MADHYA PRADESH ELECTRICITY BOARDversusJAGDISH CHANDRA SHARMA

             MADHYA PRADESH ELECTRICITY BOARD                                A
                              v.
                 JAGDISl-I CHANDRA SHARMA

                            MARCI-I 4, 2005

       (N. SANTOSl-l l-IEGDE, TARUN CHATTERJFE AND P.K.                      B
                    BALASUBRAMANY AN, JJ.]


      labour laws:

       Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section I IA-Madhya Pradesh Industrial C
 Relations Act, 1962-Section JO?A-Misconduct-Charges of physically
assaulting superior officer at work place followed by unauthorised absence
from duty, found proved against the delinquent employee-Punishment of
dismissal by employer set aside by labour Court on ground that the punishment
was punitive-Order of labour Court though reversed by Industrial Court in D
appeal, was restored by High Court in its writ jurisdiction-Interference with
punishment imposed by the employer-Propriety of-Held : On facts, the
punishment imposed was not so harsh or disproportionate to the charges
proved so as to warrant interference by the labour Court-High Court exceeded
its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in interfering with the
punishment imposed.                                                            E
      Employee, a muster roll labourer, during work, allegedly hit his
superior officer with a tension screw on his back and on his nose leaving
him with a bleeding and broken nose; and thereafter remained
unauthorizedly absent for three weeks. The Enquiry Officer found the
charges proved, based on which services of the employee were terminated.      F
On reference, Labour Court did not disagree with the finding of
misconduct as recorded at the enquiry, but set aside termination holding
the punishment to be punitive in nature. It ordered reinstatement of the
employee but without back wages. In appeal, the Industrial Court set aside
the order of the Labour Court and held that the termination of service as
a punishment was justified. The employee filed writ petition, whereupon
High Court restored the decision of the Labour Court.

      Allowing the appeal of the employer and dismissing the employee's

                                    559
    560                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   (2005] 2 S.C.R.

A appeal, the Court
          HELD : I. It is clear from the findings recorded and the materials
    available, that the charge against the employee of hitting a superior officer
    with an implement and causing him injury stood proved, as also his
    absence from duty without intimation. In fact, the Labour Court has found
B   nothing wrong with the domestic enquiry wherein the charges were found
    to have been proved. The Labour Court also proceeded on the basis that
    the charges were proved. The Industrial Court in appeal accepted the
    finding that the charges against the employee were proved. The High
    Court also held that the charges against the employee stood prove1. The
C   High Court also took note of the fact that the employee did not even
    challenge this part of the finding of the Labour Court in the appeal, he
    filed before the Industrial Court. Thus, it is clear that there is no reason
    for this Court to interfere with the finding that the charges against the
    employee stood proved, even assuming that the employee is permitted to
    raise the question regarding proving of the charges against him. The
D   materials clearly disclose that the charges were proved. (564-C-Fl

          2; Section 107A of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act,
    1962 is almost a reproduction of Section l lA of the Industrial Disputes
    Act. The jurisdiction under Section 107 A of the Madhya Pradesh
E   Industrial Relations Act to interfere with punishment when it is a discharge
    or dismissal can be exercised by the Labour Court only when it is satisfied
    that the discharge or dismissal is not justified. Similarly, the High Court
    gets jurisdiction to interfere with the punishment in exercise of its
    jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution only when it finds that
    the punishment imposed, is shockingly disproportionate to the charge
F   proved. [564-G; 565-B, q

          UP. State Road Transport C01pn. v. Subhash Chandra Sharma and Ors.,
    (20001 3 SCC 324; Krishnakali Tea Estate v. Akhil Bharatiya Chah Mazdoor
    Sangh and Anr., (2004) 8 SCC 2000; Bharat Forge Company Ltd. v. Uttam
    Manohar Nakate, (2005) 1 SCALE 345; Mahindra and Mahindra ltd. v. N.
G   B. Narawade, (2005) 2 SCALE 302; Orissa Cement ltd. v. V. Adikanda Sahu
    (1960) 1 LLJ-518-SC; New Shorrock Mills v. Maheshbhai T. Rao, (1996(6
    SCC 590 and Employers, Management, Muriadih Col/ie1y Mis BCCL ltd. v.
    Bihar Colliery Kamgar Union, Through Workmen JT (2005)2 SC 444, relied
    on.

H         State of Rajasthan v. B.K. Meena, (1996( 6 SCC 417 and The
        M.P. ELECTRICITY BOARD,.. J.C. SHARMA [BALASUBRAMANYAN . .I]      561

Management o.fTournamul/a Estate v. Workmen, 1197312 sec 502, referred A
to.

      3. 1. In the instant case, the employee has been found guilty of hitting
and injuring his superior officer at the work place, obviously in the
presence of other employees. This clearly amounted to breach of discipline
in the organization. Discipline at the work place in an organization like        B
the employer herein, is the sine qua non for the efficient working of the
organization. When an employee breaches such discipline and the
employer terminates his services, it is not open to a Labour Court or an
Industrial Tribunal to take the view that the punishment awarded is
shockingly disproportionate to the charge proved. 1566-G-H; 567-AI               C
      3.2. Obedience to authority in a workplace is not slavery. lt is not
violative of one's natural rights. It is ei;sential for the prosperity of the
organization as well as that of its employees. When in such a situation, a
punishment of termination is awarded for hitting and injuring a superior
officer supervising the work of the employee, with no extenuating                D
circumstance established, it cannot be said to be not justified. It cannot
certainly be termed unduly harsh or disproportionate. The Labour Court
and the High Court in this case totally misdirected themselves while
exercising their jurisdiction. The Industrial Court made the correct
approach and came to the right conclusion. 1567-C, DI
                                                                                 E
      4. Setting aside the decision of the High Court, the decision of the
Industrial Court is restored. That means that the punishment of
termination awarded to the employee will stand. (567-D, El

     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 1339 and
1340 of 2003.                                                                    F
     From the Judgment and Order dated 25.6.200 I of the Madhya Pradesh
High Court in W.P. No. 460 of 1999.

      Sakesh Kumar and Satish K. Agnihotri for the Appellant.
                                                                                 G
      Ajay Vir Singh Jain and Shankar Divate for the Respondent.

      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

     P.K. BALASUBRAMANY AN, J. 1. The appeal C.A. No. 1339 of
2003 is by the employer. C.A. No. 1340 of 2003 is by the employee. The           H
    562                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2005] 2 S.C:R.

A employee was working as a muster t'oll labourer in the employer-Organization.
    On 19.01.1984, while in employment, he allegedly physically assaulted a
    superior officer A.K. Singh, Sub-Engineer. He hit him with a tension screw
    on his back and on his nose. The blow on the nose allegedly resulted in
    fracture of the nose and severe bleeding. According to the employer,
B   consequent on the incident, the employee remained unauthorizedly absent for
    about three weeks. A show cause notice along with a memo of charges based
    on his assault on the superior officer and his unauthorized absence from duty,
    was served on him. He was charged with violating the service rules of the
    employer-organization. Pursuant to the objections filed by the employee, an
    enquiry officer was appointed to hold a domestic enquiry. A proper enquiry
C   was held. The Enquiry Officer found the charges proved and submitted a
    report on that basis. On 14.9.1984, based on the findings, the services of the
    employee were terminated with effect from 15.9.1984.

        2. At the instance of the employee, a reference was made to the
  Labour Court. The Labour Court did not disagree with the finding at the
D enquiry either on the inflicting of injuries on the superior officer or on the
  unauthorized absence and the consequent violations of the service rules. The
  Labour Court took the view that the punishment of termination inflicted on
  the employee was punitive in nature. The employee had been kept out of
  service till the date of the decision by that Court and that was enough
E punishment in the circumstances. Therefore, exercising its powers under
  Section I 07 A of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act, 1962, which
  correspondents to Section I IA of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Labour
  Court set aside the punishment of termination and ordered reinstatement of
  the employee but without back wages. The employer filed an appeal before
  the Industrial Court challenging the interference with the punishment. The
F employee filed an appeal challenging the denial of back wages. In the appeal
  filed by the employer, the Industrial Court took the view that the Labour
  Court acted illegally and perversely in interfering with the punishment awarded
  on the findings at the enquiry accepted by the Labour Court. Therefore, the
  Appellate Authority, the Industrial Court, set aside the interference by the
G Labour Court with the punishment awarded and held that the termination of
  service as a punishment was justified in th·e circumstances. Thus, the order
  of termination issued by the employer was upheld. As a consequence, the
  appeal filed by the employee claiming back wages was dismissed.

          3. Feeling aggrieved by the decision of the Industrial Court, the employee
H   filed W.P. No. 460 of 1999 in the High Cou1t of Madhya Pradesh invoking
                M.P. ELECTRICITY BOARD 1·.•l.C. Sl-IARMA [BALASUBRAMANYAN . .I.)    563

         Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court held that A
         the charges against the employee stood proved and the finding in that behalf
         by the Labour Comt had not been challenged by the employee in the appeal
         filed by him before the Industrial Court, since his appeal challenged only that
         part of the order of the Labour Court which denied him back wages. Though,
         the High Court found no reason to interfere with the finding that the charges
         were proved, it interfered with the punishment. The reasons given were, that B
         taking into account the entire facts and circumstances of the case, the gravity
         of the misconduct proved, the past behaviour and all other attendant
         circumstances appearing on record, the Labour Court was justified in
         interfering with the quantum of punishment. As an added reason, it stated
         that while entertaining the Writ Petition, the High Court had stayed the C
         operation of the order of the Industrial Court, upholding the dismissal and
         that was also a ground for interfering with the punishment. The High Court
         had no difficulty in observing that the charge levelled against the employee
         was a major one, but since the Labour Court had decided to award a lesser
         punishment, the same should not have been interfered with by the Industrial
         Court. Thus, the High Court set aside the decision of the Industrial Court and D
         restored the decision of the Labour Court. This meant that the employee's
         reinstatement was ordered but back wages were denied to him.


-              4. The employer and the employee have challenged this decision of
         the High Court in these appeals. The employer has questioned the interference
         with the punishment awarded and the employee, the denial of back wages to
         him.
                                                                                            E


                5. Learned counsel for the employer submitted that the High Court
         and the Labour Court have totally misunderstood the nature of their jurisdiction
         under Section 107A of the Act. Learned counsel submitted that the charge           F
         proved against the employee was a serious one affecting the discipline in the
    ('   entire organization. Even otherwise, inflicting of a grave injury on a superior
         officer while at work, could not be countenanced by any organization and
         this coupled with the unauthorized absence by the emplayee, clearly justified
         the order of termination. Learned Counsel relied on the decisions of this
         Court rendered on Section I IA of the Industrial Disputes Act to contend that      G
         the interference with the punishment under the circumstances was clearly
         unjustified and the decision of the High Court calls for interference. He also
         pointed out that the fact that an interim stay was granted while admitting the
         Writ Petition filed by the employer, was not at all a ground to interfere with
         the punishment of termination. Learned counsel for the employee submitted          H
    564                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2005] 2 S.C.R.

A that the Labour Court had taken note of the circumstances as a whole to come
    to the conclusion that the punishment imposed was punitive in nature and
    called for interference in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section I 07 A of
    the Act and that there was no reason to interfere with the award of such
    punishment upheld by the High Court. Learned counsel also relied on some
B   of the decisions of this Court in support of his contention. He also made an
    attempt to argue that the charge against the employee had not been proved
    though the employee had not filed an appeal against that part of the decision
    of the Labour Court in the Industrial Court and 'had confined himself to
    challenging the refusal to award back wages.

c before6.us, Itthatis clear from the findings recorded and the materials available
                       the charge against the employee of hitting a superior officer
    with an implement and causing him injury stood proved, as also his absence
    from duty without intimation. In fact, the Labour Court has found nothing
    wrong with the domestic enquiry wherein .the charges were found to have
    been proved. The Labour Court also proceeded on the basis that the charges
D   were proved. The Industrial Court in appeal accepted. the finding that the
    charges against the employee were proved. The High Court also held that the
    charges against the employee stood proved on the facts of this case. The
    High Court also took note of the fact that the employee did not even challenge
    this part of the finding of the Labour Court in the appeal, he filed before the
E   Industrial Court. Thus, it is clear that there is no reason for this Court to       ......
    interfere with the finding that the charges against the employee stood proved,
    even assuming that the employee, the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 1340 of
    2003, is permitted to raise the question regarding the proving of the charges
    against him. We were taken through the relevant materials. The materials
    clearly disclose that the charges were proved. We have, therefore, only to ask
F   ourselves whether in the face of the charges proved, it was proper for the
    Labour Court or for the High Court to interfere with the punishment imposed
    by ~e employer.

          7. On a comparison, it is seen that Section 107A of the Act is almost
    a reproduction of Section I IA of the Industrial Disputes Act. Learned counsel
G . also agreed that its scope was the same as that of Section 11 A of the Industrial
    Disputes Act.

          8. The question then is, whether the interference with the punishment
                                                                                        -   \...



    by the Labour Court was justified? In other words, the question is whether
H   the punishment imposed was so harsh or so disproportionate to the charge
       M.P. ELECTRICITY BOARD r. J.C. SHARMA [BALASUBRAMi\NYAN . .I]    565

 proved, that it warranted or justified interference by the Labour Cou1t? Here, A
 it had been clearly found that the employee during work, had hit his superior
 officer with a tension screw on his back and on his nose leaving him with a
 bleeding and broken nose. It has also been found that this incident was
 followed by the unauthorized absence of the employee. It is in the context of
 these charges found established that the punishment of termination was B
 imposed on the employee. The jurisdiction under Section I 07 A of the Act to
 interfere with punishment when it is a discharge or dismissal can be exercised
 by the Labour Court only when it is satisfied that the discharge or dismissal
 is not justified. Similarly, the High Court gets jurisdiction to interfere with
 the punishment in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India only when it finds that the punishment imposed, is C
shockingly disproportionate to the charge proved. These aspects are well
settled. In U.P. State Road Transport Corpn. v. Subhash Chandra Sharma
and Ors., [2000] 3 SCC 324, this Court, after referring to the scope of
 interference with punishment under Section I IA of the Industrial Disputes
Act, held that the Labour Court was not justified in interfering with the order
of removal from service when the charge against the employee stood proved. D
It was also held that the jurisdiction vested with the Labour Court to interfere
with punishment was not to be exercised capriciously and arbitrarily. It was
necessary, in a case where the Labour Court finds the charge proved, for a
conclusion to be arrived that the punishment was shockingly disproportionate
to the nature of the charge found proved, before it could interfere to reduce E
the punishment. In Krishnakali Tea Estate v. Akhil Bharatiya Chah Mazdoor
Sangh and Anr., [2004] 8 SCC 200, this Court after referring to the decision
in State of Rajasthan v. B.K. Meena, [1996] 6 SCC 417, also pointed out the
difference between the approaches to be made in a criminal proceeding and
a disciplinary proceeding. This Court also pointed out that when charges
proved were grave, vis-a-vis the establishment, interference with punishment F
of dismissal could not be justified. In Bharat Forge Company ltd. v. Uttam
Manohar Nakate, [2005] I SCALE 345, this Court again reiterated that the
jurisdiction to interfere with the punishment should be exercised only when
the punishment is shockingly disproportionate and that each case had to be
decided on its facts. This Court also indicated that the Labour Court or the G
Industrial Tribunal, as the case may be, in terms of the provisions of the Act,
had to act within the four corners thereof. It could not sit in appeal over the
decision of the employer unless there existed a statutory provision in that
behalf. The Tribunal or the labour Court could not interfere with the quantum
of punishment based on irrational or extraneous factors and certainly not on
what it considers a compassionate ground. It is not necessary to multiply H
    566                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2005] 2 S.C.R.

A authorities on this question, since the matter has been dealt with in detail in
   a recent decision of this Court in Mahindra and Mahindra ltd. v. N. B.
   Narawade, (2005) 2 SCALE 302. This Court summed up the position thus:
   "It is no doubt true that after introduction of Section 11-A in the Industrial
   Disputes Act, certain amount of discretion is vested with the labour court/
B Industrial Tribunal in interfering with the quantum of punishment awarded
   by the Management where the concerned workman is found guilty of
   misconduct. The said area of discretion has been very well defined by the
   various· judgments of this Court referred to herein above and it is certainly
   not unlimited as has been observed by the Division Bench of the High Court.
   The discretion which can be exercised under Section 11-A is available only
C on the existence of certain factors like punishment being disproportionate to
   the gravity of misconduct so as to disturb the conscience of the court, or the
   existence of any mitigating circumstances which requires the reduction of the
   sentence, or the past conduct of the work.man whi.ch may persuade t.he Labour
   Court to reduce the punishment." It may also be noticed that in Orissa Cement
   Ltd. v. V. Adikanda Sahu (1960) 1 LLJ-518-SC and in New Shorrock Mills
D V. Maheshbhai T. Rao, [I 996] 6 sec 590, this Court held that use of abusive
   language against a superior, justified punishment of dismissal. This Court
   stated "punishment of dismissal for using abusive language cannot be held to
  -be disproportionate". If that be the position regarding verbal assault, we think
   that the position regarding dismissal for physical assault, must be found all
E the more justifiable. Recently, in Employers,. Management, Muriadih Collie1y
   Mis BCCL Ltd. v. Bihar Colliery Kamgar Union, Through Workmen, (JT
   2005 (2) SC 444) this Court after referring to and quoting the relevant passages
   from Management of Krishnaka/i Tea Estate v. Akhil Bharatiya Chah Mazdoor
   Sangh and Anr., [2004] 7 SCALE 608] and The Management o/Tournamul/a
   Estate V. Workmen, [1973] 2 sec 502 held :-
F
            "The courts below by condoning an act of physical violence have
           ·undermined the discipline in the organization, hence, in the above
            factual backdrop, it can never be said that the Industrial Tribunal
            could have exercised its authority under Section I I (A) of the Act to
            interfere with the punishment of.dismissal.'~
G
          9. In the case on hand, the employee has been found guilty of hitting
    and injuring his superior officer at the ~ork place, obviously in the presence
    of other -employees. This clearly amounted to breach of discipline in the
    organizatiol1. Discipline at the work place in an organization like the employer
H   herein, is the sine qua 11011 for the efficient working of the organization.
         M.P. ELECTRICITY BOARD r. J.C. SHARMA [BALASUBRAMANYAN, J.]         567

When an employee breaches such discipline and the employer terminates his            A
services, it is not open to a Labour Court or an Industrial Tribunal to take the
view that the punishment awarded is shockingly disptoportionate to the charge
proved. We have already referred to the views of this Court. To quote Jack
Chan, "discipline is a form of civilly responsible behaviour which helps
maintain social order and contributes to the preservation, if not advancement,
of collective interests of society at large." Obviously this idea is more relevant   B
in considering the working of an organization like the employer herein or an
industrial undertaking. Obedience to authority in a workplace is not slavery.
It is not violative of one's natural rights. It is essential for the prosperity of
the organization as well as that of its employees. When in such a situation,
a punishment of termination is awarded for hitting and injuring a superior           C
officer supervising the work of the employee, with no extenuating circumstance
established, it cannot be said to be not justified. It cannot certainly be termed
unduly harsh or disproportionate. The Labour Court arid the High Court in
this case totally misdirected themselves while exercising their jurisdiction.
The Industrial Court made the correct approach and came to the right
conclusion.                                                                          D

      10. We, therefore, allow C.A. No. 1339 of2003 filed by the employer
and se~ing aside the decision of the High Court, restore the decision of the
Industrial Court. That means that the punishment of termination awarded to
the employee will stand. The appeal C.A. No. 1340 of 2003 filed by the               E
employee is dismissed.

8.8.B.                                              C.A.No. 1339/03 allowed.
                                                  C.A. No. 1340/03 dismissed.