Holding

The amendment to Section 4(1) and its proviso are ultra‑vires and violative of Articles 14 and 21, whereas the amendment to Section 9(2) is valid and does not affect the university’s autonomy.

Summary

The Maharshi Mahesh Yogi Vedic Vishwavidyalaya, a university created under the 1995 Act to impart Vedic and other education, challenged the Amendment Act 5 of 2000 which altered Section 4(1) to restrict instruction to Vedic learning only, deleted the phrase “dissemination of knowledge”, and added a proviso requiring State Government approval for courses and centres. It also contested the amendment to Section 9(2 concerning the appointment of the Chancellor. The Supreme Court held that the amendment to Section 4(1) and its proviso were ultra‑vires, violating Articles 14 and 21 as they imposed an unreasonable embargo on the fundamental right to education, while the amendment to Section 9(2) did not impair the university’s autonomy. Consequently, the appeal was partly allowed, setting aside the Section 4(1) amendment and its proviso, and upholding the rest of the Division Bench’s decision.

Issues considered

The amendment to Section 4(1) of the 1995 Act, which added the word “only” and deleted “dissemination of knowledge”, violates Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.
The proviso to Section 4(1) requiring prior State Government approval for courses and centres exceeds the State’s legislative competence under Entry 66 of List I and the University Grants Commission Act, 1956.
The amendment to Section 9(2) concerning the appointment of the Chancellor impinges on the university’s autonomy and fundamental rights.

Legislation cited

Amendment Act 5 of 2000s. 31-B, s. 31-C, s. 37-A, s. 37-B, s. amended 17, s. amended 2, s. amended 4(1), s. amended 9(2), s. inserted 31-A
Constitution of Indias. Article 14, s. Article 21, s. Article 21A, s. Article 41, s. Article 45, s. Article 46, s. Article 51A(k)
Maharshi Mahesh Yogi Vedic Vishwavidyalaya Adhiniyam, 1995s. 12, s. 17, s. 2, s. 31-A, s. 31-B, s. 31-C, s. 37-A, s. 37-B, s. 4(1), s. 9(2)
University Grants Commission Act, 1956s. 12, s. 2(f)

Subjects

constitutional lawright to educationuniversity autonomystatutory interpretationlegislative competenceUniversity Grants Commission Actfundamental rightsultra viresVedic education

Judgment

[2013] 13 S.C.R. 464

..i.. -
A MAHARSHI MAHESH YOGI VEDIC VISHWAVIDYALAYA
v.
STATE OF M.P. & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 6736 of 2004)
JULY 3, 2013
B
[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN AND FAKKIR MOHAMED
IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, JJ.)

Maharshi Mahesh Yogi Vedic Vishwavidyalaya
C Adhiniyam, 1995:
s. 4(1)(as amended by Amendment Act 5 of 2000) -
Constitutional validity of -. Establishment of the University -
With the objective of imparting knowledge in Vedas, and its •
0 allied subjects - By issuing Ordinance, the University apart
from prime subjects on Vedas, also included numerous
professional courses - s. 4(1) amended to the effect that
disbursement of the knowledge by the University would be
confined only to the exclusive field of vedic teaming - Held:
E The University was established for imparting education in
Vedas and simultaneously to teach Sanskrit, Science and
technology and.for spreading knowledge in all fields - If the
scope of imparting knowledge is restricted only to vedic
learning by way of amendment, the very purpose of
establishing the University would be frustrated - Right to
F education is a fundamental right - The University was
established mainly for imparting education - The amendment
creates an embargo on the right to education - Therefore, it
is in clear violation of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution
and hence ultra vires, the Constitution - Constitution of India,
G 1950 - Articles 14, 21, 21A, 41, 45, 46 and 51A(k).

s. 4 Proviso (as amended by Amendment Act 5 of 2000)
- State Government stipulating condition on the University to
seek prior approval of State Government before conducting
H 464
MAHARSHI MAHESH YOGI VEDIC VISHWAVIDYALAYA v. 465
STATEOFM.P
- ~ any course and before establishing any centre - A
Constitutional validity of - Held: The subjects of conducting
of courses and establishment of centres are governed by s.
12 of University Grants Commission Act which fall within
exclusive realm of Entry 66 of List I and not under Entry 25
of List /II of VII Schedule of Constitution - Thus, the State B
lacks legislative competence to stipulate the restrictions -
Constitution of India, 1950- VII Schedule, List I-Entry 66 and
List II-Entry 25 - University Grants Commission Act, 1956.

s. 9(2) (as amended by Amendment Act 5 of 2000) -
Procedure for appointment of Chancellor - Challenged - C
Held: Though the appointment of Chancellor was subject to
approval of State Government, but such appointment could
be made only from the panel prepared by the Board of
Management - Thus the procedure did not impinge upon
Constitutional or fundamental rights of the University and also D
does not affect its autonomy.

Interpretation of Statutes - Determination of scope of
applicability of a statute .;.. By the aid of preamble to the statute
- Preamble cannot control the scope of applicability of the E
statute - If the provision contained in the main Act are clear
and without any ambiguity and legislatjve intent is clear, there
is no need to look into the preamble.

Maxim - 'Noscitur a Sociis' - Applicability of - Held: This
rule of construction is not applicable to cases where it is clear F
that the· wider words have been deliberately used in order to
make the scope of the defined words correspondingly wider.

Words and Phrases:
G
Dissemination of knowledge' - Meaning of.

Expression 'Gyan-Vigyan' - In the context of Maharshi
Mahesh Yogi Vedic Vishwavidyalaya Adhiniyam, 1995 -
Connotation of.
H
466 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 13 S.C.R.

A The appella.nt-University was created by the Maharshi
Mahesh Yogi Vedic Vishwavidyalaya Adhiniyam, 1995
(1995 Act), which was to provide for education and
prosecution of research in vedic learnings and practices
and to provide for matters connected therewith or
B incidental thereto. The University framed Ordinance No.
15 which contained courses of studies. The Ordinance,
apart from prime subjects on Vedas, also included other
professional courses such as Project Management,
Human Resources Management, Financial Management,
C Marketing Management, Accounting and Auditing,
Banking, as well as vocational courses in typing,
stenography, secretarial practice, computer technology
marketing and sales, dress designing and manufacturing,
textile designing and printing, horticulture, seed
production, crop production, sericulture, as well as, short
0
term courses in various international topics such. as,
political science, theory of Government, theory of
defense, theory of education, theory of management etc.
The appellant University was added in the list of
Universities maintained by the University Grants
E Commission, as provided under· Section 2(f) of the
University Grants Commission Act, 1956, The appellant
University also opened up as many as 55 centers. The
Department of Higher Education, sent a memorandum,
alleging that the course of study prescribed in Clause 1(i)
F and (j) of Ordinance No.15, were contrary to the aims and
objectives of the University and therefore, not acceptable.
Thereafter, the Amendment Act 5 of 2000 came to be
introduced. By Amendment Act 5 of 2000, the provisions
u/ss. 2, 4, 9, 17 of the Act were amended and ss. 31-A, 31-
G B, 31-C, 37-A, 37-B were inserted to the Act. These
amendments and insertions were challenged by filing the
present writ petition and the same was partially allowed
by Division Bench of High Court. Hence the present
appeal.
H
MAHARSHI MAHESH YOGI VEDIC VIS~AVIDYALAYA v. 467
STATE OF M.P.

- f Partly allowing the appeal, the Court A

HELD: 1.1. The purport of establishing the appellant-
University was to ensure that the ancient knowledge
embedded in Vedas, Upvedas, Agam Tantra, ltihas,
Puranas etc., are kept intact and the wealth of knowledge 8
contained in these Vedas, Upvedas etc., are not only
spread by establishing an institution, but by teaching
them through well established institutions and thereby,
ensuring that such wealth of knowledge is kept intact for
the future generations to come. [Para 9] (486-8-C]
c
1.2. Though under Section 4(1 ), reference to Vedic
learning and its allied subjects was made in the opening
sentence, the University was not established for the
purpose of imparting education in Vedas alone, but it was
intended for spreading the knowledge of Vedas and D
simultaneously to teach Sanskrit, science and technology
and also as specifically mentioned in Section 4, for
spreading of knowledge in all fields. [Para 69] (512-E-G]

1.3. By virtue of the amendment introduced to E
Section 4(1), an embargo has been clearly created in
one's right to seek for education, which is a
Constitutionally protected Fundamental Right. Therefore,
there was .a clear violation of Articles 14 and 21 of the
Constitution and consequently, such a provision by way F
of an amendment cannot stand the scrutiny of the Court
of Law. [Para 80] [519-F-G]

Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan vs.
Union of India (2012) 6 SCC 1: 2012 (2) SCR 715; Bhartiya
• '"" Seva Samaj Trust v. Yogeshbhai Ambalal Patel (2012) 9 G
SCC 310: 2012 (7) SCR 1054; State of T.N. vs. K. Shyam
Sunder (2011) 8 SCC 737: 2011 (11) SCR 1094; Satimbla
Sharma vs. St. Paul's Sr. Sec. School (2011) 13 SCC 760:
2011 (10) SCR 203; Ashoka Kumar Thakur vs. Union of India
(2008) 6 SCC 1: 2008 (4) SCR 1 - relied on. H
468 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 13 S.C.R.

A 1.4. Right to Education is a Fundamental Right.
Imparting of education is a Fundamental Right, in as
much as, the establishment of the appellant University
was mainly for the purpose of imparting education, while
promotion of Vedic learning is one of the primary
B objectives of the University. Any attempt on the part of
the State to interfere with the said main object viz.,
imparting of education, would amount to an infringement
of the Fundamental Right guaranteed under the
Constitution. Consequently, the amendment, which was
c introduced to Section 4(1) and also the insertion of"the
proviso, has to be held ultra-vires. [Para 80] [520-C-E]
1.5. Framing of the Ordinance 15, which provided for
the study on various courses in the appellant University
was consciously approved by the State Govern-ment
D without any inhibition. A perusal of the course contents
in the Ordinance discloses that there were as ma"ny as
49 courses connected with Vedic learning and practices
and about 33 courses on other subjects. By introducing
the amendment under Act 5 of 2000 and thereby, insisting
E that imparting of education in the appellant University
can be restricted only to Vedic learning and that the
science and technology shduld also be only for the
purpose of learning Vedas and its practices, is creating
a formidable restriction on the right to education, which
F is a guaranteed Constitutional right and thereby, clearly
violating Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. Equally,
the addition of the expression "in the above fields and
in these fields may......... " while deleting the expression
"dissemination of knowledge", drastically interfered with
G the right to education sought to be advanced by the
University by its creation originally under the 1995 Act,
which restriction now sought to be imposed can never
be held to be a reasonable restriction, nor can it be held
to have any rationale, while creating such a restriction by
H way of an amendment to Section 4(1). [Para 79] [518-H;
519-A-D]
MAHARSHI MAHESH YOGI VEDIC VISHWAVIDYALAYA v. 469
STATE OF M.P.
- ,,.. 1.6. Dissemination of learning is for acquisition of A
knowledge in every kind of discipline and that such a
perception should be maintained at all cost.
"Dissemination of knowledge" as it originally stood in
Section 4(1 ), which was deleted by way of the
Amendment Act 5 of 2000, caused havoc by restricting B
the scope of acquisition of knowledge to be gathered by
an individual from the facilities made available in the
appellant University. [Para 83] [521-E-G]

- lshwar Singh Bindra and Ors. vs. State of UP. AIR 1968
SC 1450: 1969 SCR 219 - relied on.

Osmania University Teachers' Association vs. State of
C

Andhra Pradesh and another (1987) 4 SCC 671: 1987 (3)
SCR 949 - referred to.
D
)( 1.7. The deletion of the expression "dissemination of
knowledge", will have to be held to be an arbitrary action
of the respondent State and thereby, violating equality in
law and equal protection of law as enshrined under
Article 14 of the Constitution, in as much as all other E
Universities, which were being controlled and
administered by the State by the 1973 Act, enjoy the
freedom of setting up any course with the approval of the
University Grants Commission, the appellant alone would
be deprived of such a right and liberty by restricting the
scope of imparting education in an.y field other than F
Vedas and its practices. [Para 88] [523-F-G]

1.8. The legal maxim Noscitur A Sociis, is merely a
rule of construction and it cannot prevail in cases where
it is clear that the wider words have been deliberately G
used in order to make the scope of the defined word
correspondingly wider. It is only where the intention of
the Legislature in associating wider words with words of
narrower significance is doubtful or otherwise not clear
H
470 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 13 S.C.R.

A that the present rule of construction namely Noscltur A "'I -
Sociis can be usefully applied. [Para 58) [508-C·D)
State of Bombay and others vs. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha
and others AIR 1960 SC 610: 1960 SCR 866; Ronit Pulp and
Paper Mills Ltd. vs. Collector of Central Excise AIR 1991 SC
B
754: 1990 (2) SCR 797; Kera/a State Housing Board and
others vs. Ramapriya Hotels (P) Ltd. and others (1994) 5 SCC
672: 1994 (2) Suppl. SCR 338; Samantha vs. State Qf
,
Andhra Pradesh AIR 1997 SC 3297: 1997 (2) Suppl. SCR ~
'-" r
305; K. Bhagirathi G. Shenoy and others Vs. K. P. Ballakuraya
c and another AIR 1999 SC 2143: 1999 (2) SCR 438; ....._

Brindavan Bangle Stores and others vs. Assistant
Commissioner of Commercial Taxes and another AIR 2000
SC 691: 2000 (1) SCR 97; CBI, AHD, Patna Vs. Braj
Bhushan Prasad and others AIR 2001 SC 4014: 2001 (3)
D Suppl. SCR 627 - relied on.
~

State of Orissa and Anr. vs. Mamata Mohanty (2011) 3
SCC 436: 2011 (2) SCR 704; Ramesh Rout vs. Rabindra
Nath Rout (2012) 1 SCC 762: 2011 (16) SCR 254; State of
E Rajasthan and Anr. vs. Sripal Jain AIR 1963 SC 1323: 1964
SCR 742; Mis. Shriram Vinyl and Chemical Industries vs.
Commissioner of Customs, Mumbai (2001) 4 SCC 286;
Union of India (UOI) and Anr. vs. Hansoli Devi and Ors. (2002)
7 SCC 273: 2002 (2) Suppl. SCR 324 - referred to.
F 1.9. Though the expression 'and' has been used,
prior to the expression 'promotion and development of
the study of Sanskrit.. .. .' and again prior to the set of
expression 'for the advancement' and again prior to the
set of expression 'dissemination of knowledge', the
G context in which the Legislation was brought into force
and reading the said section along with the Preamble and
other sub clauses of Section 4, the expression 'and' has
to be read disjunctively and not conjunctively. Therefore,
in the present case, the expression 'dissemination of
H knowledge', as well as 'promotion and development of
MAHARSHI MAHESH YOGI VEDIC VISHWAVIDYALAYA v. 471
STATE OF M.P.
- /.- the study of Sanskrit' and 'to make provision for A
research', were all expressions which have been used
disjunctively and not conjunctively with the words Vedic
learning and practice. [Para 95] [527-D-G]

lshwar Singh Bindra and Ors. vs. State of UP. AIR 1968 B
SC 1450: 1969 SCR 219; Prof Yashpal and Anr. vs. State
of Chhattisgarh and Ors.) (2005) 5 SCC 420: 2005 (2) SCR
23; Reserve Bank of India vs. Peerless General Finance and

- ~ Investment Co. Ltd. Others 1987 (1) SCC 424: 1987 (2) SCR

- 1; Joint Director of Mines and Safety vs. T & N Stone
Quarries (P) Ltd. (1987) 3 SCC 208: 1987 (2) SCR 801 -
relied on.
c

Utkal Contractors and Joiners Pvt. Ltd. and Ors vs. State
of Orissa and others (1987) 3 SCC 279: 1987 (3) SCR 317
- held inapplicable. D

Green vs. Premier Glynrhonwy State Co. (1928) 1 KB
561; Mersey Docks and Harbour Board vs. Henderson Bros.
(1888) 13 AC 595 - referred to.

1.10. So far as the expression "promotion and E
development of the study of Sanskrit as the University
may from time to time determine" is concerned, the study
of Sanskrit is totally unconnected to the learning of
~~
Vedas and its allied subjects, except that the scripts of
Vedas may be in Sanskrit. For that purpose, there need F
not necessarily be a specific provision to the effect that
there should be promotion and development of the study
of Sanskrit. Therefore, apart from Vedic learning and its
practices, the establishment of the appellant University
was for the purpose of providing education in the field G
of science and technology, intensive learning of Sanskrit
and provision for research in every other field for the
advancement and disbursement of knowledge. Only
such an interpretation to the un-amended Section 4(1)
would be the only way of interpretation that can be H
472 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 13 S.C.R.

A accorded to the said provision. In view of such
interpretation, the amendment which was introduced by
Act 5 of 2000, was clearly intended to purposely do away
with its original intendment and.thereby, restrict the
scope of activities of the appellant University to the
B learning of Vedas and its practices and nothing else. The
restriction so created by introducing the amendment was
self-destructive and thereby, the original object and
purpose of establishing the appellant University was
done away with. [Paras 78 and 79] [518-B-G]
c 1.11. The expression Gyan-Vigyan was specifically
mentioned in Section 4(1), not merely to make a scientific
, study of what is contained in Vedas, as even such a study
-
may not fulfill the purpose for which the University was
created. If a scientific study exclusively about Vedas is
D made for that purpose alone a creation of a University
would not have been necessitated. On the other hand, it
is the other way around, in as much as Vedas contains
very many scientific subjects such as, mathematics,
study about atoms, human anatomy and physiology and
E other formulae. At this juncture, the inclusion of the
expression "Gyan-Vigyan", will have to be understood to
have been inserted with a view to study modern science
and technology as it exists and study the same in
consonance with the basic principles contained in Vedas
F ·and Puranas. In fact, such an approach, while reading the
provisions would be the proper way of reading the said
provisions. Gyan Vigyan is nothing but a systematic
study of science through senses by applying one's mind
with absolute consciousness. If it is the meaning to be
G attributed to the expression "Gyan Vigyan", it will have
to be held that the said expression used in Section 4(1)
cannot be restricted to a mere study on Vedas and its
practices. Such a narrow interpretation will be doing
violence to the whole concept of Gyan Vigyan, which is
H the combination of human senses, mind and
MAHARSHI MAHESH YOGI VEDIC VISHWAVIDYALAYA v. 4 73
STATE OF M.P.
consciousness, which should be applied to every aspect A
of human life, which would include all other academic
subjects viz., science, mathematics, philosophy,
management, etc. [Para 77] [517-B-G; 518-A-B]

1.12. Establishment of the University as the Preamble 8
goes to state was to provide for education in the
forefront. It will be appropriate to hold that such a
provision for education in so far as the appellant
University was concerned, should concentrate and focus
in the prosecution of research in Vedic learning and C
practices and to provide for matters connected therewith
or incidental thereto. Merely because such specific
reference was made to prosecution of research in Vedic
learnings, if it is could be held that the imparting of
education in the appellant University should be restricted
to the said subject alone and not in any other subject, D
such a narrow interpretation would be doing violence to
the very basic concept of education, and would create a
serious restrain on the University, where, imparting of
education is the primary objective and dealing with any
specific subject may· be for enabling any one to acquire E
special knowledge on such subjects. In other words, any
such restrictive interpretation would go against the basic
tenets of the concept of education, which no Court can
venture to state. [Paras 74 and 75) [515-8-F]
F
1.13. The Preamble cannot control the scope of the
applicability of the Act. If the provision contained in the
main Act are clear and without any ambiguity and the
purpose of the Legislation can be thereby duly
, "" understood without any effort, there is no necessity to G
even look into the Preamble for that purpose. [Para 84)
[522-A-B]

Union of India vs. E/phinstone Spinning and Weaving Co.
Ltd. and others etc. AIR 2001 SC 724: 2001 (1) SCR 221 -
relied on. H
474 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 13 S.C.R.

-<. -
A 1.14. It is the statutory provision, which will have to
be read and analyzed for the purpose of understanding
the scope and purport for which the Legislation was
intended and the brief statement contained in the
Preamble will be of very little value. Even a reading of the
B Preamble shows the importance attached to imparting of
education in the appellant University, as has been
highlighted in the forefront while making a mention about
the other aspects of providing scope for research )Y .....
oriented education on Vedas and its practices by the
c appellant University. [Para 86] [522-H; 523-A-B]
1.15. Vedas has not left any subject untouched. The
Division Bench has noted the various fields, which have
been dealt with and associated in Vedas. The Division
Bench has gone to the extent of saying that some
D scientists have seen the atomic dance in the deity of
'Natraj'. It has also been noted that mathematic formulae
are much· more concise and precise in Vedas. It is said
that Vedic learning is concerned with human anatomy
and physiology. It was further found that there were
E enough materials in Vedas, which pertains to seed
production, crop production, sericulture, health care,
management, beauty culture, marketing and accounting.
[Para 76) [515-H; 516-A-C]

F 1.16. According to the Maharshi, who was the man
behind the establishment of the appellant University, in
order to develop the limitless inner potential of students
and teachers, the only solution is education and to achieve
that end, according to him, ancient Vedic sciences have
G to be revived and the knowledge for systematic unfolding
the range of human consciousness. In fact, this
knowledge was stated to be Maharshi technology of the
unified field, which included Transcendental Meditation
and Transcendental Meditation Siddhi Programmes. It is
also stated that Transcendental Meditation is learnt by
H
MAHARSHI MAHESH YOGI VEDIC VIS..WVAVIDYAlAYA v. 475
STATE OF M.P.

- ~ more than three million people worldwide and
implemented in public and private educational institutions
A

in more than 20 countries through Universities, colleges,
schools and educational institutions. Therefore,
considering the very purport and intent of the Maharshi,
who relentlessly fought for the establishment of the B
appellant University for nearly four decades and ultimately
achieved the said objective for establishing the University,

- ~
it can never be held that his sole purport was only to
spread vedic learning and nothing else. Therefore, by
virtue of the amendment, the un-amended Section 4(1') will c
become meaningless and that the very purport of
establishing the appellant University would become a
futile exercise, if it were to restrict its courses only to mere
Vedic learning, without providing scope for learning all
other incidental and ancillary subjects dealt with by Vedas 0
viz., all other worldly subjects such as, Project
Management, Finance Management, Crop Management,
Human Resource Management, mathematics and other
sciences for which fundamental basic provisions have
been prescribed in Vedas and practices including,
E
Darshan, Agam Tantra, ltihas, Puranas and Upvedas. [Para
76] [516-C-H; 517-A-B]

1.17. The appellant University has proceeded to
establish its institution for the purpose of imparting
education by making huge investments. A major part of F
which would have definitely come by way of fees
collected from the students who had joined the institution
aspiring for improving their educational career, it is the
responsibility of the State to ensure that such high
expectation of the students who joined the appellant G
University is not impaired and that for whatever expenses
incurred by the students, appropriate returns should be
provided to them by way of ·imparting education in the
respective fields which, they choose to associate
themselves by getting themselves admitted in the H
476 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 13 S.C.R.

A appellant University. Therefore, such expectations of the
students, as well as their parents cannot be dealt with so
very lightly by the State, while considering for any
change to be brought about in the Constitution and
functioning of the appellant University. It can therefore be
B validly held that such expectations of the students and
their parents, as well as that of the appellant University,
can validly be held to be a legitimate expectation and

,
_considering the challenge made to the amendment
introduced on various grounds raised at the instance of
c the appellant, the legitimate expectation of the appellant
University, as well as the student community, would also
-
equally support the contentions of the appellant
University, while challenging the amendments in
particular the amendment introduced to Section 4(1 ), as
well as the addition of a proviso to the said Section. [Para
0
11 O] [536-B-G]

1.18. The establishment of the appellant University at
the repeated persuasion of Maharshi Mahesh Yogi was
definitely to provide full-fledged education on Vedas and
E the various intricate subjects, which are found in Vedas,
as well as its practices, lthihas, Puranas etc. In fact, there
can be no two opinion that such an institution with such
a laudable objective for imparting education in different
fields based on the teachings in Vedas, was very rare and
F it is said that the appellant University is stated to be an
unique University created and established by the
founders of the said institution headed by Maharshi
Mahesh Yogi. Therefore, when such a premium
University, which is stated to be only one of its kind in
G the whole of the Country was successfully established
based on the 1995 Act, such a well established institution
should be allowed to survive by enabling the said
University to con.duct courses as has been planned by
it and introduced under Ordinance 15 and thereby, make
H the appellant University a viable one. Such an approach
MAHARSHI MAHESH YOGI VEDIC VISHWAVIDYALAYA v. 477
STATE OF M.P.

- ~ alone, ensure the successful existence and continued
running of the University in the further years and thereby,
A

benefit very many aspirants from among the younger
generation who wish to learn more and more about very
many subjects by understanding such subjects based on
the teachings that are found and established in Vedic 8
learnings, its practices, lthihas and Puranas etc.

..
Therefore, on this ground as well, any attempt made from
any quarters, which would disrupt the running of the
·~. appellant University, will only amount to interfering with
its various Constitutional rights and fundament~I rights c
enshrined in the Constitution. Therefore, when such
interference is brought to the notice of this Court, the
Court has to necessarily come to the rescue of the
appellant University by saving it from any such onslaught
being made on its continued existence. [Para 111] [536-
-.. D
)-.
G-H; 537-A-F]

Brown v Board of Education 347 U.S. 483(1954) -
referred to.

Mohini Jain vs. State of Karnataka and others (1992) 3 E
SCC 666: 1992 (3) SCR 658; Unni Krishnan J.P. and others
vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and others (1993) 1 ·SCC 645:
1993 (1) SCR 594; M. C. Mehta vs. State of Tamil Nadu and
,. others (1996) 6 sec 756: 1996 (9) Suppl. SCR 726;
Bandhua Mukti Morcha vs. Union of India and others (1997) F
·' 10 SCC 549: 1997 (2) SCR 379; P.A. lnamdar and others
vs. State of Maharashtra and others (2005) 6 SCC 537: 2005
(2) Suppl. SCR 603; Reserve Bank of India vs. Peerless
General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. and Others 1987
(2) SCR 1; Utkal Contractors and Joiners Pvt. Ltd.and Ors vs.
~ ~ G
State of Orissa and ors. (1987) 3 sec 279: 1987 (3) SCR
317 - referred to.

2.1. The proviso added to Section 4 is to the effect
that no courses should be conducted and no centers
should be established or run without the prior approval H
478 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 13 S.C.R.

A of the State Government. It is bef:nd the legislative ~
-:
competence of the State Legislat re to stipulate any
restriction, as regards the conduc of the courses by
getting the approval of the State Government and such
lack of competence would equally apply to the running
B of the centers as well. Section 12 of the University Grants
Commission Act, 1956 would encompass apart from
determining the course contents with reference to which
the standard of teaching and its maintenance is to be
monitored by the University Grants Commission, would • •
c also include the infrastructure that may be made
available, either in the University or in other c~mpuses,
such as the centers, in order to ensure that such
standard of education, teaching and examination, as well
as research are maintained without any fall in standard.
[Paras 98 and 105) [528-F; 534-A-D]
D "
2.2. The running of centers by the appellant Joe
University would fall within the exclusive realm of Entry
66 of List - I, and not under Entry 25 of List Ill of VII
Schedule of the Constitution, which would in turn be
E governed by Section 12 of the University Grants
Commission Act and consequently the State Government
to that extent should be held to lack the necessary
legislative competence to meddle with such centers set
~
up by the appellant University. The entire proviso to
F Section 4(1) has to be held to be ultra-vires. [Paras 108
and 109) (535-E-F]
Prof. Yashpal and Anr. vs. State of Chhattisgarh and
Ors.) (2005) 5 SCC 420: 2005 (2) SCR 23; R. Chitralekha
G
vs. State of Mysore AIR 1964 SC 1823: 1964 SCR 368; The
Gujarat University, Ahmedabad vs. Krishna Ranganath
)- .
Mudho/kar and Ors. 1963 Supp (1) SCR 112; Osmania
Universtity Teachers' Association vs. State of Andhra Pradesh
and Anr. 1987 (3) SCR 949; Dr. Preeti Srivastava and another
Vs. State of M.P. (1999) 7 SCC 120: 1999 (1) Suppl. SCR
H 249; Annamalai University vs. Secretary to Government,
MAHARSHI MAHESH YOGI VEDIC VISHWAVIDYAl.AYA v. 4 79
STATE OF M.P
-~ Information and Tourism Department) (2009) 4 SCC 590: A
2009 (3) SCR 355; State of Tamil Nadu vs. S. V.Bratheep
(2004) 4 SCC 513: 2004 (2) SCR 1218; State of Tamil Nadu
and Anr. vs. Adhiyaman Educational and Research Institute
and others) (1995) 4 SCC 104: 1995 (2) SCR 1075; Gujarat
University, Ahmedabad vs. Krishna Ranganath Mudholkar) B
1963 Supp. 1 SCR 112 - relied on.

3. Under the un-amended s. 9(2) of 1995 Act, after the
first Chancellor viz., Maharshi Mahesh Yogi, the Board of
Management was empowered to appoint the Chancellor C
from among the persons of eminence and renowned
scholar of Vedic education who can hold office for a term
of five years and who would be eligible for
reappointment. Under the amended Section 9(2), it was
stipulated that after the first Chancellor, the Board of
Management should prepare and submit a panel of three D
persons to the State Government and out of the panel,
one person should be appointed as Chancellor by the
Board of Management, after obtaining the approval of the
State Government. As far as the period of holding office
was concerned, there was no change in its terms. Even E
after the amendment, the Management had the power of
recommendation and they could recommend a person of
eminence and renowned scholar of Vedic education and
even if the ultimate appointment is to be made with the
approval of the State Government, since any such F
appointment can be only from the panel prepared by the
Board of management, such a stipulation contained in
the amendment does not in any way impinge upon any
right, much less the Constitutional Right or Fundamental
Right of the appellant University, nor does it affect the G
autonomy of the appellant University. [Paras 112 and 113)
[538-C-G]

Case Law Reference
347 U.S. 483(1954) referred to Para 23 H
480 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 13 S.C.R.

A 1992 (3) SCR 658 referred to Para 29
'4
--
1993 (1) SCR 594 referred to Para 30
1996 (9) Suppl. SCR 726 referred to Para 31
1997 (2) SCR 379 referred to Para 32
8
2005 (2) Suppl. SCR 603 referred to Para 41
2011 (2) SCR 704 referred to Para 53 }
~.

2011 (16) SCR 254 referred to Para 53
c
1964 SCR 742 referred to Para 53
(2001 > 4 sec 286 referred to Para 53
2002 (2) Suppl. SCR 324 referred to Para 53
D 1969 SCR 219 relied on Para 54 -k

1987 (2) SCR 801 relied on Para 54
2005 (2) SCR 23 relied on Para 54

E 1995 (2) SCR 1075 relied on Para 55
1963 Supp. 1 SCR 112 relied on Para 55
1960 SCR 866 relied on Para 58.
1990 (2) SCR 797 relied on Para 58
F
1994 (2) Suppl. SCR 338 relied on Para 58
1997 (2) Suppl. SCR 305 relied on Para 58
1999 (2) SCR 438 relied on Para 58
)- '
G
2000 (1) SCR 97 relied on Para 58
2001 (3) Suppl. SCR 627 relied on Para 58
1964 SCR 368 relied on Para 65
H 1963 Supp (1) SCR 112 relied on Para 65
MAHARSHI MAHESH YOGI VEDIC VISHWAVIDYALAYA v. 481
STATE OF M.P.

- ~ 1987 (3) SCR 949 relied on Para 65 A
1999 (1) Suppl. SCR 249 relied on Para 65

2009 (3) SCR 355 relied on Para 65

2004 (2) SCR 1218 relied on Para 65
B
1987 (2) SCR 1 referred to Para 67

1987 (3) SCR 317 referred to Para 67
... ""' 2012 (2) SCR 715 relied on Para 80(i)
c
2012 (7) SCR 1054 relied on Para 80(ii)

2011 (11) SCR 1094 relied on Para 80(iii)
2011 (10) SCR 203 relied on Para 80(iv)
2008 (4) SCR 1 relied on Para 80(v) D
,;
1987 (3) SCR 949 relied on Para 82
2001 (1) SCR 221 relied on Para 85
1987 (3) SCR 317 held inapplicable Para 87 E
1987 (2) SCR 1 relied on Para 88
1987 (2) SCR 801 relied on Para 93
."-.
(1928) 1 KB 561 referred to Para 95
F
(1888) 13 AC 595 referred to Para 95
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
6736 of 2004.
.... From the Judgment & Order dated 20.03.2002 of the High G
Court of Judicature at M.P. at Jabalpur in W.P. No. 1065 of
2001.

L. Nageshwar Rao, Santosh Kumar, V. Sushant Gupta {for
Mushtaq Ahmad), Vibha Datta Makhija, Archi Agnihotri, Varun H
482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 13 S.C.R.

A Thakur, Varinder Kumar Sharma, Chander Shekhar Ashri for
the Appearing parties.
~ -
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J. 1. This
B appeal is directed against the Division Bench decision of the
High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur, dated 20.03.2002,
in W.P.No.1065 of 2001, in and by which, the Division Bench
allowed the writ petition in part. The challenge in the writ petition
/>' ·-.-
was to the amendment introduced to Sections 2, 4, 9 and 17,
c as well as insertion of Sections 31-A, 31-B, 31-C, 37-A, 37-B
to the Maharshi Mahesh Yogi Vedic Vishwavidyalaya
Adhiniyam, 1995 (Act No.37 of 1995), hereinafter referred to
as "1995 Act". The amendment was by way of Amendment Act
No.5 of 2000, hereinafter called the "Amendment Act".
D
2. The Division Bench upheld the amendment to Section
4( 1) of 1995 Act. The Division Bench also held that the
amendment to Sections 9(2), 31-A(1) and (2), 31-B, 31-C, 37-
B(a}, 37-B(b), 37-B(d) and 37-B (e) are intra-vires. The Division
Bench further held that the proviso to Section 4 is intra-vires,
E
as far as it provides that no Centres shall be established without
prior approval of the State Government and no centre would
mean no further Centres excluding the existing ones. The
Division Bench further held that the said proviso as far as it >.
stipulated that no courses should be conducted or run without
F the prior approval of the State Government is ultra-vires, as far
as, it related to the present stream of courses and the existing
Centres. Section 37-A was held to be ultra-vires in its entirety.
Section 37-8 (e} was held to be not ultra-vires.

G 3. To understand the scope of challenge made in this ,_
appeal, the brief facts are required to be stated. The appellant
is the University, which was a creation by way of a Statute viz.,
1995 Act. Therefore, in the forefront, it will be better to note the
scheme of the Act, which received the assent of the Governor
H on 25th November 1995 and was published in the Madhya
MAHARSHI MAHESH YOGI VEDIC VIS...rNAVIDYAl.AYA v. 483
STATE OF M.P. [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.)
..... Pradesh Gazette dated 29th November 1995. The Preamble A
of the Act would state that it was an Act to establish and
incorporate a University, in the State of Madhya Pradesh and
to provide for education and prosecution of research in Vedic
learnings and practices and to provide for matters connected
therewith or incidental thereto. Section 2 defines the various B
expressions, including the expressions "Board of
Management", "Distance Education System", "Institution",
"Statutes" and "Ordinance" and the definition of "University"
under Section 2(u) mean~ the appellant University. Again
Section 3(1) refers to the appellant University and Section 3(2) c
refers to the headquarters of the University to be at village
Karondi in District Jabalpur, Madhya Pradesh, providing for
establishment of campuses at such other places within its
jurisdiction. Under sub-section (3) to Section 3, the First
Chancellor, Vice Chancellor and the first Members of the Board 0
of Management of the Academic Council etc., has been set out.

4. The crucial section is Section 4 and in particular sub-
clause (1) of Section 4, which refers to the powers of the
·University, which specifically states that such power would
provide for instruction in all branches of Vedic Learning, as well E
as promotion and development of the study of Sanskrit, as the
University may from time to time determine and also to make
provision for research and for the advancement and
dissemination of knowledge.
F
5. Sub-clauses (ii) to (xxviii) of Section 4 refers to the
various other powers such as granting diplomas and
certificates; to organize and undertake extra-mural studies;
conferment of honorary degree; facilities for distance education
system; to recognize an institution of higher learning for such G
purposes as the University may determine; to recognize
persons for imparting instructions in any college or institution
maintained by the University; to appoint persons working in any
other University or organization, as a teacher of the University
for a specific period; to create teaching, as well as
H
484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 13 S.C.R.

A administrative posts; to co-operate or collaborate with any other
....
University or authority; to establish other campus, special
centers, specified laboratories etc., to institute and award
fellowships, scholarships etc., to establish and maintain
colleges and institutions; to make provision for research and
B advisory service; to organize and conduct refresher courses;
to make special arrangements for teaching women students;
to appoint on contract or otherwise visiting professors, scholars;
to confer autonomous status on a college or an institution or a ,_ ~
,.._
department; to determine standards of admission of the
c University etc.; to fix quota for reserved class students; to
demand and receive payment of fees and other charges; to take
care of the hostels of the students with other inmates of the
college; to lay down conditions of service of all categories of
employees; to frame discipline; to receive benefications, gifts,
etc., and to do all such other acts and things as may be
D
necessary, incidental or conducive for attainment of all or any :..:
of its objects.

6. Section 5 states that the jurisdiction of the University
would extend to the whole of the State of Madhya Pradesh. The
E status of the Chancellor has been described in Section 9. Sub-
section (1) of Section 9 recognizes the status of Maharshi
MaheshYogi as its first Chancellor, who was entitled to hold
office during his lifetime. Sub-section (2) to Section 9 provides >-.
the manner in which the next Chancellor can be appointed by
F the Board of Management and the qualification and eligibility
for appointment as Chancellor. Section 10 deals with the
position of the Vice Chancellor, qualification and procedure for
filling up of the said post. Section 11 deals with the status of
the Pro-Vice Chancellor. Sections 12, 13 and 14 deals with the
f
G position of Deans of Schools, the Registrar and the Finance
Officer of the appellant University.

7. Section 15 deals with the manner of appointment,
powers and duties of the other officers of the University, which
has to be prescribed by the Statutes. Sections 17 and 18
H
MAHARSHI MAHESH YOGI VEDIC VISHWAVIDYALAYA v. 485
STATE OF M.P [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]
- ... specifically deal with the power of the Board of Management A
and its constitution. Section 19 deals with the Academic
Council, while Section 20 deals with the Planning Board and
Section 24 enumerates the powers to make Statutes and the
provisions to be contained therein. Section 25 enumerates as
to how the Statues has.to be made. Section 26 stipulates as B
to how all Ordinances should be made. Section 28 deals with
the preparation of annual report of the University, including the
~ ~ annual accounts and the balance sh~et duly audited .by a
chartered accountant under the direction of the Board of
Management. Sections 30 and 31 prescribe the procedure for c
appeal and arbitration in disciplinary cases against students.
Section 32 deals with the creation of provident and pension
funds. Section 34 deals with the constitution of committees,
while Section 35 deals with the manner in which the casual
vacancies are· to be filled up. The transitional provisions are
Ji.. D
specified in Section 38 of the Act. The last Section 39
stipulates that every Statute, Ordinance or Regulation made
under the Act, should be published in the Official Gazette and
that it should be laid down, as soon as it is made before the
Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly.
E
8. A conspicuous reading of the above provisions of the
1995 Act, discloses that the appellant University was
established and incorporated under Section 3 of the Act. At the
very outset, it must be stated that the establishment of the
University itself was at the behest of Maharshi Mahesh Yogi, F
who was the man behind the institution and was an inspiration,
if we may say so, for the establishment and effective functioning
of it. The State Government came forward to pass the
~
legislation for establishing the appellant University on his
initiative and persuasion. It was his vision of spreading total G
knowledge on the holistic interpretation of the 'Vedas' and it
must be stated that his move to propagate natural law and
technology of consciousness was very laudable. It is stated that
he was instrumental for establishing many such Universities at
various places throughout the world. Therefore, it was his vision,
H
486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS {2013) 13 S.C.R.

A as well as mission, to establish this University with the laudable
~ -
object of spreading the holistic principle enshrined in the
Vedas, Upvedas, Agam Tantra, ltihas, Puranas, as well as
Gyan-Vigyan.

9. The purport of establishing this University at his instance
B
was to ensure that the ancient knowledge embedded in those
Vedas, Upvedas, Agam Tantra, ltihas, Puranas etc., are kept
intact and the wealth of knowledge contained in these Vedas, ,
f
Upvedas etc., are not only spread by establishing an institution, '

c
but by teaching them through well established institutions and
thereby, ensuring that such wealth of knowledge is kept intact
for the future generations to come.
- "'

10. In this context, we must state that the Division Bench
of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in its scholarly judgment has
D dealt with the intricacies of the wealth of knowledge contained ).,
in Vedas, running for several pages and hence, we only state
that the same shall be read as part and parcel of this judgment
for its better understanding.

11. When we refer to the subjects dealt with in Vedas, it
E
will be worthwhile to note the details garnered and noted in the
judgment of the Division Bench, which in our considered
opinion have to be referred to in order to appreciate the
challenge made to the amendment by the State Government
with particular reference to Section 4(1) of the 1995 Act. In fact
F the Division Bench has dealt with the above aspects in several
pages, however, for the purpose of this case, it will be sufficient
if we refer to certain relevant portions of the judgment in order
to get a better understanding that the concept of Vedas deals
with various aspects of life, which also includes science in
G general, as well as human autonomy. Reference can be made
to paragraph 29 and 30 of the judgment, where the Division
Bench has noted the four different branches of Vedas viz.,
Rigveda, Samaveda, Yajurveda and Atharvaveda, along with
the four Upvedas viz., Ayurveda, Gandharvaveda, Dhanurveda
H and Sthapatyaveda. If all these Vedas are understood in their
MAHARSHI MAHESH YOGI VEDIC VISHWAVIDYALAYA v. 487
STATE OF M.P. [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]
... _,_
proper perspective, we can find that they deal with various A
aspects of life, the way of living, the culture, sculpture,
medicines and quintessence of civilization and so on and so
forth.

12. The Division Bench has also noted that in Vedas there B
are formulae, which deals with mathematics. The Vedic sutras
enable a person to solve complex mathematical problems
because of its cogency, compactness and simplicity. The
~
Division Bench has also stated that it is a total misconception

-- for any one to state that Vedas are only relatable to rituals. It
went on to add that mathematicians have observed that while
ordinary multiplication methods require many steps, in Sanskrit
c
sutra, only one line method is sufficient. To quote a few, the
Division Bench has referred to 'Urdhwa', 'Tiryak Sutra',
'Ekadhiken Purva Sutra' and 'Kalana-Kalna Sutra'. A little more
detailed analysis made by the Division Bench, as regards the D
in-depth contents in Vedas can be profitably referred to by
extracting paragraph 33 of the judgment.of the Division Bench,
which reads as under:

"33. The modern physicists are a/so connecting certain E
theories propagated by the ancien.t Indians. Some
scientists have seen atomic dance in the deity of 'Natraj'.
.A The empirical knowledge which has been achieved, had
been perceived knowledge which has been achieved,
had been perceived by the ancient 'Drastas'. The F
memories of cells, which is the modern discovery finds
. place in the wise men of the past. The Psychology,
Psychiatry, Neurology had also been adverted in their
own way in the Shastras. Presently scholars recognize
- ~ one continuous shining background which had its base
G
is the pure consciousness. Thoreau, the eminent thinker,
realised this and expressed so through his writing,
Psychological quiescence is not unknown to the
ancients. The principle that there cannot be difference
between the body and mind was found by them. The great
American, Emerson expressed : H
488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013] 13 S.C.R.

A "They reckon ill who leave me out; When me they
fly I am the wings; I am the dou~ter and the doubt, And,
I the hymn the Brahamana sings."

Possibly for these reasons T. S. Eliot wrote:
B "Mankind cannot bear too much of reality."

13. Again in paragraph 43, the Division Bench has
highlighted how Vedic learning is also concerned with human
anatomy and physiology. It mentions that Atharvaveda gives a ~

picture of human bio-existence in a different ma_nner. It is also
c stated that Vedas qua human anatomy, coincides more or less ......__

with the medical science of today. It is further mentioned that
the language of interpretation may be different, but the essence
of science is one and the same. The Division Bench states that
the Atharvaveda does not perceive man's physiology, as
D delineated in terms of science, but visualizes in subtler
elements, by making specific reference to the nadis,
·annihilation, exhalation, retention of air in the body, which has
its corresponding note in the winds and vayu.

E 14. We have ventured to make a detailed reference to the
above facets highlighted in the judgment in order to state and
understand that by making reference to Vedas and its other
allied subjects, one cannot arrive at a conclusion that it only
deals with rituals and some religious tenets and that it has
nothing to do with other aspects of life. On the other hand, a
F
detailed reference was made by the Division Bench by making
an in depth study disclosing that the study of Vedas should
enlighten a person in all aspects of life not necessarily restricted
to religion or rituals simpliciter.
,._ -
G 15. When we attempt to understand the intricacies of
Vedas, which as stated by us earlier has been dealt with by
the Division Bench in several pages in the opening part of its
judgment, we also wish to make a reference to the meaning of
the expression "Gyan Vigyan", as has been expressed by
H Dr.Subash Sharma, Dean of Indian Business Academy, Noida
MAHARSHI MAHESH YOGI VEDIC VISHWAVIDYALAYA v. 489
STATE OF M.P. [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]

... 7 in his article "From Newton to Nirvana: Science, Vigyan and A
Gyan". A reading of the said note on "Gyan Vigyan" by the
author really gives a clear picture about the said concept. We
feel that it is worthwhile to make a brief reference to what has
been attempted to be explained by the said author. According
to the writer, "Gyan Vigyan" can be analyzed in two ways, viz., 8
Vishesh Gyan and Vishya Gyan. The world science has
linkages with senses and hence, scientific knowledge has got
its roots in senses. He would state that the traditional knowledge
-~
gets legitimacy only if it can b~ tested on the basis of objectivity,

.......
through the senses. He would elaborate his idea by stating that c
while science relies on senses, Vigyan i.e. Vishesh Gyan, can
be acquired through 'mind'. Therefore, Vigyan is more than
science as 'mind' is more than senses. He would conclude his
analysis by saying that 'Gyan' both in terms of its metaphysical
and spiritual meaning, is acquired through 'consciousness' and
D
;i.._ that it is more than Vigyan as 'consciousness' is more than
'mind'. If the analysis made by the writer is understood, it can
be held that if one represents senses, mind and consciousness
in terms of three concentric circles, we may observe that radius
of consciousness is larger than the radius of the mind and
radius of mind is larger than the radius of the senses. E

16. He would therefore, co.nclude by saying that just as
senses, mind and consciousness are interconnected, the three
circles of science, Vigyan and Gyan are also interconnected.
It can therefore be safely stated that "Gyan Vigyan" would be F
nothing but a systematic study of science through senses, by
applying one's mind with absolute consciousness.

17. Keeping the above perception about the basics of
--; Vedas i.e., Upvedas, Agam Tantra, ltihas, Puranas etc., in
' G
consonance with Gyan Vigyan, it will be necessary to briefly
refer as to how the University came to be established after the
coming into force of 1995 Act. It is also imminently required in
as much as, such an establishment had resulted in the
investment of considerable sum of money for the purpose of
H
490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013) 13 S.C.R.

A imparting education on Vedas and its allied subjects, including l'- -
Gyan Vigyan and for dissemination of knowledge, as was
originally thought of by the lawmakers, while enacting 1995 Act.
for the purpose of establishing the appellant University.

8 18. One of the main themes, which was propagated by
Maharshi Mahesh Yogi was that the solution of the problems
in the field of education lies in developing the limitless inner
potential of its students and teachers. According to him, to
achieve the said goal, it was necessary to revive the ancient
C Vedic science and knowledge for the systematic unfolding of
the full range of human consciousness. The said line of thinking
of the Yogi contains the technology of the unified field that
includes the Transcendental Meditation (TM) and
Transcendental Meditation Siddhi Programmes. It was also
highlighted by the Yogi that there were enough materials in
D Vedas, which pertains to seed production, crop production,
sericulture, health care, management, beauty culture, marketing
and accounting. It was further claimed that Vedas are the
structure of pure knowledge, having infinite creative potential,
which an individual can harvest. In order to highlight the
E valueability of the above intricate subjects, considerable
investment had to be made while establishing the appellant
University.

19. It was in this background that the Yogi is stated to have
F made an attempt for nearly four decades by repeatedly
knocking at the doors of the Legislators who came forward with
the Statute viz., 1995 Act for establishing the institution with the
laudable object of spreading the knowledge on Vedas and its
intricate subjects, through the medium of education. After the
G Statute viz., 1995 Act, came into effect, the appellant University r ..
took every effort to create the necessary infrastructure of high
standards in education and teaching. It is revealed that the
infrastructure comprised of permanent furnished buildings,
teachers, staff, transport facilities, library, hostel facilities etc.,
H and the capital expenditure as on 31.03.2000, was stated to
MAHARSHI MAHESH YOGI VEDIC VISHWAVIDYALAYA v. 491
STATE OF M.P. [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]
~ _,. be Rupees 12.74 crores. Besides this, the recurring A
expenditure was also of an equal sum: After its commencement,
it is stated that 3006 students, who received education from the
University, were conferred with certificates/diplomas and
degrees. In the academic year 2000-01, the student strength
was stated to be 3136 and that it has also awarded Ph.D B
degrees to 1O students, while 70 other students were pursuing
their doctorate education by enrolling themselves with the
University. Amongst the 70 students who enrolled themselves
~ for pursuing their doctorate courses in the University, 46 students
were granted scholarship in the range of Rs.1500 to Rs.2000. c

-- per month.

20. In the rejoinder affidavit filed in the High Court, the
University further claimed that it has Rs.60 crores deposit and
has realized a sum of Rs.2.5 crores by way of tuition fees and
stated that the University has invested huge sums for the D
J. purpose of imparting education in Vedas, as well as in other
science and art subjects, which according to the University were
essential requirements to be established for the purpose of
attaining its objectives.
E
21, The appellant University would therefore, contend that
in the field of education, though the main objective of the
University was to reinforce the greatness of Vedas, Upvedas,
agam tantra, itihas, darshan, upanashid, puranas etc., in as
much as every other field of education was intrinsically F
connected with the main objective of spreading the knowledge
of Vedas. It was contended that the attempt of the State
Government to cripple the activities of the University by
restricting the scope of education in the University to Vedas
alone would be doing grave injustice to the University, as well
G
as to its beneficiaries.

22. Having analysed the emergence of the appellant
University based on enactment viz., 1995 Act, we are of the
consid~red opinion that it will also be appropriate to emphasis
the need of education and its benefits in order to appreciate H
492 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013] 13 S.C.R.

A the issue involved in this litigation in particular to the challenge
made at the instance of the appellant to certain of the
amendments, which were introduced in the said 1995 Act, by
the Amendment Act. It is needless to state that education, a
Constitutional right, has been explained as an essential part in
B every one's life. In order to understand its consequential effects
on the society at large, the Father of the Nation, Mahatma
Gandhi, while referring to education has stated, "live as if you
were to die tomorrow. Learn as if you were to live
forever". Later reinforced by Nelson Mandela "Education is
c the most powerful weapon which you can use to change
·the world". The process of learning, as has been highlighted
by the father of the nation, emphasises the need for one to have
an everlasting thirst for acquiring knowledge by getting himself
educated. It is stated that education is the most potent
D mechanism for the advancement of human beings.' It enlarges,
enriches and improves the individual's image of the future. A
man without education is no more than an animal. Education
emancipates the human beings and leads to liberation from
ignorance. According to Pestalozzi who is a Swiss pedagogue
and educational reformer stated that education is a constant
E process of development of innate powers of man, which are
natural, harmonious and progressive. It is said that in the 21st
Century, 'a nation's ability to convert knowledge into wealth
and social good through the process of innovation is going
to·determine its future.' Accordingly the 21st Century is termed
F as the 'century of knowledge'.

23. Mr. Will Durrant defines 'education' as the
'transmission of civilization'. George Peabody has defined
'education' as "a debt due from present to future generations".
G Education confers dignity to a man. The significance of
education was very well explained by the US Supreme Court
first, in the case of Brown V Board of Education - 347 U.S.
483(1954), in following words: "It is the very foundation of good
citizenship. Today, it is principal instrument in awakening the
H child to cultural value, in preparing him for later professional
MAHARSHI MAHESH YOGI VEDIC VISHWAVIDYALAYA v. 493
STATE OF M.P. [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]

. -·r training and in helping him to adjust normally to his A
environment." Hence, it is said that a child is the future of the
nation.

24. A private organization~ named the International Bureau
of Education, was established in Geneva in 1924 and was
B
transformed into an inter-governmental organization in 1929, as
an intern~tional coordinating centre for institutions concerned
with education. A much broader approach was chosen,
however with the establishment of UNESCO in 1945. United
Nations, on 10th December, 1998 adopted the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The Preamble to the c
UDHR stated that: "every individual and organ of society.... ,
shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for
these rights and freedoms.... " In accordance with the Preamble

.. ~
of UDHR, education should aim at promoting human rights by
importing knowledge and skill among the people of the nation D·
States.

25. Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
·declares:
E
"Ever:Y._one has the right to education. Education shall
be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental
stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory.
Technical and Professional education shall be generally
....... available and higher education shall be equally
accessible to all on the basis of merit." (Emphasis added) F

26. The same concept has been repeated in the UN
Declaration of the Rights of the Child, which seeks to ensure;

"Right to free and compulsory education at least in the
~
G
elementary stages and education to promote general
culture, abilities, judgment and sense of responsibility to
become a useful member of society and opportunity to
recreation, and play to attain the same purpose as of
education."
H
494 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 13 S.C.R.

A 27. The role of international organizations regarding the 'f- .-'
implementation of the right to education is just not limited to the
preparation of documents and conducting conferences and
conventions, but it also undertakes the operational programmes
assuring, access to education of refugees, migrants, minorities,
B indigenous people, women and the handicaps. India
participated in the drafting of the Declaration and has ratified
the covenant. Hence, India is under an obligation to implement
such provisions. As a corollary from the Human Rights
perspective, constitutional rights in regard to education are to
c be automatically ensured.

28. Having briefly analyzed the International Conventions,
we would like to refer to the provisions in our own Constitution,
which provides for the significance and need for education. The
Founding Fathers of the nation, recognizing the importance and
D significance of the right to education, made it a constitutional
goal, and placed it under Chapter IV Directive Principles of
State Policy of the Constitution of India. Article 45 of the
A. -
Constitution requires the State to make provisions within 10
years for 'free and compulsory education' for all children until
E they complete the age of 14 years.

29. Further, Article46 declares that the state shall promote
with special care the educational and economic interests of the
weaker sections of the people. It is significant to note that A.
F among several Articles enshrined under Part IV of the Indian
Constitution, Article 45 had been given much importance, as ....
education is the basic necessity of the democracy and if the
people are denied their right to education, then democracy will
be paralyzed; and it was, therefore, emphasized that the
objectives enshrined under Article 45 in Chapter IV of the
G /> '
Constitution should be achieved within ten years of the adoption
of the Constitution. By establishing the obligations of the State,
the Founding Fathers made it the responsibility of future
governments to formulate a programme in order to achieve the
given goals, but the unresponsive and sluggish attitude of the
H
>

MAHARSHI MAHESH YOGI VEDIC VISHWAVIDYALAYA v. 495
STATE OF M.P [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]

. -'r government to achieve the objectives enshrined under Article A
45, belied the hopes and aspirations of the people. However,
the Judiciary showed keen interest in providing free and
compulsory education to all the children below the age of
fourteen years. In the case of Mohini Jain V State of Kamataka
and others - (1992) 3 SCC 666, this Court held that right to B
education is a fundamental right enshrined under Article 21 of
the Constitution. The right to education springs from right to life.
The right to life under Article 21 and the dignity of the individual
cannot fully be appreciated without the enjoyment of right to
education. The Court observed: c
"Right to life" is the compendious expression for all those
rights which the Courts must enforce because they are
basic to the dignified enjoyment of life. It extends to the
full range of conduct which the individual is free to pursue.
.... The right to education flows dirf!!ctly from right to life. The D
right to life under Article 21 and the dignity of an
-- individual cannot be assured unless it is accompanied
by the right to education. The State Government is under
an obligation to make endeavour to provide educational
facilities at all levels to its citizens. " E

30. In the case of Unni Krishnan J.P. ~nd others V State
of Andhra Pradesh and others reported in (1993) 1 SCC
> 645, this Court was asked to examine the decision of Mohini
Jain's case. In Unni Krishnan (supra) this Court partly overruled F
the decision rendered in Mohini Jain's case. The Court held
that, the right to education is implicit in the right to life and
personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21 and must be
interpreted in the light of the Directive Principles of State Policy
contained in Articles 41, 45 and 46. This Court, however,
G
limited the State obligation to provide educational facilities as
follows:

(i) Every Citizen of this Country has a right to free education
until he completes the age of fourteen years;
H
'
~

496 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 13 S.C.R.

A (ii) Beyond that stage, his right to education is subject to -,'- .
the limits of the economic capacity of the state.

His Lordship Mr. Justice Mohan, as he then was, has
stated as under in paragraph 10 & 11:
B "10. The fundamental purpose of Education is the same
at all times and in all places. It is to transfigure the
human personality into a pattern of perfection through a
synthetic process of the development of the body, the
enrichment of the mind, the sublimation of the emotions
c and the illumination of the spirit. Education is a
preparation for a living and for life, here and hereafter.

11. An old Sanskrit adage states: "That is Education
which leads to liberation"- liberation from ignorance
D which shrouds the mind,· liberation from superstition ·
which paralyses effort, liberation from prejudices
which blind the Vision of the Truth."

(Emphasis added)

E 31. Further, this Court in M. C. Mehta V State of Tamil
Nadu and others reported in (1996) 6 SCC 756, observed
that, to develop the full potential of the children, they should be
prohibited from doing. hazardous work and education should be
made available to them. In this regard, the Court held that the ..\.
F government should formulate programmes offering job oriented
education, so that they may get education and the timings be
so adjusted so that their employment is not affected.

32. Again in Bandhua Mukti Morcha V Union of India and
others, reported in (1997) 10 SCC 549, Justice K. Ramaswamy
G and Justice Saghir Ahmad observed that illiteracy has many
adverse effects in a democracy governed by a rule of law. It
was held that educated citizens could meaningfully exercise
their political rights, discharge social responsibilities
satisfactorily and develop sprit of tolerance and reform.
H Therefore, compulsory education is one of the essentials for the
_,

MAHARSHI MAHESH YOGI VEDIC VISHWAVIDYALAYA v. 497
STATE OF M.P [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]
-)'
stability of democracy, social integration and to eliminate social A
evils. This Court by rightly and harmoniously construing the
provision of Part 111 and IV of the Constitution has made 'Right
to education' a basic fundamental right.

33. The Government of India by Constitutional (86th
B
Amendment Act) Act, 2002 had added a new Article 21A, which
provides that "the state shall provide free and compulsory
-1 education to all children of the age of 6 to 14 years in such
,. manner as the State may, by law determine". Further, they
strengthened this Article 21A by adding a clause (k) to Article
51-A, which provides for those who are a parent or guardian c
to provide opportunities for education to his/her child or ward
between the age of 6 and 14 years. On the basis of the
Constitutional mandate provided under Articles 41, 45, 46, 21-
~
A, 51-A(k) and various judgments of this Court, both the
;.. Government of India, as well as this Court has taken several D
steps to eradicate illiteracy, improve the quality of education
and simultaneously ensure that the dropouts are brought to nil.
Some of these programmes are the National Technology
Mission, District Primary Education Programme, and Nutrition
Support for Primary Education, National Open School, Mid-Day E
Meal Scheme, Sarva Siksha Abhiyan and other state specific
initiatives. Besides this, several States have enacted
~ legislations to provide free and compulsory primary education
such as: The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory
Education Act, 2009, The Kerala Education Act 1959, The F
Punjab Primary Education Act 1960, The Gujarat Compulsory
Primary Education Act 1961, U.P. Basic Education Act 1972,
Rajasthan Primary Education Act 1964, Tamil Nadu Right of
Children to Free and Compulsory Education Rules, 2011, etc.

34. The right to education will be meaningful only and only G
if all the levels of education reach to all sections of people,
otheiwise it will fail to achieve the target set out by our Founding
Fathers, who intended to make the Indian society an egalitarian
society.
H
498 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 13 S.C.R.

A 35. The 15th official census in India was calculated in the
year 2011. In a country like India, literacy is the main foundation
for social and economic growth. When the British rule ended
in 1947, the literacy rate was just 12%. Over the years, India
has changed socially, economically, and globally. After the 2011
8 census, literacy rate in India, during 2011 was found to be
74.04%. Compared to the adult literacy rate here, the youth·
literacy rate is about 9% higher. Though this seems like a very
great accomplishment, it is still a matter of concern that still so
many people in India cannot even read and write. The number
C of children who do not get education especially in the rural
areas are still high. Though the government has made a law
that every child under the age of 14 should get free education,
the problem of illiteracy is still at large.

36. Now, if we consider female literacy rate in India, then
D it is lower than th1:1 male literacy rate, as many parents do not
allow their female children to go to schools. They get married
off at a young age instead. Though child marriage has been
lowered to very low levels, it still happens. Many families,
especially in rural areas believe that having a male child is better
E than having a baby girl. So the male child gets all the benefits.
Today, the female literacy levels according to the Literacy Rate
2011 census are 65.46%, where the male literacy rate is over
80%. The literacy rate in India has always been a matter of
concern, but many NGO initiatives and government ads,
F campaigns and programs are being held to spread awareness
amongst people about the importance of literacy. Also the
government .has made strict rules for female equality rights.
Indian literacy rate has shown a significant rise in the past 10
years.
G 37. According to us, illiteracy is one of the major problems
faced by the developing nations. In Africa and South East Asia,
it has been identified as a major cause of socio economic and
ethical conflicts that frequently surfaced in the region. Therefore,
literacy has. now become part .of the Human Right dialogue.
H
l\MHARSHI MAHESH YOGI VEDIC VIS~AVIDYAf.AYA v. 499
STATE OF M.P. [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]
-'¥
"!'
Now most of the nations of the world have also accepted their A
obligation to provide at least free elementary education to their
citizens.

38. Owens and Shaw have stated in their book
- 'Development Reconsidered' "It is self-evident that literacy is B
a basic element of a nationwide knowledge system. The most
important element of a literacy program is not the program
itself, but the incentive to become and remain literate."

39. Education is thus, viewed as an integral part of national
development and held as an instrument by which the skills and c
productive capacities are developed and endowed. Literacy
forms the cornerstone for making the provision of equality of
opportunity a reality.
_,,
' 40. With great respect, it will also have to be stated that
... bereft of improvement in the educational field when we pose
D

to ourselves the question as to what extent it has created any
impact, it will have to be stated that we are yet to reach the
preliminary level of achievement of standardised literate
behaviour. In fact, in the earlier years, though the literate level
E
was not as high as it now stands, the human value had its own
respected place in the society. It will be worthwhile to recall the
control the elders could administer over the youngsters, de hors
-> the lack of education. It is unfortunate that today education
r
instead of reforming the human behaviour, in our humble
F
opinion appear to ~!'Ive failed to achieve its objective. Instead
we find troubled atmosphere in the society at large, which calls
for immediate reformation with the efforts of one and all.
Therefore, it has become imperative to see that the institution,
the teachers, the parents, the students and the society at large
can do for bringing about such a transformation. When by and G
large the development of education has been achieved and the
percentage of literacy has considerably improved, at least to
more than 60%, there should not be any difficulty for the
educated mass to prevail upon every section of the society in
order to ensure that the orderly society emerges, which would H
500 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 13 S.C.R.

A pave the way for a decent and safe living for every human being
who is part of the society.

41. We can usefully refer to the importance of the education
as highlighted by the seven Judge Bench of this Court in P.A.
8 lnamdar and others V. State of Maharashtra and others -
{2005) 6 SCC 537. 'In paragraphs 81, 85 and 90, it has been
held as under:

81. "Education" according to Chambers Dictionary is
"bringing up or training; , .. strengthening of the powers
C of body or mind; culture".

85. Quadri, J .. has well put it in his opinion in Pai
Foundation:

"287. Education plays a cardinal role in transforming a
D
society into a civilised nation. It accelerates the progress
of the country in every sphere of national activity. No
section of the citizens can be ignored or left behind
because it would hamper the progress of the country as
a whole. It is the duty of the State to do all it could, to
E educate every section of citizens who need a helping
hand in marching ahead along with others."

90. In short, education is national wealth essential for the ,._,
nation's progress and prosperity.
F
· 42. The following· quote of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Unni Krishnan's case sums up the importance of education;

"Victories are gained, peace is preserved, progress is
achieved, civilisation is built up and history is made not
G on the battlefields where ghastly murders are committed
in the name of patriotism, not in the Council Chambers
where insipid speeches are spun out in the name of
debate, not even in factories where are manufactured
novel instruments to strangle life, but in educational
H institutions which are the seed-beds of culture, where
MAHARSHI MAHESH YOGI VEDIC VISHWAVIDYALAYA v. 501
STATE OF M.P [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]
' - )' children in whose hands quiver the destinies the future, A
are trained. From their ranks will come out when they grow
up, statesmen and soldiers, patriots and philosophers,
who will determine the progress of the land."

43. Having thus highlighted the importance of Education,
B
when we now refer to the core issue involved in this appeal,
the provocation for the appellant to file the writ petition was the
amendment introduced by Amendment Act 5 of 2000, by which,
Ai Sections 2, 4, 9 and 17 of 1995 Act was amended, while
simultaneously Sections 31-A, 31-B, 31-C, 37-A and 37-B were
Y' inserted.
c
(

44. Before adverting to the consequence of the
amendments introduced to two of the crucial provisions viz.,
Section 4(1) and its proviso and Section 9(2) of the un-
amended Act, it will have to be kept in mind that after the D
coming into force of the 1995 Act, the appellant University has
framed its Statutes, as well as Ordinance No.15. Ordinance
• No.15, contains the courses of studies, which are numerous .
Apart from prime subjects on Vedas there were also other
professional courses such as Project Management, Human E
Resources Management, Financial Management, Marketing
Management, Accounting and Auditing, Banking, as well as
vocational courses in typing, stenography, secretarial practice,
_,.. computer technology marketing and sales, dress designing and
...... manufacturing, textile designing and printing, horticulture, seed F
production, crop production, sericulture, as well as, short term
courses in various international topics such as, political science,
theory of Government, theory of defense, theory of education,
theory of management etc.
~
/
45. One other relevant factor to be noted is that the G
appellant University was added in the list of Universities
maintained by the University Grants Commission, as provided
under Section 2(f) of the University Grants Com!llission Act,
1956 .•The same was addressed by way of a communication
to the University Grants Commission dated 24.08.1998, in and H
502 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 13 S.C.R.

A by which, the inclusion of the appellant University in the schedule ,,. - ,
to the University Grants Commission Act, 1956 was notified.
One other factor which is also to be kept in mind is that by virtue
of the provisions contained in the un-amended Act, the
appellant University also opened up as many as 55 centers in
s which an average of 35 students stated to have got themselves
enrolled to pursue various courses of study.

46. Keeping the above factors and details in mind, when
we examine the challenge made in the writ petition, in the
forefront, the challenge was to the amendment, which was
C made to Section 4(1) of the 1995 Act.

47. The next challenge was to the proviso to Section 4 and
the third crucial challenge was to the amendment to Section 9(2)
of the 1995 Act. In fact, Mr.Nagaeshwara Rao, learned senior
D counsel for the appellant in his submissions, mainly
concentrated on the above three aspects on which the _.
amendments impinge upon the·rights of the appellant.

48. In the first instance, we wish to take up the amendment
E to Section 4(1) of the Act. In order to appreciate the
submissions of the respective counsel, it will be worthwhile to
note the un-amended Section 4(1), the amended Section 4(1),
as well as the Preamble to the Act which are as under:

"4 (i) to provide for instruction in all branches of Vedic
F teaming and practices including Darshan, Agam Tantra,
ltihas, Puranas, Upvedas and Gyan-Vigyan and the
promotion and development of the study of Sanskrit as
the University may, from time to time determine and to
make provision for research and for the advancement
G and dissemination of knowledge."

The amended provision reads as under:-

"to provide for instruction only in all branches of Vedic
learning and practices including Darshan, Agam Tantra,
H /tihas, Puranas, Upvedas and Gyan-Vigyan and the
MAHARSHI MAHESH YOGI VEDIC VISHWAVIDYALAYA v. 503
STATE OF M.P. [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]
-1'
promotion and development of the study of Sanskrit as A
the University may from time to time determine and to
make provison for research and for the advancement in
the above fields and in these fields may ......... "

Preamble: B
"An Act to establish and incorporate a University in the
State of Madhya Pradesh and to provide for education
_. and prosecution of research in Vedic learnings and
-

practices and to provide for matters connected therewith
,_. or incidental thereto." c
49. A reading of the above amendments to Section 4(1)
discloses that by way of the amendment, the expression "only"
and the expression "in the above fields and in these fields
may ... " were added, while the last set of expressions D
"dissemination of knowledge" were deleted. After the
amendment, the grievance of the appellant was that, prior to
the coming into force of the Amendment Act viz., Act 5 of 2000,
the Officer on Special Duty, in the Department of Higher
Education, sent a memorandum, alleging that the course of
E
study prescribed in Clause 1(i) and U) of Ordinance No.15,
were contrary to the aims and objectives of the University and
therefore, not acceptable. The University submitted through its
-·,lt.
reply vide Annexure P-7, explaining in detail with cogent
reasons as to why it was entitled to conduct those courses. It
F
is in the above stated background that the Amendment Act 5
of 2000 came to be introduced.

50. In the above stated background, when we examine the
.. 4
amendment to Section 4 (1), it is quite apparent that by adding
the word "only" after the expressions "instruction" in the opening G
part of the Section and by adding expression "in the above
0
fields ind in these fields may ... ", the State Legislature
apparently wanted to restrict the scope of providing instructions
to its students only in r8spect of studies in branches of Vedic
learning and practices, including Darshan, Agam Tantra, ltihas, H
504 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 13 S.C.R.

A Puranas, Upvedas and Gyan-Vigyan and also the promotion ~- '

and development of study of Sanskrit, which was left to be
determined by the University. It was also entitled to make
provisions for research and for the advancement in the fields
mentioned above. By omitting or by deleting the set of
B expression "dissemination of knowledge", apparently the State
Legislature wanted to give a thrust to its intendment of restricting
the scope of study in the appellant University to Vedic
instructions and its allied subjects. By taking up the deletion of
the expression "dissemination of knowledge", by way of the ~ ..
c amendment as stated earlier, the State Legislature wanted to
restrict the scope of study in the appellant University to Vedic
instructions alone. The expression "dissemination of
knowledge" is, to put it precisely, the spreading of knowledge
over wide frontiers. Going by the dictionary meaning and to put
it differently, "dissemination of knowledge" would mean
D
spr~ading of knowledge widely or disbursement of knowledge
widely. Therefore, the said set of expressions on their own,
..
would only mean any attempt for spreading of knowledge or
disbursement of knowledge. With the said set of expressions
as originally contained in Section 4(1 ), the question for
E consideration was as to whether such spreading of knowledge
or disbursement of knowledge should l;>e confined only to the
exclusive field of Vedic learning alone, or whether it should be
read disjunctively to be applied for such spreading of ,,., '
knowledge, on a wide spectrum. In fact, the Division Bench has
F even concluded that even by retaining these set of expressions,
the position would be that such dissemination of knowledge
would be referable only to Vedic learning and not for general
application.

G 51. Mr. Nageshwar Rao, learned senior counsel in his
"""
..
submissions took pains to contend that by reading the un-
amended Section 4(1) by virtue of the word 'and' pfiod9 the
set of expressions "for the advancement" and "dissemination
of knowledge", the learned senior counsel contended that the
H whole idea and purpose, while establishing the appellant
MAHARSHI MAHESH YOGI VEDIC VISHWAVIDYALAYA v. 505
STATE OF M.P. [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]
- )'
University was for the cause of advancement and spreading of A
knowledge in a wide spectrum and not by restricting it to the
field of Vedic learning alone. To reinforce his submissions, the
learned senior counsel vehemently contended that Section 4(1),
apart from providing scope for Vedic learning and practices,
including Darshan, Agam Tantra, ltihas, Puranas and Upvedas B
also used the expression "Gyan-Vigyan" which is nothing but
science and technology. The learned senior counsel therefore,
contended that apart from spreading the process of learning
in the field of Vedas, the establishment of the appellant

- University was also in other fields such as, science and
technology and other vocational courses, by way of
dissemination of knowledge. The learned senior counsel
c

therefore, contended that by bringing out the amendment to
Section 4(1), by way of an addition to the expressions "only"
and "in the above fields and in these fields may ... ", the State
Jo
D
Government has violated the Constitutional right of the appellant
in the field of education, thereby conflicting with Articles 14, 19
and 21 of the Constitution.

52. The learned senior counsel further contended that the
State Legislature lacks competence, in as much as education E
is a subject contained in Entry-66 of List-I and is already
governed by the central legislation viz., the University Grants
"')L Commission Act, 1956 and therefore, the State was
incompetent to restrict the scope of education in various fields
by bringing out an amendment, as has been made in Act 5 of F
2000.

53. To support the above submission, the learned senior
counsel by referring to the Preamble of 1995 Act contended
. ~ that the Act was enacted to provide for education primarily and
G
prosecution of research in Vedic learning and practices, apart
from providing· for matters connected therewith or incidental
thereto. The submissions of the learned senior counsel was that
going by the Preamble to the enactment, the purport of the
legislation was to provide education in all fields in the forefront,
H
506 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 13 S.C.R.

'I' - .
A apart from prosecution of research in Vedic learning and
practices. The learned senior counsel would contend that the
said submission was rejected by the Division Bench by
restricting the consideration to the words preceding the
expression "dissemination of knowledge" and by applying the
B principle Noscitur A Sociis. The learned senior counsel would
contend that such an approach of the Division Bench was not
justified and relied upon the decisions reported in (2011) 3 sec
436 (State of Orissa and Anr. Vs. Mamata Mohanty), (2012)
1 SCC 762 (Ramesh Rout Vs. Rabindra Nath Rout), AIR 1963
c SC 1323 (State of Rajasthan and Anr. Vs. Sripal Jain), (2001)
4 SCC 286 (Mis. Shriram Vinyl and Chemical Industries Vs.
Commissioner of Customs, Mumbai) and (2002) 7 SCC 273
-
(Union of India (UOI) and Anr. Vs. Hansoli Devi and Ors.).

54. The learned senior counsel also referred to Section 6
D of the Madhya Pradesh University Act, 1973 and contended
that "dissemination of knowledge" is referable to spreading of
knowledge in all other fields which may also include Vedic
learning. The learned senior counsel also relied upon AIR 1968
SC 1450 (lshwar Singh Bindra and Ors. Vs. State of UP.),
E (1987) 3 SCC 208 (Joint Director of Mines Safety Vs. Tandur
and Nayandgi Stone Quarries (P) Ltd.) and (2005) 5 SCC 420
(Prof Yashpal and Anr. Vs. State of Chhattisgarh and Ors.)
for the proposition as to how to understand the expression
"and".
F
55. Apart from the submission on Section 4(1), the learned
senior counsel, while attacking the amendment made by
introducing proviso to Section 4, contended that as far as the
introduction of various courses, as well as opening of centers
G are concerned, they are exclusively governed by the University
Grants Commission Regulations; which was framed under the
provisions of the University Grants Commission Act, 1956 and
therefore, the introduction of the said proviso was directly in
conflict with the occupied field by the University Grants
Commission Act and consequently ultra-vires of the
H
MAHARSHI MAHESH YOGI VEDIC VISHWAVIDYALAYA v. 507
STATE OF M.P. [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]

Constitutional provisions. The learned senior counsel relied A
upon Prof. Yashpal and another (supra), (1995) 4 sec 104
(State of Tamil Nadu and Anr. v. Adhiyaman Educational and
Research Institute and others) and 1963 Supp. 1 SCR 112
(Gujarat University, Ahmedabad Vs. Krishna Ranganath
Mudholkar). Reference was also made to Section 12 of the B
University Grants Commission Act, 1956 in support of the said
submission. ·

56. As far as the challenge relating to Section 9(2) of the

- Act, was concerned, the learned senior counsel contended that C
the submission based on Entry 66 of List-I of the Constitution
would equally apply to the said challenge. Besides this, he also
contended that as the appellant University was created by a
Statute, the amendment only seeks to interfere with its
independence by casting onerous conditions on the appellant
D .
to submit a panel of three persons to the State Government,
ana by empowering the State Government to grant its approval
as a pre-condition for the appointment of the Chancellor.
According to the learned senior counsel such a condition
imposed was highly arbitrary and therefore, was liable to be set
aside. E

57. The learned senior counsel therefore, contended that
the insertion of the word "only" in Section 4(1) of the Act, was
made by simultaneously deleting the expression "dissemination
of knowledge" and thereby, the un-amended provision has been
made meaningless. According to the learned senior counsel,
the conclusion of the Division Bench that even without the
deletion, the position remains the same, was not correct
because every word in the legislation has a purpose and the
principle Noscitur A Sociis was not applicable to the case on
hand because the term "dissemination of knowledge" is of
wider import.

58. The above proposition of law as contended by the
learned senior counsel has been widely dealt with by this Court
in a catena of decisions right from State of Bombay and others
508 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 13 S.C.R.

A vs. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha and others (AIR 1960 SC 610),
Rohit Pulp and Paper Mills Ltd. Vs. Collector of Central
Excise (AIR 1991 SC 754), Kera/a State Housing Board and
others Vs. Ramapriya Hotels (P) Ltd. and others, (1994) 5
SCC 672), Samantha Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (AIR 1997
B SC 3297), K. Bhagirathi G. Shenoy and others Vs. K.P.
Ballakuraya and another (AIR 1999 SC 2143), Brindavan
Bangle Stores and others Vs. Assistant Commissioner of
Commercial Taxes and another (AIR 2000 SC 691) ending
with the decision in CBI, AHO, Patna Vs. Braj Bhushan
c Prasad and others (AIR 2001 SC 4014 at page 4020). It has
been held that the legal maxim Noscitur A Sociis, is merely a
rule of construction and it cannot prevail in cases where it is
clear that the wider words have been deliberately used in order
-
to make the scope of the defined word correspondingly wider.
0 It is only where the intention of the Legislature in associating
wider words with words of narrower significance is doubtful or
.
'

otherwise not clear that the present rule of construction namely
Noscitur A Sociis can be usefully applied.

59. As far as the proviso to Section 4 was concerned, the
E submission of the learned senior counsel was, what applied to
the courses would equally apply to centers and since the
Division Bench has held that the State Governmenfwas not
competent to legislate, as regards the courses to be introduced,
on the same logic, the Division Bench ought not to have set
F aside the proviso in its entirety.

60. As against the above submissions Ms.Vibha Datta
Makhija, learned counsel for the State contended that the
University Grants Commission Rules was related to the
G standard of education and not on courses. According to the
learned counsel, going by the Preamble to 1995 Act, it is
categorical and unambiguous to the effect that the
establishment of the University was only to provide education
in Vedic learning and therefore, it qan only be in courses

H
MAHARSHI MAHESH YOGI VEDIC VISHWAVIDYALAYA v. 509
STATE OF M.P. [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]
-~ connected with Vedas. As a corollary it was submitted that any A
course not connected with Vedic learning will stand excluded.

61. The learned counsel submitted that even going by the
un-amended Section 4, it is clear that it referred only to all
learning connected with Vedic study, since the various sub- B
clauses to Section 4 also disclosed that it was more Vedic
centric rather than on general subjects. By referring to Section
17, the learned counsel pointed out that the degree of autonomy
granted to the appellant University, as compared to other
Universities was limited in scope.
c
62. The learned. counsel also referred to the object and
scope of the Madhya Pradesh Vishwavidyalaya Adhiniyam,
1973 (Act 22 of 1973) in particular to the Objects and Reasons
and contended by making reference to the object of the said
Act, which purported to consolidate and amend the law relating D
to Universities and to make better provisions for the
organization and administration of Universities in Madhya
Pradesh. The learned counsel further contended that the various
provisions of the said Act viz., Section 4(17), Section 6 (1) &
(8), Sections 7, 12, 24, 25, 26 and 39 provides the required E
authority to the State Government to regulate the manner of
functioning of the Universities in the State of Madhya Pradesh,
including the appellant University.

63. As far as the legislative competence is concerned, the
learned counsel referred to Entries 63 to 66 of List-I, which F
deals with "Co-ordination and determination of standards in
institutions for higher education or research and scientific and
technical institutions". By referring to Entry 32 of List - II, which
deals with incorporation and regulation of Universities, as well
as Entry 25 of List - 111, which again deals with Education, G
including technical education, medical education and
Universities, subject to the provisions of Entries 63, 64, 65 and
66 of List I, the learned counsel contended what was taken away
was only "co-ordination and determination of standards of
education" as covered by Entries 63 to 66 and by virtue of the H
510 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 13 S.C.R.

A enabling provision in Entry 32 of List-II, which empowers the
State Government for incorporating an University and regulating
its functioning, ample powers are vested with the State
Government to pass the impugned legislation. The learned
counsel therefore, contended that Section 4(1) only deals with
B the scope within which the appellant University can function and
that it does not talk about curriculum or standard. In such
circumstances, when the said provision empowers the
University to set up an institution by regulating the same by
taking certain measures, it cannot be held that such an
c exercise can be questioned on the ground of lack of
competence.

64. The learned counsel would contend that the
amendment introduced by the State Government was in public
interest, which falls squarely under Entry 32 of List-II, as well
D as Entry 25 of List-Ill and therefore, there was no repugnancy
with Entry 66 of List-I of the Constitution. In support of the above
submission, the learned counsel also referred to Section 2(f)
of the University Grants Commission Act, 1956 and contended
that the definition of the term 'University' under the said Act
E means a University established or incorporated by or under a
Central Act, a Provincial Act or a State Act and therefore, the
University which was established under the 1995 Act can
always be regulated by the State Government by passing
appropriate amendments to the Act by which the State created
F the said University.

65. The learned counsel also referred to Section 12 of the
University Grants Commission Act, 1956 to contend that the
general duty of the Commission is to take, in consultation with
G the Universities or other bodies concerned, all such steps as it
may think fit for the promotion and co-ordination of University
education and for the determination and maintenance of
standards of teaching, apart from examination and research in
Universities for which it can take certain actions. In support of
her submission, the learned counsel relied upon the decisions
H reported in AIR 1964 SC 1823 (R. Chitralekha Vs. State of
MAHARSHI MAHESH YOGI VEDIC VISHWAVIDYALAYA v. 511
STATE OF M.P [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]
- ·~
A
Mysore}, 1963 Supp (1) SCR 112 (The Gujarat University,
Ahmedabad Vs. Krishna Ranganath Mudho/kar and Ors),
1987 (3) SCR 949 (Osmania Universtity Teachers'
Association Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr.) and (1999)
7 SCC 120 (Dr. Preeti Srivastava and another Vs. State of
M.P.), The learned counsel also relied upon (2009) 4 SCC 590 8
(Annamalai University Vs. Secretary to Government,
Information and Tourism Department) and (2004) 4 SCC 513
(State of Tamil Nadu Vs. S. V.Bratheep).

66. The sum and substance of the submissions of the
learned counsel for the State was that the state had
c
competence ·to legislate by introducing the amendments, that
the autonomy of the appellant University was also subject to the
regulation by the State and that the only thing to be ensured
was that such regulatory measures should be reasonable and
in consonance with Article 19(1)0) of the Constitution. D

67. On the proviso to Section 4, the learned counsel
contended that so long as the Centre is connected with the
establishment of University, it would fall under Entry 32 of List-
II and therefore, the said proviso was rightly held to be intra- E
vires by the Division Bench. According to the learned counsel,
the effect of the amendment was not a curtailment, but was only
by way of clarification. According to the learned counsel to
• 11:
interpret the amendment, the principle of Mischief Rule will have
to be applied. The learned counsel further contended that the F
word "and': used in the Preamble, as well as under Section (4),
will have to be read conjunctively and relied upon 1987 (2) SCR
1 (Reserve Bank of India Vs. Peerless General Finance and
Investment Co. Ltd., and Others) and (1987) 3 SCC 279 (Utkal
.contractors and Joiners Pvt. Ltd., and Ors Vs. State of Orissa
and others). G

68. Having heard the learned senior counsel for the
appellant, as well .as the learned counsel for the State, and
having bestowea our serious consideration to the respective
submissions and having perused the scholarly judgment of the H
512 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 13 S.C.R.

A Division Bench and other material papers, at the very outset
we are of the view that providing education in an University is
the primary concern and objective, while all other activities
would only be incidental and adjunct. In this context, it would be
worthwhile to emphasis the importance of education which has
B been emphasised in the 'Neethishatakam' by Bhartruhari (First
Century B.C.) in the following words: "Translation: Education is
the sp~cial manifestation of man; Education is the treasure
which can be preserved without the fear of loss; Education
secures material pleasure, happiness and fame; Education is
c the teacher of the teacher; Education is God incarnate;
Education secures honour at the hands of the State, not money;
A man without education is equal to animal." For this very
reason, we have elaborately stated the importance of education
as stated by the Father of our Nation, other renowned Authors
0 and great men in public life as well as the mindset of our
Constitutional framers in paragraphs 22 to 42. We have also
referred to some of the leading judgments of this Court where
•
it has already been held that Right to Education is a
Fundamental Right, guaranteed by Article 21 of our Constitution.

E 69. Keeping the said basic principles in mind, when we
examine the issue involved in this appeal, the burden of the
appellant was that though under Section 4(1 ), reference to Vedic
learning and its allied subjects was made in the opening s •
sentence, the University was not established under the 1995
F Act, only for the purpose of imparting education in Vedas alone,
but it was intended for spreading the knowledge of Vedas and
simultaneously to teach Sanskrit, science and technology and
also as specifically mentioned in Section 4, for spreading of
knowledge in all fields. In fact, in the pursuit of our above
G perception, we have quoted extensively the view points of
various personalities, as well as the importance of education
and the various constitutional provisions, which were
incorporated mainly with a view to spread education in the
independent India in order to ensure that the Society is
H enlightened and by_such enlightenment the rights of the people
MAHARSHI MAHESH YOGI VEDIC VISHWAVIDYALAYA v. 513
STATE OF M.P. [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]
and orderly society is ensured in this Country. Also while A
referring to a decision of this Court rendered in Mamata
Mohanty (supra), the importance of imparting education is
emphasized as hereunder:

"29. Education is the syst(3matic instruction, schooling or 8
training given to the young persons in preparation for the
work of life. It also connotes the whole course of
scholastic instruction which a person has received.
Education connotes the process of training and
developing the knowledge, skill, mind and character of C
students by formal schooling .... "

***

33. In view of the above, it is evident that education is
necessary to develop the personality of a person as a 0
whole and in totality as it provides the process of training
and acquiring the knowledge, skills, developing mind and
character by formal schooling. Therefore, it is necessary
to maintain a high academic standard and academic
discipline along with academic rigour for the progress of E
a nation. Democracy depends for its own suNival on a
high standard of vocational and professional education.
Paucity of funds cannot be a ground for the State not to
provide quality education to its future citizens. It is for this
reason that in order to maintain the standard of education
the State Government provides grant-in-aid to private F
schools 1o ensure the smooth running of the institution
so that the standard of teaching may not suffer for want
of funds."

70. With the above said prelude, as regards the G
importance of education in an orderly society, when we come
to the core issue, the appellant was aggrieved by the
amendment Act 5 of 2000 by which Section 4(1) of 1995 Act
was altered and thereby, the State want to contend that the
appellant University can impart education only in the field of H
514 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 13 S.C.R.

A Vedic learning and practices, including Darshan, Agam Tantra,
ltihas, Puranas and Upvedas. 'Darshan' means a proper
reading of one's own self and the environment. Agam Tantra
is oriental research, which includes history and geography.
ltihas, Puranas as the very words suggest, relates to history.
Upvedas are part of Vedas. The section as it originally stood
8
stated that the University can provide education in all branches
of Vedic learning and practices, which also mentioned Gyan-
Vigyan, as well as promotion and development of the study of
Sanskrit as the University may from time to time determine. It
C also mentioned that the University can make provision for
,__
research and for the advancement and dissemination of
knowledge.

71. According to Mr. L. Nageshwar Rao, the learned senior
counsel for the appellant, the words "and" preceding the
D expression "Gyan-Vigyan", "the promotion and development of
study of Sanskrit", "as well as for the advancement and
dissemination of knowledge", have to be read disjunctively and
not conjunctively with the first part of the provision viz.,
"providing for instruction in all branches of Vedic learning".
E
72. As against the above submission, Ms. Makhija the
learned counsel for the State would contend that having regard
to the manner in which the provision has been couched, it will
have to be read conjunctively and not disjunctively. A..,

F 73. Both the learned counsel referred to the Preamble in
support of their submissions. When we refer to the Preamble
of the 1995 Act, we find that it has been stated that "an Act to
establish and incorporate a University in the State of Madhya
Pradesh and to provide for education and prosecution of
G research in Vedic learnings and practices and to provide for
matters connected therewith or incidental thereto." Here again,
while Mr.Nageshwar Rao the learned senior counsel would
contend that the expression "and" used clearly distinguish each
set of expression, according to the learned counsel for the State,
H the same will have to be read conjunctively.
MAHARSHI MAHESH YOGI VEDIC VISHWAVIDYALAYA v. 515
STATE OF M.P. [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]
- y A
74. Having considered the various submissions and the
analysis made based on detailed circumstances leading to the
intricacies of Vedas, the field it covers, as noted by the Division
Bench, as well as the concept of education, which has been
explained by very many learned and prominent persons to
whom we have made detailed references to in the earlier part B
of our judgment, we are of the considered view that education
is the base for every other subject to be taught in the process
of learning. Therefore, establishment of the University as the
Preamble goes to state was to provide for education in the
forefront. It will be appropriate to hold that such a provision for c
education in so far as the appellant University was concerned,
should concentrate and focus in the prosecution of research in
Vedic learning and practices and to provide for matters
connected therewith or incidental thereto. While holding so, it
will have to be stated in uncontroverted terms that merely
D
because such specific reference was made to prosecution of
research in Vedic learnings, it could be held that the imparting
of education in the appellant University should be restricted to
the said subject alone and not in any other subject.

75. In our considered view, such a narrow interpretation E
would be doing violence to the very basic concept of education,
and would create a serious restrain on the University, where,
~A
imparting of education is the primary objective and dealing with
any specific subject may be for enabling any one to acquire
special knowledge on such subjects. In other words, any such F
restrictive interpretation would go against the basic tenets of
the concept of education, which no Court can venture to state.

76. In this context, we must state that if such a narrow
' ~ interpretation is sought to be placed, it would even create an
G
embargo in the prosecution of research in Vedic learning and
practices. In this context, as has been widely considered and
referred to by the Division Bench, which we have also noted,
in a precise form in the earlier part of the judgment, we find that
Vedas has not left any subject untouched. The Division Bench
H
516 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013] 13 S.C.R.

A has noted in paragraphs 20 and 30 the various fields, which
~ -.
have been dealt with and associated in Vedas. The Division
Bench has gone to the extent of saying that some scientists
have seen the atomic dance in the deity of 'Natraj'. It has also
been noted that mathematic formulae are much more concise
B and precise in Vedas. It is said that Vedic learning is
concerned with human anatomy and physiology. It was further
found that there were enough materials in Vedas, which pertains
to seed production, crop production, sericulture, health care,
management, beauty culture, marketing and accounting. In fact,
c according to the Maharshi, who was the man behind the
establishment of the appellant University, in order to develop
the limitless inner potential of students and teachers, the only
solution is education and to achieve that end, according to him,
ancient Vedic sciences have to be revived and the knowledge
for systematic unfolding the range of human consciousness. In .
0
fact, this knowledge was stated to be Maharshi technology of
the unified field, which included Transcendental Meditation and
Transcendental Meditation Siddhi Programmes. It is also
stated that Transcendental Meditation is learnt by more than
E three million people worldwide and implemented in public and
private educational institutions in more than 20 countries
through Universities, colleges, schools and educational
institutions. Therefore, considering the very purport and intent
of the Maharshi, who relentlessly fought for the establishment
of the appellant University for nearly four decades and ultimately
F achieved the said objective for establishing the University, it can
never be held that his sole purport was only to spread vedic
learning and nothing else ..Therefore, in that view when we
examine the respective submissions of the learned counsel we
find force in the submission of the learned senior counsel for
G the appellant when he contended that by virtue of the
amendment, the un-amended Section 4(1) will become
meaningless and that the very purport of establishing the
appellant University would become a futile exercise, if it were
to restrict its courses only to mere Vedic learning, without
H providing scope for learning all other incidental and ancillary
llAAHARSHI MAHESH YOGI VEDIC VlSHWAVIDYALAYA v. 517
STATE OF M.P. [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]
subjects dealt with by Vedas viz., all other worldly subjects such A
as, Project Management, Finance Management, Crop
Management, Human Resource Management, mathematics
and other sciences for which fundamental basic provisions have
been prescribed in Vedas and practices including, Darshan,
Agam Tantra, ltihas, Puranas and Upvedas. B

77. It will have to be stated that the expression Gyan-
Vigyan was specifically mentioned in Section 4(1), not merely
to make a scientific study of what is contained in Vedas, as
even such a study may not fulfill the purpose for which the
University was created. When we think aloud as to what would C
happen if a scientific study exclusively about Vedas is made,
we wonder whether for that purpose a creation of a University
would have been necessitated. On the other hand, it is the other
way around, in as much as Vedas contains very many scientific
subjects such as, mathematics, study about atoms, human D
anatomy and physiology and other formulae. At this juncture,
the inclusion of the expression "Gyan-Vigyan", will have to be
understood to have been inserted with a view to study modern
science and technology as it exists and study the same in
consonance with the basic principles contained in Vedas and E
puranas. In fact, such an approach, while reading the provisions
in our considered opinion, would be the proper way of reading
the said provisions and not as contended by the learned
counsel for the State that the study of Gyan-Vigyan should be
exclusively for the purpose of understanding Vedas and Vedic F
principles. We have earlier explained what is "Gyan Vigyan" by
making reference to an Article "From Newton to Nirvana:
Science, Vigyan and Gyan" by Dr.Subash Sharma, Dean of
. ;,
Indian Business Academy, Noida. Based on the said Article,
we have noted that Gyan Vigyan is nothing but a systematic G
study of science through senses by applying one's mind with
absolute consciousness. If it is the meaning to be attributed ,to
the expression "Gyan Vigyan", it will have to be held that the
said expression used in Section 4(1) cannot be restricted to a
mere study on Vedas and its practices. Such a narrow H
518 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013] 13 S.C.R.

A interpretation will be doing violence to the whole concept of "!'-
Gyan Vigyan, which as explained by Dr. Subash Sharma, is the
combination of human senses, mind and consciousness, which
should be applied to every aspect of human life, which would
include all other academic subjects viz., science, mathematics,
B philosophy, management, etc.

78. In this context, when we refer to the expression
"promotion and development of the study of Sanskrit as the
University may from time to time determine", we find that even )..
indisputably the said provision for the study of Sanskrit is totally
c unconnected to the learning of Vedas and its allied subjects, .... )

except that the scripts of Vedas may be in Sanskrit. For that
purpose, there need not necessarily be a specific provision to
the effect that there should be promotion and development of
the study of Sanskrit. Therefore, apart from Vedic learning and
D its practices, the establishment of the appellant University was
~
for the purpose of providing education in the field of science
and technology, intensive learning of Sanskrit and provision for
~
research in every other field for the advancement and
disbursement of knowledge.
E
79. We are of the considered opinion that only such an
interpretation to the un-amended Section 4(1) would be the only
way of interpretation that can be accorded to the said provision.
Once, we steer clear of the interpretation of the said provision ;. ~
in the above said manner, we find that the amendment, which
F '
was introduced by Act 5 of 2000, was clearly intended to
purposely do away with its original intendment and thereby,
restrict the scope of activities of the appellant University to the
learning of Vedas and its practices and nothing else. The
restriction so created by introducing the amendment was self-
G destructive and thereby, the original object and purpose of f/.- -
establishing the appellant University was done away with. In this
context, the framing of the Ordinance 15, which provided for the
study on various courses in the appellant University was
consciously approved by the State Government without any
H
MAHARSHI MAHESH YOGI VEDIC VISHWAVIDYALAYA v. 519
STATE OF M.P. [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]
""'.6--'f
inhibition. A perusal of the co.urse contents in the Ordinance A
discloses that there were as many as 49 courses connected
with Vedic learning and practices and about 33 courses on
other subjects. By introducing the amendment under Act 5 of
2000 and thereby, insisting that imparting of education in the
appellant University can be restricted only to Vedic learning and B
that the science and technology should also be only for the
purpose of learning Vedas.and its practices, will have to be
;/.. stated unhesitatingly as creating a formidable restriction on the
right to education, which is a guaranteed Constitutional right and

- thereby, clearly violating Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.
Equally, the addition of the expression "in the above fields and
in these fields may ......... " while deleting the expression
c

"dissemination of knowledge", in our considered opinion,
drastically interfered with the right to education sought to be
advanced by the University by its creation originally under the
-.f D
1995 Act, which restriction now sought to be imposed can
never be held to be a reasonable restriction, nor can it be held
to have any rationale, while creating such a restriction by way
of an amendment to Section 4(1 ).

80. Having regard to our fundamental approach to the E
issue raised in this appeal and our conclusion as stated above,
we are convinced thatthe arguments based on the Legislative
• J... competence also pales into insignificance. Even without
addressing the said question, we have in as much found that
by virtue of the amendment introduced to Section 4(1), an F
embargo has been clearly created in one's right to seek for
education, which is a Constitutionally protected Fundamental
Right. Therefore, there was a clear violation of Articles 14 and
.., 21 of the Constitution and consequently, such a provision by
~
way of an amendment cannot stand the scrutiny of the Court of G
Law. To support our conclusion, we wish to refer to the following
decisions rendered by this Court, right from Mohini Jain case,
viz.,

(i) Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan
H
v. Union of India- (2012) 6 SCC 1
520 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 13 S.C.R.

A (ii) Bhartiya Seva Samaj Trust v. Yogeshbhai
Ambalal Patel - (2012) 9 SCC 310 '
•'
(iii) State of T.N. v. K. Shyam Sunder (2011) 8 SCC
737
B (iv) Satimbla Sharma v. St. Paul's Sr. Sec. School
c2011) 13 sec 160

(v) Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India - (2008)
6 sec 1;
c wherein, this Court has consistently held that Right to
Education is a Fundamental Right. Thus, our conclusion is
fortified by the various judgments of this Court, wherein, it has
been held that imparting of education is a Fundamental Right,
in as much as, we have held that the establishment of the
D appellant University was mainly for the purpose of imparting
education, while promotion of Vedic learning is one of the
primary objectives of the University. Any attempt on the part of
the State to interfere with the said main object viz., imparting
of education, would amount to an infringement of the
E Fundamental Right guaranteed under the Constitution.
Consequently, the amendment, which was introduced under the
1995 Act to Section 4(1) and also the insertion of the proviso,
has to be held ultra-vires. ).. ...

F 81. Having arrived at the above conclusion, when we
examine the stand of the State, at the very outset, we are not
persuaded to accede to the submission of the learned counsel
that the amendment was only by way of a clarification of the
existing provision. In fact, the Division Bench also proceeded
G on the footing that 'dissemination of knowledge' as it originally
existed, did not empower the University to provide education
to other courses other than Vedas and its practices. With great
respect to the Division Bench, we are of the view that such an
approach was directly in conflict with the basic principle of the
H Constitutionally protected Fundamental Right, the Right to
MAHARSHI MAHESH YOGI VEDIC VISHWAVIDYALAYA v. 521
STATE OF M.P [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]
-·'1, Education and consequently the said line of reasoning of the A
Division Bench and the submissions on that basis cannot also
be countenanced.

82. In fact, in this context, the decision relied upon by the
learned counsel for the respondent State reported in (1987) 4
B
SCC 671 (Osmania University Teachers' Association Vs.
State of Andhra Pradesh and another), rather than supporting
the respondent State can be usefully applied to state that
"dissemination of knowledge" in every respect would apply to
any subject and cannot be restricted to any particular subject.
In paragraph 30 of the said decision, while concluding as to
c
the role of the University Grants Commission in the matter of
academic education, it has been stated as under:

" ... Dissemination of learning with search for new
• knowledge with disci11,/ine all round must be D
~ maintained at all costs. It is hoped that University Grants
Commission will duly discharge its responsibility to the
Nation and play an increasing role to bring about the
needed transformation in the academic life of the
University." (Emphasis added) E
83. The above sentence amply establishes that
dissemination of learning is for acquisition of knowledge in
.. J... every kind of discipline and that such a perception should be
maintained at all cost. We therefore, hold that "dissemination
of knowledge" as it originally stood in Section 4(1), which was F
deleted by way of the Amendment Act 5 of 2000, caused havoc
by restricting the scope of acquisition of knowledge to be
gathered by an individual from the facilities made available in
the appellant University. We make it clear that it can never be
-~ G
..j.
held that the said expression used in the un-amended Section
4(1) can be held to have a limited application for acquisition
of knowledge on Vedas alone and not in other fields.

84. As far as the argument of the learned counsel for the
respondent based on the expression used in the Preamble was H
522 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 13 S.C.R.

A concerned, at the very outset, it will have to be held that the -y' -
Preamble cannot control the scope of the applicability of the
Act. If the provision contained in the main Act are clear and
without any ambiguity and the purpose of the Legislation can
be thereby duly understood without any effort, there is no
B necessity to even look into the Preamble for that purpose.

85. In fact, the Division Bench itself has made reference
to a decision of this Court in Union of India Vs. Elphinstone
Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. and others etc., reported in
AIR 2001 SC 724. The extent to which a Preamble of an Act
c can be referred to or relied upon has been succinctly stated
as under:

" ... The preamble of an Act, no doubt can also be read
along with other provisions of the Act to find out the
D meaning of the words in enacting provision to decide ""-
whether they are clear or ambiguous but the preamble ~
in itself not being an enacting provision is not of the same
weight as an aid to construction of a Section of the Act
as are other relevant enacting words to be found
E elsewhere in the Act. The utility of the preamble
diminishes on a conclusion as to clarity of enacting
provisions. It is, therefore, said that the 11.reamble is
not to influence the meaning_ otherwise ascribable to
the enacting f;!,arls unless there is a comf;!.elling_ reason J....
F for it. If in an Act the preamble is general or brief
statement of the main purpose, it may well be of little
value .... We cannot, therefore, start with the preamble for
construing the provisions of an Act, though we could be
justified in resorting to it nay we will be required to do so
if we find that the language used by Parliament is ...
G ambiguous or is too general though in point of fact
..;.._
'
Parliament intended that it should have a limited
application .... " (Emphasis added)

86. The above statement of law makes the position
H abundantly clear that it is the statutory provision, which will have
MAHARSHI MAHESH YOGI VEDIC VISHWAVIDYALAYA v. 523
STATE OF M.P [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]
""'\
,--''f
to be read and analyzed for the purpose of understanding the A
scope .and purport for which the Legislation was intended and
j
the brief statement contained in the Preamble will be of very
( little value. That apart, we have noted in the earlier part of the
judgment as to how even a reading of the Preamble shows the
importance attached to imparting of education in the appellant B
University, as has been highlighted in the forefront while making
a mention about the other aspects of providing scope for
research oriented education on Vedas and its practices by the
appellant University.

- 87. In the light of our above discussions, we hold that the
submission of the learned counsel for the State by making a
detailed reference to the Preamble is of no assistance to the
c

respondents. For the very same reason, the arguments of the
learned counsel that any course to be conducted in the
appellant University should be Vedic centric cannot also be D
--+
countenanced. On the other hand, as held by this Court in
Osmania University case, "dissemination of knowledge" as
originally incorporated in the un-amended Section 4(1} alone
would serve the purpose of effective functioning of the appellant
University in imparting and spreading knowledge on every other E
field available, apart from providing intensive educational
curriculum in Vedic learning and its practices.
i J-
88. In the light of our above conclusion, the deletion of the
said expression will have to be held to be an arbitrary action F
l of the respondent State and thereby, violating equality in law
' and equal protection of law as enshrined under Article 14 of
the Constitution, in as much as all other Universities, which were
being controlled and administered by the State by the 1973 Act,
" ~ enjoy the freedom of setting up any course with the approval
G
of the University Grants Commission, the appellant alone would
be deprived of such a right and liberty by restricting the scope
of imparting education in any field other than Vedas and its
practices.
89. As far as the decision relied upon by the learned H
524 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 13 S.C.R.

A counsel for the State for the proposition that the word "and" in y--.'
the Preamble, as well as in Section 4 will have to be read
conjunctively viz., the decision reported in (1987) 3 sec 279
(Utkal Contractors and Joiners Pvt. Ltd. and Ors Vs. State of
\
Orissa and others), in the light of our conclusions based on the
B context in which the 1995 Act was brought into force and the
reading of Section 4(1) in the said context, the expression "and"
used in the said Section will have to be necessarily read
disjunctively. We do not find any scope to apply the said
decision to the facts of this case.
c 90. As far as the decision reported in 1987 (1) SCC 424
(Reserve Bank of India Vs. Peerless General Finance and
Investment Co. Ltd., and Others), we find the following
paragraph as more relevant in order to appreciate the present
-
controversy with which we are concerned; paragraph 33 reads
D as under:

33. Interpretation must depend on the text and the context.
They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say
if the text is the texture. context is what gives the
E colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That
interpretation is best which makes the textual
interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best
interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this
knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole and
F then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by
phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked at, in the
'
context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute-
maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the sections,
'
clauses, phrases and words may take colour and appear
different than when the statute is looked at without the
G
glasses provided by the context. With these glasses we
must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each
section, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant
and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire
Act. No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be
H
MAHARSHI MAHESH YOGI VEDIC VISHWAVIDYALAYA v. 525
STATE OF M.P. [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]
·-Y construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed so A
that every word has a place and everything is in its
place .... "

(Emphasis added)

91. Reading the said paragraph and having analyzed the B
1995 Act on the whole along with the Preamble, the various
definition clauses, Section 4(1) and the sub-clauses (ii) to
(xxviii) and the provision providing for enacting the Statutes and
Ordinances, we have to hold that the expression "and" used in
Section 4(1) will have to be read disjunctively and not C
conjunctively. In this context, we wish to rely on the decision
rendered by this Court in Prof. Yashpal and another (supra),
wherein, it has been held in paragraph 17 as under:

"17. In Constitutional Law of India by Seervai, the learned 0
--+ author has said in para 2. 12 (3rd Edn.) that the golden
rule of interpretation is that words should be read in
their ordinarv. natural and grammatical meaning
subject to the rider that in construing words in a
Constitution conferring legislative power the most E
liberal construction should be put upon the words so
that thev mav have effect in their widest amplitude.
This is subject to certain exceptions and a restricted
1 .i meaning may be given to words if it is necessary to
prevent a conflict between two exclusive entries."
(Emphasis added) F
92. Besides the above two decisions, which discuss about
the methodology of interpretation of a Statute, we also refer to
the following decisions rendered by this Court in lshwar Singh
' -'" Bindra (supra), wherein in para 11 it has been held as under: G

"11 ........ It would be much more appropriate in the context
to read it disconjunctively. In Stroud's Judiciql Dictionary,
3rd Edn. it is stated at p. 135 that "and" has generally a
cumulative sense, requiring the fulfillment of all the
H
526 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013] 13 S.C.R.

A conditions that it joins together, and herein it is the
antithesis of or. Sometimes, however, even in such a
connection, it is, by force of a contexts, read as "or".
Similarly in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes. 11th
Edn .. it has been accepted that "to carry out the
B intention of the legislature it is occasionally found
necessary to read the conjunctions 'or' and 'and' one
for the other". "(Emphasis added)

93. We may also refer to para 4 of the decision rendered
C by this Court in (1987) 3 SCC 208 (Joint Director of Mines and
Safety Vs. T & N Stone Quarries (P) Ltd.,) :

"4. According to the plain meaning, the exclusionary
clause in sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act read with
the two provisos beneath clauses (a) and (b), the word
D "and" at the end of para (b) of sub-clause (ii) of the
proviso to clause (a) of Section 3(1) must in the context
in which it appears, be construed as "or"; and if so
construed, the existence of any one of the three
conditions stipulated in paras (a), (b) and (c) would at
E once attract the proviso to clauses (a) and (b) of sub-
section (1) of Section 3 and thereby make the mine
subject to the provisions of the Act. The High Court
overlooked the fact that the use of the negative language
in each of the three clauses implied that the word "and"
used at the end of clause (b) had to be read disjunctively.
F
That construction of ours is in keeping with the
legislative intent manifested by the scheme of the Act
which is primarily meant for ensuring the safety of
workmen employed in the mines."
G (Emphasis added)

94. Applying the ratio as laid down in the above mentioned
decisions, we are convinced that our above conclusion is fully
supported by the said principles and therefore, we are not
H inclined to hold that the expression "and" used in the Preamble,
MAHARSHI MAHESH YOGI VEDIC VISHWAVIDYALAYA v. 527
STATE OF M.P [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]
,-y as well as in Section 4 should be read conjunctively as A
contended by the learned counsel for the State. On the other
hand, in the context in which the said expression is used, it will
have to be read as "or" creating a disjunctive reading of the
provision.
B
95. In this context it will be worthwhile to refer to what
Scrutton, L.J. has stated in the celebrated decision reported
in Green Vs. Premier Glynrhonwy State Co. (1928) 1 KB 561,
"You do sometimes read 'or' as 'and' in a statute. But you do
not do it unless you are obliged because 'or' does not generally
mean 'and' and 'and' does not generally mean 'or' ". And as
c
pointed out by Lord Halsbury the reading of 'or' as 'and' is not
to be resorted to, 'unless some other part of the same statute
or the clear intention of it requires that to be done'. [refer
Mersey Docks and Harbour Board Vs. Henderson Bros.,
(1888) 13 AC 595 at pg.603 (HL)]. In fact in the case on hand D
~
we have found that though the expression 'and' has been used,
prior to the expression 'promotion and development of the study
of Sanskrit.. .. .' and again prior to the set of expression 'for the
advancement' and again prior to the set of expression
'dissemination of knowledge', the context in which the E
Legislation was brought into force and reading the said section

.).
along with the Preamble and other sub clauses of Section 4,
the expression 'and' has to be read disjunctively and not
conjunctively. Therefore, even applying the principle laid down
by Lord Scrutton and Lord Halsbury, we are fortified by our F
conclusion that in the case on hand the expression
'dissemination of knowledge', as well as 'promotion and
development of the study of Sanskrit' and 'to make provision
for research', were all expressions which have been used
disjunctively and not conjunctively with the words Vedic learning G
and practice.

96. The decision relied upon by the learned senior counsel
for the appellant reported in HansofiDevi (supra}, para 9 also
supports the above proposition of law. Para 9 of the said
decision reads as under: H
528 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013] 13 S.C.R.

A "9. Before we embark upon an inquiry as to what would y-
be the co"ect interpretation of Section 28-A, we think it
appropriate to bear in mind certain basic principles of
interpretation of a statute. The rule stated by Tindal, C.J.
in Sussex Peerage case s'fill holds the field. The
B aforesaid rule is to the effect: (ER p. 1057)

"If the words of the statute are in themselves
precise and unambiguous, then no more can be
necessary than to expound those words in their
natural and ordinary sense. The words
c themselves alone do, in such case, best declare
the intention of the lawgiver.•

It is no doubt true that if on going through the plain
meaning of the language of statutes, it leads to
D anomalies. injustices and absurdities, then the court
mav look into the purpose for which the statute has
been brought and would trv to give a meaning, which
would adhere to the purpose of the statute: .... ."

E 97. The above said proposition of law laid down by this
Court fully supports the claim of the appellant.

98. With this, when we come to the other submission of
the learned counsel for the appellant relating to the challenge .k. •
made to the proviso added to Section 4., the proviso which has.
F been added is to the effect that no courses should be conducted
and no centers should be established or run without the prior
approval of the State Government. The contention of the learned
counsel for the appellant before the Division Bench, as well as
before us was that the creation of courses, as well as the
G centers are governed by the provisions of 1995 Act and such --;.
activities of the appellant University can at best be regulated
only by the University Grants Commission, by virtue of the
statutory prescription under Section 12 of the University Grants
Commission Act, read along with Entry 66 of List-I of the
H
MAHARSHI MAHESH YOGI VEDIC VISHWAVIDYPJJl..YA v. 529
STATE OF M.P. [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]
-y~

' Constitution and that the State Legislature has no competence A
to deal with the said issue.

99. While dealing with the above contention, the Division
Bench after making a detailed reference to various Entries
commencing from Entries 63 to 66 of List-I, as well as Entry
B
25 of List-Ill and also Section 12 of the Universities Grants
Commission Act, 1956 ultimately held that having regard to the
__j, inclusion of the appellant University in the list of Universities
maintained by the Commission under Section 2(f) of the 1956
Act, as reflected in Annexure P-5, dated 24.08.1988, the
existence of Ordinance 15, which came into being in c
accordance with law that once the University Grants
Commission Act is in force, the running of the courses and
-I determination thereof, has to be controlled by the University
"""' Grants Commission. The proviso stipulating that no course
~ should be conducted and no centers should be established and D
run without the prior approval of the State Government. The
restriction is so far as it related to conduct of courses is
concerned, the same was beyond the Legislative competence
of the State Legislature. So holding thus, the Division Bench
declared that the proviso so far as it related to the aspect that E
no course should be conducted and run without the prior
approval of the State, was ultra vires and beyond the Legislative
i j. competence of the State Legislature.

100. This Court in Prof Yashpal and another (supra) held F
in paragraphs 28, 33 and 34 as under:

"28. Though incorporation of a university as a legislative
head is a State subject (Entry 32 List II) but basically a
university is an institution for higher education and
" research. Entry 66 of List I is coordination and G
determination of standards in institutions for higher
education or research and scientific and technical
institutions. There can thus be a clash between the powers
of the State and that of the Union. The interplay of
various entries in this regard in the three lists of the H
5:30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 13 S.C.R.

A Seventh Schedule and the real import of Entry 66 of List
I have been examined in several decisions of this Court.
In Gujarat University v. Krishna Ranganath Mudholkar a
decision by a Constitution Bench rendered prior to the
Forty-second Amendment when Entry 11 of List II was in
B existence, it was held that Items 63 to 66 of List I are
carved out of the subject of education and in respect of
these items the power to legislate is vested exclusively
in Parliament. The use of the expression "subject to" in
Item 11 of List II of the Seventh Schedule clearly
c indicates that the legislation in respect of excluded
matters cannot be undertaken by the State Legislatures.
In AIR para 23, the Court held as under: (SCR pp. 137-
38)

"Power of the State to legislate in respect of education
D including universities must to the extent to which it is
entrusted to the Union Parliament, whether such power
is exercised or not, be deemed to be restricted. If a
subject of legislation is covered by Items 63 to 66 even
if it otherwise falls within the larger field of 'education
E including universities' power to legislate on that subject
must lie with Parliament. ... Item 11 of List II and Item
66 of List I must be harmoniously construed. The two
entries undoubtedly overlap: but to the extent of
overlapping. the power conferred by Item 66 List I
F must prevail over the power of the State under Item
11 of List II. It is manifest that the excluded heads deal
primarily with education in institutions of national or
special importance and institutions of higher education
including research, sciences, technology and vocational
·~ -
G training of labour."

***

33. The consistent and settled view of this Court,
therefore. is that in spite of incorporation of
H universities as a legislative head being in the State
MAHARSHI MAHESH YOGI VEDIC VISHWAVIDYALAYA v. 53~
STATE OF M.P. [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.)
--y
List, the whole gamut of the universitY.. which will A
iaclude teaching. gualit'I.. of education being im11.arted,
curriculum, standard of examination and evaluation
and also research activitr.. being carried on will no~
come within the 11.urview of the State Legislature on
account of a s11.ecific entr'/.. on coordination and B
determination of standards in institutions for higher
education or research and scientific and technical
education being in the Union List for which Parliament
~
alone is com11.etent. It is the responsibility of Parliament
to ensure that proper standards are maintained in c
institutions for higher education or research throughout
the country and also uniformity in standards is
maintained.

34. In order to achieve the aforesaid purpose, Parliament
has enacted the University Grants Commission Act. First D
c+
para of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the
University Grants Commission Act, 1956 (for short "the
UGC Act'J is illustrative and consequently it is being
reproduced below:
E
''The Constitution of India vests Parliament with exclusive
authority in regard to 'coordination and determination of
standards in institutions for higher education or research
;. j.
and scientific and technical institutions'. It is obvious that
neither coordination nor determination of standards is F
possible unless the Central Government has some voice
in the determination of standards of teaching and
examination in universities, both old and new. It is also
necessary to ensure that the available resources are
- -"t utilised to the best possible effect. The problem has
G
become more acute recently on account of the tendency
to multiply universities. The need for a properly
constituted Commission for determining and a/locating
to universities funds made available by the Central
Government has also become more urgent on this
"C"""n'
Cl rc:m"'h""';"'
VVU It. " {'-11 /J ICh.:>I..;> added)
H
532 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 13 S.C.R.

y-
A 101. In yet another decision, this Court has held in para 7
of the decision reported in R. Chitralekha (supra) as follows:

"7. . .. This and similar other passages indicate that if the
law made by the State by virlue of entry 11 of List II of
the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution makes
B
impossible or difficult the exercise of the legisiative power
of the Parliament under the entry "Co-ordination and
determination of standards in institutions for higher
education or research and scientific and technical
institutions" reserved to the Union, the State law may be
c bad. This cannot obviously be decided on speculative
and hypothetical reasoning. If the impact of the State law
providing for such standards on entry 66 of List I is so
heavy or devastating as to wipe out or appreciably abridge
the central field, it may be struck down. But that is a
D question of fact to be ascertained in each case .... t--
102. While considering the submission of the learned
senior counsel for the appellant, it will be worthwhile to make a
reference to Section 12 of the University Grants Commission
E Act, 1956 wherein while describing the functions of the
University Grants Commission, it has been stipulated that it is
the general duty of the Commission to take, in consultation with
the Universities or other bodies concerned, all such steps as it
~ •
may think fit for the promotion and co-ordination of University
F education and for the determination and maintenance of
standards of teaching, examination and research in
Universities, and for the purpose of performing its functions
under this Act, the Commission may hold certain enquiry and
do certain other activities. In fact, the Division Bench while
holding that conduct of courses come exclusively within the "/'< -
G
realm of control of the University Grants Commission, apparently
relied upon the said provision.

103. In fact the Division Bench has made a specific
reference to the expression used in the said Section, while
H ultimately holding that it was within the exclusive jurisdiction of
..
MAHARSHI MAHESH YOGI VEDIC VISHWAVIDYALAYA v. 533
STATE OF M.P. [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]
---...,,. the University Grants Commission i.e., the running of the A
Courses. The Division Bench has held to the effect "we have
no hesitation in our mind that once the University Grants
Commission Act is in force, the running of the courses and
determination thereof has to be controlled by the University
Grants Commission". The said sets of expressions have been B
more or less borrowed from the expression used in Section 12
itself.

.... 104. When we examine the ultimate conclusion of the
Division Bench that such a control by the University Grants
Commission will not extend to the running of the centers, we
c
are of the considered view that what all may apply to conduct
of courses, should equally apply to the running of centers as
well. In this context, it will be worthwhile to make a further
reference to the stipulation contained in Section 12 of the
University Grants Commission Act, which makes the position D
-+ clear. Under Section 12, the general duty of the Commission
to take in consultation with the Universities or other bodies is
concerned, is all such steps as it may think fit for the promotion
and co-ordination of University education and for the
determination and maintenance of standards of teaching, E
examination and research in Universities. It also further
stipulates that such a decision should be taken by the University

> . Grants Commission for the purpose of the Universities to
perform its functions under the Act. The Division Bench itself
has noted that the running of the courses and determination F
thereof, can be controlled only by the University Grants
Commission by virtue of the operation of Section 12. If it is for
the University Grants Commission to take a decision in

-
consultation with the Universities, such steps as it thinks fit for
..., the promotion and co-ordination of Universities education, then G
it will have to be held that, that it should include, apart from the
course content, the manner in which education is imparted viz.,
the process of teaching, while at the same time ensuring the
standard of such teaching is maintained by deciding as to
whether such teaching process can be allowed to be imparted H
534 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 13 S.C.R.

A in places other than the University campus viz., in the centers _,,., -
or other colleges.

105. In our considered opinion, Section 12 of the
University Grants Commission Act, 1956 would encompass
B apart from determining the course contents with reference to
which the standard of teaching and its maintenance is to be
monitored by the University Grants Commissi'on, would also
include the infrastructure that may be made available, either in
the University or in other campuses, such as the centers, in ,..
order to ensure that such standard of education, teaching and
c examination, as well as research are maintained without any
fall in standrard. Therefore, while upholding the conclusion of
the Division Bench that it is beyond the legislative competence
of the State Legislature to stipulate any restriction, as regards
the conduct of the courses by getting the approval of the State
0 Government, in the same breath, such lack of competence
would equally apply to the running of the centers as well. +--
106. In Dr. Preeti Srivastava (supra) while dealing with the
scope of Entry 66 of List-I vis-a-vis Entry 25 of List-111, this Court
E considered on what basis the standard of education in an
institution can be analyzed. In paragraph 36, it has been held
as under:

"36 ..... Standards of education in an institution or college ~ .
depend on various factors. Some of these are:
F
(1) The caliber of the teaching ·staff; (2) A proper syllabus
•
designed to achieve a high level of education in the
given span of time; (3) The student-teacher ratio; (4) The
ratio between the students and the hospital beds
G available to each student; (5) The caliber of the students
admitted to the institution; (6) Equipment and laboratory
-,.. -
facilities, or hospital facilities for training in the case of
medical colleges; (7) Adequate accommodation for the
college and the attached hospital; and (8) The standard
H of examinations held including the manner in which the
MAHARSHI MAHESH YOGI VEDIC VISHWAVIDYALAYA v. 535
STATE OF M.P. [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]
- ..,.. papers are set and examined and the clinical A
performance is judged."

107. The above statement of law on Entry 66 of List-I vis-
a-vis Entry 25 of List-Ill throws much light on this issue. For
instance, in the case of the appellant, while it has got its own B
infrastructure facilities for imparting education on various
courses spelt out in Ordinance 15, which has opened up
centers in various places falling within its jurisdiction viz. the
~ State of Madhya Pradesh for imparting education on the very
same courses specified in Ordinance 15. If we apply the
principle spelt out in paragraph 36 of the above decision, where
c
the standard for examining the standard on education of an
University, the various factors culled out in the said paragraph
can be held to be the factors to be considered. In the same
line of reasoning, it will have to be held that the various centers
created by the appellant University, would also fall as one of D
-:f
the items along with the eight items spelt out in the said
paragraph.

108. In the light of the said reasoning also, it will have to
be held that the running of centers by the appellant University E
would fall within the exclusive realm of Entry 66 of List - I, which
would in turn be governed by Section 12 of the University Grants
Commission Act and consequently the State Government to
> ~
that extent should be held to lack the necessary legislative
competence to meddle with such centers set up by the appellant F
University.

109. We therefore, hold that the entire proviso to Section
4(1) has to be held to be ultra-vi res. The contention of the
..., -1' learned counsel for the appellant therefore, merits acceptance
and the contention to the contrary made by the learned counsel G
for the State stands rejected.

110. It is also necessary to note, as well as mention that
after the University was established for its initial establishment
and for running the institution, according to the appellant, more H
536 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013] 13 S.C.R.

_,,.---
A than Rs.12 crores were spent by way of an investment and that
nearly Rs.60 crores have been spent for running the University
and its various centers throughout the State of Madhya Pradesh.
The recurring expenditure was stated to be Rs.11 crores.
Therefore, when the appellant University has proceeded to
B establish its institution for the purpose of imparting education
by making huge investments, a major part of which would have
definitely come by way of fees collected from the students who
had joined the institution aspiring for improving their educational
career, in our considered opinion, it is the responsibility of the
c State to ensure that such high expectation of the students who
joined the appellant university is not impaired and that for
whatever expenses incurred by the students, appropriate returns
should be provided to them by way of imparting education in
the respective fields which, they choose to associate themselves
by getting themselves admitted in the appellant University.
0
Therefore, on this ground as well, it will have to be held that such
expectations of the students, as well as their parents cannot be
dealt with so very lightly by the State, while considering for any
change to be brought about in the Constitution and functioning
E of the appellant University. It can therefore be validly held that
such expectations of the students and their parents, as well as
that e>f the appellant University, can validly be held to be a
legitimate expectation and considering the challenge made to
the amendment introduced on various grounds raised at the
instance of the appellant, the legitimate expectation of the
F appellant University, as well as the student community, would
also equally support the contentions of the appellant University,
while challenging the amendments in particular the amendment
introduced to Section 4(1), as well as the addition of a proviso
to the said Section.
G
111. One other relevant factor )Nhich is also to be kept in
mind is the establishment of the appellant University at the
repeated persuasion of Maharshi Mahesh Yogi was definitely
to provide full-fledged education on Vedas and the various
H intricate subjects, which are found in Vedas, as well as its
MAHARSHI MAHESH YOGI VEDIC VISHWAVIDYALAYA v. 537
STATE OF M.P. [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]
.... ·:-y-
practices, lthihas, Puranas etc. In fact, there can be no two A
opinion that such an institution with such a laudable objective
for imparting education in different fields based on the teachings
in Vedas, was very rare and it is said that the appellant
University is stated to be an unique University created and
established by the founders of the said institution headed by B
Maharshi Mahesh Yogi. Therefore, when such a premium
University, which is stated to be only one of its kind in the whole
of the Country was successfully established based on the 1995
.>(
Act, in our considered opinion, such a well established
institution should be allowed to survive by enabling the said c
University to conduct courses as has been planned by it and
introduced under Ordinance 15 and thereby, make the
appellant University a viable one. Such an approach alone, in
our considered view, ensure the successful existence and
continued running of the University in the further years and
D
thereby, benefit very many aspirants from among the younger
generation who wish to learn more and more about very many
subjects by understanding such subjects based on the
teachings that are found and established in Vedic learnings,
its practices, lthihas and Puranas etc. Therefore, on this ground
as well, in our considered opinion, any attempt made from any
E
quarters, which would disrupt the rqnning of the appellant
University, will only amount to interfering with its various
,. ).... Constitutional rights and fundamental rights enshrined in the
Constitution. Therefore, when such interference is brought to the
notice of this Court, the Court has to necessarily come to the F
rescue of the appellant University by saving it from any such
onslaught being made on its continued existence. We,
therefore, find force in the submission of the learned senior
, . _,, counsel for the appellant while attacking the amended Section
4(1) and its proviso, by which the appellant University was G
deprived of its valuable right to hold very many programmes in
the conduct of the course enumerated in its Ordinance 15, which
consequently resulted in violation of its Constitutional, as well
as Fundamental Rights in the running of its educational
institutions. H
538 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 13 S.C.R.

A 112. With this, we come to the last part of the submission
made on behalf of the appellant, which related to the
amendment to Section 9(2) of the 1995 Act. Under the un- •
amended provision, after the first Chancellor viz., Maharshi
Mahesh Yogi, the Board of Management was empowered to
B appoint the Chancellor from among the persons of eminence
and renowned scholar of Vedic education who can hold office
for a term of five years and who would be eligible for
reappointment. Under the amended Section 9(2), it was
stipulated that after the first Chancellor, the Board of
c Management should prepare and submit a panel of three
persons to the State Government and out of the panel, one
person should be appointed as Chancellor by the Board of
Management, after obtaining the approval of the State
Government. As far as the period of holding office was
concerned, there was no change in its terms. The Division
0
Bench while considering the said amendment introduced under
Act 5 of 2000, has held that even after the amendment, the
Management had the power of recommendation and they can
recommend a person of eminence and renowned scholar of
E Vedic education and even if the ultimate appointment is to be
made with the approval of the State Government, since any
such appointment can be only from the panel prepared by the
Board of management, such a stipulation contained in the
amendment does not in any way impinge upon any right, much
less the Constitutional Right or Fundamental Right of the
F appellant University.

113. Having bestowed our serious consideration to the
above conclusion of the Division Bench, we do not find anything
wrong with the said conclusion. We also hold that the said
G provision does not in any way offend Article 14 of the 't- '
Constitution, nor does it affect the autonomy of the appellant
University. Apart from the above challenges, no other
submission relating to the other amended provisions were
seriously argued before us.
H
MAHARSHI MAHESH YOGI VEDIC VISHWAVIDYALAYA v. 539
STATE OF M.P. [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.)
114. In the light of our above conclusion, this appeal is A
partly allowed. We hold that the amended Section 4(1) under
Act 5 of 2000 inclusive of the introduction of proviso to the said
Section is ultra-vires of the Constitution and the same is liable
to be set aside. In other respects, the judgment of the Division
Bench stands confirmed. The application for intervention B
considered, no merits, the same is dismissed.

Kalpana K. Tripathy Appeal partly allowed.

-.