Holding

Section 12 of the Resettlement Act makes any transfer, subdivision or partition of land after a Section 11 notification void, so the 1979 compromise cannot defeat the acquisition.

Summary

The appellant challenged the Maharashtra Resettlement of Project Displaced Persons Act notifications that declared his village a benefited zone and the subsequent land acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act. He argued that a 1979 compromise and partition of his family’s land, which reduced his holdings, should be given retroactive effect to the 1967 suit and thus be valid despite the earlier 1978 notification. The Supreme Court examined Section 12 of the Resettlement Act, which expressly prohibits any transfer, subdivision, or partition of land after a Section 11 notification unless expressly permitted by the State Government. The Court held that the legislative intent was clear that such post‑notification transfers are void, and the compromise could not override this statutory prohibition. Consequently, the compromise was deemed void ab initio and could not defeat the acquisition. The appeals were dismissed without any order as to costs.

Issues considered

Whether a partition or compromise effected after the issuance of a Section 11 notification under the Maharashtra Resettlement of Project Displaced Persons Act is void under Section 12 of the Act.
Whether the principle of retroactivity can render a post‑notification partition effective as of the date of the original suit.

Legislation cited

Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 4, s. 6
Maharashtra Resettlement of Project Displaced Persons Act, 1976s. 11, s. 12, s. 15, s. 16

Subjects

Resettlement ActLand acquisitionPartitionVoid transferLegislative intentRetroactive effectPublic policy

Judgment

[2009] 7 S.C.R. 74

A MAHAVIR JANGONDA Pl.fflL
v
DIRECTOR OF RESETTLEMENT & ORS.
Civil Appeal Nos. 6335-6336 of 2001
APRIL 22, 2009
B
(HARJIT SINGH BEDI AND J.M. PANCHAL, JJ.)

Maharashtra Resettlement of Project Displaced Persons
Act, 1976:

c Sections 11, 12, 15 - Section 15( 1) Notification -
Compromise between brothers entered into thereafter- Effect
of - Held: In view of the clear legislative intent under section
12, any transfer by way of sale, partition etc. after the
Notification would be void - Where the statute itself is against
D
a transfer it is the statute which will predominate vis-a-vis any
other consideration - Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Sections.4,
6.
Addagada Raghavamma and Anr. Vs. Addagada
Chenchamma and Anr. [1964] 2 SCR 933 and State of Punjab
E vs. Amar Singh [1974) 2 SCC 70 - referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No(s).
•
6335-6336 of 2001
....
From the Judgement and Order dated 12.04.2001 of the
F High Court of-Judicature at Bombay in Review Application No.
71 of 2001 in Writ Petition No. 6063 of 1988 and dated
22.03.2001 in-Writ Petition No. 6063 of 1988.
,;
Chinmoy Khaladkar (for Vimal Chandra S. Dave), for the
Appellant(s).
G
Arun Ramnath PeClnekar (for Asha Gopalan Nair), for the
Respondent(s). t

The following order of the Court was delivered :

H 74
•
MAHAVIR JANGONDA PATIL V. 75
DIRECTOR OF _RESETTLEMENT & ORS.

~ These appeals are directed against the judgment and A
order dated 12.4.2001 in Review Application No.71 of 2001
passed by the Bombay High Court and the judgment and order
dated 22.3.2001 passed by the Bombay High Court in Writ
Petition No.6063 of 1988 dated 22.3.2001 whereby the Writ
Petition filed by the present appellant has been dismissed. B

In the writ petition a challenge has been made by the
~ appellant to the notification under Section 15(1) dated 29th May,
1982 of the Maharashtra Resettlement of Project Displaced
Persons Act, 1976 (hereinafter called the "Resettlement Act")
and also for quashing the notifications under Sections 4 and 6. C
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 issued. by Respondent No.4.

Brief facts of the case are as under:-

\ Respondent No.6, through respondent No.3, issued a
notification on 2nd November, 1978 under Section 11 (1) of the D
Resettlement Act declaring the villages comprised therein to
be covered under the benefited zones of Warna Project in
Kolhapur District from the said date. The said notification
included the appellant's village, Shriti. Respondent No.2
thereafter issued notification under Section 14(1) of the E
Resettlement Act on 24th December, 1981 provisionally
declaring the area to be acquired under Section 16 for the said
Y Warna Project. The Respondents also issued a. notification
under Section 15 of the Resettlement Act which was published
in the government gazette on 29th May, 1982 finally declaring F
the areas covered by the benefited zone. Respondent No.4, on
1st September, 1983, issued a notification under Section 4 of
the Land Acquisition Act intending to acquire the Petitioner's
land bearing gat No.677 part, admeasuring 1 hectare 62 ares
for the purpose of resettlement of persons affected by the Warna G
1 Project. The appellant lodged his objections to the notices
issued pursuant to the Resettlement Act and the Land
Acquisition Act and pointed out inter alia that on account of a
compromise recorded in the year 1979, arising out a suit for
H
76 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 7 S.C.R.

A partition filed in 1967, the land had been partitioned amongst
various members of the. family and that the land holdings of the "'
petitioner and his brothers had accordingly been reduced to
less than 8 acres and the petitioner's land thus could be acquired
in view of Section 16 of the Resettlement Act read along with
B the schedule appended thereto. The High Court in the impugned
judgment held that as the compromise had been effected in the
year 1979, i.e., after the date of notification dated 2.11.1978
issued under Section 11(1) of the Resettlement Act, the ...
aforesaid compromise could not be taken into account as it
c was void ab initio and, accordingly, dismissed the Writ Petition.
It is in this situation, the matter is before us.
We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have
gone through the record.
D Section 12 of the Resettlement Act, 1976 reads as under: •
"12. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for
the time being in force, no land in the villages of areas
specified in the notification under Section 11 shall, after
publication of that notification in the official Gazette, and
E
until the Deputy Director makes a declaration to the effect
that all proceedings for the acquisition of lands in the
benefited zone area completed, be -
"(

(a) transferred, whether by way of sale (including sale in
F execution of a decree of a Civil Court or of an award or
order of any other competent authority) or by way of gift,
exchange, lease or otherwise.
(b) sub-divided including sub-division by a decree or order
of any court or any other competent authority), or ;.,.
G
(c) partitioned (including partition by a decree or order of
any court or any other competent authority}, except with
"
the permission in writing of the State Government.
(2) The State Government may refuse to give such
H
MAHAVIR JANGONDA PATIL V. 77
Ill DIRECTOR OF RESETILEMENT & ORS.
(

permission if in its opinion the transfer, sub-division or A
partition of land is likely to defeat the object of this Act, or
may give such general or special permission, subject to
such conditions, if any, as it may deem fit to impose to
carry out the object of this Act or may give such general or
special permission, subject to such conditions (if any) as B
it may deem fit to impose to carry out the object of this Act,
including a condition that the grant of such permission
shall be without prejudice to the area of land liable fo be
compulsorily acquired under section 16, on the basis of
any holding as it existed immediately before the grant of c
such permission.

(3) Any transfer, sub-division, partition of land made in
contravention of sub-section (1) or of any condition
imposed under sub-section (2) shall be void and
D
inoperative.
(4) The State Government may, by general or special
order, delegate its powers under sub-section (1) and (2)
to all or any of the Collectors of Districts who are ex-officio
Deputy Directors (Land), subject to such conditions and E
limitations, if any as may be specified in the order.".

.... A perusal of Section 12 reveals that after the land has been
notified under Section 11, any sub-division of the land by means
of partition etc., shall be deemed to be void. Admittedly, the
compromise in the matter was after the date of notification in
F
the year 1978. The learned counsel for the appellant has,
however, forcefully submitted that in view of the judgment of this
Court in Addagada Raghavamma And Anr. v. Addagada
Chenchamma And Anr. [1964) 2 S.C.R. 933, once the partition
had been effected even if by a compromise, it would relate back G
~
to the date when the intention to separate had been expressed
. by the parties and this date would be the year 1967, when the
suit had been filed. Undoubtedly, some of the observations in
the aforesaid judgment do support the arguments raised by the
H
78 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 7 S.C.R.

A learned counsel, but in this very judgment the Supreme Court
has observed that the principle of retroactivity, unless a
legislative intention was clearly to the contrary, would save vested
rights. It would be clear that this observation by itself makes a
distinction as to the retroactive nature of the compromise
B effected i.e. in case where the legislative intention is to the
contrary. We find herein a clear legislative intent as Section 12
of the Resettlement Act clearly stipulates that any transfer by ~
way of sale, partition etc. after the date of notification under
Section 11, would be void.
c The learned counsel for the respondent has also taken us
to a judgment of this Court in the case of State of Punjab v.
Amar Singh (1974) 2 SCC 70 which is a judgment rendered
under Section 10-A of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act,
1
0 1953. The principle laid down in the afore-cited case has been
noticed in this judgment as well in paragraph No.33 in the
following words:
"Another argument was suggested that the order, even
though passed on a compromise was as valid and binding
E as one passed on contest. May be, that as a broad
proposition one may assent to it. But where a compromise
goes against a public policy prescription of a stature or a
mandatory direction to the Court to decide on its own
certain foundational facts, a razi cannot operate to defeat
F the requirement so specified or absolve the Court from
the duty. The resultant order will be ineffective. After all, by
consent or agreement, parties cannot achieve what is
contrary to law and a decree merely based on such
agreement cannot furnish a judicial amulet against statutory
G violation. For, "by private agreement, converted into a
decree, parties cannot empower themselves to do that
which they could not have done by private agreement
alone". (See Mulla: Civil Procedure Code, Vol. II, P. 1300).
The true rule is that "the contract of the parties is not the
H
MAHAVIR JANGONDA PATIL V. 79
DIRECTOR OF RESETILEMENT & ORS ..
' .....d_ ...... .._ \,. :~'

less a contract, and subject to the incidents of a contract, A,
because there is supesadded the command of the Judge".
It is, therefore, obvious that where the statute itself is
against a transfer, it is the statute which will pre-dominate vis-a-
vis any other consideration.
B
We, thus, find no merit in these appeals. Dismissed,
however with no order as to costs.

G.N. Appeals dismissed.

J . !,.•