MAHAVEER SHARMAversusEXIDE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED & ANR.

                [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1311 : 2025 INSC 268

                         Mahaveer Sharma
                                 v.
           Exide Life Insurance Company Limited & Anr.
                      (Civil Appeal No. 3562 of 2025)
                              25 February 2025
       [B.V. Nagarathna and Satish Chandra Sharma,* JJ.]


                           Issue for Consideration
       Whether there was any material suppression of fact on the part of
       the appellant’s father while obtaining an insurance policy or not.

                                 Headnotes†
       Consumer Disputes – Life insurance policy – Repudiation
       of claim, when not proper – Life insurance policy of Rs.25
       lakhs was taken by the deceased (father of the appellant) –
       He died in an accident – Appellant’s claim was repudiated
       on the ground that there was material suppression by his
       father as he had disclosed only one other life insurance
       policy availed by him at the time of filing the proposal form,
       but failed to disclose other similar policies – Claim of the
       appellant, if was rightly rejected on account of suppression
       of material facts:
       Held: No – The disclosed policy was for Rs.40 Lakhs, an amount
       significantly more than the policies not disclosed and the sum
       assured by the subject policy herein – Thus, the insured had
       made a substantial disclosure inasmuch as he had disclosed
       that he had obtained another policy from a private insurer for
       Rs.40 lakh which was in force – The other policies were of
       inconsequential sum assured amounting to Rs.2,30,000/- – Such
       a failure would not influence the decision of a prudent insurer to
       issue the policy proposed – The substantial disclosure made was
       sufficient for a prudent insurer to determine the risk assumed –
       Further, the policy in question is not a Mediclaim policy; it is a
       life insurance cover and the death of the deceased had taken
       place on account of an accident – Thus, failure to mention about
       other policies does not amount to a material fact in relation to



* Author
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    the policy availed – Therefore, the claim could not have been
    repudiated by the respondent-company – Order repudiating the
    claim of the appellant and the orders of the National Commission
    and the State Commission, set aside – Respondent to release all
    benefits under the policy to the appellant with interest, as directed.
    [Paras 9, 18-20]

    Consumer Disputes – Insurance contracts – “material facts”;
    “material suppression” – What is:
    Held: An insurance is a contract uberrima fides – It is the duty of
    the applicant to disclose all facts which may weigh with a prudent
    insurer in assuming the risk proposed – These facts are considered
    material to the contract of insurance and its non-disclosure may
    result in the repudiation of the claim – The materiality of a certain
    fact is to be determined on a case-to-case basis – When a claim
    is repudiated on the ground that the policy holder has suppressed
    material facts in his application form w.r.t existing life insurance
    policies from other insurers, the burden is on the insurer to prove
    the allegation of non-disclosure of the material fact and that the
    non-disclosure was fraudulent – The burden of proving the fact,
    which excludes the liability of the insured to pay compensation lies
    on the insured alone and no one else. [Paras 12, 16]

                             Case Law Cited
    Reliance Life Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr. v. Rekhaben Nareshbhai
    Rathod [2019] 6 SCR 733 : (2019) 6 SCC 175; Satwant Kaur
    Sandhu v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. [2009] 10 SCR 560 :
    (2009) 8 SCC 316; Mahakali Sujatha v. Branch Manager, Future
    Generali India Life Insurance Company Limited & Another [2024]
    4 SCR 724 : (2024) 8 SCC 712 – distinguished.
    Manmohan Nanda v. United India Assurance Company Limited
    & Another [2021] 11 SCR 1138 : (2022) 4 SCC 582 – relied on.

                             List of Keywords
    Life insurance policy; Material suppression of fact; Material fact;
    Insurance contract; uberrima fides; Repudiation of claim; Disclosed
    policy; Proposal form; Substantial disclosure; Private insurer;
    Failure to mention Other policies; Similar policies not disclosed;
    Inconsequential sum; Not a Mediclaim policy; Failure to mention;
    Life insurance cover; Prudent insurer.
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                        1313

     Mahaveer Sharma v. Exide Life Insurance Company Limited & Anr.


                             Case Arising From
       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3562 of 2025
       From the Judgment and Order dated 28.05.2019 of the National
       Consumers Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi in FA
       No. 1963 of 2018

                          Appearances for Parties
       Advs. for the Appellant:
       Abhijeet Singh, Anirudh Singh, Ms. Chitrangda Rastravara,
       Dhananjai Shekhwat, Aishwary Mishra, Anjali Saxena, Dashrath
       Singh, Gp. Capt. Karan Singh Bhati.
       Advs. for the Respondents:
       Praveen Mahajan, Ms. Adviteeya, Rakesh K. Sharma.

                 Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                 Judgment

       Satish Chandra Sharma, J.

1.     Leave Granted.
2.     The present appeal is arising out of order dated 28.05.2019 passed
       by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New
       Delhi, (for short, “the National Commission”) in First Appeal No. 1963
       of 2018 dismissing the appeal preferred by the present appellant
       against the order dated 27.09.2018 passed by the Consumer
       Disputes Redressal Commission, Rajasthan, Jaipur (for short, the
       “State Commission”) by which the claim of the present appellant was
       rejected on account of suppression of material facts.
3.     The facts of the case reveal that the father of the appellant –
       Ramkaran Sharma had obtained an insurance policy from the
       respondent – Exide Life Insurance Co. Ltd. on 09.06.2014 and
       unfortunately, died in an accident on 19.08.2015. The present
       appellant being the son of late Ramkaran Sharma submitted a
       claim for payment of benefits under the policy; however, the said
       claim was repudiated vide letter dated 03.03.2016. The claim was
       repudiated on the ground that there was material suppression by
       the father of the appellant while applying for insurance policy and
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     respondents have relied upon the terms and conditions of Exide
     Life My Term Insurance Plan (UIN-114N063V01) in rejecting the
     claim. The appellant being aggrieved by repudiation of the claim
     submitted a complaint before the State Commission and the claim
     was dismissed vide order dated 27.09.2018 on the grounds that
     while submitting the proposal, the deceased insurer had disclosed
     only one policy taken by him from Aviva Life Insurance whereas he
     had concealed other insurance policies which he had taken from
     the Life Insurance Corporation of India and were in force at the time
     the insurance cover was sought.
4.   The appellant being aggrieved by the order of the State Commission
     preferred an appeal before the National Commission, but the National
     Commission dismissed the appeal placing reliance on the judgment
     delivered by this Court in the case of Reliance Life Insurance Co.
     Ltd. & Anr. v. Rekhaben Nareshbhai Rathod, (2019) 6 Supreme
     Court Cases 175 and Satwant Kaur Sandhu v. New India Assurance
     Co. Ltd., (2009) 8 SCC 316.
5.   Learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently argued before this
     Court that the orders passed by the State Commission as well as
     the National Commission deserve to be set aside as there was no
     material suppression on the part of his father while obtaining a life
     insurance policy from the respondent company. It is further argued
     that it was not a policy relating to any Mediclaim nor any material
     fact regarding health was suppressed, however, inadvertently, the
     policies issued by Life Insurance Corporation of India were not
     mentioned under clause 54 which is a mere omission as his father
     has mentioned about another policy issued by Aviva in clause 54.
     It has also been argued that the format of the application form was
     filled up by the agent and all necessary information was provided to
     the agent of the company and, therefore, if there is some omission, it
     should not amount to suppression of material fact, as in the present
     case the death has occurred on account of accident and not on
     account of any illness. Learned counsel for the appellant has also
     placed reliance upon the judgment delivered in the case of Mahakali
     Sujatha v. Branch Manager, Future Generali India Life Insurance
     Company Limited & Another, (2024) 8 SCC 712 and has prayed
     for setting aside the order dated 27.09.2018 passed by the State
     Commission and order dated 28.05.2019 passed by the National
     Commission.
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     Mahaveer Sharma v. Exide Life Insurance Company Limited & Anr.


6.     On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent insurance
       company while opposing the contentions of the appellant has
       vehemently argued before this Court that the insurance company was
       justified in repudiating the claim on account of material suppression
       on the part of the father of the appellant as at the relevant point of
       time, he was holding four policies; i.e. one issued by the Aviva and
       three issued by the Life Insurance Corporation of India. He has
       placed reliance on the judgment delivered by this Court in Manmohan
       Nanda v. United India Assurance Company Limited & Another,
       (2022) 4 SCC 582.
7.     Heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the
       record. The undisputed facts of the case reveal that on 09.06.2014,
       the father of the appellant had obtained a life insurance policy from
       the respondent and the father of the appellant expired on account
       of accident and not on account of any illness on 19.08.2015. The
       claim of the appellant was repudiated on 03.03.2016, thereafter,
       the complaint preferred before State Commission was dismissed
       on 27.09.2018, and the appeal preferred in the matter was also
       dismissed on 28.03.2019. The question raised before this Court is
       whether there was any material suppression of fact on the part of
       the appellant’s father while obtaining an insurance policy or not?
       The terms and conditions as contained under clauses 51, 52, 53,
       54 and 55 reads as under:
            “51. Are you an existing customer of Exide Life Insurance
            Company Limited?
            52. Have you concurrently/simultaneously applied for any
            life, health insurance cover with us or any other life, health
            insurance company which is still under consideration?
            53. Have you concurrently/simultaneously applied for any
            life, health insurance cover with us or any other life, health
            insurance company which is still under consideration?
            54. Please provide details of existing insurance cover
            on your life in the below table. If you do not have any
            existing insurance on your life, please mention ‘NIL’ in
            Sum Assured column below. Please include any Keyman
            Insurance, Partnership Insurance & Employer Employee
            Insurance cover as well. If answer to question 52 to 55
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          is YES, then please provide the complete details in the
          below mentioned table:

           Policy/Proposal/    Year of Issue/   Company  Sum
           Application No.      Submission       Name   Assured

              No. 89478         02/01/2014        AVIVA      400000


           Decision            Status (In            Type of Policy
           (Standard, other    Force, Lapsed,        (Life, Health,
           than standard       Surrendered, Paid     Accident)
           terms               up, Applied for

               Standard               Force                Life

8.   Clause 54 provides for details of the existing policies and the father
     of the appellant has certainly mentioned one policy issued by Aviva
     which is again a life insurance policy. It is also true that the father
     of appellant at the relevant point of time was also insured by Life
     Insurance Corporation of India and there were other insurance
     policies in existence at the time the insurance cover was issued by
     the respondent company.
9.   It also merits consideration that that disclosed policy – issued by
     Aviva – was erroneously mentioned in the proposal form as assuring
     a sum of Rs.4 Lakhs. In fact, the disclosed policy was for Rs. 40
     Lakhs, an amount significantly more than the policies not disclosed
     and the sum assured by the subject policy herein. A perusal of
     material on record reflects that the insured had supplied a copy of
     the extant policy issued by Aviva assuring a sum of Rs. 40 Lakhs
     to the Respondent-Insurer at the time of filing the Proposal Form.
10. At this juncture, it will be relevant to delineate what falls from the
    phrase “material facts” and consequently what may be considered
    a ‘material suppression’ for the purpose of insurance contracts. This
    Court has carefully gone through the judgment delivered in the case
    of Manmohan Nanda (supra) which has dealt with this issue in
    paras 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39 and 43, which reads as under:
          “34. Under the provisions of the Insurance Regulatory
          and Development Authority (Protection of Policyholders’
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                           1317

  Mahaveer Sharma v. Exide Life Insurance Company Limited & Anr.


           Interests) Regulations, 2002 the Explanation to Section 2(d)
           defining “proposal form” throws light on what is the meaning
           and content of “material”. For an easy reference the
           definition of “proposal form” along with the Explanation
           under the aforesaid Regulations has been extracted as
           under:
                “2. Definitions.—In these Regulations, unless
                the context otherwise requires—
                ***
                (d) “Proposal form” means a form to be filled
                in by the proposer for insurance, for furnishing
                all material information required by the insurer
                in respect of a risk, in order to enable the
                insurer to decide whether to accept or decline,
                to undertake the risk, and in the event of
                acceptance of the risk, to determine the rates,
                terms and conditions of a cover to be granted.
                Explanation—“Material” for the purpose of
                these Regulations shall mean and include all
                important, essential and relevant information in
                the context of underwriting the risk to be covered
                by the insurer.”
                Thus, the Regulation also defines the word
                “material” to mean and include all “important”,
                “essential” and “relevant” information in the
                context of guiding the insurer in deciding whether
                to undertake the risk or not.
           35. Just as the insured has a duty to disclose all material
           facts, the insurer must also inform the insured about the
           terms and conditions of the policy that is going to be issued
           to him and must strictly conform to the statements in the
           proposal form or prospectus, or those made through his
           agents. Thus, the principle of utmost good faith imposes
           meaningful reciprocal duties owed by the insured to the
           insurer and vice versa. This inherent duty of disclosure
           was a common law duty of good faith originally founded
           in equity but has later been statutorily recognised as
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        noted above. It is also open to the parties entering into
        a contract to extend the duty or restrict it by the terms
        of the contract.
        36. The duty of the insured to observe utmost good faith
        is enforced by requiring him to respond to a proposal
        form which is so framed to seek all relevant information
        to be incorporated in the policy and to make it the basis
        of a contract. The contractual duty so imposed is that any
        suppression or falsity in the statements in the proposal form
        would result in a breach of duty of good faith and would
        render the policy voidable and consequently repudiate it
        at the instance of the insurer.
        37. In relation to the duty of disclosure on the insured, any
        fact which would influence the judgment of a prudent insurer
        and not a particular insurer is a material fact. The test is,
        whether, the circumstances in question would influence
        the prudent insurer and not whether it might influence him
        vide Reynolds v. Phoenix Assurance Co. Ltd. [Reynolds v.
        Phoenix Assurance Co. Ltd., (1978) 2 Lloyd’s Rep 440]
        Hence the test is to be of a prudent insurer while issuing
        a policy of insurance.
        38. The basic test hinges on whether the mind of a prudent
        insurer would be affected, either in deciding whether to
        take the risk at all or in fixing the premium, by knowledge
        of a particular fact if it had been disclosed. Therefore, the
        fact must be one affecting the risk. If it has no bearing on
        the risk it need not be disclosed and if it would do no more
        than cause insurers to make inquiries delaying issue of
        the insurance, it is not material if the result of the inquiries
        would have no effect on a prudent insurer.
        39. Whether a fact is material will depend on the
        circumstances, as proved by evidence, of the particular
        case. It is for the court to rule as a matter of law, whether,
        a particular fact is capable of being material and to give
        directions as to the test to be applied. Rules of universal
        application are not therefore to be expected, but the
        propositions set out in the following paragraphs are well
        established:
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                          1319

  Mahaveer Sharma v. Exide Life Insurance Company Limited & Anr.


                39.1. Any fact is material which leads to the
                inference, in the circumstances of the particular
                case, that the subject-matter of insurance is not
                an ordinary risk, but is exceptionally liable to
                be affected by the peril insured against. This is
                referred to as the “physical hazard”.
                39.2. Any fact is material which leads to the
                inference that the particular proposer is a
                person, or one of a class of persons, whose
                proposal for insurance ought to be subjected at
                all or accepted at a normal rate. This is usually
                referred to as the “moral hazard”.
                39.3. The materiality of a particular fact is
                determined by the circumstances of each case
                and is a question of fact.
           43. The basic rules to be observed in making a proposal
           for insurance may be summarised as follows:
                43.1. A fair and reasonable construction must
                be put upon the language of the question
                which is asked, and the answer given will
                be similarly construed. This involves close
                attention to the language used in either case,
                as the question may be so framed that an
                unqualified answer amounts to an assertion
                by the proposer that he has knowledge of the
                facts and that the knowledge is being imparted.
                However, provided these canons are observed,
                accuracy in all matters of substance will suffice
                and misstatements or omissions in trifling and
                insubstantial respects will be ignored.
                43.2. Carelessness is no excuse, unless the error
                is so obvious that no one could be regarded as
                misled. If the proposer puts “no” when he means
                “yes” it will not avail him to say it was a slip of the
                pen; the answer is plainly the reverse of the truth.
                43.3. An answer which is literally accurate, so
                far as it extends, will not suffice if it is misleading
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        by reason of what is not stated. It may be
        quite accurate for the proposer to state that he
        has made a claim previously on an insurance
        company, but the answer is untrue if in fact he
        has made more than one.
        43.4. Where the space for an answer is left
        blank, leaving the question unanswered, the
        reasonable inference may be that there is
        nothing to enter as an answer. If in fact there is
        something to enter as an answer, the insurers
        are misled in that their reasonable inference is
        belied. It will then be a matter of construction
        whether this is a mere non-disclosure, the
        proposer having made no positive statement at
        all, or whether in substance he is to be regarded
        as having asserted that there is in fact nothing
        to state.
        43.5. Where an answer is unsatisfactory, as being
        on the face of it incomplete or inconsistent the
        insurers may, as reasonable men, be regarded
        as put on inquiry, so that if they issue a policy
        without any further enquiry they are assumed to
        have waived any further information. However,
        having regard to the inference mentioned in
        Head 43.4 above, the mere leaving of a blank
        space will not normally be regarded as sufficient
        to put the insurers on inquiry.
        43.6. A proposer may find it convenient to
        bracket together two or more questions and
        give a composite answer. There is no objection
        to his doing so, provided the insurers are given
        adequate and accurate information on all points
        covered by the questions.
        43.7. Any answer given, however accurate and
        honest at the time it was written down, must be
        corrected if, up to the time of acceptance of the
        proposal, any event or circumstance supervenes
        to make it inaccurate or misleading.”
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                        1321

  Mahaveer Sharma v. Exide Life Insurance Company Limited & Anr.


11. In the case of Satwant Kaur Sandhu (supra), there was suppression
    of material fact relating to health of the insured and in those
    circumstances, the respondent insurance company was held to
    be justified in repudiating the insurance contract. This Court in
    the case of Mahakali Sujatha (supra) was again dealing with the
    repudiation of claim on account of non-disclosure of diabetes and
    chronic renal failure in relation to a Mediclaim policy, wherein this
    Court in paragraph 27 held as under:
           “27. It would be beyond anybody’s comprehension that
           the insured was not aware of the state of his health
           and the fact that he was suffering from diabetes as also
           chronic renal failure, more so when he was stated to be on
           regular haemodialysis. There can hardly be any scope for
           doubt that the information required in the afore-extracted
           questions was on material facts and answers given to
           those questions were definitely factors which would have
           influenced and guided the respondent Insurance Company
           to enter into the contract of mediclaim insurance with the
           insured.”
12. An insurance is a contract uberrima fides. It is the duty of the
    applicant to disclose all facts which may weigh with a prudent insurer
    in assuming the risk proposed. These facts are considered material
    to the contract of insurance, and its non-disclosure may result in the
    repudiation of the claim. The materiality of a certain fact is to be
    determined on a case-to-case basis. The aforementioned judgements
    illustrate instances of material facts, wherein the non-disclosure of
    certain medical conditions was held to be material in the context of
    a Mediclaim policy.
13. We are cognisant and conscious of this Court’s judgement in
    Rekhaben Nareshbhai Rathod (supra), whereby the insurer was
    held to be entitled to repudiate the insurance claim on account of
    a complete failure to disclose previous insurance policies availed
    by the applicant. The primary consideration that weighed with this
    Court was that this information could potentially allow the insurer
    to question as to why the insured had in such a short span of time
    obtained two different life insurance policies.
14. In Rekhaben Nareshbhai Rathod (supra), the repudiation of
    the policy by the insurer was within a period of two years from
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     the commencement of the insurance cover on the ground of
     non-disclosure of a material fact and suppressing/non-disclosing a
     pre-existing life insurance. In the said case, the expression “material”,
     in the context of insurance policy, was defined as any contingency or
     event that may have an impact upon the risk appetite or willingness
     of the insurer to provide insurance cover. In the said case, Item 17 of
     the proposal form required a detailed disclosure of other insurance
     policies held by the proposer including sum assured. A disclosure
     was also required of the status of pending proposals. These were
     answered with a “not-applicable” response, following the statement
     that the proposer therein did not hold any other insurance cover. The
     fact that insured therein had obtained a policy from the other insurer
     was not disclosed. This was non-disclosure of the earlier cover for
     life insurance held by the insured. The repudiation in the said case
     was within a period of two years from the commencement of the
     insurance cover. This Court held that there was non-disclosure by
     the insured in the proposal form that barely two months prior to the
     contract of insurance was entered into with the appellant therein the
     insured had obtained another insurance cover for his life entitled the
     insurer to repudiate the claim under the policy.
15. In Mahmohan Nanda (supra), on a consideration of several
    judgments, this Court deduced, inter alia, the following principles:
          “xxx
          55.1 There is a duty or obligation of disclosure by the
          insured regarding any material fact at the time of making
          the proposal. What constitutes a material fact would depend
          upon the nature of the insurance policy to be taken, the
          risk to be covered, as well as the queries that are raised
          in the proposal form.
          55.2 What may be a material fact in a case would also
          depend upon the health and medical condition of the
          proposer.
          55.3 If specific queries are made in a proposal form then it
          is expected that specific answers are given by the insured
          who is bound by the duty to disclose all material facts.
          55.4 If any query or column in a proposal form is left blank
          then the insurance company must ask the insured to fill it
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  Mahaveer Sharma v. Exide Life Insurance Company Limited & Anr.


           up. If in spite of any column being left blank, the insurance
           company accepts the premium and issues a policy, it cannot
           at a later stage, when a claim is made under the policy,
           say that there was a suppression or non-disclosure of a
           material fact, and seek to repudiate the claim.”
16. In Mahakali Sujatha (supra), this Court observed that if a claim
    was repudiated on the ground that the policy holder has suppressed
    material facts in his application form with respect to existing life
    insurance policies from other insurers, the burden is on the insurer
    to prove the allegation of non-disclosure of the material fact and that
    the non-disclosure was fraudulent. Further, the burden of proving the
    fact, which excludes the liability of the insured to pay compensation
    lies on the insured alone and no one else.
17. Applying the aforesaid judgments to the facts of the case, it is noted
    that the insured had made a substantial disclosure inasmuch as he
    had disclosed that he had obtained another policy from a private
    insurer-Aviva for an assured sum of Rs. 4 lakhs (which is actually
    Rs.40 lakh) which was in force. Further the queries under Clauses
    52 and 53 were with regard to the policies from other insurers “under
    consideration” and under clause 54 details of “existing insurance
    cover” had to be mentioned. Evidently, the details of only one
    insurance cover was mentioned and not about others which were
    produced by the insurer before the State Commission as Exhibit A-4
    to A-6 therein. Thus, there was only a partial disclosure. It is noted
    that the other policies Exhibit A-4 to A-6 were of inconsequential
    sum assured amounting to Rs.2,30,000/- in aggregate whereas
    the policy disclosed was issued by Aviva was for Rs. 40 lakhs.
    It is averred in the complaint that the sum assured by Aviva was
    erroneously mentioned as Rs. 4 Lakhs when it actually was Rs. 40
    lakhs whereas in the instant case the sum assured is Rs. 25 lakhs.
    A copy of the said policy was also submitted to the insurer along
    with the proposal form.
18. The case at hand involves a slightly different consideration. The father
    of the appellant had disclosed one other life insurance policy availed
    by him at the time of filing the proposal form, but failed to disclose
    other similar policies. While the aforementioned judgement relates
    to a complete failure to disclose in the peculiar circumstances of two
    policies being availed of in a short span of time, the present case
    stands on a different footing of a substantial disclosure which would
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     be sufficient for a prudent insurer to determine the risk assumed. We
     are of the considered view that such a failure would not influence the
     decision of a prudent insurer to issue the policy proposed. The policy
     in question is not a Mediclaim policy; it is a life insurance cover and
     the death of the deceased has taken place on account of an accident.
     Accordingly, failure to mention about other policies does not amount to
     a material fact in relation to the policy availed and consequently, the
     claim could not have been repudiated by the respondent company.
19. Therefore, we find that in the facts of this case the respondent-
    insurer decided to issue a policy to the father of the appellant herein
    even though it was aware that there was another policy for a higher
    sum assured which was taken by the insured from Aviva. Thus, the
    insurer was also aware of the fact that the insured had capability
    and capacity to pay the premium for the policy obtained from Aviva
    and was confident that the insured had the capacity to pay the
    premium in respect of the policy which was issued to the insured
    by the respondent-insurer for a sum lesser assured being Rs.25
    lakh only. Consequently, we find that the repudiation of the policy,
    in the facts and circumstances of the present case, was improper.
    Therefore, the appellant herein is entitled to the benefit of the policy
    which was issued by the respondent herein.
20. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, the appeal
    filed by the appellant stands allowed. The order dated 03.03.2016
    repudiating the claim of the appellant, the order dated 28.05.2019
    passed by the National Commission in First Appeal No. 1963 of 2018
    and the order dated 27.09.2018 passed by the State Commission
    in Complaint Case No. 56 of 2017 are set aside. The respondent
    insurance company is directed to release all benefits under the policy
    in question along with an interest of 9% per annum from the date the
    amount became due till the date of its realization to the appellant.
21. No orders as to costs. Pending applications, if any, shall stand
    disposed of.

     Result of the case: Appeal allowed.




     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey