Holding

Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC does not bar prosecution because the alleged offences were not committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in any court; therefore the High Court’s order quashing the proceedings is set aside.

Summary

The appellant, Mahesh Chand Sharma, purchased land and obtained possession, but the accused (Panna Lal, Ram Babu and Rajkumar) colluded with an area lekhpal to have the property mutated in their names through a false report. The appellant filed a complaint under Section 156(3) CrPC, leading to investigation and a charge‑sheet for offences under IPC sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120‑B. The accused sought quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 CrPC, and the Allahabad High Court Single Judge set aside the charge‑sheet, invoking the bar of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that Section 195(1)(b)(ii) bars prosecution only when the offence is committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a court, which was not the case here; consequently the High Court’s order was unsustainable. The Court also rejected the use of Section 340 CrPC and found no jurisdiction for relief under Section 482. The appeal was allowed and the magistrate was directed to proceed with the criminal complaint.

Issues considered

Whether Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the CrPC bars prosecution for the alleged offences when the alleged wrongdoing is not in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in any court.
Whether the High Court was correct in quashing the charge‑sheet and the order under Section 156(3) CrPC.
Whether Section 340 CrPC can be invoked in the present facts.
Whether relief under Section 482 CrPC is available to the accused.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 156(3), s. 195(1)(b)(ii), s. 340, s. 482
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 120-B, s. 420, s. 467, s. 468, s. 471

Subjects

Section 195 CrPCSection 482 CrPCSection 340 CrPCland mutationforgeryprivate complaintjurisdictiondocument evidenceIPC offences

Judgment

[2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 922

A MAHESH CHAND SHARMA -+
v.
STATE OF U.P. & ORS.
(Criminal Appeal No. 1640 of 2009)
AUGUST 28,. 2009
B
[V.S. SIRPURKAR AND DEEPAK VERMA, JJ.]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s. 195(1)(b)(ii) -
Interpretation of - Vendee purchased land from vendor and
c took possession - Accused in collusion with Area Lekhpal got
the said property mutated in their names - Registration of
case against accused ulss. 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B /PC
- High Court quashing the said proceedings in view of bar of
,_,
s. 195 and also the order passed uls. 156(3) Cr.P.C. to ·~

D investigate the matter - Sustainability of - Held: Under s:- ..,..
195(1)(b)(ii) prosecution is for offences ulss. 463, 471, 475
and 476, committed with respect to a document subsequent
to its production or given in evidence in a proceeding in any
court - There was non-application of law with regard to
E provisions contained in s. 195 - Offence committed by
accused in collusion with Area Lekhpal was not in relation to
court proceedings - It was behind the back of vendee - Also,
High Court erred in resorting to s. 340 CrPC - Relief uls. 482
CrPC could not be granted - Thus, order of High Court not
F sustainable and is set aside - Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 420,
467, 468, 471 and 120-B.

Appellant-vendee purchased certain land from
vendor and was handed over the possession of the
G same. Respondent nos.2, 3 and 4-accused in collusion
with the Area Lekhpal got the said property mutated in
their names. Appellant alleged commission of offence
punishable u/ss. 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B IPC.

H 922
MAHESH CHAND SHARMA v. STATE OF U.P. & 923
. ORS .
-t- Magistrate passed. an order ·u/s. 156(3) Cr.P .C. to A
investigate the matter. A case was-r.e_gistered against the
accused. Thereafter, accused filed petition u/s. 482 Cr.P .C.
for quashing the charge sheet. Single Judge of High
Court quashed the proceedings of the case in view of the
bar of s. 195 Cr.P.C. and allowed the petition u/s. 482 of B
the Code and also quashed the order passed u/s. 156(3)
~ Cr.P.C. to investigate the case. Hence the present appeal.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1. Section 195 (1) (b) (ii) of the Cr.P.C. C
contemplates a situation where offences enumerated
therein are committed with respect to a document
subsequent to its production or giving in evidence in a
,. '
proceeding in any Court. [Para 29] [935-0-E]
D
2.1. On going through the impugned order passed by
Single Judge of High Court, it is found that there has
been total non-application of law with regard to provision
contained in section 195 .of Cr.P.C. The order passed by
the Single Judge cannot be sustained in law. Single E
Judge proceeded on absolutely wrong facts and applied
incorrect principles of law. It completely lost sight of the
f- fact that the offence committed by accused in collusion
with Area Lekhpal was not in relation to court I
proceedings. It was in any case behind the back of the ! F
appellant and as soon as he came to know with regard
to the illegal designs of the accused he lodged a
complaint under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. [Paras 22,
26, 27 and 28) [929-D; 935-A-E]
G
~ 2.2. Single Judge further committed a gross error in
resorting to Section 340 of the Cr.P.C. as provisions qf
the said Section can be invoked only when it is
established that offence of forgery had already been
H
924 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A committed. In any case, accused had miserably failed for -+
grant of any relief under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. The
limit of exercising jurisdiction conferred on the Court
under Sectio·n 482 of the Cr.P .C is well defined and by
no stretch of imagination, it could be said that petition
B filed by accused under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C had
fulfilled the requirement as contemplated in this Section.
Thus the impugned order cannot be sustained and is set
~·
aside and quashed. The Magistrate is directed to proceed
with the Criminal Complaint filed by appellant against the
c accused. [Paras 30, 31and 32] (935-E-H; 936-A-B]

Sachida Nand Singh and Anr. v. State of Bihar and Anr.
1998 (2) SCC 493; Iqbal Singh Marwah and Anr. v.
Meenakshi Marwah and Anr. (2005) 4 SCC 370, relied Qn. ~
D
Case Law Reference: .....

1998 (2) sec 493 Relied on. Para 24
(2005) 4 sec 370 Relied on. Para 25
E CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 1640 of 2009.

From the Judgment & Order dated 9.5.2008 of the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Misc. Application ~

F No. 26653 of the 2007.

D.K. Goswami, Radha Srivastava, Shiv Sagar Tiwari for
the Appellant.

R. Dash, Sunita Gautam, Anuvrat Sharma for the
G Respondents.
>--
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

DEEPAK VERMA, J. 1.Leave granted.
H
MAHESH CHAND SHARMA v. STATE OF U.P. & 925
ORS. [DEEPAK VERMA, J.]

).- 2.This appeal arises out of Judgment and order dated A
9.5.2008 passed by learned Single Judge of High Court of
Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Misc. Application No.26653
of 2007 wherein and whereby a petition filed by respondent
Nos.2, 3 and 4, viz., Panna Lal, Ram Babu an9 Rajkumar
respectively under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal B
Procedure (for short, 'Cr.P.C.') has been allowed and the
Criminal case No.1245/IX of 2007 titled State Vs. Panna Lal
~ and Ors. registered against them under Sections 420, 467,
468, 471 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code (for short, 'IPC')
on the file of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-I, Mathura and c
the order dated 24.9.2007 whereby and whereunder the
Presiding Officer of the Court took cognizance against the
accused, respondent nos.2 to 4 herein, have been quashed.

- ~
Appellant, feeling aggrieved by the said order of quashment is
before us challenging the same on variety of grounds. D

3.We have accordingly heard Mr. D.K. Goswami, learned
counsel for the appellant and Mr. R. Dash, learned senior
counsel for respondent No.1-State. Despite service of notices
none appeared before us for the accused-respondent Nos.2 E
to 4.

4. Facts, shorn of unnecessary details, are mentioned
-j..
hereinbelow:

5. The appellant filed a complaint purportedly under F
Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. on 13.10.2004 before the Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Mathura. The main allegation in the said
complaint is that he had purchased land admeasuring 0.38
decimal from Mahesh Chand, S/o Shri Jagan Prasad vide
registered sale deed dated 6.10.1986. Pursuant to the G
execution of said sale deed in favour of the appellant-Mahesh
~
Chand Sharma, he was handed over possession of the same
by the vendor and since then he continues to be in possession
thereof.
H
926 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A 6. On 23.9.1996 appellant, with an intention to protect the ~
property, started constructing boundary wall, which was
objected to by Panna Lal, Ram Babu and Rajkumar, respondent
Nos.2 to 4 herein. They contended that the land in question,
alleged to have been purchased by the appellant is recorded
B in their names and they were ready to fight on this issue.

7. Thereafter, appellant Mahesh Chand Sharma and his
vendor Mahesh Chand both went to Tehsilda~s Court and made
4
inquiries about case no.293/14 AT and came to know that the ·
c said accused in collusion with Area Lekhpal, Prahlad Singh.got
their names mutated on the basis of report dated 18.8.1992
said to have been prepared under Section 22 of the Land
Record Manual. ·

D
8. In the said report, Area Lekhpal reported that accused
Panna Lal, Ram Babu and Rajkumar, sons of Parsadi are the
only heirs of Jagan Prasad and Devi Prasad both sons of
~
-
'

Bidha Ram. It was falsely stated that Jagan Prasad had no heir,
~
while the vendor of the appellant Mahesh Chand is the only son
of Late Jagan Prasad and is still alive and he is also the legal
E
heir of his real uncle Devi Prasad who had no issues.

9. It appears that the Area Lekhpal had given totally untrue
statement and by showing an alive person Mahesh Chand S/o
Jagan Prasad, appellant's vendor as dead had got the said +
F names of the accused mutated. According to appellant, they
had thereby committed the offences punishable under_ Sections
420, 467, 468, 471 and 1208 of the IPC.

10. On the strength of these allegations, an order under
G Section 156(3), Cr.P.C. was passed. The said_ application/
complaint of the appellant was allowed and police registered
the FIR and started investigation. .
):

11. Even though learned Single Judge has given the details
H
MAHESH CHAND SHARMA v. STATE OF U.P. & 927
ORS. [DEEPAK VERMA, J.]

of the family tree of the respondents and Mahesh Chand, vendor A
of the appellant but to decide the said case, it is not necessary
to dwell on it further. Suffice it to say that Mahesh Chand is the
only surviving lineage on his side of the family. Therefore,
Mahesh Chand being the only person alive, inherited the entire
property of Bidha Ram. Being the lawful owner of the above B
mentioned property, he executed the sale deed on 6.10.1986
as mentioned hereinabove in favour of appellant.
.~
12. As would be revealed from the facts of the case, it was
Area Lekhpal who, in furtherance of his evil-intentions, gave a c
false statement with an object to help the accused asserting
that the last descendant of Bidha Ram, i.e., Mahesh Chand,
vendor of the appellant had already died. On the strength of this
statement having been made by Area Lekhpal, the names of
"""
' the respondent Nos.2 to 4 were mutated in their favour by the D
.,.. Court of Tehsildar on 9.10.1992 .
13. Accused Respondent Nos.2 to 4 asserted that
disputed property was mutated in their names on the basis of
an unregistered Will dated 14.07.1974 said to have been
E
executed by late Jagan Prasad, father of Mahesh Chand,
ignoring his only son, which is highly ridiculous and certainly an
afterthought.

14. The appellant, on coming to know that names of
accused have been mutated on the property of which he is the F
lawful owner, having purchased the same from its previous
owner, Mahesh Chand, S/o Jagan Prasad, thereby moved an
application before SOM, Mathura, to set aside the mutation
order dated 9.10.1992, which application ultimately came to be
allowed. G

15. Feeling aggrieved by the said order passed in favour
of the appellant, accused-respondents filed an appear before
the Commissioner of Agra Division, but it met the fate of
H
928 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

·A dismissal. The matter thus came to an end as far as·mutation
proceedings were concerned.

16. Looking to the adamant and offensive attitude of the
accused, the appellant was constrained to move a complaint
B under Section 156(3) of the CrPC before the learned
Magistrate, Mathura who directed to investigate the matter and
register a case against the accused-respondents. An FIR was
registered as Crime No.51/2004. After investigation, the
investigating officer submitted the final report on 15.12.2004.
c The appellant, ft3eling aggrieved by the said final report of the
police, filed a Protest Petition in the Court of A.C.J.M., Mathura
on 19.3.2005, who treated it to be a complaint and fixed the
case for recording of the statement of the appellant.

17. Being aggrieved by the said order passed by ACJM,
D
Mathura, the appellant filed Criminal Revision No.335/2005 )f'
before Additional Sessions Judge, Mathura, which came to be
admitted for hearing on 15.6.2005. During the pendency of this
Revision, the appellant's protest petition dated 19.3.2005 was
dismissed in default by the learned Magistrate. On coming to
E
know about the dismissal of the said protest petition, appellant
filed another Criminal Revision No. 526/2005 before the
Additional Sessions Judge, Mathura.

18. The Additional Sessions Judge allowed both the
F Revisions vide its judgment dated 31.10.2005 and set aside
the orders of the learned Magistrate dated 7.6.2005 treating
the ·protest petition to be a complaint as also the order of
dismissal of the said petition.

·G 19. Pursuant to the directions of the learned Addi.
Sessions Judge, Mathura, the Magistrate once again heard the
appellant and pursuant thereto, directions were issued to the
police to further investigate the matter rejecting the final report
of the .police dated 15.12.2004. Thereafter, police completed
H
MAHESH CHAND SHARMA v. STATE OF U.P. & 929
ORS. [DEEPAK VE;RMA, J.]

the investigation and Investigating Officer submitted the charge A
sheet on 18.9.2007 in the Court of Magistrate, Mathura for
commission of alleged offences under Sections 420, 467, 468,
471 and 1208 of the IPC.

20. On the strength of the charge sheet, Criminal Case B
No.1245/IX of 2007 as mentioned hereinabove was registered
against the respondents, which took cognizance against
respondent Nos.2 to 4 vide order dated 24.9.2007.

21. The accused moved the High Court by filing a petition
under Section 482, Cr.P.C. as mentioned hereinabove with a
c
prayer for quashing. the charge sheet and taking cognizance
thereof. The said petition having been allowed, Mahesh Chand
Sharma S/o Ganga Charan Sharma is before us in this appeal.

22. We have critically gone through the impugned order D
~
passed by learned Single Judge and find that there has been
total non-application of law with regard to provision contained
in Section 195 of Cr.P.C. The relevant portion of the order
passed by the learned Single Judge is reproduced
hereinbelow: E

"Thus, it is clear from the aforesaid Section that the
complainant could move an application in this regard
·</ before the Court of Tehsildar and that Court after making
necessary enquiry could pass an order for lodging a F
complaint against the accused persons and that complaint
could be sent to the Court of Magistrate having jurisdiction
to try the offence. The above procedure, which was the
right and correct procedure in present case, was not
followed but an application under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. G
was moved for police investigation, which was barred in
view of the provisions of Section 195 Cr.P.C.

Thus, the entire proceedings taken on the basis of
the orders passed on the application under section 156(3) H
I

930 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R:

'A Cr.P.C. and on the charge sheet submitted in compliance -""(
of the orders on that application are without jurisdiction,
and the learned Magistrate erred in law by taking
cognizance on that charge sheet. Hence, the present
application under section 482 Cr.P.C. deserves to be
B allowed and the proceedings of the case deserves to be '
quashed in view of the bar of Section 195 Cr. P.C. The
complainant opposite party No.2 shall, however, be at
liberty to move an application against the accused )..

applicants under Section 340 Cr..P .C. before the
c concerned Court in accordance with the provisions of law.

The application under section 482 Cr.P.C. is,·
therefore, aUowed and the charge sheet submitted in
Criminal Case No.1245/IX of 2007 State Vs. Panna Lal ......---
and others and the. order of the Magistrate dated
D
24.9.2007 taking cognizance thereon are set aside. ~
"
However, it will be open to the complainant opposite party
No. 2 to move an application before the concerned court .•
for taking action against the accused persons in
E accordance with the provisions of section 340 Cr.P.C."

23. To appreciate the facts and apply the law correctly, it
is necessary to go through the relevant provisions and thus we
reproduce Section 195( 1)(b )(ii):
F "195. Prosecution for contempt of lawful authority of
public servants, for offences against public justice and for
offences relating to documents given in evidence -

(1) No Court shall take cognizance-
G
(a) .........
)..--
(b) (i) .........

(ii) of any offence described in Section 463,
\
' H
MAHESH CHAND SHARMA v. STATE OF U.P. & 931
ORS. [DEEPAK VERMA, J.]

or punishable under Section 471, section
475 or section 476, of the said Code, when
such offence is alleged to have been
committed in respect of a document
produced or given in evidence in a
proceeding in any court, or
•••} n
( Ill ........ .

24. While dealing with the provision contained in Section
195 of the Cr.P.C. this Court in a celebrated judgment reported
_ in (1998) 2 SCC 493 titled Sachida Nand Singh & Anr. v.
State of Bihar & Anr. has held as under:-

"6. A reading of the clause reveals two main postulates for
......... operation of the bar mentioned there. First is, there must
be allegation that an offence (it should be either an offence II
~ described in Section 463 or any other offence punishable
under Sections 471, 475, 476 of the IPC) has been
committed. Second is that such offence should have been
committed in respect of a document produced or given in
evidence in a proceeding in any court. There is no dispute II
before us that if forgery has been committed while the
document was in ~he custody of a court, then prosecution
can be launched only with a complaint made by that court.
-1 There is also no dispute that if forgery was committed with
a document which has not been produced in a court then fl
the prosecution would lie at the instance of any person. If
so, will its production in a court make all the difference?
""""
.7. Even if the clause is capable of two interpretations we
are inclined to choose the narrower interpretation for (::
obvious reasons. Section 190 of the Code empowers "any
magistrate of the first classn to take cognizance of "any
offence" upon receiving a complaint, or police report or
information or upon his own knowledge. Section 195
,...
restricts such general powers of the magistrate, and the
932 SU~REME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

-A general right of a person to move the court with a complaint
is to that extent curtailed. It is a well-recognized canon of.I
interpretation that provision curbing the general jurisdiction
of the court must normally receive strict interpretation
unless the statute or the context requires otherwise (Abdul
B Waheed Khan v. Bhawani AIR 1966 SC 1718: 1966 (3)
SCR 617)"

25. Similar issue again came up for consideration before }..
the Constitution Bench of this Court in yet another judgment in
c Iqbal Singh Marwah & Anr. v. Meenakshi Marwah & Anr.
(2005) 4 sec 370 and held as under :

"7. On a plain reading clause (b)(ii) of sub-section (1) of

D
Section 195 is capable of two interpretations. One
possible interpretations is that when an offence described
in Section 463 or punishable under Section 471, Section
~
-"'
475 or Section 476 IPC is alleged to have been committed
in respect of a document which is subsequently produced
or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court, a
-.-
complaint by the court would be necessary. The other
E
possible interpretation is that when a document has been
produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court
and thereafter an offence described as aforesaid is
committed in respect thereof, a complaint by the court
,~-
would be necessary. On this interpretation if the offence
F
as described in the section is committed prior to
production or giving in evidence of the document in court,
no complaint by court would be necessary and a private
complaint would be maintainable. The question which
requires consideration is which of the two interpretations
G
should be accepted having regard to the scheme of the
Act and object sought to. be achieved.

8. Dr. A.M. Singhvi, learned Senior Counsel for the
appellants, sub_mitted that the purpose of Section 195 is
H
MAHESH CHAND SHARMA v. STATE OF U.P. & 933
ORS. [DEEPAK VERMA, J.]

to bar private prosecution where the cause of justice is J11
sought to be perverted leaving it to the court itself to uphold
its dignity and prestige. If a very restricted interpretation
is given to Section 195 (1)(b)(ii)CrPC, as held in Sachida
Nand Singh v. State of Bihar ( 1998) 2 SCC 493 : 1998
SCC (Cri.) 660 the protection afforded by the provision El
will be virtually reduced to a vanishing point, defeating the
very object of the enactment. The provision, it is urged,
does not completely bar the prosecution of a person who
has committed an offence of the type described
thereunder, but introduces a safeguard in the sense that C
he ca~ be so prosecuted only on the complaint of the court
where the document has been produced or given in
evidence or of some other court to which that court is
subordinate. Learned counsel has also submitted that
I ~
being a penal provision, giving a restricted meaning. as [
held in Sachida Nand Singh would not be proper as a
...... person accused of having committed an offence would be
deprived of the protection given to him by the legislatu,re.
He has also submitted that on the aforesaid view there is
a possibility of conflicting findings being recorded by the E=
civil or revenue court where the document has been
produced or given in evidence and that recorded by the
criminal court on the basis of private complaint and
therefore an effort should be made to interpret the section
in the manner which avoids such a possibility." F
Finally while interpreting the provision of Section 195 of
the Cr.P.C. the Bench held as under in para 10 of the said
Judgment.
G:
"10. The scheme of the statutory provision may now be
examined. Broadly, Section 195 Cr.P.C deals with three
distinct categories of offences which have been described
in clauses (a), (b)(i) and (b)(ii) and they relate to (1)
contempt of lawful authority of public servants, (2) offences HI
934 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

·against public justice, and (3) ·offences relating to .··
documents given in evidence. Clause (a) deals with
offenees punishable under Sections 172 to 188 IPC which
occur in Chapter X IPC and the heading of the Chapter is
- "Of Contempts of the Lawful Authority of Public
Servants". These are offences which directly affect the
functioning of or discharge of lawful duties of a public
servant. Clause (b)(i) refers to offences in Chapter XI IPC
which is headed as -· "Of False Evidence and Offences
Against Public Justice". The offences mentioned in this
clause clearly relate to giving or fabricating false evidence
or making a false dedaration in any judicial proceeding .•.

or before a court cif justice or before a public servant who
is bound or authorised by law to receive such declaration,
and als'o to some other offences which have a direct
correlation with the· proceedings in a court of justice
(Sections 205 and 211 IPC). This being the scheme of two·
provisions or clauses of Section 195 viz. that the offence
should be .such Which has direct bearing or affects the
functioning or discharge of lawful duties of a public servant
or has a direct correlation with the proceedings in a court
of justice, the expression "when such offence is alleged to
have been committed in respect of a document produced .
or given in evidence in a proceeding in any courf occurring
in clause (b )(ii) should normally mean commission of such
an offence after the document has actually been produced
or given in evidence in the court. The situation or
contingency where an offence as enumerated in this
clause has already been committed earlier and later on the
document is produced or is given in evidence in court,
does not appear to be in tune with clauses (a)(i) and {b){i)
and consequently with the scheme of Section 195 Cr.P.C.
This indicates that clause (b )(ii) contemplates a situation
where the offences enumerated therein are committed with
respect to a document subsequent to its production or
MAHESH CHAND SHARMA v. STATE OF U.P. & ,.935
ORS. [DEEPAK VERMA, J.]
)- giving in evidence in a proceeding in any cou~. n A

26. The ratio decidendi of the aforesaid two cases lead
us to a conclusion that the order passed by the learned Single
Judge cannot be sustained in law.
B
27. Learned Single Judge proceeded on absolutely wrong
facts and incorrect principles of law have been applied.
~-
28. Learned Single Judge completely lost sight of the fact
that the offence committed by accused in collusion with Area
Lekhpal was not in relation to court proceedings. It was in any c
case behind the back of the appellant and as soon as he came
to know with regard to the illegal designs of the accused he
lodged a complaint under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C.
~
29. The law on the point is too well settled in the light of D
)£
the above said two judgments of this Court that Section 195
(1)(b)(ii) of the Cr.P.C. contemplates a situation where offences
enumerated therein are committed with respect to a document
subsequent to its production or giving in evidence in a
proceeding in any Court. E

30. The learned Single Judge further committed a gross
error in resorting to Section 340 of the Cr.P.C. as provisions
-f of the said Section can be invoked only when it ·is established
that offence of forgery had already been ·committed. In any case,
F
accused had miserably failed for grant of any relief under
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. The limit of exercising jurisdiction
conferred on the Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C is well
defined and by no stretch of imagination, it could be said that
petition filed by accused under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C had
G
fulfilled the requirement as contemplated in this Section.

31. Looking to the facts from any angle, we are of the
considered opinion that the impugned order cannot be

H
' .

936 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R. .,,
i
;,...
A sustained. The same is accordingly hereby s·et aside and
quashed.

32. As a necessary consequence thereof, learned
Magistrate is directed to proceed with the Criminal Comp,laint
filed by appellant herein against the accused-respondent nos,2,
8
3 and 4 in accordance with law and on merits at an early date
and endeavour would be made by him to dispose of the same
within a period of six months from the date of appearance of
the parties.
c 33. The appeal stands allowed.

N.J. Appeal allowed.
; f
I