower G
portion of the corpse in the forest and threw the head in the
flowing river. More so, the High Court had taken a view that the
conviction under particular provisions of IPC by the Trial Court
was not justified, meaning thereby that the Trial Court did not
frame the charges properly. Even the money shown to have H
962 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 12 S.C.R.
A been recovered from the appellants had been planted and not
actually recovered. Most of the witnesses examined by the
prosecution are relatives of the deceased. There are material
contradictions in the deposition of the witnesses and a large
number of witnesses to some of the recoveries have been
B withheld. Only the police personnel have been made the
recovery witnesses though large numoer of persons had
gathered and were available for being made the recovery
witnesses. The video prepared at the time of exhumation of the
dead body was not presented in the Trial Court and that
c Jayanna (A.3) on whose behest it is alleged that the dead body
was recovered is not shown in the photographs taken at the
time of exhumation. One of the alleged witnesses of recovery
i.e. Pranesh (PW.11) had been dis-believed by the Trial Court
and another witness i.e. Sadananda (PW.13) has been dis-
D believed by the High Court. They are the witnesses of extra-
judicial confession as well. In such a fact-situation, none of the
said witnesses are trustworthy. Unde:r no circumstance the
appellants could have been awarded the death sentence. Thus,
the appeals deserve to be allowed.
E 4. On the contrary, learned counsel appearing for the State
had opposed the appeals contending that the Investigating
Officer was not asked in cross-examination any of the question
raised before this Court for the first time, either in respect of
the videography prepared at the time of exhumation or about
F the absence of Jayanna (A.3) in the photographs taken at that
time. Law does not prohibit making the police personnel as
recovery witnesSes and most of the discrepancies raised by
the appellants are-0f trivial nature which do not materially affect
the merit of the case. Thus, in view of the above, the appeals
G are liable to be dismissed.
5. We are of the considered opinion that both the courts
below have taken into consideration the evidence and
appreciated the same meticulously. The prosecution has relied
on the following circumstances to prove its case:
H
MAOHU @ MADHURANATHA & ANR. v. STATE OF 963
KARNATAKA [DR. 8.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
I. The motive of the offence was robbery and in A
pursuance to which the accused persons murdered
the deceased, robbed him, chopped off the head
and buried the trunk of the body. The head and the
weapon of offence were thrown in Nandi River.
8
II. PW-11 deposed about the motive and produced
cash amounting to Rs. 39000/- and a mobile phone
along with its SIM purchased from the total cash of
Rs. 50000/- deposited by A-1 with him.
Ill. A-1 made an extra-judicial confession before PW- c
13, requesting PW-13 to save him and on his
advice, surrendered before the police. ·
IV. Voluntary disclosure by A-3 about the location of the
dead body and wherefrom, the dead body was D
exhumed.
v. PW-1 identified the trunk of the dead body from the
tattoo. The D.N.A. report confirmed the body to be
that of the deceased/son of PW-22.
E
VI. The Post Mortem Report and the manner in which
the body was found irrefutably point to a homicidal
death.
VII. A-2 was arrested from the house of PW-10 who
F
had produced two worthless articles and a gold
chain-MOS before the police left by A-2. PW-1 had
identified the said gold chain to be that of the
deceased.
VIII. Recovery of Rs. 1,01,000/- from the house of A-1 G
and Rs. 2,02,700/- from the house of A-2 concealed
in the cattle shed which is un-explained and un-
accounted.
IX. Recovery of a mobile set M014 from A-3 identified H
964 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 12 S.C.R.
A by PW-1 as that of the deceased.
X. Last seen circumstance of the deceased being in
the company of the accused persons on 8.8.2005
around 12:30 PM as deposed by PW-4 who is
acquainted with the deceased as well as the
B
accused persons.
6. This Court has dealt with the case of circumstantial
evidence time and again. It has consistently been held that a
conviction can be based solely on circumstantial evidence. The
C prosecution's case must stand or fall on its own legs and cannot
derive any strength from the weakness of the defence put up
by the accused. However, a false defence may be called into
aid only to lend assurance to the court where various links in
the chain of circumstantial evidence are complete in
D themselves. The circumstances from which the conclusion of
guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The facts so
established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the
guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be
explainable or point to any other hypothesis except that the
E accused is guilty. The circumstances should be of a conclusive
nature and tendency. The evidence produced by the
prosecution should be of such a nature that it makes the
conviction of the accused sustainable.
(Vide: Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of
F Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 1622; State of Uttar Pradesh v.
Satish, AIR 2005 SC 1000; and Paramjeet Singh@ Pamma
v. State of Uttarakhand, AIR 2011 SC 200).
7. Both the courts below have dismissed the aforesaid
G circumstances in light of the aforesaid legal propositions and
reached to a conclusion that the appellants had committed the
crime. We do not see any reason to interfere with such
concurrent finding of fact.
8. It has been canvassed on behalf of the appellants that
H
MAOHU @ MADHURANATHA & ANR. v. STATE OF 965
KARNATAKA [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
there are discrepancies and contradictions in the depositions A
of witnesses like the timings when deceased was seen last
with the appellants and the distances of places etc. do not tally.
Thus, their evidence cannot be relied upon.
9. In Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana, JT 2013 (8) SC
8
181, this Court considered the issue of discrepancies in the
depositions. It is a settled legal proposition that while
appreciating the evidence of a witness, minor discrepancies
on trivial matters which do not affect the core of the case of
the prosecution must not prompt the court to reject the evidence
in its entirety. Therefore, irrelevant details which do not in any C
way corrode the credibility of a witness should be ignored. The
court has to examine whether evidence read as a whole
appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed,
t is undoubtedly necessary for the court to scrutinize the
evidence, more particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, D
drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a
whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the
general tenor of the evidence given by the witnesses and
whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken, so as
to render it unworthy of belief. Thus, the court is not supposed E
to give undue importance to omissions, contradictions and
discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter, and
shake the basic version of the prosecution witness.
A similar view has been re-iterated in State of U.P. v. M.K. F
Anthony, AIR 1985 SC 48; State rep. by Inspector of Police
v. Saravanan & Anr., AIR 2009 SC 152; and Vijay@ Chinee
v. State of M.P., (2010) 8 sec 191.
10. Learned counsel for the appellants has vehemently
argued that in some of the recoveries, though a large number G
of people were available, but only police personnel were made
recovery witnesses. Thus, the whole prosecution case
becomes doubtful.
The term 'witness' means a person who is capable of H
966 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 12 S.C.R.
A providing information by way of deposing as regards relevant
facts, via an oral statement, or a statement in writing, made or
given in Court, or otherwise.
In Pradeep Narayan Madgaonkar & Ors. v. State of
B Maharashtra, AIR 1995 SC 1930, this Court dealt with the issue
of the requirement of the examination of an independent
witness, and whether the evidence of a police witness requires
corroboration. The Court held that though the same must be
subject to strict scrutiny, however, the evidence of police
officials cannot be discarded merely on the ground that they
C belong to the police force and are either interested in the
investigation or in the prosecution. However, as far as possible
the corroboration of their evidence on material particulars
should be sought.
D (See also: Paras Ram v. State of Haryana, AIR 1993 SC
1212; BalbirSingh v. State, (1996) 11SCC139; Kalpnath Rai
v. State (Through CBI), AIR 1998 SC ;!01; M. Prabhulal v.
Assistant Director, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, AIR
2003 SC 4311; and Ravinderan v. Superintendent of
E Customs, AIR 2007 SC 2040).
11. Thus, a witness is normally considered to be
independent unless he springs from sources which are likely
to be tainted and this usually means that the said witness has
cause to bear such enmity against the accused so as to
F implicate him falsely. In view of the above, there can be no
prohibition to the effect that a policeman cannot be a witness
or that his deposition cannot be relied upon if it inspires
confidence.
G 12. This Court in Laxmibai (dead) Thr. L.Rs. & Anr. v.
Bhagwantbuva (dead) Thr. L.Rs. & Ors., AIR 2013 SC 1204
examined a similar issue and held:
"Furthermore, there cannot be any dispute with respect to
the settled legal proposition, that if a party wishes to raise
H
MAOHU @ MADHURANATHA & ANR. v. STATE OF 967
KARNATAKA [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
any doubt as regards the correctness of the statement of A
a witness, the said witness must be given an opportunity
to explain his statement by drawing his attention to that
part of it, which has been objected to by the other party,
as being untrue. Without this, it is not possible to impeach
his credibility. Such a law has been advanced in view of B
the statutory provisions enshrined in Section 138 of the
Evidence Act, 1872, which enable the opposite party to
cross-examine a witness as regards information tendered
in evidence by him during his initial examination in chief,
and the scope of this provision stands enlarged by Section c
146 of the Evidence Act, which permits a witness to be
questioned, inter-alia, in order to test his veracity.
Thereafter, the unchallenged part of his evidence. is to be
relied upon, for the reason that it is impm1si.ble for the
witness to explain or elaborate upon any doubts as
0
regards the same, in the absence of quest1on:!I put to him
with respect to the circumstances which indicate that the
version of events provided by him, is not fit to be believed,
and the witness himself, is unworthy of credit. Thus, if a
party intends to impeach a witness, he must provide
adequate opportunity to the witness in the witness box, to E
give a full and proper explanation. The same is essential
to ensure fair play and fairness in dealing with witnesses.
(See: Khem Chand v. State of Himacha/ Pradesh, AIR
1994 SC 226; State of U.P. v. Nahar Singh (dead) &
Ors., AIR 1998 SC 1328; Rajinder Pershad (Dead) by F
L.Rs. v. Darshana Devi (Smt.), AIR 2001 SC 3207; and
Sunil Kumar & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2005 SC
1096)".
13. It has been canvassed on behalf of t_he appellants that G
the provisions of Sections 174 and 176(3) Cr.P.C. had not
been complied with and the body had been exhumed by the
10 without the permission of the Executive Magistrate and
therefore, the investigation had not been conducted in
accordance with law. Sub-section (1) of Section 174 Cr.P.C. H
968 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ~2013] 12 S.C.R.
A only puts an obligation on the part of the 10 to intimate the
Executive Magistrate empowered to hold inquest but there is
nothing in law which provides that investigation cannot be
carried out without his permission in writing or in his absence.
Even otherwise, the provision stands qualified "unless otherwise
B directed by any rule prescribed by the State Government, or
by any general or special order of the District or Sub-divisional
Magistrate." The object of the inquest proceeding is merely to
ascertain whether a person has died under unnatural
circumstances or an unnatural death and if so, what is the cause
c of death. More so, the inquest report is not a piece of
substantive evidence and can be utilised only for contradicting
the witnesses to the inquest examined during the trial. Neither
the inquest report nor the post-mortem report can be termed
as basic or substantive evidence and thus, any discrepancy
occurring therein cannot be termed as fatal or suspicious
0
circumstance which would warrant benefit of doubt to the
accused.
(Vide: Pooda Narayan & Ors. v. State of A.P., AIR 1975
SC 1252; Rameshwar Dayal & Ors. v. State of U.P., AIR 1978
E SC 1558; Ku/deep Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1992 SC
1944; George & Ors. v. State of Kera/a & Anr., AIR 1998 SC
1376; Suresh Rai & Ors. v. State of Bihar, AIR 2000 SC 2207;
and Munshi Prasad & Ors. v. State of Bihar, AIR 2001 SC
3031).
F
14. So far as the provisions of Section 176 Cr.P.C. are
concerned, the said provisions are attracted when a person
dies in police custody and there is suspicion that death had
been caused by the police itself. In other eventualities also, as
G provided in Section 176 Cr.P.C., the Magistrate may hold the
enquiry. Ej,ven if the submission of the appellants is considered
to have some substance it will not tilt the balance in their favour.
It is a settled legal proposition that evidence collected even by
improper or illegal means is admissible if it is relevant and its
genuineness stands proved. However, the court may be
H cautious while scrutinizing such evidence. In such a fact-
MAOHU @ MADHURANATHA & ANR. v. STATE OF 969
KARNATAKA [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.)
situation, it niay be considered a case of procedural lapse on A
the part of the Investigating Officer and it should not be
discarded unless the appellant satisfies the court that any
prejudice has been caused to him.
(Vide: Umesh Kumar v. State of Andhra Pradesh, JT B
2013 (12) SC 213; and Pooran Mal v. Director of Inspection,
Income-Tax, New Delhi & Ors., AIR 1974 SC 348).
15. A number of witnesses have deposed of seeing the
deceased in the company of the appellants before the incident.
In cases where the accused was last seen with the deceased C
victim (last seen-together theory) just before the incident, it
becomes the duty of the accused to explain the circumstances
under which the death of the victim occurred. (Vide: Nika Ram
v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1972 SC 2077; and
Ganesh/a/ v. State of Maharashtra, (1992) 3 SCC 106). D
16. It is obligatory on the part of the accused while being
examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., to furnish some
explanation with respect to the incriminating circumstances
associated with him, and the court must take note of such E
explanation even in a case of circumstantial evidence, to
decide whether or not the chain of circumstances is complete.
[Vide: Musheer Khan @ Badshah Khan & Anr. v. State of
Madhya Pradesh, AIR 2010 SC 762; and Dr. Sunil Clifford
Daniel (supra)).
F
17. The High Court regarding Sadananda (PW.13) has
observed as under:
"It may be that PW11 may appear as accomplice but
nonetheless the evidence of PW13 clinchingly establish G
the extra-judicial confession of A 1. The analysis of the
above evidence would clinchingly establish the guilt of A 1
to A3. Therefore, the order of conviction is sound and
proper."
H
970 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 12 S.C.R.
A Similarly, the Trial Court in respect of PW.11 observed as
under:
"Even if the extra-judicial confession said to have
been made by the first accused before PW.13 is
8 eschewed, the statement made before PW.11 shows that
immediately after the incident the first accused
Madhuranatha who had earlier sought the assistance of
PW.11 for the same crime has met him in his house during
night and handed over Rs.50,000/- for safe custody and
also requested him not to disclose it to any one."
c
If the aforesaid findings of the courts below are read
together, none of them has disbelieved either of the witnesses.
Therefore, we do not find any force in the submissions
advanced by learned counsel for the appellants that one of the
D said witnesses had been disbelieved by the Trial Court and
another by the High Court and thus, none of them could be
relied upon. The courts below opined that even if evidence of
one of them is eschewed, deposition of another is enough to
lend support to the prosecution case.
E
18. However, the facts of the case did not warrant death
penalty.
The extreme penalty of death need not be inflicted except
in gravest cases of extreme culpability. Before opting for the
F death penalty the circumstances of the offender are also
required to be taken into consideration along with the
circumstances of the crime for the reason that life imprisonment
is the rule and death sentence is an exception. The penalty of
death sentence may be warranted only in a case where the
G court comes to the conclusion that imposition of life
imprisonment is totally inadequate having regard to the relevant
circumstances of the crime. The balance sheet of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances has to be drawn up and in doing
so, the mitigating circumstances have to be accorded full
H
MAOHU @ MADHURANATHA & ANR. v. STATE OF 971
KARNATAKA [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
weightage and a just balance has to be struck between the A
aggravating and mitigating circumstances before the option is
exercised. The condition of providing special reasons for
awarding death penalty is not to be construed linguistically but
it is to satisfy the basic features of a reasoning supporting and
making award of death penalty unquestionable. The 8
circumstances and the manner of committing the crime should
be such that it pricks the judicial conscience of the court to the
extent that the only and inevitable conclusion should be
awarding of death penalty. (Vide: Bachan Singh v. State of
Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 898; Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab, C
AIR 1983 SC 957; Devender Pal Singh v. State of NCT of
Delhi, AIR 2002 SC 1661; State of Maharashtra v. Goraksha
Ambaji Adsul, AIR 2011 SC 2689; and Neel Kumar v. State
of Haryana, (2012) 5 sec 766).
19. In Haresh Mohandas Rajput v. State of Maharashtra, D
(2011) 12 sec 56, this court held as under:
"20. 'The rarest of the rare case' comes when a convict
would be a menace and threat to the harmonious and
peaceful coexistence of the society. The crime may be E
heinous or brutal but may not be in the category of 'the
rarest of the rare case'. There must be no reason to
believe that the accused cannot be reformed or
rehabilitated and that he is likely to continue criminal acts
of violence as would constitute a continuing threat to the F
society. The accused may be a menace to the society and
would continue to be so, threatening its peaceful and
harmonious coexistence. The manner in which the crime
is committed must be such that it may result in intense and
extreme indignation of the community and shock the
collective conscience of the society. Where an accused G
does not act on any spur-of-the-moment provocation and
indulges himself in a deliberately planned crime and
meticulously executes it, the death sentence may be the
most appropriate punishment for such a ghastly crime. The
972 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 12 S.C.R.
A death sentence may be warranted where the victims are
innocent children and helpless women. Thus, in case the
crime is committed in a most cruel and inhuman manner
which is an extremely brutal, grotesque, diabolical, revolting
and dastardly manner, where his act affects the entire
B moral fibre of the society e.g. crime committed for power
or political ambition or indulging in organised criminal
activities, death sentence should be awarded."
20. The facts and circumstances involved in the instant
case do not meet the requirement of rarest of rare cases as
C explained hereinabove and we are of the considered view that
it is not a fit case where the death sentence awarded to the
appellants should be affirmed. Considering the current trend in
view of the judgment of this Court in Swamy Shraddanand (2)
@ Murali Manohar Mishra v. State of Kamataka, (2008) 13
D SCC 767 which has subsequently been followed by this Court
as is evident from the judgments in State of Uttar Pradesh v.
Sanjay Kumar, (2012) 8 SCC 537; and Gurvail Singh@ Gala
v. State of Punjab, (2013) 2 SCC 713, we are of the
considered opinion that ends of justice would meet if they are
E awarded the sentence of 30 years without remission.
21. With the aforesaid modification, the appeals stand
disposed of.
B.B.B. Appeals disposed of.
Search Indian case law
Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.
Try "circumstantial evidence"Sign in to search