Holding

The 1946 order is a gift/ex‑gratia payment, not a law, and therefore does not bind the State of Rajasthan.

Summary

The plaintiffs, four sons of the former Maharaja of Jodhpur, claimed a retrospective annual allowance of Rs 30,000 each, based on a 13 September 1946 order issued by the Maharaja. They argued that the order was a "law" under Section 3(ii) of the United State of Rajasthan Ordinance I of 1949, which continued the laws of the erstwhile princely states after their merger into Rajasthan. The Supreme Court examined whether the order was a legislative enactment or merely an ex‑gratia gift. It held that the order was an executive grant, lacking the characteristics of a law, and therefore did not create a legally enforceable obligation on the State of Rajasthan. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeals, affirming the High Court’s decision that the allowance could not be recovered from the State.

Issues considered

Whether the 1946 order granting an annual allowance to the Maharajkumars qualifies as a 'law' within the meaning of Section 3(ii) of the United State of Rajasthan Ordinance I of 1949.
Whether such an order, if deemed a law, would bind the State of Rajasthan after the merger of Jodhpur into Rajasthan.
Whether the order constitutes a statutory right, a custom, or merely an ex‑gratia gift.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 133(1)(a), s. Article 31A
United State of Rajasthan Ordinance I of 1949s. 3(ii)

Subjects

definition of lawcontinuation of statutes after mergerex‑gratia giftmaintenance allowancejagirprincely state legislationstatutory interpretationconstitutional certificate

Judgment

' - MAHARAJ DHIRAJ HIMMATSINGHJI & ORS. A
v.
STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ANR.

NOVEMBER l2, 1986

[M.P. THAKKAR AND V. KHALID,JJ.] B

United State of Rajasthan Ordinance I of 1949, section 3(ii)-
Meaning of the 'Law' explained therein-Whether the order (Ex. I)
dated 13. 9.1946 passed by the Maharaja granting an-annual allowance
_ of Rs.30,000 to each of his four Maharaj Kumars with respective effecc

- (-from the date of their birth, a "law" within the meaning of section 3(ii) C
· of the Ordinance, so as to bind the State of Rajaschan_
Jodhpur was a sovereign State till April 6, 1949. The S?id Jodhpur
State merged with the other sovereign States to form the United State of
Rajasthan on April 7, 1949. On April 7, 1949, Ordinance No. I of 1949
was promulgated which provided for the contiituance of the laws of the D
covenenting States (which included the Jodhpur State) in the United
State of Rajasthan, by virtue of section 3 which provided, inter alia,
that all laws in force in the aforesaid covenanting States immediately
before the commencement of the Ordinance shall continue to be in
force.
On September 13, 1946, some two and a half years prior to the E
merger of the then State of Jodhpur with the United States of Rajas-
than, the then Ruler of Jodhpur passed an order CB/7114 (Ex. l) grant-
ing an annual allowance of Rs.30,000 per annum to each of the four
Maharajkumars from the dates of their birth and for the period of their
minority. The amounts claimed by the sons by filing our different suits
in 1955 were ~ecreed by the Trial Court. The appeals preferred by the F·
State were allowed by the High Court holding that the order dated
13.9.49 granting the annual allowance was not a 'law' within the mean-
ing of section 3 of the Ordinance. Hence the appeals by certificate
granted under Article 133(l)(a) of the Constitution.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court,< G
HELD: l. l In substance the amount directed to be pcid as per.
Order Ex. I was nothing else hut "a gift" by the then Ruler to his sons,
unrelated to any legal rights of the said sons (appellants). It did not
create any legal obligation enforceable against the State of Rajasthan in-
asmuch as the order in question was riot a 'law' obtaining in the then
H
State of Jodhpur. And accordingly it cannot be held that the said order

209
210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1987] I S.C.R.

A continued to prevail as a 'law' in the State of Rajasthan under the 1949
ordinance or any other law. The order cannot therefore be enforced
against the .State of Rajasthan treating it as a 'law' creating a legally
enforceable obligation. [216C-O, H-217B]

I .2 Having regard to the language of the order itself, it appeared
B to be an executive order conferring a grant (or a gift) on the aifpeUants-
plaintiff. It did not have the characteristics of a legislative measure and
did not constitute a law inasmuch as it failed to pass the tests laid down hy
the Supreme Court. [2 ISC-0 I

State of Gujarat v. Vara Fiddali, AIR 1964 SC 1043 = [1964] 6
·--f -
c SCR 461; Narsingh Pratap Singh Dea v, Sate of Orissa, AIR [1964] SC
1793 = [1964] 7 SCR 112; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhargavendra
Singh, AIR 1966 SC 704 = [1966] 2 SCR 56; and State of Madhya
PradeSh v. Lal Rampa/, AIR 1966 SC 821 = [1966] 2 SCR 53, referred
to.

D
.
!.3 1.I so far as it relates to the period anterior to the passing of
the order (stretching
.
from 8 to 21 years) the order cannot be said to be
an order paSSed in connection with his maintenance of the junior mem-
bers of the Ruler's family for they had already been maintained at the
expense of the State exchequer as revealed by the evidence, including
the budget estimates. (2170]
E
l.4 "Jagir" has been associated with the grant in respect of land
revenue. In Thakur Amar Singhji's case, the Supreme Court construed
the term "jagir" in that sense only. Though the expression "Jagir"
would also be applicable to maintenance grants in favour of persons
·-
who were not cultivators, such as the members of the Ruling family, the
F grant has been construed in relation to rights in respect of Ian<! revenue
recoverable from the actual tiUers hy intermediaries known as
Jagirdars. Testing the grant said to have been made under the order in
question by the Ruler of Jodhpur in favour of the appellants, it cannot
he said that it is a grant of a 'Jagir' in this sense, for, no question of
alienation of land revenue in favour of the appellants is involved. All
G that the Ruler has done is to order that a particular amount of money be
paid in respect of a specified period anterior to the date of the order at
the specified rate. Further the order in question providing for payment
of annual aUowance for the past years during which the appellants had
already been maintained by the State exchequer lacks in the essential
ingredients which would justify characterising the order. as a rule or a
H regulation. To put it somewhat crudely, divesting of refinement, the
M.D. HIMMATSINGHJI v. STATE OF RAJ. [THAKKAR, J.I 211

order merely directs payment of a speeilied sum to the appellants which
payment has no nexus with any services rendered by them or any A
customary right enjoyed by them by virtue of their status as junior
members of the family, but merely by reason of the fact that the appel-
lants were the sons of the Ruler on whom the Ruler intended to confer
cash benefit. [217F-G, 2188-D, 219H-220B]
B
. _.., Thakur Amarsinghji v. State of Rajasthan, [1955] 2 SCR p. 303;
and Madhaorao Phalke v. The State of Madhya Bharat, [1961] I SCR p.
957, distinguished.
. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals No. 2290

- (- (N) of 1970 and 97 to 99 of 1972. .

From the Judgment and Order dated 6.5. 1970 of the Rajasthan
c
--f High Court in First Appeal Nos. 134, 119, 120, 121of1960.

Hafish Salve, Mrs. A.K. Verma and D.N. Mishra for the
A pp ell an ts. D

V.M. Tarkunde, V.C. Mahajan, S.K. Jain, S, Atreya, L.K.
Gupta and C. V. Subba Rao for the Respondents ..

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
E
THAKKAR, J .· Whether the High Court was justified in revers-
ing the judgment and decree passed by the trial court in favour of the

- four sons of the Sovereign Ruler of the then State of Jodhpur in the
context of an order 1 passed by the said Ruler, and in dismissing the
suits instituted by them against the State of Rajasthan for the recovery
A.,of various amounts under the said order, it the problem in these F
appeals' by the unsuccessful plaintiffs. That order issued by the Ruler
.1. ih~ter alia provided that an annual sum of Rs.30,000 be paid to each of
1s aforesaid sons (described as Maharajkumars) by way of an annual
allowance with retrospective effect from the date of their birth till the
date of their attaining majority.
G
On September 13, 1946, some two-and-a-half years prior to the
merger of the then State of Jodhpur with the United States of
~ · Rajasthan (which event -occurred on April 7, 1949), the then Ruler of

1. Order No. C.B./7114 dated 13th September, 1946. (Ex. l).
----- H
1. By certificate granted under Article 13.1( I )(a) of the Constitution of India .

....
212 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1987) 1 S.C.R.

A the said State passed order Ex. 1 which is the foundation of the suits
giving rise to the present group of appeals.

The said order in so far as material reads as under:-

B "His Highness the Maharaja Sahib Bahaqur has been
pleased to order that with a view to making suitable provi-
sion for the maintenance of younger Maharajkumar and )':
Shri Baiji Lal Sahiba:

(i) xxxxx

c (ii) xxxxx
i -
(iii) An annual allowance of Rs.30,000 per annum each be
granted to all younger Maharajkumars from the dates
of their birth for the period of their minority.
D
(iv) XXXXXX

(v) XXXXXXX."

The amounts claimed by each of the four sons in the suits in-
E stituted by them in 1955 was in respect of the claim for annual allo-
wance by way of grant at Rs. 30,000 per annum computed retrospec- 'r ~
lively from the dates of their birth till the date of the passing of the
order, that is to say, till September 13, 1946. The particulars relating to
the claim may be tabularized as under:-

F
Appeal No. Name of the Date of Period for Amount/'\
before the appellant. Birth which claimed I
Supreme allowance Rs. ~'
Court is claimed

G C.A.. 97(N) Devisinghji 20.9.1933 20.9.1933
of 1972 to 2.3~.550
l3.9. l946
( l3 years &
7 days).

H
M.D. HIMMATSJNGHJI v. STATE OF RAJ. [THAKKAR; J.] 213

C.A. 98(N) Dalipsinghji 20.10.1937 . 20. 10. 1937
''i of 1972 to 1,61,050 A
13.9.1946
(8 years, l l
months&
lldays).

·-.j C.A. 99(N) Harisingh ji 2 l.9.1929 2 l.9.1929 B
of 1972 to 3,06,500
13.9.1946
( 17 years
- ~ Himmat-
& lO days)

21.6. 1925
C.A. 2290(1) 21.6. 1925 c
of 1970 singhji to 4,42,000
13.9.1946
(17 years &
10days)

The following facts have been established:- D

( 1) Jodhpur was a sovereign State till April 6, 1949.

(2) The said Jodhpur State merged with the other Sovere-
ign States to form the United State of Rajasthan on
April 7, 1949. E ·

(3) On April 7, 1949, an ordinance waspromulgated which
provided for the continuance of the laws of the coven-
anting States (which included Jodhpur State) in the
United State of R.ajasthan by virtue of Section 3 which
provided inter alia, that all laws in force in the afore- F
"
I'
I
./,_ said covenanting States immediately before the comm-
encement of the Ordinance shall continue to be in
force.

(4) On April 7, 1949, administrators were appointed in
respect of different State.s which had merged in the G
State of Rajasthan.
),... .
'
The High Court allowed the appeals preferred by the State and
dismissed the suits instituted by the sons of the late Ruler of Jodhpur
on the following reasoning:-
. H.
( 1) The Order(Ex. l), on the basis of which the claim of
214 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 1 S.C.R.

the plaintiffs was founded was not passed by the then
A
Ruler in his capacity as the Head of the State in the
discharge of any legal liability or obligation subsisting
in favour of his four sons. It was an ex-gratia payment
ordered to be made by him in his.personal capacity as
the father of the four plaintiffs and not in his capacity
B as the Sovereign Ruler of the State inasmuch as the
order for payment was not supported )Jy any law or
custom having the force of law in the then State of
Jodhpur.
(2). The cash allowance ordered to be paid to the four
plaintiffs as per Order (Ex. l) retrospectively for the
1 -
c past period preceding the date of making of the order
was in substance a gift by the ruler in his personal
capacity to his children and not an enforceable obliga-
tion incurred by the Sovereign Ruler vis-a-vis the
plaintiffs.
D (3) On the aforesaid premises the amount which had not
yet been recovered in respect of the past period could
not be recovered from the State of Rajasthan as there
was no legal and enforceable obligation against the said
State.
It was contended before the High Court that on taking into ..r
E account the true nature of the, order (Ex. I) it was a law within the
meaning of Section 3 (ii) of Ordinance No. I of 19.\9 1, the order had all
the characteristics of law that is to say, of a binding rule of conduct "of
the will of the Sovereign". Since this was a law in the Sovereign State
of Jodhpur, its operation continued on the formation initially of the
United State of Rajasthan and subsequently of the State of Rajasthan. /"\,,
F The High Court negatived this contention relying on the law enun-
ciated by this Court in a catena of decisions.' The view taken in the I
i..,
. L In this section "Law .. means any Act. Ordinance. regulation. rule, order. or bye-law
which. having been made by a competent Legislature or other competent authority
in a Covenanting State. has the force of law in that State."

G .. A.LR. 19&.fS.C. !0-1-3 = [ 196-l.] 6 SCR 46 l. (State of Gujarat v. Vora Fiddali).

A.LR. 196-<S.C. 179.1=[196-ll7SCR112.
(Narsingh Pratap Singh Deo v State of Orissa)

A.LR. 1%6 S.C. 70-l = [ 1966[ 2 SCR 56.
(State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhargavendra Singh).

, H A.LR. 1966 S.C. 820=I1966] 2 SCR 5.1.
(State of Madhya Pradesh\-', Lal Rarnpal).
M.D. HIMMATSINGHJI v. STATE OF RAJ. [THAKKAR, J.] 215

)'.· aforesaid decisions in substance was that every order passed by a
A
Sovereign Ruler 'Yas not 'law' inasmuch as it was not necessarily an
order passed in the discharge of its legislative function. The Ruler of
the Sovereign State, when he passes an order, may be acting in any
one of the three spheres namely, legislative sphere, executive sphere
or the judicial sphere, though all the three capacities were combined in
him. All the same, only that order would constitute 'law', which was B
passed in exercise of the powers of the Sovereign in ihe legislative
sphere, and none other. An order passed by the Sovereign in his
executive capacity, if it is not the result of a legislative process, and if it
)- is not calculated or designed to bind as a rule of conduct, cannot be
- · characterized as a 'law'. If the result of the order was no more then to
bring about a contract, or a grant or a gift, it would not constitute
'law'. The High Court was right in taking the view that having
c
regard to the language of the order itself, it appeared to be an execu-
tive order conferring a grant (or a gift) on the plaintiffs appellants. It
did not have the characteristics of a legislative measure and did not
constitute a law inasmuch as it failed to pass the earlier mentioned
tests evolved by this Court in the matter of State of Gujarat v. Vora D
Fidda/i, (supra) and Narsingh Pratap Singh Dea v. State of Orissa
(supra).

It appears to us that in fact the then Ruler of Jodhpur was mak-
ing a gift in favour of the appellants. It is evident from the fact that the
amount ordered to be paid' at the rate of Rs.30,000 per annum is in E
respect of the preceding years. The four sons had, admittedly, already
been maintained and brought up with due dignity and decorum.'prior
- to the passing of the order in question. Since they had already been
maintained in a manner and style befitting their status and dignity, at
;..\ the expense .of the State, there was no question 'of granting any allo-
1 · wance in respect of the (past) period during which they had already F
bee.n maintained. There is therefore no escape from the conclusion
that it was by way of a gift. albeit, without saying so in so many words.
The fact that the expression 'gift' has not been employed did not
detract from this obvious conclusion. It was an amount ordered to be
paid by the Ruler to his sons, It was clearly a gift, inasmuch as it is not
shown that till the date of the order any obligation had been incurred G
by the grantor in favour of the grantees either under any law or under

L As per order Ex. I dated 13th September. l9-i6.

2. As dis~losed by the Budget Estimate of the State of Jodhpur recorded at E:c A- !Oto
Ex. A-I~. H
216 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1987] 1 S.C.R.

A any custom. It has of course been argued on behalf of the appellants
that under the 'custom' of the State, the Ruler was bound to maintain
:v
his sons. To say that the Ruler was bound to maintain the appeUants is
not to say that the Ruler was obliged to make a gift in respect of the
past period during >,yhich the appeUants had 'already' been
maintained. It is not the case of the appeUants, and there is no
B evidence to that effect, that there was a custom ·of making any cash
allowance every y,ar besides being maintained with due dignity and
decorum at the cost of the State exchequer. No such aUowance was
shown to have been made in the past. What, it may be wondered, was
the occasion for making a retrospective allowance for a period ranging --f
from 8 years to 17 years by the Order (Ex. I) at a point of time, just
C two-and-a-half years before the merger? In fact the circumstances
-
might weU give rise to an inference that it was 'gift' being made in
anticipation of the forthcoming merger. Be that as it may, at best it is a
gift which has nothing to do with any customery obligation of the Ruler
to maintain the sons. which obligation was already fulfiUed by the
Ruler in bringing up the appeUants with due dignity and decorum at
D the cost c.f the State for all the past years till the passing of the said
order. A communication' addressed by the Chief Minister of the then
State of Jodhpur to the Finance Minister prior to the passing of the
aforesaid order' supports and strengthens the conclusion that the
allowance which was ordered to be paid had nothing to do with the
past maintenance as wiU be evident from the foUowing extract the
E refrom:~

"His Highness has expressed a wish that his two sons
Maharaj Kumars Himmat Singhji and Hari Singhji should
now be placed on an aUowance to be granted by the State -
as a preliminary to their being given Jagirs later on. His .A
F Highness' idea is that if they receive an allowance and it is I '
carefully husbanded they should accumulate some surplus
to help them when they become Jagirdars. His Highness
considers that an allowance of Rs.5.000 per mensem m
each case is the correct figure ...

G We are therefore satisfied that the High Court was right in taking the
view that the order for paying annual allowance at Rs.30.000 for the
past years was not made in the discharge of any legal liability or obliga- ~
tion of the Ruler under any law or custom having the force of law. It
was merely an ex-gratia payment in the nature of a gift which could not
I. Ex. A.6 dated
H l- Ex. I
M.D. HIMMATSINGHJI v. STATE OF RAJ. (THAKKAR, J.J 217

be enforced against the State. The relevant part of the order cannot be A
construed as a 'law' obtaining in the then State of Jodhpur. And
aceordingly it cannot be held that.the said order continued to prevail as
a 'law' in the State of Rajasthan under the 1949 ordinance or any other
law. The order cannot therefore be enforced against the State of
Rajasthan treating it as a 'Jaw' creating a legally enforceable obli·
gation. B

It was contended that the purpose of granting maintenance allo·
wance in cash to meet the expenditure from the civil list was to enable
-:;J.he junior members of the Ruler's family to accumulate some surplus
- ' to help them when they become jagirdars in due course on attaining
majority. It was argued that if the allowance had been granted earlier, c
.the allowance could have been .accumulated by the beneficiaries and
~ since it was not granted earlier, it was granted with retrospective
effect. We cannot accede to this submission. In so far as it relates to
the period anterior to the passing of the order (stretching from 8 to 21
years) it -cannot be said to be an order passed in connection with the
maintenance of the junior members of the Ruler's family for they had D
already been maintained at the expense of the State exchequer as
revealed by the evidence, including the budget estimates. '

Another argument addressed by counsel for the appellants was
that the annual allowance ordered to be paid to the junior members of
the family of the Ruler has the same legal status as a 'Jagif', and that
the order granting such an allowance would have the force of Jaw. The
submission is sought to be buttressed by two decisions of this Court. In

- ths first instance support is sought from Thakur Amarsinghji v. Sta(e of
Rajasthan, [1955] 2 S.C.R. p. 303. This Court was concerned with the
)... constitutional validity of Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of
1 \,Jagirs Act in Thakur Amarsinghji's case. In the course of the discus· F
sion, the Court had an occasion to consider the import of the ex pres·
/J.. sion 'Jagir'. What emerges from the discussion is that the term 'Jagir'
originally connoted grants made by Rajput Rulers to their clansmen in
lieu of services rendered or to be rendered. With passage of time, the
term 'Jagir' came to be applied to grants made for.religious and charit·
able purposes and even to non·Rajputs. The Court has then proceeded G
to make it clear that both in its popular sense and in legislative practice
the word •Jagir' has come to be used as connoting all grants which
.... conferred on the grantees rights in respect of land revenue. And it was
in this sense that the term 'Jagir' was construed under Article 31A of
the Constitution of India. What is of significance is that jagir has been
I. Ex. A·ll
H
218 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1987] 1 S.C.R.

A associated with the grant in respect of land revenue. Accor.dingly the
Court proceeded to observe ~hat considering the world jagir in that
sense it must be held that a jagir was meant to cover all grants in which
the grantees had only rights in respect of land revenue and were not
tillers of the soil. The expression 'Jagir' would also be applicable to
maintenance grants in favour of persons who were not cultivators such
B as the members of the ruling family. However, the grant has been
construed in relation to rights in respect of land revenue recoverable
from the actual tillers by intermediaries known as Jagirdars. Testing
the grant said to have been made under the order in question by the
Ruler of Jodhpur irn favour of the appellants, it is futile to contend tha!-f
it is a grant of a 'jagir' in this sense for no question of alienation of land
C revenue in favour of the appellants is involved. All that the Ruler has
-
done is to order that a particular amount of money be paid in respect
of a specified period anterior to the date of the order at the specified
rate. There is.nothing in Thakur Amarsinghji's case which could come
to the rescue of the appellants in support of the contention that the
allowance in question would constitute a 'Jagir'. It was argued as a
D matter of logical corrollary that since it was a jagir, the order confering
the jagir could be construed as a 'la;.,• even if it was not a legislative
measure promulgated by the Ruler. Since the first premise that the
allowance constitutes 'Jagir' is found to be lacking in substance the
submission urged as a corrollary of this premise must also fall to the
grounds as a-matter of logical necessity.
E
Reliance was also placed on Madhaorao Phalke v. The State of
Madhya Bharat, [ 1961] l S.C.R. p. 957 in support of the contention
that the grant made in favour of the appellants would constitute 'law'
and that the State of Rajasthan would therefore be under a legal -•
obligation to make payment of the annual allowance to_ the appellants/
F as provided in the .order. The submission, in our opinion, is not well ·
founded. Madhaorao's case is not an authority for the proposition that
any order passed by the sovereign directing payment of an allowance 1-.
would constitute law of the State concerned which would have the
force pf 'law' in the covenanting States by virtue of the provision made
for continuing the existing laws in the covenanting States. The ques-
(j tion which had arisen before this Court in Madhaorao's case was as
regards the kalambandis' issued by the then Ruler of Gwalior confer-
ring a right to receive Rs.21 and annas 8 per month in favour of an ·-4
Ekkan. It may be mentioned that the Ekkans were a class of horsemen
who formed part of the Peshwa's Cavalry. They were foreigners and
they brought with them their own horses and accountrements. After
H making an allowance for the fact that they would have to pay for the
M.D. HIMMATSINGHJI v. STATE OF RAJ. (THAKKAR, J.l 21'1

·-,. maintenance of the horses, a provision for payment ofRs.21 andannas A
8 per month was made, by way of 'Bachat'. Whether the right to
receive this amount was a statutory right, in other words, whether the
kalambandis on which the rights were founded, constituted rules and
regulations having the force of law was the problem posed before the
Court in Madhaorao's case. The Court considered the nature of the
B
provisions contained in the documents and came to the conclusion that
the documents unambiguously bore the imprint of the character of a
statute or regulation having the force of a statute inasmuch as it recog-
nised.and coferred:
)-
(i) hereditary rights;
c
(ii) it provided for the •adoption of a son by a widow of the
deceased holder; _, ·

(iii) it provided for the maintenance of widows out of the
funds specially set apart for that purpose;
0
(iv) it provided for the offering of a substitute when the
holder became old or otherwise became unfit to ren-
der services; and

( v) it also provided for protection in respect of the execu-
tion of decree against the amount payable under the E
kalambandi.

Having taken into account all these features of the grant, the Court
proceeded to observe: ·
_,...._\
"In our opinion, having regard to the contents of the two F
orders and the character of the provisions made by them in
such a detailed manner it is difficult to distinguish them
from statutes or laws; in any event they mu•I be treated as.
rules cir regulations having the force of law ... "

Far from supporting the claim of the "appellants, the decision in G
Madhaorao's case highlights the fact that ihe order in question provid-
)... ing for payment of annual allowance for the past years during which
the appellants had already been maintained by the State exchequer
lacks in the essential ingredients which would justify characterising the
order as a rule or a regulation. To put it somewhat crudely, divesting
of refinement, the order merely directs payment of a specified sum to H
210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ lQ87] l S.C.R.

A the appellants which payment has no nexus with any services rendered '<
by them or any customary right enjoyed by them by virtue of their
status as junior members of the family, butmerely by reason of the fact
that the appellants were the sons of the Ruler on whom the Ruler
intended to confer cash benefit. In our opinion, what has been granted
under the aforesaid order is nothing but an ex-gratia payment or a gift.
B
Lastly it was contended that the junior members of the family of x
the Ruler were entitled to a maintenance allowance during their
minority as per the custom in the State and that they were entitled to
grant of Jagirs upon their attaining majority as per the same custom~
The allowance made to the junior members during their minority was ·
c treated under· a separate head of the State Budget. On these premises
it was argued that the order in question must of necessity be construed
as legislative in character. We are not impressed by this submission.
The allowance made under the order had no nexus with any right to a
jagir. All the appellants were minors at the relevant point of time and
they had not even become entitled to jagirs. As discussed earlier the
D expression 'Jagir' is apposite only in the context of alientation of.land
revenue recoverable from the tillers. What was granted by the Ruler to
the appellants had nothing to do with a jagir. Even according to the
custom pleaded by the appellants the question of granting a jagir
would have arisen only after they had attained majority. The payment
which was directed to be made to them was not referable either to a
E jagir or to any other customary right. It was merely a direction to pay a
particular amount computed on a particular basis referable to a past
period commencing from the date of their birth. We are therefore fully
convinced, and firmly of the view, that in substance the amount
directed to be paid as per Order Ex. I was nothing else but a 'gift' by
-
F the then Ruler to his sons, unrelated to any legal rights of the appelr
lants. And that it did not create any legal obligation enforceable ,
against the ·'state of Rajasthan inasmuch as the order in question was 1..,
not a 'law'. There is thus no substance in any of the submissions urged -
on behalf of the appellants. The view taken by the High Court is
unexceptionable and the appeals are devoid of merit. We accordingly
dismiss the appeals. There will be no order as to costs.
G
S.R. Appeals dismissed.